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FOREWORD 
This book is the result of years of research, consulting, teaching, travelling and 
sharing ideas with colleagues, friends and students. Given the wide array of 
memories and anecdotes that populate its pages, I am sure I would have written 
it very differently when I was 25, and will probably want to rewrite it from 
scratch when I’m 64. As in Heraclitus’ ƴƾǌĲĮ ބİݶ, even if the river is the same, 
the water will always be new; what’s more, I tend to agree with Cratylus, who 
argued that it is impossible to step into the same river even once. As a matter of 
fact, even rewriting this book today would probably lead to a different result. 
The song remains the same, but the mind moves, like in the famous Zen kŮan 
reported by Douglas Hofstädter, in which two monks were arguing about a flag. 
One said, “The flag is moving.” The other said, “The wind is moving.” The sixth 
patriarch, Zeno, happened to be passing by. He told them, “Not the wind, not 
the flag; mind is moving.”  
As a son of two professors of human anatomy, specialized i.a. in neuro-peptides, 
I always had problems with the basic assumptions of neoclassical economics, 
which seemed to me too far from reality, and dangerously so. These certainly 
included the assumptions that income, unlike most goods, features constant 
marginal returns; and that individual preferences are independent of income 
and of the context in which they emerge. These two basic tenets – the 
irrelevance of distributional issues and pure methodological individualism – are 
heavily challenged in the pages of this Thesis: overcoming them would lead 
economics – and law and economics along with it – to much higher grounds.  
The problem is that the pars destruens of behavioral economics has so far been 
much more convincing than the corresponding pars construens: as a matter of 
fact, it has inflicted a lethal wound to mainstream neoclassical economics, but 
did not show where to go from there. Truth is that modern neuroscience makes 
economics even more dismal, by portraying our brain as a lone soldier entrusted 
with the desperate attempt to reduce complexity, constantly trying to collect all 
available information that can be found in past experience, external signals, 
distorted beliefs, anticipated regret, and just a drop of logic – not more than 
that. This tells us that we are doomed to use proxies in whatever we do. And that 
we will never be able to fully master the mysterious ways in which humans react 
to legal rules. I remember a quote my Dad used in his classes on the nervous 
system: “If the brain were simple enough for us to understand it, we would be 
too simple to understand it.” 
This applies also to public authorities, not just to individuals. And it explains 
why the ex ante assessment of the costs and benefits of public policy should be 
taken as an exercise constrained by the imperfection of our brains: public 
authorities should be asked to collect and illustrate all available information 
from past experience, sound scholarly work, external opinions, basic principles 
and fundamental goals before they decide to intervene; at the same time, they 
might want to postpone the answer to certain questions, and prioritize certain 
decisions, just as we do when we just have too much to squeeze in just one day. 
But they cannot be asked to build a crystal ball and predict the future with full 
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certainty, nor they should be required to make their calculations in isolation, 
such that they would reach the same results under every sky. 
Writing this book, I have gradually realized that some social sciences have 
progressed more than economics in the past few decades. In my opinion, this 
occurred because economics, unlike these other disciplines, desperately needs to 
be immediately useful to policy. That’s why “we the economists” should learn 
from what our colleagues in other social sciences can teach us. To paraphrase 
Bob Dylan in “my back pages”, we were much older ten years ago; we are much 
younger now, and must take action to help policymakers address the huge 
challenges that they will have to face in the coming years. Even more difficult, 
we need to reflect further on what does it mean to be “efficient”, “fair” and 
“just”, and find new ways of reconciling the three concepts in our approach to 
public policies. Otherwise we will be forced to accept reality: that we economists 
are not able to predict crises, we are not helpful in fostering the happiness of the 
most, and that, when we are particularly smart people prefer to call us 
philosophers (one easy example: Amartya K. Sen).  
Social sciences are like this, after all. The fact that what you are writing about 
does not exist in rerum natura can be overwhelming at times. This reminds me 
of when I was 22, and I attended one of my first conferences in law and 
economics in Hamburg, Germany. I sneaked into a room and ended up seating 
next to a legendary Professor from the University of Manchester, Anthony Ogus, 
one of the most enlightened fathers of the European Law and Economics 
movement. When Professor Ogus saw me, he shook my hand and asked me 
what I was researching on at the time. I said “I am studying fairness”. He then 
smiled, took a while to reflect, and then replied “fairness is a very nice subject… 
because it doesn’t exist!” 
My deepest gratitude goes to all those that have directly or indirectly influenced 
my research over the past years. In the study of law and economics, Roberto 
Pardolesi and Roger van den Bergh – with whom the first concept of this book 
was discussed – have taught me how to walk even before I could stand on my 
own feet. Michael Faure has patiently and quickly read my drafts, and pointed 
me in the right direction when my mind was drifting apart. Marianne Breijer 
has taught me how to navigate the very difficult waters of Rotterdam regulations 
for the Thesis defense. In the RIA world, colleagues and friends such as Claudio 
Radaelli, Scott Jacobs, Bob Hahn, Colin Kirkpatrick, Jacques Pelkmans have 
shown me the keys of the kingdom. My girlfriend Rosa, my mother Loredana, 
my brothers Luca and Carlo, Fiorella, Amy, Franca, Jorge and our good old 
friends have made it possible by giving my boggling mind a compass, a warm 
shelter, and many things to be proud of.  
 
Rome, 14 February 2011 
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1 PROLOGUE: THE BIRTH OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 
ore than three decades ago, lawyers and economists met in Chicago for 
“the greatest gig in the sky” in the history of law and economics: the 
Symposium on “Efficiency as a legal concern”, where many of the most 
authoritative law and economic scholars of that time discussed the merit of 
adopting efficiency criteria in legal adjudication, and ended up digging quite 
thoroughly into the virtues and hidden traps of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion as a 
normative basis for deciding about complex and controversial legal issues. That 
was also the time in which scholars like Richard Posner, William Landes, 
George Priest and Paul Rubin – all in favor of replacing legal criteria in 
adjudication with Kaldor-Hicks efficiency – were challenged by others, such as 
Ronald Dworkin, Richard Epstein, Anthony Kronman, Duncan Kennedy, 
Charles Fried, Gerald O’Driscoll Jr. and Mario Rizzo, who considered that 
efficiency criteria could lead to potential distortions in the making of value 
judgments when adjudicating legal controversies.  
One of the most striking result of the Symposium was that economists, not 
lawyers, were the first to reject the idea that legal adjudication in common law 
could be based on resourcist efficiency criteria aimed at wealth maximization, 
such as the Kaldor-Hicks one. For example, Richard Posner stated (and later 
wrote) that “while Kaldor-Hicks is not a Pareto criterion as such, it will 
sometimes function as a tolerable, and more to the point, administrable 
approximation of the Pareto superiority criterion”1; whereas the economist 
Mario Rizzo recalled, from its Austrian School perspective, that “the substantial 
information requirements that must be satisfied in order to identify efficient 
legal rules make efficiency impractical as a standard”2.  
The papers presented in the Chicago symposium – later published in the 
Hofstra Law Review and the Journal of Legal Studies – have eternally marked 
the law and economics debate in the US, and traces of the battle between 
efficiency and fairness are still quite visible in the literature, starting from 
attempts to modify the Kaldor-Hicks criterion “from the inside” (e.g., by adding 
ethical considerations as well as accounting for behavioral concerns); and 
ending with research streams that depart from resourcist approaches, and 
increasingly look at utility functions, happiness maximization and even weak 
paternalistic claims3.  
                                                   
1  Posner, R. A. (1980), The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common 
Law Adjudication, 8 Hofstra L. Rev., 1980, p. 487. 
2  See Rizzo, M. J. (1980), The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 Hofstra L. Rev., 1979-1980, p. 641. 
3  Zerbe Jr., Richard O., Justice and the Evolution of the Common Law (November 2005); 
Zerbe Jr., Richard O., Should Moral Sentiments Be Incorporated into Benefit-Cost 
Analysis? An Example of Long-Term Discounting. Policy Sciences, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=739804; Kahneman, Experienced Utility and Objective 
Happiness: A Moment-Based Approach, Chapter 37, pp. 673-692, in: D. Kahneman and A. 
Tversky (Eds.), Choices, Values and Frames, New York: Cambridge University Press and 
the Russell Sage Foundation, (2000), etc.; Adler and Posner, Happiness Research and 
M
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The Chicago Symposium was also very topical, as it marked an important 
schism in the history of law and economics in the US: one the one hand, 
efficiency criteria failed to become the one and only grounds for adjudication in 
the US, thus frustrating the alleged “imperialist” attempt of neoclassical lawyers 
and economists; on the other hand, the Kaldor Hicks criterion entered the stage 
in US policymaking from another front door: the requirement that Federal 
agencies perform an ex ante appraisal of their major new regulations, which 
culminated in the introduction of Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) as a 
mandatory procedure. This, in turn, meant that government agencies, such as 
i.a. the Department of Transport, the Occupational Safety and Health Agency 
and the Environmental Protection Agency, were de facto called to apply Kaldor-
Hicks in crafting their regulations, and justify them in “net benefit” terms4. This 
trend, strengthened during the Clinton Administration with Executive Order 
12,866, later led authoritative commentators to advocate for a “cost-benefit 
state”5; and even to the so-called “Grand Experiment”, i.e. the compilation of 
yearly reports to the President of the United States, on the costs and benefits of 
Federal regulation as a whole6. Today, use of net benefits calculations remains 
at the core of federal regulation in the US, and is ensured by the constant 
monitoring and operation of a rather “adversarial” gatekeeper – the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs within the OMB – which secures that 
agencies perform adequate cost-benefit analysis when taking actions to solve a 
market failure, and justify that action in net benefit terms, by de facto adopting 
the Kaldor-Hicks criterion of potential Pareto efficiency7.  
The different fate of cost-benefit analysis in these two streams of public 
decision-making – common law adjudication on the one hand, federal 
regulation on the other – may appear, at first blush, rather odd, and hard to 
explain. How can one reject efficiency criteria as a “mirage” in common law 
adjudication, at the same time adopting them as the one and only principle in 
identifying the alternative to be undertaken in federal regulation? If, quoting 
again Rizzo, “the substantial information requirements that must be satisfied in 
order to identify efficient legal rules make efficiency impractical as a standard” 
in common law adjudication, how could the opposite hold when the public 
decision-maker is an agency? And how can we reconcile Calabresi’s 
“pointlessness of Pareto” with the almost religious vocation to potential Pareto 
                                                                                                                                                     
Cost-Benefit Analysis, at http://lsr.nellco.org/upenn/wps/papers/167, (2007); Frey and 
Stutzer (2007), at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/36/38331948.pdf. And Cass Sunstein 
and Richard Thaler, Nudge. Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness, 
Yale University Press 2008. 
4  U. S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB). (2003). Circular A-4: Regulatory analysis. 
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf. 
5  Sunstein, C. R. (2002), The Cost-Benefit State, University of Chicago Law School, John M. 
Olin Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 39. 
6  Hahn, R. W. and M. B. Muething (2003), The Grand Experiment in Regulatory Reporting, 
Administrative Law Review, 2003, Vol. 55, No. 3, pp. 607-642. 
7  See Renda, A. (2006), Impact Assessment in the EU, Centre for European Policy Studies, 
Brussels.  
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efficiency of federal agencies in the US? Does a resourcist efficiency criterion 
such as the “net benefit” one provide a sound basis for regulatory decisions? 
1.1 Twins separated at birth? 
The three decades that have elapsed since the Chicago symposium on “efficiency 
as a legal concern” have witnessed a remarkable increase in the use of economic 
arguments to justify public policy decisions. In academia, the expansionist 
(many would say, imperialist) nature of economics has led to the proliferation of 
movements of all kinds, bringing economics into previously unexplored 
domains, from marriage and divorce to terrorism and the cold war. At a more 
political level, fueled by international organizations such as the OECD and the 
World Bank, the need to introduce forms of ex ante policy appraisal has become 
a recurring refrain in the international community, gradually developing into a 
field of research and professional expertise that meets growing demand in the 
job market. The most common acronym used to summarize the ex ante 
appraisal of future consequences of policy measures is “RIA”, i.e. regulatory 
impact analysis: this acronym, later shortened as “IA” (impact assessment) in 
the European context, represents a fairly standardized practice in the 
international community, which follows specific steps to guide policymakers in 
the evaluation of alternatives and the selection of the most appropriate policy 
option8. As shown in the figure below, today virtually all OECD member 
countries have adopted a RIA procedure, and many non-OECD countries have 
done the same, at national and sometimes also sub-national level9.   
Figure1–RIAadoptioninOECDcountries
 
Source: OECD 
Despite this apparent success, the use of economics as the main foundation of ex 
ante policy evaluation – albeit not necessarily the only one – is not 
                                                   
8 See below, Section 2, for a description of the key steps of an impact assessment.  
9 An estimated 50 countries today have institutionalized RIA in their legal system. 
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uncontroversial, for a number of reasons. First, economics in and of itself is not 
an uncontroversial subject matter: many social scientists have expressed serious 
doubts on the inherent bias embedded in the use of mainstream economic tools, 
especially those related to the Neoclassical paradigm that still dominates a large 
portion of economic studies, as well as the application of economics to public 
policy. Second, the use of economics from an ex ante perspective (i.e., with a 
normative purpose) has been heavily criticized, since it can lead policymakers 
into the formulation of rather heroic assumptions when communicating and 
motivating policy choices: this, in turn, can end up transplanting into 
policymaking the typical problems attributed to economics, such as the “can 
opener” problem (over-reliance on assumptions); the “knowing the price of 
everything, and the value of nothing” problem: and many others10. Third, the 
transparent use of economic analysis to back policy proposals often elicits the 
fierce resistance of elected political powers. Parliamentarians, for example, 
typically hate being constrained by any form of objective rationale when voting 
on policy proposals: rather, they prefer pursuing their own political agenda and 
strike deals between conflicting and often competing interests11. Finally, and 
perhaps more importantly, the economic analysis of proposed legal rules is 
normally performed by civil servants in charge of a policy portfolio within a 
national administration: traditional “Weberian” bureaucrats, however, typically 
do not possess enough knowledge to perform sophisticated economic analysis, 
and they, themselves, end up resisting the adoption of these tools. So to say, 
people normally either love or hate economics, but hate is much easier and way 
more frequent.   
Today, the reluctance to accept the wide use of economics to back public policy 
decisions is also rooted in the poor performance exhibited by economic theory 
in protecting citizens from a number of adverse consequences of human 
behavior and market interaction. Examples are manifold, and range from 
collective action problems in taking action against global hunger and climate 
change to the frequent intrusion of hackers into private computer networks. 
Economic theory was targeted by even more violent critiques due to the recent, 
major economic crisis that originated in the sub-prime mortgage crunch in the 
United States, and later spread like an oil spot in the real economies of most 
developed countries worldwide12. The idea that one of the most deeply 
                                                   
10  See, i.a. F. Ackerman, L. Heinzerling and R. Massey, Applying Cost-Benefit to Past 
Decisions: Was Environmental Protection Ever a Good Idea?, Georgetown Public Law 
Research Paper No. 576161, Georgetown University, August 2004; F. Ackerman and L. 
Heinzerling, Priceless: on Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing, New 
York: The New Press, 2004; and See David Driesen’s White Paper, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Neutral?, 2 February 2005 (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=663602), p. 7. See also 
Hahn, R.W. (2005), In Defense of the Economic Analysis of Regulation, American 
Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 2005. 
11  See, i.a. McCormick, R.E. and R. D. Tollison (1981), Politicians, Legislation and the 
Economy. An Inquiry into the Interest-Group Theory of Government, Boston: Martinus 
Nijoff; Kau, J. B. and P. H. Rubin (1982), Congressmen, Constituents and Contributors, 
Boston: Martinus Nijoff; Peltzman, S. (1984), Constituent Interest and Congressional 
Voting, Journal of Law and Economics 27, 181-210.  
12  See i.a., Posner, R.A. (2009), A Failure of Capitalism. The Crisis of '08 and the Descent 
into Depression, Harvard University Press. Stiglitz, J. et al. (2010), The Stiglitz report: 
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researched domains of human interaction – financial markets – ended up being 
prey of an unsustainable pattern of evolution and eventually crashed without 
parachute – expressed in terms of legal rules, governance, or even liability – 
struck the attention and conscience of the public opinion, casting a dark shadow 
over the soundness of the economics used in support of regulation.  
In a nutshell, when it comes to the use of economic theory in support of public 
policy, we live in an age of distrust. A time like this, however, is also a time of 
great opportunities for improving our understanding of the economic 
interactions that form the subject matter of policymaking. After all, economic 
theory has been on trial before. For example, in the aftermath of the 1973-1975 
oil crisis, while receiving the Nobel prize in 1974 Friederich Von Hayek took the 
opportunity to scream against those economists that tried to “sell” economics as 
a natural science, just like physics, and against those policymakers that did not 
resist the sirens of such an apparently reassuring practical, easy advice. In short, 
Hayek meant that public policy was based on obsolete, highly surpassed 
economics: without a careful updating of the theoretical framework, using 
economics to inspire public policy becomes a fairly dangerous exercise. 
More than three and a half decades after Hayek’s speech, and despite the 
progress made in some domains of economics, most of the rhetoric of public 
policy is still dominated by a rather unsophisticated Neoclassical approach. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, international organizations have used that 
approach to heavily promote privatization and market liberalization in 
developing countries, creating fragile outcomes that have recently been defined 
as “gods with clay feet”, and thus not very different from the sub-prime 
mortgage market before the crisis13.  
Interestingly, while the practice of ex ante regulatory impact analysis (RIA) in 
the United States blossomed at the end of the 1970s as a natural consequence of 
a period of expansionism of economics into public policy, in those same years 
the law and economics movement that had changed the mindset of lawyers and 
policymakers in the 1960s started transforming into the “economic analysis of 
law” (EAL), i.e. a normative version of law and economics that started looking, 
more than at the way the law is, at how the law ought to be designed. The two 
disciplines overlapped in many respects. EAL essentially looked at how to 
design and structure legal rules to trigger efficient outcomes, mostly relying on 
individual and market reaction to the introduction of new policy measures. On 
the other hand, RIA was meant to guide policymakers in the selection of the 
policy solutions that fulfilled one given condition, i.e. they stood to maximize 
net benefits and thus social welfare. Even more importantly, both EAL and RIA 
have until recently been based (at least in the United States) on the application 
of a specific criterion – Kaldor-Hicks efficiency – that imposes a “resourcist” 
calculation of net benefits.  
                                                                                                                                                     
Reforming the World Economy in the Wake of the Global Crisis, The New Press, New 
York. And Krugman, P. (2009), The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 
2008, W.W. Norton & Company, New York.  
13  I owe this definition to my friend and colleague Paul Cook, Professor Emeritus of 
Economics at the University of Manchester.   
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Despite this parallelism, which makes them almost “twins” in the landscape of 
social sciences, EAL and RIA have remained “separated at birth” since the early 
1980s. It was only quite recently that the enormous progress made by EAL over 
time has surfaced again in the aisles of the major institution in charge of RIA in 
the United States – the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. This is 
due, in particular, to the appointment of one of the most prolific and insightful 
law and economics scholar of our time, Cass R. Sunstein, as the Head of the 
OIRA (the so-called “Regulatory Czar”) within the Obama administration. From 
that pedestal, Cass Sunstein is starting to import more modern (behavioral) law 
and economics concepts into the daily policy activities of the US 
administration14. Funnily enough, while early law and economics contributors 
were mostly considered as conservative Chicagoans, the return of law and 
economics in RIA after thirty years was received with a degree of skepticism by 
many commentators, who consider Sunstein – a Chicagoan himself – almost as 
a dangerous Marxist for his ideas of “libertarian paternalism”15. 
The perceived “hybridization” of the established practice of ex ante RIA in the 
US with contemporary law and economics is not, after all, a departure from a 
state of grace. As a matter of fact, both EAL and RIA are drowning into a deep 
mid-life crisis. On the one hand, law and economics scholars are struggling with 
an expansionist movement that willingly neglects every conclusion that does not 
lend itself to formalization in mathematical terms, to the extent that lawyers – 
once the driving force of the movement – hardly recognize their original 
approach, polluted as they are by the streams of propositions and lemmas that 
populate most of the scholarly papers in the field16. In addition, outside the US 
acceptance of this inter-disciplinary approach has been rather cold: in a recent 
article, Garoupa and Ulen (2007) observe that “law and economics has been one 
of the most important developments in North American legal scholarship of the 
twentieth century but has hardly registered as a scholarly innovation in 
Europe”17. Overall, EAL is still perceived in many enlightened academic 
environments of the Old Continent as a very conservative, pro-market 
discipline.  
On the other hand, it is no mystery that so far the implementation of RIA has 
been a failure in most countries around the world. In the United States, RIA is 
under attack mostly for reason related to the methodology it adopts to reach 
very socially relevant conclusions – in particular, I refer again to the use of 
Kaldor-Hicks Benefit-Cost Analysis in the assessment of so-called “lifesaving 
                                                   
14  See, for a brief overview of Sunstein’s academic work, Wiener, J. (2008), Best Cass 
Scenario, Tulsa L. Rev., Vol. 43, 933-946. 
15  Of the several article appeared in the press, see Benjamin Wallace-Wells, Cass Sunstein 
wants to nudge us, New York Times, 16 May 2010. Interviewed by the NY Times reporter, 
Saul Levmore – a former Dean of the School of Law at the University of Chicago – observed 
that Sunstein has “the quintessential University of Chicago habit of mind”.   
16  See, i.a., Manne, H. G. and J. D. Wright (2008), The Future of Law and Economics: a 
Discussion, George Mason University Law and Economics Research Paper Series n. 08-35.  
17  Ulen, Thomas S. and Nuno M. Garoupa (2007), The Market for Legal Innovation: Law 
and Economics in Europe and the United States. University of Illinois Law and Economics 
Research Paper No. LE07-009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=972360.  
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regulation”, including policy domains related to health care, safety, and the 
environment18. In the EU and elsewhere, critiques of the RIA system currently 
focus both on issues related to governance and substance. Even if international 
organizations like the OECD often mention RIA as a practice that has 
successfully spread in most developed and several developing countries, the 
reality is that the formal adoption of the model has been followed by very 
limited and often awkward implementation attempts. Today, in virtually no 
country outside the US RIA can be said to be a success, with the only, very 
partial exceptions of the European Commission and possibly the United 
Kingdom. This also means that there is no Civil Law jurisdiction where RIA has 
been successfully mainstreamed into the policymaking process to date.  
1.2 Motivation for this research project 
The idea of writing about the relationship between law and economics and RIA 
came to me back in 2005, when I started performing systematic research on the 
European Commission’s impact assessment system and its comparison with the 
US RIA model. Reading through the impact assessment documents produced by 
these administrations over time, the absence of a real consideration of 
individual incentives and market behavior naturally raised my eyebrows, given 
my academic background in law and economics. I decided to start exploring the 
missing links between the two disciplines already in a short paper presented at 
the mid-term meeting of the Erasmus Mundus European Master in Law and 
Economics in Ghent in March 200819.   
Further inspiration came when the European Commission called me to lead a 
major impact assessment project, on the delicate issue of whether and how to 
encourage private antitrust damages actions in Europe. Law and economics 
scholars know well that private enforcement and litigation is one of the fields of 
law in which the law and economics movement has provided the most inspiring 
and revolutionary contributions. The drafting of that report for the European 
Commission led me to draw several lessons, which I report in some of the 
sections of this Thesis20. Perhaps the most important of all lessons was that, 
while Commission officials seemed to be chiefly interested in the first part of the 
report, dedicated to the monetization of the costs and benefits of a 
“hypothetically more effective” private antitrust enforcement system in Europe, 
I always thought that the most useful part of the report was the more difficult 
and sophisticated second part, where our research team was making extensive 
use of the law and economics approach to show which combination of legal rules 
                                                   
18  For a definition of lifesaving regulation, See Graham, J. D. (2007), Saving Lives through 
Administrative Law and Economics, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 157: 395, 
at 397. And see Harrington, W., L. Heinzerling and R. Morgenstern (2009) for a discussion 
of some of the outstanding critiques to the US RIA system, with a focus on the RIA practice 
of the Environmental Protection Agency.  
19  The paper, titled like this Thesis, is available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1291032.  
20  See Renda et al. (2008), Making Antitrust Damages Actions More Effective in the EU, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/impact_st
udy.pdf. 
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would have placed the most efficient incentives on all players involved. It is on 
this dichotomy that this Thesis is essentially grounded.  
Later on, I drew further inspiration from other works carried out for the 
European Commission: most notably, from the application of the Standard Cost 
Model in a number of fields (see, in particular, my account of large exposure 
reporting below, in Section 5.5); and from the study on tying and other 
potentially unfair commercial practices in retail financial services. In the latter 
study, again, policymakers cared mostly about quantification and monetization 
of impacts, whereas the most relevant part of the work was the attempt to 
understand the peculiar dynamics of the interaction between consumer and 
financial services providers, characterized by fiduciary elements and a strong 
informational asymmetry.  
Moreover, the temptation to undertake this work became irresistible when I 
started discussing with one of the most authoritative experts in the field about 
the possibility for RIA to address distributional impacts. Opinions are still split: 
some authors think RIA should stay away from the monetization of impacts, in 
particular social impacts, that are very difficult to quantify; others propose to 
depart from Kaldor-Hicks exactly for the purpose of accounting for 
distributional impacts; and others think Kaldor-Hicks should be at least 
complemented (if not replaced) by measures of happiness and hedonic values 
that, in their opinion, provide a better measure of societal improvements than a 
mere “resourcist” measure of net benefits21.  
Finally, a decisive element in the decision to carry out this work came from the 
recognition that the two disciplines analyzed in the following pages are both 
navigating through rather difficult waters, for different reasons. The temptation 
of “catching two birds with one stone” by identifying avenues for tighter 
cooperation between two disciplines is one that scholars normally fail to resist. I 
am no exception. 
1.3 Main research questions 
This research project attempts to provide an answer to a number of main 
research questions, which I illustrate below. 
First, should law and economics be more integrated with the practice of ex 
ante impact assessment? This question, in turn, entails a discussion of the main 
purpose and scope of RIA systems, as well as problems emerged in the 
implementation of RIA at national and regional level (in particular, in the US 
and EU).  
Second, in what ways can law and economics contribute to the quality, 
usefulness and effectiveness of ex ante impact assessment? This question looks 
at the methodological approaches adopted by law and economics scholars, 
which have led to a more thorough understanding of individual and collective 
behavior and, more generally, to the development of normative conclusions as 
to how to design and enforce legal rules.  
                                                   
21 I refer, in particular, to Scott Jacobs, John Graham, and Cass Sunstein.  
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Third, what does the law and economics literature imply for the design and 
organization of policy evaluation within government? Law and economics is 
not only about policy impacts, but also about the organization of government 
and the use of better regulation tools to control the bureaucracy. A stronger role 
for law and economics in RIA systems should not be confined to the substance 
of RIA, but easily extends also to the design of RIA systems, including the 
purpose, scope and governance of RIA at national and regional level.  
Fourth, what would a stronger integration between law and economics and 
RIA mean for the US and EU impact assessment systems? In particular, given 
the significant differences in the pattern of adoption and implementation, as 
well as in the success of both law and economics and RIA on the two sides of the 
Atlantic, it is important to assess whether the prospects for a stronger 
interaction between the two disciplines would yield similar results, or whether 
different conclusions and recommendations should be drawn for the two legal 
systems.  
1.3.1 What this Thesis is not 
Both law and economics and RIA are complex disciplines, which have been 
approached from several different perspectives. In particular, RIA has been 
studied by political scientists, public management scholars, economists and – to 
a lesser extent – lawyers in different ways22. It is thus important to clarify what 
this research project is not, i.e. which of the many perspective on RIA and law 
and economics do not form the core subject matter of this volume. 
First, this is not a project on regulatory governance and regulatory reform, in 
the sense normally adopted by international organizations such as the World 
Bank or the OECD. For perspectives on how to approach RIA within the broader 
framework of regulatory reform, readers can refer to OECD (1995, 2009); 
Jacobs (2006); and to several papers written by experts – including myself – for 
the World Bank23.  
Second, this is not a project focused on the US and EU better regulation agenda. 
Although the analysis of RIA systems in the US and EU will necessarily lead me 
to touch upon several issues related to the future of better regulation tools on 
the two sides of the Atlantic, the main purpose of this book is to look at RIA 
from the perspective of institutional mechanisms and methodology, rather than 
within the broader context of political priorities expressed in these two complex 
legal systems. For more specific literature and my own analysis of this specific 
perspective, please see i.a. Renda (2006, 2008); Renda et al. (2009), where the 
                                                   
22  See, for a description of the literature on impact assessment, Meuwese, A. C. M. (2008), 
Impact Assessment in EU Lawmaking, Kluwer Law International.  
23  See, i.a. IFC Better Regulation for Growth program, Regulatory Governance in Developing 
Countries, available online at: http://www.fias.net/ifcext/fias.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle 
/BRG_PapersWhatisit/$FILE/RegulatoryGovinDevCountries.pdf  See also i.a. Renda, A. 
(2010), The Development of RIA in the European Union, paper presented at the World 
Bank Regulatory Reform Conference in Belgrade (Serbia), 13-14 September 2010. 
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comparison between the US and EU agenda and better regulation strategy is 
performed more in detail. 
Third, this volume is not chiefly aimed at offering an evaluation of the quality of 
impact assessment in the US and the EU, although the approach adopted is per 
se critical on the specific types of methodology adopted and suggested by 
current guidelines. For more focused papers on this issue, readers can refer to 
several papers by Bob Hahn with different co-authors, and to Cecot, Hahn, 
Renda and Schrefler (2007)24.  
Finally, this research project does not aim at offering a systematic overview of 
all the vast literature existing both in the law and economics field, as well as in 
the field of policy appraisal and regulatory reform. The need to allow for a 
meaningful comparison of the main tenets of the two disciplines suggested a 
degree of parsimony in references to existing literature. This hopefully 
facilitates the reader in understanding the core messages contained in the text.  
1.4 Methodology 
This Thesis looks at the interaction between two already inter-disciplinary fields 
of research, and as such draws on several different streams of literature in social 
science. Below, I briefly summarize the different scientific achievements that 
compose the pantheon of this work.  
First, mainstream law and economics is a key reference of this book, also thanks 
to the extensive work done by scholars such as Parisi and Mackaay in 
categorizing the main schools that have made the history of law and economics. 
Within this domain, I will extensively draw on the contribution of the pioneers 
                                                   
24  See Hahn R.W. and R. E. Litan. (2005). Counting Regulatory Benefits and Costs: Lessons 
for the US and Europe, Journal of International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, 
vol. 8(2), pages 473-508. Hahn, R.W., Regulatory Reform: Assessing the Government’s 
Numbers, AEI-Brookings Center for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 99-06, 
American Enterprise Institute and Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C., 1999. Hahn, 
R.W., In Defense of the Economic Analysis of Regulation, American Enterprise Institute, 
Washington, D.C., 2005. Hahn, R.W. and R. Litan, An Analysis of the Third Government 
Report on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulation, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for 
Regulatory Studies, American Enterprise Institute and Brookings Institute, Washington, 
D.C., 2000. Hahn, R.W., J. Burnett, Chan Yee-Ho, E. Mader and P. Moyle, “Assessing 
Regulatory Impact Analysis: the Failure of Agencies to Comply with Executive Order 
12866”, Harvard Journal of Law and Policy, 2000, Vol. 23, No. 3. Hahn, R.W. and Cass R. 
Sunstein, Regulatory Oversight Takes Exciting New Tack, AEI-Brookings Joint Center 
Policy Matters 01-25, American Enterprise Institute and Brookings Institute, Washington, 
D.C., 2001. Hahn, R. and C. Sunstein, “New Executive Order For Improving Federal 
Regulation? Deeper And Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis”, University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, 2002, Vol. 150, No. 1489.  Hahn, R.W. and M.B. Muething, “The Grand 
Experiment in Regulatory Reporting”, Administrative Law Review, 2003, Vol. 55, No. 3, 
pp. 607-642. Hahn, R. and P. Dudley, How well Does the Government Do Cost-Benefit 
Analysis?, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper 04-01, 
American Enterprise Institute and Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C., 2004. Finally, 
see Cecot, Caroline, Hahn, Robert W., Renda, Andrea and Schrefler, Lorna, An Evaluation 
of the Quality of Impact Assessment in the European Union with Lessons for the U.S. and 
the EU (December 2007). AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper No. 07-09. 
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of law and economics, and especially Ronald Coase, Guido Calabresi and 
Richard Posner, but also all the scholars that contributed to the Symposium on 
Efficiency as a Legal Concern” already quoted in this introductory chapter. In 
addition, I have found inspiration in the work of more recent contributors, such 
as Ian Ayres and Lee Anne Fennell, especially as regards the development of 
optional law.  
Another key theoretical framework used in the drafting of this Thesis is the 
study of theories of justice, especially in the work of John Rawls, David 
Gauthier, John Braithwaite, John Harsanyi and Amartya Sen. The outstanding 
quality of their analysis in this domain has left me with a recurring doubt: that 
economists, when they are really good, tend to become and be called 
philosophers. The quest for viable definitions of justice, fairness and efficiency 
has crossed paths with law and economics in several occasions, in the work of 
Richard Posner but also at a later stage, not least when Louis Kaplow and 
Steven Shavell tried to reconstruct the view that efficiency also means fairness.  
This Thesis also reflects the new paradigms in law and economics that have 
been brought by the advancement of cognitive sciences, behavioral economics 
and neuroeconomics, especially through the pioneering work of Maurice Allais 
and Herbert Simon, and later of Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, Colin 
Camerer, Christine Jolls, Russel Korobkin, Tom Ulen and Richard Thaler. Their 
insights are the real beacons of hope towards a better integration of law and 
economics with more practical policy appraisal.  
Besides the contributions of behavioral economics and neuroeconomics, I have 
been greatly inspired by the literature on methodological individualism and 
preference-based policy. I refer in particular to the work of Amir Licht (2000), 
Robert Ahdieh (2002), and above all Herbert Hovenkamp (1994).  
At the same time, the “RIA world” has chiefly been a subject matter of political 
scientists in Europe. I have learned a great deal from exchanges I have had in 
the past years with some of the best experts in this field. Scholars such as such 
as Claudio Radaelli) have by far outperformed lawyer-economists in the 
developing an understanding of “how context matters” in impact assessment, 
what are the preconditions for its successful implementation, and the key 
mechanisms that trigger its diffusion in a given legal system including political 
commitment, actor certification, accountability, the existence of an epistemic 
community of champions of better regulation25. All this elaboration underlies 
the text of this Thesis, especially in Chapters 2 and 3, where I describe the 
evolution of the RIA system.  
A separate room in my pantheon is inhabited by those scholars that have 
advanced scientific knowledge in the field of public law and economics. I refer, 
in particular, to the study of cost-benefit analysis as a tool for procedural 
efficiency within a chain of delegation and oversight, like i.a. Matthew Adler and 
Eric A. Posner26. Their work is also highly indebted with the previous 
                                                   
25  See, for an illustration, Radaelli, C.M. (2004), How context matters: regulatory quality in 
the European Union, paper delivered to the PSA Conference (Lincoln, 2004). 
26  See Adler, M. and E.A. Posner (2006), New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis, Harvard 
University Press. And Adler, M. and E.A. Posner (2007), Happiness Research and Cost-
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elaboration of scholars that have elaborated the notion of transaction cost 
politics, such as Niskanen (1971), and later McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 
(1986), Dixit (1996), Adler and Posner (2000), Posner (2001) and Epstein and 
O’Halloran (2003). 
Along with the work of political scientists, also economists and practitioners in 
the field of impact assessment have represented a key reference for this Thesis. I 
refer, i.a. to the work of Scott Jacobs, John Graham and Bob Hahn, Dick 
Morgenstern and Jonathan Wiener as providing the building blocks of any 
meaningful economic analysis of a RIA system. Likewise, economists and 
lawyers that have provided interesting critical views of the US and EU RIA 
systems in the past decade include Bruce Ackerman, Lisa Heinzerling and 
Richard Revesz.  
Finally, besides the living example of Cass Sunstein, the only attempt to propose 
a  further integration of law and economics I have found before drafting this 
thesis are in the work of Anthony Ogus. I am therefore indebted to his initial 
intuition, which I hope to have developed in some meaningful direction.  
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
This Thesis is structured as follows. The first part of the work sets the scene to 
help the non-specialized reader get familiar with RIA and its main role in 
contemporary policymaking. Section 2 explains the context in which RIA 
developed in the late 1970s in the United States, and explains how the system 
evolved over time, focusing in particular on the governance arrangements of 
RIA, the main mechanisms that underpin its functioning and main purpose, and 
the current debate on the most appropriate methodology to be used to assess 
both marketable and non-marketable goods. Section 3 contains the story of the 
adoption of the impact assessment model in the European Union and explains 
in detail the differences in the scope and methodology used in Brussels 
compared to Washington DC. This is reflected also in an extensive scorecard 
analysis of the content of European Commission’s impact assessments produced 
between 2003 and the end of 2009, as well as in a description of the main 
governance arrangements currently in place for motivating officials in EU 
institutions to produce high quality ex ante impact assessments. The Section 
comments briefly also on the failure of RIA adoption in EU member states and 
in other non-EU countries.  
The second part of this Thesis is dedicated to law and economics, and its 
evolution since the early, seminal contributions of pioneers such as Ronald 
Coase, Guido Calabresi, Gary Becker, Richard Posner and Oliver Williamson. In 
particular, Section 4 explores the key insights that can be derived from the main 
schools of law and economics as described in the mainstream literature – e.g. in 
Mackaay (2000), Medema (2010) and Parisi (2004). The chosen taxonomy of 
existing schools implies the existence of a “positive” a “normative” and a 
                                                                                                                                                     
Benefit Analysis, U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 07-15; U of Penn Law 
School, Public Law Research Paper No. 07-29; U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin 
Working Paper No. 345. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=999928.  
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“functional” school of law and economics, each with peculiar focus and 
approach to the economic analysis of legal rules. This section also concludes by 
highlighting the areas of RIA in which the law and economics approach seems to 
be most useful, and potentially calls for a revision of the current RIA practice. 
Section 5 then operationalizes these insights by discussing eight case studies of 
impact assessments performed in the EU.  
Finally, Section 6 looks at future developments and provides answers to the 
main research questions addressed by this Thesis, drawing conclusions also in 
terms of whether and how should we act to change our RIA systems in the US, 
and in particular in the European Union. 
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2 RIA IN THE UNITED STATES 
Today, Regulatory Impact Analysis is understood as a “family of tools” 
belonging to the better regulation toolkit, and as a procedural requirement 
composed by a number of phases. Regardless of the nuances featured by a 
number of national RIA models, it can be safely stated that RIA requires at least 
the following steps: 
x Problem definition. This phase normally entails the identification of the 
problem, e.g. a market failure or a regulatory failure, and the identification 
of the need to intervene.  
x Identification of alternative regulatory options. Often, available guidelines 
at international and national level recommend that alternatives to “heavy-
handed” regulation, such as light-touch regulation, regulation through 
information, principles-based regulation, and alternative forms of 
intervention such as self- and co-regulation are duly taken into account, in 
order to ensure that the remedy chosen is not disproportionate to the 
problem at hand.  
x Data collection. This phase may entail desk research, consultation of 
stakeholders, and commissioning of external studies.  
x Assessment of alternative options. This can be carried out through different 
techniques – the most common being cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA), 
cost-benefit analysis (CBA), least-cost assessment (LCA) and risk analysis. 
Options scrutinised typically have to include the so-called “zero option” or 
“baseline”, which corresponds to the option of doing nothing.  
x Identification of the preferred policy option. Once the available options 
have been carefully scrutinised, a RIA document normally leads to the 
identification of the most preferred option. This is not necessarily the 
options that should be undertaken, as the IA per se is only a support to, not 
a replacement of, the policymaker’s role in selecting the most appropriate 
action.  
x In-depth assessment of the impact of the preferred policy option. 
International guidance documents often recommend that the preferred 
option is subject to a more in-depth assessment, mostly aimed at 
quantifying the prospective impacts and associated risks, and identifying 
indicators for monitoring and evaluating the policy action over time.  
x Input to proposal drafting. At the end of the RIA exercise, a report is 
released as an input to the policy document to be drafted. Again, the RIA 
report is not necessarily indicating the “right” way to go, but only the result 
of an assessment exercise mostly aimed at capturing impacts.  
x Provisions for monitoring and evaluation. The RIA report should also 
specify the ways in which the impact of the selected policy action can be 
monitored overtime, and a clear and efficient time horizon for revision of 
the action in the future. In addition, whenever indicators can be selected at 
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the ex ante stage, this facilitates the interim and ex post evaluation of the 
selected action, which should follow the ex ante phase. 
That said, RIA systems worldwide differ widely on a number of key dimensions 
such as the scope of the procedure, the purpose for which it was adopted, the 
methodology and the degree of quantification in the analysis of the impacts, the 
overall governance of the system and the effective volume of RIA documents 
that have been produced. More generally, RIA systems worldwide differ 
according to the “context” in which they have been introduced, being sometimes 
the result of a tendency towards rational policymaking (the United States), a 
drop in an ocean of symbolic politics (the United Kingdom, the European 
Commission), or a more pragmatic move towards simplification and 
deregulation (e.g., Scandinavian countries)27.  
Below, I introduce the non-specialized reader to the RIA world by providing a 
historical account (Section 2.1) of how the procedure was introduced for the first 
time in the United States, and with what methodological features (Section 2.2). 
Then, Section 2.3 concludes and summarizes the main critiques to the US RIA 
model.   
2.1 A historical account 
2.1.1 The early years 
As already mentioned in the introductory section of this Thesis, the United 
States were the first country to adopt a RIA model. The earliest evidence of rules 
requiring the calculation of prospective costs and benefits of new regulations 
dates back to the Nixon administration, when US firms started complaining 
about the costs of regulation and uncontrolled ‘regulatory creep’, mostly as a 
result of newly passed environmental legislation28. The administration reacted 
with the so-called Quality of Life Review, which mandated a preliminary 
calculation of firms’ costs resulting from compliance with new environmental 
rules as a fundamental pre-condition of good-quality regulation29. The Review, 
conceived as a privileged channel for public consultation, soon ended up 
enhancing the risk of regulatory capture, leaving legislative initiatives in the 
environmental field prey to aggressive and well-organised interest groups30.  
                                                   
27  Radaelli, C.M. and A.C.M. Meuwese (2009), Better Regulation in Europe: between Public 
Management and Regulatory Reform, Public Administration, Volume 87, Issue 3, pages 
639–654, September 2009. 
28  For a short illustration of the major waves of regulatory reform in the US, see Office of 
Management and Budget (available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ 
inforeg/chap1.html).  
29  See the OMB memorandum on “Agency regulations, standards, and guidelines pertaining 
to environmental quality, consumer protection, and occupational and public health and 
safety”, 5 October 1971 (available at http://www.thecre.com/ombpapers/QualityofLife1.htm). 
30  See Rodriguez, L. (1988), Constitutional and Statutory Limits for Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Pursuant to Executive Orders 12291 and 12498, 15 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 505. See also, for 
a short description, Robert W. Hahn and Robert E. Litan (2005), Counting Regulatory 
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Under the Ford administration, the US government showed an increased 
interest in promoting the use of cost-benefit analysis in assessing the 
prospective impact of proposed regulations. Executive Order 11,821, issued in 
1974, mandated an Inflation Impact Assessment by federal agencies. Such 
procedure introduced an ex ante assessment of the expected impact of new 
regulatory measures on the inflation rate31. The creation of the Council on Wage 
and Price Stability aimed at ensuring that proposed regulations that were likely 
to exert a significant upward impact on nominal prices could be rejected in case 
they carried an incomplete or insufficient assessment of the inflationary 
impact32.  
The Inflation Impact Assessment procedure can indeed be considered as a first 
version of what would later become the US Regulatory Impact Assessment 
(RIA) model. As a matter of fact, economists in the Council on Wage and Price 
Stability gradually transformed the mere estimation of the inflationary impact 
into a real cost-benefit analysis, to be used as a ‘counter-argument’ during 
public consultation processes mandated by the 1946 Administrative Procedure 
Act.33 US President Gerald Ford amended the inflation Impact Assessment 
model by issuing Executive Order (EO) 11,949, and stating that “[t]he title of 
Executive Order No. 11,821 of November 27, 1974 is amended to read ‘Economic 
Impact Statements’”.34  
A few years later, during the Carter administration, the 10 most relevant new 
regulations in each year’s US government agenda were made the subject of 
extended ex ante assessment by a specialised ad hoc group of economists called 
the ‘Regulatory Analysis Review Group’.35 But the introduction of a more 
comprehensive regulatory impact assessment procedure only occurred under 
the Reagan administration.    
2.1.2 The Reagan and Bush (Sr.) Administrations 
Under the Reagan administration, with EO 12,291 issued in 1981, federal 
agencies were obliged to adopt a full-fledged regulatory impact analysis (RIA).36 
The EO mandated a thorough reassessment of the existing regulation in force, 
for the purpose of identifying norms to be abolished or simplified. The 
                                                                                                                                                     
Costs and Benefits: Lessons for the US and Europe, Journal of International Economic 
Law, Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 474. 
31  See e.g. M. Weidenbaum, Regulatory Process Reform from Ford to Clinton, The CATO 
Institute, 2000 (available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv20n1/reg20n1a.html). 
32  See J. Morrall III, Ebbs and Flows in the Quality of Regulatory Analysis, speech at the 
Weidenbaum Center Forum on “Executive Regulatory Analysis: Surveying the Record, 
Making It Work”, National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 17 December 2001.  
33  See J. Morrall III, An Assessment of the U.S. Regulatory Impact Assessment Program, in 
Best Practices in the Main OECD Countries, OECD, Paris, 1997.  
34  See Executive Order No. 11,949 (Economic Impact Statements) of 31 December 1976 
(available at http://www.thecre.com/ombpapers/ExecutiveOrder11949.htm).  
35  See Weidenbaum, supra note 31. 
36  The text of EO12,291 is available at http://www.thecre.com/pdf/EO12291.PDF.  
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evaluation and oversight of agencies’ behavior, previously performed by the 
CWPS, was taken on by OIRA, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, 
created within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for the purpose of 
implementing the 1980 Paperwork Reduction Act37. OIRA was given the power 
to suspend regulations by sending them back to the sponsoring agency until a 
satisfactory cost-benefit analysis was performed. The OMB, as a result, became 
a sort of regulatory clearinghouse.  
Since then, thousands of proposed regulations have been scrutinized by the 
OMB. Possible contrasts between OMB and agencies were addressed with the 
help of a new Task Force on Regulatory Relief, chaired by then Vice-President 
George Bush, Sr.38 The Task Force also was asked to estimate the savings that 
could follow from a full implementation of the new RIA procedure. The result 
was striking: according to the administration, the new procedure produced 
yearly cost savings as high as $10-20 billion. This calculation, however, was 
heavily criticized.39 Similarly, the activity of the Task Force was subject to fierce 
opposition. The Reagan administration was accused of having drastically 
reduced the budget and personnel of federal agencies, achieving substantial 
decreases in the cost of regulation, but also a dramatic reduction in the number 
of policy proposals. As a consequence, in 1983, the Task Force was abolished 
and the OMB was given back its predominant role in the US RIA procedure.40 
A second Executive Order, in 1985, required agencies to provide the OMB with 
detailed information on their regulatory agenda at the end of each year. This 
eventually paved the way for what has been termed the ‘grand experiment’, i.e. 
the OMB Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations, a 
                                                   
37  In 1980 the US Congress responded to the disappointing results contained in the Final 
Report of the Commission on Federal Paperwork by enacting the Paperwork Reduction Act 
– which required agencies to request OMB approval before collecting information from the 
public and led to the creation of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) – 
and the Regulatory Flexibility Act, which mandated special analysis of rules affecting small 
businesses and small governments and created the Chief Counsel for Advocacy as a 
separate, presidentially appointed officer within the Small Business Administration. See the 
text of the 1980 Paperwork Reduction Act, available online at  
http://www.thecre.com/pdf/Carter_PaperworkRedAct1980.PDF; and the 1980 Regulatory 
Flexibility Act, at http://www.thecre.com/pdf/Carter_RegFlexAct1980.PDF. 
38  The other members were the Secretary of the Treasury, Attorney General, Secretary of 
Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Director of OMB, Assistant to the President for Policy 
Development and the Chairman of the Counsel of Economic Advisers. See the White 
House’s Fact Sheet on Reagan’s Initiatives to Reduce Regulatory Burdens, 18 February 1981 
(available at http://www.thecre.com/pdf/Reagan_RegainInitiatives.pdf). President Reagan 
identified regulatory relief as one of the four key elements for the recovery of the US 
economy. The results were however quite disappointing. See Reagan’s Memorandum on 
the “Comprehensive Review of Federal Regulatory Programs”, 15 December 1986; and the 
commentary by William A. Niskanen, The Weak Fourth Leg of Reaganomics, that 
appeared in The Wall Street Journal on 30 June 1988.  
39  See Weidenbaum, supra note 31, and S. Breyer, Regulation and Deregulation in the United 
States, in G. Majone (Ed.), “De-regulation or Re-regulation? Regulatory Reform in Europe 
and the United States”, London: Pinter Publishers, 1990.  
40  See A. Morrison (1986), OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to 
Write a Regulation, 99 Harvard Law Review 1059, 1062 (describing Reagan’s EO as 
implicitly designed to ensure that regulation was only a ‘last resort’ option). 
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yearly publication that constitutes a unique example of a comprehensive, yearly 
calculation of total costs and benefits of the corpus of existing regulations.41 
Under the Bush Sr. administration, the role formerly played by the Task Force 
on Regulatory Relief was assigned to the Council on Competitiveness, chaired by 
Vice-President Richard Quayle, which was given a mandate to abrogate all 
federal rules that could hinder the competitiveness of US firms.42 The main goal 
was to minimize regulatory burdens faced by the economy. Such a revolutionary 
attempt was strongly criticized by the Democrats and a number of economists, 
but also by federal agencies, Congress Commissions and environmentalist 
associations, which lamented that the OMB (and in particular, the OIRA) 
exercised an excessive and unchallenged veto power on proposed regulations. 
Some commentators complained that OIRA and the White House had been 
captured by powerful interest groups, which inspired their intervention to stifle 
and repeal needed regulations, thus decreasing the transparency and 
accountability of federal rule-making. Institutional tension reached a peak when 
Congress refused to confirm a politically appointed agency director.43 
According to an authoritative commentator, the excess centralization of the RIA 
procedure and the consequent critiques contributed to an institutional void and 
a lack of legal certainty that led to an increase in the burden of regulation, 
particularly in the fields of public health, environment and public safety.44 At 
the end of the Bush mandate, the US RIA model appeared at once as a 
pioneering experience worldwide and a problem ‘in search of a solution’, in 
strong need of careful redressing, mostly aimed at reducing regulatory burdens 
for US firms.  
2.1.3 RIA under the Clinton administration 
A tentative reaction to this impasse was the enactment of Executive Order 
12,866 in 1993, under the Clinton administration.45 Within the more general 
                                                   
41  See the description provided by Robert W. Hahn and Mary Beth Muething, The Grand 
Experiment in Regulatory Reporting, Administrative Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 3, Summer 
2003, pp. 607-642. 
42  See Weidenbaum, supra note 31.  
43  See e.g., the 1992 Report by the OMB Watch and Public Citizen, Voodoo Accounting: the 
Toll of President Bush's Regulatory Moratorium, stating that claims of huge public savings 
resulting from the announced regulatory moratorium were hardly substantiated. See also 
B.D. Friedman, Regulation in the Reagan-Bush Era: The Eruption of Presidential 
Influence. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1995; and B. Woodward and D.S. 
Broder, “Quayle’s Quest: Curb Rules, Leave ‘No Fingerprints’”, Washington Post, 9 January 
1992.  
44  See R.W. Hahn (1999), Regulatory Reform: Assessing the Government’s Numbers, AEI-
Brookings Center for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 99-06, July 1999. See also 
W.F. West (2005), “The Institutionalization of Regulatory Review. Organizational Stability 
and Responsive Competence at OIRA”, Presidential Studies Quarterly, No. 1, Center for 
the Study of the Presidency, 2005.  
45  The text of EO 12,866 is available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/ 
direct/orders/2646.html. 
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context of ‘Reinventing Government’ and the National Performance Review, EO 
12,886 attempted to ‘cut red tape’ by providing OMB with the power to 
syndicate over proposed regulations within a strict 90-day deadline from 
presentation of the RIA form by the federal agency. If, after the deadline 
expired, conflict between OIRA and the sponsoring agency had not been solved, 
the US President or the Vice-President entered the stage to solve the 
controversy.46 The unconditioned veto power previously awarded to the OMB 
was then transformed into a conditional opposition with limited potential to 
infinitely delay entry into force of newly proposed regulations. Furthermore, the 
Vice-President’s power to directly influence administrative policy was replaced 
with a milder role of ‘default’ mediator in case the agency and OIRA failed to 
negotiate a mutually satisfactory solution. This escamotage significantly 
increased the transparency of regulatory reforms in the US.47  
One of the major problems to be solved was undoubtedly OMB’s overwhelming 
workload in the regulatory review process. Before the Clinton mandate, the 
OMB, with just 40 employees, had reviewed on average more than 2,200 federal 
regulations every year.48 In order to avoid the inevitable inefficiency that 
followed from such a drastic centralization, EO 12,866 introduced a minimum 
threshold, specifying that only regulations whose expected impact was greater 
than $100 million were subject to mandatory ex ante impact assessment.49 In 
October 1994, OIRA produced a report entitled “The First Year of Executive 
Order No. 12866”, finding that the number of significant rules reviewed by 
OIRA had fallen to 900 per year, 60% lower than the 2,200 per year average 
reviewed under the previous Executive Order, and that about 15% of the rules 
were found to be “economically significant”. The report also found that the 90-
day review period had been generally respected, and concluded that the new 
openness and transparency policy had served to defuse, if not eliminate, the 
criticism of OIRA’s regulatory impact analysis and review program. 
                                                   
46  See ibid., at Section 7: “[t]o the extent permitted by law, disagreements or conflicts between 
or among agency heads or between OMB and any agency that cannot be resolved by the 
Administrator of OIRA shall be resolved by the President, or by the Vice President acting at 
the request of the President, with the relevant agency head (and, as appropriate, other 
interested government officials).” 
47  Executive Order 12866: Regulatory Planning and Review, Federal Register 58, 
Washington, D.C.: The White House, 30 September 1993. EO 12866 also required that all 
written communications to OIRA or the White House from non-governmental parties 
should be placed on the public record. Moreover, the EO ordered that only the OIRA 
administrator or the deputy administrator could receive oral communications from parties 
outside the Government, and mandated docketing of all conversations between OIRA and 
agencies as well as between White House officials and private interests.  
48  See, inter alia, the descriptions provided in the OMB’s Reports to Congress on the Costs 
and Benefits of Federal Regulations, (available online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
omb/inforeg_regpol_reports_congress/).  
49  For a more detailed definition of significant regulatory actions, see Section 3.2.1 below.  
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2.1.4 RIA under George W. Bush 
During the eight years of George W. Bush, a number of relevant changes have 
been introduced to the institutional setting of RIA. In particular, these concern 
the role and powers attributed to the OIRA and the Vice President. As occurred 
in the EU, the regulatory pendulum in the US evidently shifted in the direction 
of cutting red tape. First, EO 13,258, issued on 26 February 2002, removed the 
Vice President from the regulatory review process50. Such removal responded to 
critiques that hinged on the excessive powers granted to the executive in 
shaping bureaucrats’ decisions, as well as to growing concerns that the 
involvement of the Vice President could significantly raise procedural costs. At 
the same time, the Bush administration tried to grant enhanced powers to 
OIRA. Its structure was consolidated to only four branches – Health, 
Transportation and General Government; Information Policy and Technology; 
Natural Resources, Energy and Agriculture; and Statistical and Science Policy. 
OIRA had six branches in 1992, and five under the Clinton administration. Such 
consolidation was aimed at revitalizing OIRA, as testified by its increased 
staffing level. OIRA had 90 staff members in 1981, but the size had decreased to 
69 under Reagan, 60 under Bush Sr. and 47 during the Clinton administration. 
The George W. Bush administration started hiring seven new members and is 
gradually increasing the staff number, hiring also scientists and engineers, and 
thus bringing skills that OIRA had never had before.51 OIRA administrator John 
Graham started issuing ‘prompt letters’, which suggest that agencies give 
priority to specific issues – a novelty that was welcomed with enthusiasm by 
authoritative scholars such as Bob Hahn and Cass Sunstein (who would later 
become Graham’s successor).52 
More generally, the removal of the office of the Vice President from its oversight 
role seems to have led to a more aggressive confrontation between OIRA and 
federal agencies. Along with some other commentators, the US General 
Accounting Office remarked that the role played by OIRA vis-à-vis federal 
agencies has shifted from a ‘collaborative, consultative’ role under Clinton to 
that an ‘adversarial gatekeeper’ model in the Bush administration.53 Data on the 
number of rules returned or withdrawn by OIRA confirm this shift. West (2005) 
reports that an annual average of 106 rules were either returned or withdrawn 
during the last two years of the Bush Sr. administration, whereas the 
                                                   
50  67 Fed. Reg 9,385 (2002). 
51  See West, cit., supra note 44. 
52  The list of issued Prompt Letters under the George W. Bush Administration is available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/prompt_letter.html. For positive comments on 
the introduction of prompt letters, see R.W. Hahn and Cass R. Sunstein (2001), Regulatory 
Oversight Takes Exciting New Tack, AEI/Brookings Joint Center Policy Matters 01-25, 
September 2001. 
53  See the Report by the General Accounting Office on OMB’s Role in the Reviews of Agencies’ 
Draft Rules and the Transparency of these Reviews, September 2003. See also West (op. 
cit.), finding that the review has become “less invasive and less confrontational”. This new 
pattern of relationships is sometimes referred to as a ‘hot-tub approach’ after a definition 
given by Sally Katzen, Clinton’s first OIRA administrator.  
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corresponding figure was only 20.5 under Clinton and jumped again to 172 
during George W. Bush’s first year in office.54  
OIRA’s strengthened role also led to increased attention for standards to be 
applied in performing cost-benefit analyses and to a marked reduction in the 
estimated dollar cost of new rules. The average annual cost of new rules 
decreased from $8.5 billion under the first Bush administration to $5.7 billion 
under Clinton and down to $1.5 billion in the first three years after George W. 
Bush took office. And, although the total regulatory burden appears to have 
continued its growth, its growth rate appears to have significantly declined over 
the past few years.55 This was also the result of the proliferation of government 
initiatives on administrative simplification, aimed at streamlining the regulatory 
environment, facilitating dialogue with small businesses and, more generally, 
cutting red tape. 
In 2007, EO 13,422 signed by President Bush extended the provisions of 
EO12,866 to guidance documents, together with regulation. In addition, and 
most notably, the new Executive Order included independent regulatory 
agencies – previously subject only to part of the provisions of the EO 12,866, 
and certainly not to centralised review by the OIRA – in its cost-benefit 
regulatory reports to Congress56.   
2.1.5 RIA under Barack Obama: back to the future? 
On January 30, 2009, President Barack Obama signed Executive Order 13,497 
which revoked Executive Order 13,422, and marked almost a U-turn in the way 
RIA is overseen by the OIRA in the United States – as a matter of fact, the new 
Executive Order “restored the regulatory review process to what it had been 
under Executive Order 12866 between 1993 and 2007”57. However, a more 
careful look reveals that the Obama administration has gone beyond a mere 
“erase and rewind” approach: to the contrary, it marked a potentially thorough 
change in the approach to RIA, thanks mostly to the appointment of Cass R. 
Sunstein as the new chairman of the OIRA58. As announced by Sunstein himself, 
                                                   
54  See West, supra note 44, p. 19. 
55  See e.g. the testimony of  James L. Gattuso to the Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Natural 
Resources and Regulatory Affairs Committee on Government Reform, US House of 
Representatives, on “What is the Bush Administration’s Record on Regulatory Reform?”, 17 
November 2004 (available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Regulation/ 
tst111604a.cfm). 
56  As stated in Black and Jacobzone (2009), independent regulatory agencies were subject to 
part of the Executive Orders. In particular, they had to follow the “regulatory philosophy” 
and the “twelve principles” of regulation, to conform to the “unified regulatory agenda” and 
to submit their “regulatory plans”. See Black, J. and S. Jacobzone (2009), Tools for 
Regulatory Quality and Financial Sector Regulation: A Cross-Country Perspective, OECD 
Working Papers on Public Governance, No. 16, OECD Publishing. 
57  See OIRA Memorandum M-09-13, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files 
/omb/assets/memoranda_fy2009/m09-13.pdf.  
58  In a memorandum of January 30, 2009, President Obama directed the head of OMB, in 
consultation with representatives of regulatory agencies, to produce within 100 days a set 
of recommendations for a new executive order on federal regulatory review. The 
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the new regulatory philosophy at OIRA is likely to devote more attention to 
behavioral law and economics and the analysis of individual incentives and 
consumer behavior, something that is often difficult to reconcile with mere 
monetization of costs and benefits. Recently, Sunstein referred to this approach 
as one of “humanizing” RIA, which entails moving in three main directions: 
accounting for actual human behavior, including bounded rationality and 
willpower; more accuracy of data beyond mere monetary measures; and 
democratizing data by strengthening data collection, transparency of 
government and public participation within a new “open government” initiative.  
A first (and already controversial) example of the new approach to RIA at the 
White House is the first review letter sent by the OIRA under the Obama 
administration, on 19 March 2010, to the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) related to the new “Tire Fuel Efficiency Consumer 
Information Program”59. The request to analyze more thoroughly consumer 
behavior and the likely reaction to different forms of labeling has already 
elicited concerns and critiques, showing that the transition towards the new 
approach will likely be slow and difficult. 
2.2 The US RIA model: main features 
After the historical perspective given in the previous section, it bears looking at 
the way in which the US RIA model has shaped the creation of a real system of 
“administrative law and economics”. I do this by looking at selected features 
that will be relevant for the remainder of this Thesis, and in particular at the 
scope and purpose, the methodology used and the governance arrangements of 
the US RIA system.  
2.2.1 The scope and purpose of RIA in the United States 
A very important feature of the US RIA system is its limited scope. RIA is 
applied only to secondary legislation, namely agency-made rules. Moreover, RIA 
is not compulsory for all regulations: since the enactment of EO 12,866 under 
the Clinton administration, RIAs are mandatory for government agencies only 
when they entail ‘significant regulatory actions’ – i.e., those that: i) had an 
annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a 
material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, 
jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal 
                                                                                                                                                     
memorandum stated that, among other things, the recommendations should offer 
suggestions for the relationship between OIRA and the agencies; provide guidance on 
disclosure and transparency; encourage public participation in agency regulatory 
processes; offer suggestions on the role of cost-benefit analysis; address the role of 
distributional considerations, fairness, and concern for the interest of future generations; 
identify methods of ensuring that regulatory review does not produce undue delay; clarify 
the role of behavioral science in formulating regulatory policy; and identify the best tools 
for achieving public goals through the regulatory process. 
59  The review letter is available online at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/postreview/ 
Tire_Fuel_Efficiency_Consumer_Information_Final_Rule.pdf. 
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governments or communities; ii) created a serious inconsistency or otherwise 
interfered with an action taken or planned by another agency; iii) materially 
altered the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan programs 
or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof; or iv) raised novel legal or 
policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President's priorities or the 
principles set forth in EO 12,866. 
From the outset, independent agencies and Congress have been left out of the 
RIA system. This is intimately linked with the overall purpose of the system in 
the United States: as recalled, i.a., by Matthew Adler and Eric Posner, the 
system is design to entail control of specialized bureaucrats by a less informed 
watchdog60: and the requirement to use cost-benefit analysis, as will be 
explained below in Section 2.2.2.1, is the way in which OIRA (the principal) can 
control government agencies. Independent agencies were left out of this 
centralized scrutiny they were not subject to the provisions on centralized 
review of regulations by OIRA, which applied only to executive agencies. This 
choice was heavily criticized by academics, especially those that were advocating 
the transformation of the United States into a “cost-benefit state” – including 
Professor Cass Sunstein himself61. As reported by Kagan (2001), President 
Reagan introduced RIA only for 'his' executive agencies because of the fear of 
opposition from Congress – opposition raised by the threat of extending 
Presidential power beyond federal executive agencies. All other Presidents have 
confirmed the initial choice made by Reagan. De facto, the limited scope of RIA 
(there is no RIA obligation for independent agencies) has created problems in a 
number of sectors (e.g. most financial regulations 'escaped' RIA since they were 
enacted either by the SEC or by Congress). 
Although Congress is not obliged to perform RIA, in the past years the practice 
of drafting and publishing cost estimates for specific proposals or amendments 
has become more established. Today, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) is 
required to develop a cost estimate for virtually every bill reported by 
Congressional committees to show how it would affect spending or revenues 
over the next five years or more. CBO's cost estimates have become an integral 
part of the legislative process, and committees increasingly refer to them at 
every stage of drafting bills. Although mostly focused on costs for government, 
increasingly these documents report also the impact on the private sector62. 
2.2.2 Governance and procedural aspects of RIA in the United States 
The institutions that are most heavily involved in the RIA procedure are the 
proposing agencies and the OIRA. RIA is prepared by the analytical office of the 
                                                   
60  See Adler, M. D. and Eric A. Posner (2006), New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
Harvard University Press, 2006; University of Pennsylvania Law School, Public Law 
Working Paper No. 06-40; University of Pennsylvania, Institute for Law & Economics 
Research Paper No. 06-23.  
61  Pildes, R. H. and Sunstein, C. R. (1995) Reinventing the Regulatory State, The University 
of Chicago Law Review 62: 1-129; and Hahn and Litan (2005), supra note 24).  
62  The CBO’s cost estimates are available online at http://www.cbo.gov/CEBrowse.cfm.  
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federal agency promulgating a rule, and is then submitted to the OIRA for 
review. During the first phases of RIA drafting, the OIRA acts as a helpdesk to 
provide feedback and advice before formal review of the RIA is undertaken63. 
The RIA is then published together with the draft rule in the Federal Register 
for a notice and comment period of 60 days. As the OIRA has a veto power over 
the publication of RIAs where analysis is insufficient, of poor quality, or does 
not demonstrate that the benefits of the draft rule are likely to justify ensuing 
regulatory costs, the responsible agency is often called to review the RIA before 
publication. OIRA’s negative comments are included in what are known as 
‘return’ letters. Following the notice and comment period, the RIA is revised and 
finalized and the OIRA has 90 days to approve or reject the proposed rule on the 
basis of the quality of the cost-benefit analysis performed by the agency64. If the 
proposal is accepted the process continues; if not, negotiations between the 
agency and OIRA start and the latter can refuse the rule until a satisfactory 
analysis is presented (figure 2 and figure  3 below).  
 
Figure2–phasesoftherulemakingprocess
 
Source:EPA
 
As shown in Figure 3 below, in the initial stage the proposing agency drafts a 
preliminary RIA form, comparing different regulatory options – which must 
include the so-called ‘zero option’ (leaving the existing regulation unchanged) – 
and providing a rough estimation of benefits and costs associated with each 
alternative option and an indication on the relevance of the expected impact of 
the proposed regulation, which is the conditio sine qua non for the activation of 
                                                   
63  See Jacobs, S. (2006), Current Trends in Regulatory Impact Analysis: The Challenges of 
Mainstreaming RIA into Policy-making, Jacobs & Associates, Washington.  
64  See Renda, A. (2006) Impact assessment in the EU. The State of the Art and the Art of the 
States, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2006. 
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the RIA procedure.65 The RIA form is then subject to a 60-day notice and 
comment period, in which interested parties can file their comments and 
suggestions regarding the regulatory option chosen by the agency.66 After the 
notice and comment period, the final RIA form is completed as an obligatory 
step before a final proposal can be drafted and submitted for approval. At this 
stage, the OIRA has 90 days to approve or reject the proposed regulation on the 
basis of the quality of cost-benefit analysis performed by the agency. If the 
proposal is approved, the proceedings go forward. If not, a negotiation between 
OIRA and the proponent agency begins. 
Figure3:TheUSRIAmodel
 
Source: Renda (2006:21) 
 
In fact, OIRA reviews the most significant rules three times: i) at the planning 
stage during the preparation of the Regulatory Plan that agencies submit to 
Congress on an annual basis (see below); ii) before the publication in the 
Federal Register for notice and comment; and iii) before the publication of the 
final rule. Before publication on the Federal register, OIRA can call upon its 
power to reject proposals at will, until the proposal is accompanied by a 
sufficiently detailed and precise RIA. The number of rules returned or 
withdrawn by OIRA has dramatically increased under the George W. Bush 
administration, as a result of the new ‘gatekeeper’ role assumed by OIRA after 
the removal of the Vice President’s oversight role (now restored by President 
Barack Obama).  
                                                   
65  See EO 12,866, supra note 45.  
66  The 1946 Administrative Procedure Act already recognized the citizen’s right to participate 
in the consultation process. The 60-day notice and comment period was in any event 
considered only partially satisfactory, as it often results in a mere procedural step, more 
than a real opportunity to collect valuable views from the general public and targeted 
groups. See OECD, The OECD Review of Regulatory Reform in the United States, OECD, 
Paris, 1999.  
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2.2.2.1 OIRA as a watchdog 
The US RIA system follows a logic of control of delegated regulatory powers, 
whereby political principals (the US Congress and the President) need adequate 
instruments to monitor the regulatory choices of agents (federal departments 
and agencies) tasked with promulgating federal rules. Although US agencies 
have multiple principals, the centralized structure of oversight through the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) - located in the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) - suggests that the balance of power is tilted in 
favor of the President (Kagan 2001). The OIRA benefits from a strong political 
support given that the centralized enforcement of regulatory principles and 
procedures is considered a core ingredient of the US approach to regulatory 
policy (OECD 2006).  
Oversight is attributed to the OIRA that reports to the White House. Under the 
current system, the OIRA can challenge individual rules by preventing agencies 
from publishing draft rules if the accompanying RIA does not show that the 
benefits are likely to justify costs. This amounts, de facto, to a veto power on 
draft regulations, and is viewed as one of the strongest RIA oversight systems 
currently in place worldwide. In particular, between the Clinton and the Bush Jr 
administrations the role of the OIRA has been transformed from a “consultant" 
to the agencies, into a more aggressive “adversarial gatekeeper” (Renda 2006). 
Accordingly, the OIRA has made more frequent use of its powers, and 20 rules 
were returned to agencies in the first year of the George W. Bush 
Administration, more than the total number of rules returned in the previous 
eight years (OECD 2006). 
Besides issuing RIA guidelines, the OIRA also undertakes studies of the costs 
and benefits of federal regulations and can suggest review priorities to other 
departments. Since 1994, OIRA has reviewed between 500 and 700 significant 
proposed and final rules each year, and can clear the rules with or without 
changes, return the rules to the agencies for reconsideration, or encourage the 
agencies to withdraw them. As reported by the OECD (2006) the OIRA 
currently reviews about 30 to 40 “major” federal initiatives every year and has 
played for several years a leading role in regulatory innovation, due to the long 
term RIA experience of the USA. For example, ideas such as the adoption of 
regulatory budgets to aggregate the impact of regulation across different sectors, 
the use of quality of life measures, and the introduction of peer review 
originated in the OIRA. Conversely, the OIRA has been less successful in ex post 
monitoring of regulation, partially because of the reluctance of departments to 
reopen complex regulatory debates or review rules resulting from a political 
compromise (OECD 2006).  
It should be noted that the OIRA can also issue ‘prompt letters’ requiring federal 
departments and agencies to look at a specific policy field and explore whether 
additional regulation is necessary. This procedure may act as means to 
overcome the bureaucratic inertia of some agencies (Kagan 2001, Radaelli and 
De Francesco 2007), and contrasts with the traditional image of the OIRA as an 
instrument for deregulation (Graham 2007). Past evidence (McGarity 1991, 
Morgenstern 1997) suggests that OIRA’s oversight role was not always 
transparent: for example, comments on draft RIAs are not publicly available 
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and in some cases this played in favor of the deregulatory/pro-regulatory stance 
of the Government of the day. This issue was addressed by Executive Order 
12,866 promulgated under Clinton that increases the transparency of the 
oversight process during RIA preparation. The executive order requires OIRA or 
the rulemaking agencies to disclose certain elements of the review process to the 
public, including the changes made at OIRA’s recommendation. 
Besides scrutinizing quality, the OIRA also reviews RIAs to identify rules that 
are not consistent with the President’s policies, principles and priorities; to 
ensure coordination among agencies; discuss inconsistencies with regulators 
and suggest alternatives that would be consistent. Recently, the OIRA has 
increased its scrutiny powers by setting a higher level of data quality standards 
and by introducing scientific peer review of analyses. Although the OIRA lacks 
formal powers to oblige an agency not to proceed when a RIA is inadequate 
(Jacobs 2006), its recommendations and return letters are always taken into 
account by the agencies67. 
Additional scrutiny is provided by the presence of a special type of 
administrative law - the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act (APA) – and by 
judicial review. Below, we briefly explain the scope of these mechanisms. 
2.2.2.2 Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? 
Oversight activities introduced during the Clinton Administration were not 
limited to Presidential oversight. In 1996, the Congressional Review Act 
prescribed that all sponsoring agencies were bound to send their proposals to 
the Congress for an evaluation, The US Congressional Budget Office can repeal 
any draft regulation within 60 days from receipt of the proposal.68 Such an 
oversight mechanism also extends to Congressional bills, thus completing the 
framework of controls over the cost-effectiveness of federal legislation. 
Nonetheless, a number of commentators have recently advocated the extension 
of the RIA model to independent agencies.69 Given the highly ‘political’ nature 
of the US RIA model, however, such an extension would significantly 
undermine the independence of such agencies from the executive. 
As one of the political principals delegating regulatory powers to federal 
agencies, Congress has a clear interest in scrutinizing regulatory activities, and 
RIAs are a means to that end. Specifically, the Congressional Budget Office 
oversees both the quality of regulation and the activities of the OMB. Congress 
has also responded to Presidential review of regulation by directing the OMB 
not to interfere with special-interest legislation (Moe and Wilson, 1994: 39) and 
by securing Senate confirmation of OIRA heads, as well as more public 
information and precise deadlines on the review process.  
                                                   
67  For a more critical view of OIRA’s role as an oversight body, see Bagley, N. and R. L. Revesz 
(2006), Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, Columbia L. Rev. Vol. 106, 1260-
1329. 
68  The Congressional Review Act is part of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 
Fairness Act of 1996 (available at http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/bills/blcra.htm).  
69  See e.g. Gattuso, supra note 55.  
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Regulatory agencies must send their proposals to Congress for evaluation, and 
any draft regulation can be repealed within 60 days. This scrutiny also extends 
to congressional bills. Congress can also commission reports or invite experts to 
testify on the general RIA system, on presidential Executive Orders, and on 
specific RIAs. 
A degree of oversight on the RIA process is exerted by the CBO through expert 
reports that look at the activity of specific agencies, for example the EPA70. More 
occasionally, the CBO also reviews the functioning of the RIA system in 
government agencies. For example, in 1997 a comprehensive analysis of the 
consequences of RIA for the legislative process was carried out71. 
Finally, ex post scrutiny is performed by the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO). The GAO has repeatedly observed that presidential oversight of federal 
regulation, primarily through OIRA, has become well-established under 
successive administrations over the past 30 years. However, the GAO pointed 
out that (i) some administrations have been more collaborative and consultative 
with agencies, while others have assumed more of a “gatekeeper” role when 
reviewing agencies’ draft regulations; (ii) despite executive order requirements 
under successive administrations to improve the timeliness and documentation 
of OIRA’s regulatory review role, GAO identified significant gaps in the 
transparency of OIRA’s involvement in rule making.  
In addition, GAO raised concerns about the extent to which the cumulative 
procedural and analytical requirements placed on rule-making over the years 
effectively added value, or instead contributed to the “ossification” of the rule-
making process72. In addition, according to the GAO several aspects of the OIRA 
regulatory review process could be more transparent to better allow the public 
to understand the effects of OIRA’s reviews. In particular, the transparency 
requirements in Executive Order 12,866 applicable to agencies and OIRA could 
be redefined to include not only the formal review period, but also the informal 
review period when OIRA says it can have its most important effect on agencies’ 
rules.  
The GAO periodically reviews selected rules as regards the appraisal procedure 
that take place inside the agencies. A recent GAO report issued in April 2009 
reviews 139 major rules including 16 case-study rules, and finds that: (i) OIRA’s 
reviews of agencies’ draft rules often resulted in changes (of 12 case-study rules 
subject to OIRA review, 10 resulted in changes, about half of which included 
changes to the regulatory text); (ii) Agencies used various methods to document 
OIRA’s reviews, which generally met disclosure requirements, but the 
                                                   
70  See Cost-Benefit Analysis of EPA Regulations: An Overview, CRS Report for Congress 
RL30326, 1999.  
71  Available at http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=4015&type=0. 
72  GAO-07-791, GAO-05-939T. On the concept of “ossification” of rulemaking, see McGarity, 
T.O. (1997), The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor 
Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 528í36; Seidenfeld, M. (1997), Demystifying 
Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and 
Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 483í90; Pierce, Jr., R.J. (1995), Seven Ways 
to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 60í62; McGarity, T.O. (1992), 
Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385í86. 
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transparency of this documentation could be improved; (iii) out of eight prior 
GAO recommendations to improve the transparency OIRA has implemented 
only one—to clarify information posted about meetings with outside parties 
regarding draft rules under OIRA review73. 
2.2.2.3 Judicial oversight 
The Courts have played a special role in the process of learning by clarifying 
principles of risk regulation and by developing jurisprudence on risk regulation 
(Majone, 2002, Vogel, 2003). Although RIA and risk regulation are not the 
same, it is important to stress that the progress made in relation to issues such 
as uncertainty, the level of protection, risk-risk analysis, and proportionality in 
risk reduction have been made because of judicial review and the very active 
role played by courts. The courts have in fact used the review of agencies' rule to 
make the principles and practices of risk assessment more explicit and more 
rigorous.  
In the past decades, federal courts have clearly moved from an initial reluctance 
to accept cost-benefit analysis by federal agencies to an increased recognition of 
the need for sound ex ante assessment of costs and benefits aimed at motivating 
the need to regulate and the choice of the regulatory option. Eric Posner (2001) 
quotes cases such as American Trucking Associations, Inc, v EPA74 – in which 
the D.C. Circuit called on the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to 
provide a quantitative justification of the regulation if it wanted to regulate 
particulate matter pollution – and Corrosion Proof Fittings v EPA75 – in which 
the Fifth Circuit heavily criticized the EPA’s cost-benefit analysis on the merit.76  
The relevance and desirability of the judicial review of agency rulemaking has 
been subject to a lively debate in the United States, not limited to benefit-cost 
analysis but, even more hectically, in the domain of risk assessment and the use 
of scientific evidence in support of regulatory decisions. According to some 
authors, the prospect of transparency (through notice and comment) and 
subsequent review in court transforms the RIA document into a double-edged 
sword for regulatory agencies, as the document itself ay serve as a basis for 
litigation at a later stage77. Likewise, other authors have expressed doubts on the 
courts’ ability to scrutinize technical documents such as RIAs, and pointed at an 
overly strict interpretation of cost-benefit requirements as having caused 
                                                   
73  See GAO-09-205, at http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d09205high.pdf.  
74  175 F3d 1027 (DC Cir 1999), reviewed in part by Whitman v American Trucking 
Associations, Inc, 2001 US LEXIS 1952. 
75   947 F2d 1201 (5th Cir 1991). 
76  See Posner (2001), stating i.a. that the EPA had discounted costs but not benefits, had used 
inconsistent valuations for statistical lives, refused to quantify certain benefits, refused to 
repeat the analysis with better data supplied by industry, etc.. 
77  Wagner, The CAIR RIA: Advocacy Dressed Up as Policy Analysis, in Harrington, W., L. 
Heinzerling and R. Morgenstern (2009), Reforming Regulatory Impact Analysis, 
Resources for the Future Report, Washington D.C.  
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suboptimal regulatory decisions and too strict standards in regulation in a 
number of occasions78.  
2.2.2.4 Transparency and publication requirements 
Since 1984, the USA has a regulatory planning process whereby very 
preliminary RIA summaries are published every six months in the Unified 
Agenda of Federal Regulations, in order to increase transparency on the 
regulatory activities of federal agencies. Moreover, the review of draft and final 
RIAs by the OIRA is public as both ‘prompt’ and ‘return’ letters are available on 
its website. This transparent approach in reviewing RIA is unique and is closely 
linked to the very structure of the US system; the equilibria in a parliamentary 
system would render such transparency much more difficult to achieve. 
As explained above, transparency is a core element of the US RIA system and is 
enacted through a ‘notice and comment’ procedure. Before a new regulation in 
is adopted in the USA, it must be: (i) published in the Federal Register in 
proposed form, with an opportunity for public comment and, in some cases, a 
formal public hearing; and (ii) published again in the Federal Register in final 
form, with written explanation of any important revisions that have been made 
and the official response to public comments. As already recalled, the US 
Congress mandated the process of public comment already in the 1946 
Administrative Procedure Act. This process entails creation of a public docket of 
information that Federal judges can review if a regulation is challenged through 
litigation79. Relevant studies and data used by the regulator are generally 
included in the public docket and cited in the Federal Register.  
Executive Order 12,866 requires both agencies and OIRA to disclose to the 
public certain information about OIRA’s regulatory reviews. After the regulatory 
action has been published in the Federal Register or otherwise issued to the 
public, an agency is required to: (1) make available to the public the information 
provided to OIRA in accordance with the executive order; (2) identify for the 
public, in a complete, clear, and simple manner, the substantive changes 
between the draft submitted to OIRA and the action subsequently announced; 
and (3) identify for the public those changes in the regulatory action that were 
made at the suggestion or recommendation of OIRA. 
The order also requires OIRA to maintain a publicly available log that includes 
the following information pertinent to rules under OIRA’s review: (1) the status 
of rules submitted for OIRA review; (2) a notation of all written 
communications received by OIRA from persons not employed by the executive 
branch, and (3) information about oral communications between OIRA and 
persons not employed by the executive branch. After the rule has been 
published or otherwise issued to the public (or the agency has announced its 
                                                   
78  See i.a. Pierce, Jr., R. J. (1991). The Unintended Effects of Judicial Review of Agency 
Rules: How Federal Courts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of the 1990s. 
Administrative Law Review 43:7. 
79  See Graham, J. D. (2007). The Evolving Regulatory Role of the U.S. Office of Management 
and Budget, Review of Environmental Economics & Policy, 1:171-191. 
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decision to not publish or issue the rule), OIRA is required to make available to 
the public all documents exchanged between OIRA and the agency during the 
review by OIRA. However, as reported by the GAO (2009), “an OIRA official … 
pointed out that OIRA does not monitor, on a rule-by-rule basis, compliance by 
rulemaking agencies with their disclosure obligations under Executive Order 
12,866”. 
In 2003, a GAO report found that the transparency of OIRA reviews could be 
significantly improved. The GAO issued eight recommendations to OIRA, and in 
2009 found that OIRA had followed only one (improve the clarity of OIRA’s 
meeting log to better identify participants in OMB meetings with external 
parties on rules under review by disclosing the affiliations of participants). 
However, OIRA did not agree with the seven remaining recommendations in the 
2003 report and did not implement those recommendations. Accordingly, the 
2009 GAO Report reiterated the seven recommendations, which read as 
follows: 
1. Define the transparency requirements applicable to the agencies and OIRA 
in Executive Order 12,866 in such a way that they include not only the 
formal review period, but also the informal review period when OIRA says it 
can have its most important impact on agencies’ rules. 
2. Change OIRA’s database to clearly differentiate within the “consistent with 
change” outcome category which rules were substantively changed at OIRA’s 
suggestion or recommendation and which were changed in other ways and 
for other reasons. 
3. Re-examine OIRA’s current policy that only documents exchanged by OIRA 
branch chiefs and above need to be disclosed because most of the documents 
that are exchanged while rules are under review at OIRA are exchanged 
between agency staff and OIRA desk officers. 
4. Establish procedures whereby either OIRA or the agencies disclose the 
reason why rules are withdrawn from OIRA review. 
5. Define the types of “substantive” changes during the OIRA review process 
that agencies should disclose as including not only changes made to the 
regulatory text but also other, non-editorial changes that could ultimately 
affect the rules’ application (for example, explanations supporting the choice 
of one alternative over another and solicitations of comments on the 
estimated benefits and costs of regulatory options). 
6. Instruct agencies to put information about changes made in a rule after 
submission for OIRA’s review and those made at OIRA’s suggestion or 
recommendation in the agencies’ public rulemaking dockets, and to do so 
within a reasonable period after the rules have been published. 
7. Encourage agencies to use “best practice” methods of documentation that 
clearly describe those changes. 
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2.3 RIA under attack: the debate on the role of quantitative 
cost-benefit analysis in the United States 
Perhaps the most well-known trait of the US RIA system is its emphasis on 
quantitative cost-benefit analysis, which led some authors to advocate the 
transformation of the US government into a “cost-benefit state”80. Over time, 
however, the system has increasingly focused on more sophisticated 
methodologies, such as risk analysis and uncertainty analysis. Figure 4 below 
shows the required information for different rules in the US. Decision-making 
criteria in the US RIA system consist of a broad ‘soft net benefit’ approach 
whereby regulatory agencies should choose policy options that maximize net 
benefits, including potential economic, environmental, public health and safety, 
and other advantages; distributive impacts; and equity. When assessing possible 
regulatory alternatives, agencies should also take into account economic 
incentives to encourage the desired behaviour (e.g. user fees, marketable 
permits, information requirements). 
OIRA circular A-4 contains the methodological guidance to government 
agencies for carrying out RIA. Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and cost effectiveness 
analysis (CEA) are the main analytical models for US RIA (See Circular A-4, 
Section D). The two approaches are required in different circumstances (OECD 
2006): CBA is the norm for all regulations, except for health and safety rules 
where CEA is recommended, as it is believed that decisions in this specific 
policy area should not be based on cost/benefit considerations. However, for 
major health and safety rules where monetization of the primary expected 
health and safety outcomes is possible, CBA should be used. Along the same line 
of reasoning, CEA can be chosen for non health and safety proposals, whenever 
the “primary benefit categories” cannot be monetized. Reportedly, the use of 
CBA in health and environmental regulation has considerably increased in 
recent years81.  
Available empirical evidence on the use of analytical methods in RIA shows that 
there is still room for improvement. For example, Morgenstern, Pizer, and Shih 
(2001) have assessed the actual relationship between the costs reported in a 
sample of RIAs and the actual economic costs of a rule, and found that 
regulatory costs are generally overestimated82. This is often the result of the 
unanticipated use of new technology to comply with regulation, as testified by 
Harrington, Morgenstern, and Nelson (2000)83. According to an AEI-Brookings 
review of RIAs (2004), a significant percentage of assessments does not contain 
                                                   
80  See i.a. Cass R. Sunstein (1996), Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit 
State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 255; Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 7 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 
1651, 1656-63 (2001); see also Amy Sinden, Cass Sunstein’s Cost-Benefit Lite: Economics 
for Liberals, 29 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 191, 239 (2004). 
81  See Harrington et al. (2009), supra, note 77. 
82  See Morgenstern, Richard D., William A. Pizer and Jhih-Shyang Shih (2001). The Cost of 
Environmental Protection, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 83(4): 732-738.  
83  Harrington, W., R.D. Morgenstern, and P. Nelson. (2000). On the Accuracy of Regulatory 
Cost Estimates” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 19(2):297-322, at 314. 
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some basic economic information (e.g., net benefits and policy alternatives), and 
over 70% of the analyses fail to provide any quantitative information on net 
benefits. Hahn and Tetlock (2008) found that costs and benefits are often 
poorly estimated but that it is difficult to find clear evidence of systematic biases 
in RIAs. The authors also conclude that the quality of economic analysis has 
remained relatively stable across RIAs and tends to be below the standards set 
in the RIA guidelines. Moreover, it seems difficult to establish a clear link 
between economic analysis and regulatory output in the USA. However, a 
marginal effect on the content of final rules is undeniable and this may actually 
amount to significant cost-savings in the case of major rules. A deterrent effect 
of RIA and economic analysis on low-quality rules is also plausible, but difficult 
to establish. 
Figure4–Requirementsgenerallyapplicabletomajorrules
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Of the various procedural and substantive requirements, it bears recalling that 
risk assessment is required in all cases (OECD 2009) and the RIA guidance 
mandates the discussion of issues of uncertainty and sensitivity analysis. 
Guidelines recommend that RIA authors assume a risk-neutral attitude in their 
analyses, but also recognize that this may not happen in all cases. The neutral 
approach to risk validates the use of expected value analysis as the fundamental 
tool for weighing different alternatives (OECD 2007). Suggested values of a 
statistical life (VSL) adopt different real and nominal rates in respect to 
different time horizons.  The real rates vary from 3.0% (3 years) to 5.5% (30 
years) and are based on the pre-tax rate of return on private sector investments 
in recent years (OECD 2004). A discount rate of 7% is required together with 
sensitivity analysis using a discount rate of 3% (OECD 2006). 
The strength of cost-benefit analysis in the united States is not unlimited. 
Harrington et al. (2009) explain that when the law and CBA conflict (as it is 
often the case, e.g., in health and safety regulation), the law prevails. As a result, 
if Congress states that a specific performance level must be achieved by a given 
rule, but some monetization can nonetheless be included in the analysis and 
ends up questioning those targets, the resulting mismatch can lead to legal 
conflict. Moreover, in some cases CBA has not proven particularly useful as it 
was applicable only to a limited subset of the costs and benefits, thus leading to 
the consideration of a limited set of regulatory alternatives. As result, the 
complex analytical tools included in the RIA turn out to be less informative than 
simpler techniques. This ‘complexity trap’ – Harrington et al. (2010) argue – 
can be attributed to the process of judicial review that leads agencies to prepare 
RIAs for surviving judicial challenges and less as an aid to decision-making. 
Nevertheless, several authors have recognized that cost-benefit analysis in 
support of regulation has gained increasing recognition also in court. However, 
it is important to recall why cost-benefit analysis has been selected as the 
common language of regulatory agencies in the US, in order to avoid 
misunderstandings. The use of cost benefit analysis has always been under 
attack in the United States. In methodological terms CBA is under attack 
because it carries an untenable welfare standard; because it may systematically 
lead to an undervaluation of environmental and health impacts; because it lends 
itself badly to the assessment of distributional  impacts; and because it is 
difficult to implement by regulatory agencies, sometimes requiring heroic 
assumptions at best. To the contrary, defenders of the CBA approach offer 
mostly pragmatic explanations, by arguing that it minimizes error costs, and 
overall is preferable to all available alternatives, including i.a. feasibility 
analysis84. Finally, Eric Posner (2001) – following previous authors, such as i.a. 
Epstein et al. (1999), Mashaw (1997) and Matthew, Noll and Weingast (1987) – 
argues that the main purpose of CBA is not fairness or any measure of 
efficiency, but to enable and facilitate control of the bureaucracy by elected 
                                                   
84  See Masur, Jonathan S. and Posner, Eric A. (2010), Against Feasibility Analysis, 
University of Chicago Law Review, Forthcoming; University of Chicago Law & Economics, 
Olin Working Paper No. 480; University of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 274. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1452984.  
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politicians85. This statement, however, assumes that CBA is a suitable tool to 
achieve this result. In section 4.4 below I will get back to this debate to show 
how law and economics has approached the role of CBA as a tool that facilitates 
the control of bureaucracy within a principal-agent system.  
2.3.1 The impact of RIA in the US: available evidence 
The introduction of RIA by the Reagan administration was coupled with 
estimated yearly savings of roughly $10-20 billion. Non-governmental estimates 
are however very different: according to one authoritative economist, the cost of 
regulations even increased after the introduction of compulsory RIA for federal 
agencies, and has never stopped mounting since then.86  
On the other hand, relevant critiques have been addressed to the current 
implementation of RIA in the US. As already recalled, a 2000 study by Bob 
Hahn and Bob Litan found that only in less than one third of the cases agencies 
had quantified both expected costs and benefits of proposed regulations, only in 
63% of the cases the proponent agency calculated all identified costs, whereas 
only in 28% of proposals had the agency calculated the net present value of the 
regulatory intervention.87 More recently, in 2004 Bob Hahn and Pat Dudley 
analysed 55 cases of RIA performed by federal agencies between the Reagan, 
Bush Sr. and Clinton administrations, with similar results.88 Accordingly, 
economists have stressed the need for further improvements in the accuracy of 
cost-benefit estimates by federal agencies as a necessary measure for improving 
the quality of ex ante evaluation. Robert Hahn and Robert Litan have also 
issued recommendations on how to improve the quality of US RIA, by 
enhancing the soundness and pervasiveness of the model.89 
Furthermore, besides critiques addressed towards the quality of RIAs 
performed by federal agencies, some disagreement has emerged as regards the 
scope of application of the US RIA model. As of today, the US impact 
                                                   
85  Posner, E. A. (2001), Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political 
Theory Perspective, University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 68. 
86  Hahn, R.W. and R. Litan (2000), An Analysis of the Third Government Report on the 
Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulation, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory 
Studies, 2000; and E.A. Posner (2001), “Controlling Agencies with Cost-benefit Analysis. A 
Positive Political Theory Perspective”, University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 68, 2001.  
87  Ibid. 
88  R.W. Hahn and P. Dudley (2004), How well Does the Government Do Cost-Benefit 
Analysis? AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper 04-01, 
January 2004.  
89  See Hahn, R.W. and R. Litan (2005), Counting Regulatory Benefits and Costs: Lessons for 
the U.S. and Europe, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2005, pp. 473-
508, see in particular, pp. 496-499 (suggesting that “Congress pass a law requiring that all 
federal regulatory agencies submit annual cost and benefit estimates of major regulations 
to OMB”, and that “OMB issue a scorecard assessing the overall quality of regulation and 
ask the agencies to complete a scorecard for each major regulation”). See also, for a more 
recent review, Hahn, R. W. and P. Tetlock (2008), Has Economic Analysis Improved 
Regulatory Decisions?, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 22, Number 1, Winter 
2008, Pages 67–84.  
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assessment procedure only involves federal agencies, not independent 
authorities, i.e. the authorities that normally deal with the most relevant part of 
economic regulations.90 And, while it is certainly true that such authorities 
ought to be left independent of the executive, many commentators have 
criticised the decision to limit the application of RIA scrutiny to all new rules 
except core economic and social rules enacted by giant regulators, such as the 
FCC, the FTC or the SEC.91  
Finally, the US regulatory review model has been the subject of extensive study 
by game theorists and political scientists, as its peculiar institutional setting 
lends itself to applications of principal-agent models and raises issues of 
political control over the bureaucracy.92 For example, Lazer (2004) finds 
evidence that, although the staff at OIRA has remained quite stable between 
Bush Sr. and Clinton administrations, the White House has radically 
redistributed its attention and political support towards OIRA members with 
compatible political viewpoints. The appointment of John Graham as the OIRA 
head and the gradual strengthening of OIRA’s role as gatekeeper are seen as 
consistent with the removal of the Vice President from the review procedure, a 
solution aimed at ensuring that the White House keeps control over federal 
agencies and at the same time economizing on its fairly limited capacity to 
gather information on proposed new rules.  
This finding is compatible with a competitive agent model of control, and 
suggests that, in the regulatory review model adopted in the US, presidential 
influence is exerted mostly through an institutionalization of the conflict and 
competition between the anti-regulatory OIRA and activist regulatory agencies, 
such as the Environmental Protection Agency or the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration. In this model, the President has a clear incentive to 
exert heavy control on the bureaucracy also because the White House competes 
with the Congress in controlling bureaucrats.93  
Finally, the peculiar structure, scope and governance of the US RIA system seem 
to have been less widely studied than other features of the system, such as the 
cost-benefit model used to evaluate all types of secondary legislation within the 
domain of central government, including lifesaving regulation. However, the 
                                                   
90  Hahn, R. and C. Sunstein (2002), New Executive Order For Improving Federal 
Regulation? Deeper And Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, Vol. 150, No. 1489; McGarity, T.O. (1987), Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory 
Reform, Texas Law Review, Vol. 65, No. 1243. See also Pildes R.H. and C.R. Sunstein, 
Reinventing the Regulatory State, University of Chicago Law Review, 62, 1, 1995. 
91  See e.g. Gattuso, supra note 55. 
92  See, i.a., Moe, T. (1982) Regulatory performance and presidential administration, 
American Journal of Political Science, 26(2), pp. 197-224; Moe, T. (1985), Control and 
feedback in economic regulation: The case of the NLRB, American Political Science 
Review, 79, pp. 1094-1016; And Moe, T. (1984) The new economics of organization, 
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, n. 4, 739-777. See also Niskanen, W.A. 
(1971), Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Chicago, IL: Aldine, 1971. 
93  See Lazer, D. (1998), Regulatory Review: Presidential Control through Selective 
Communication and Institutionalized Conflict, available at 
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/prg/lazer/control.pdf.  
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existence of several other forms of oversight, transparency and accountability 
mechanisms is perhaps more important than the methodology used in RIA, as it 
portrays the nature of a mechanism designed to facilitate delegation and 
oversight in a presidential system such as the US one. This is essential to 
evaluate the performance of the system itself, and also to correctly approach the 
question whether a US-like RIA system can be successfully imported in Civil 
Law countries, and in parliamentary democracies. I will come back to this issue 
in Sections 4 and 6 of this Thesis.  
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3 EU IMPACT ASSESSMENT: HISTORY, PRACTICE 
AND OUTCOMES 
The European Commission has adopted methods for assessing the impact of its 
policy proposals since 1986, when the Business Impact Assessment (BIA) 
System was launched under the UK presidency. The BIA system, like the UK 
Compliance Cost Assessment procedure, exhibited a strong focus on the impact 
of proposed regulations on business enterprises, with no specific emphasis on 
social welfare as a whole94. As such, the BIA procedure elicited strong criticisms 
for its lack of theoretical soundness and scarce impact on regulatory costs faced 
by European firms.95 As a result, the system was gradually integrated with an 
array of initiatives and projects (such as the Business Test Panel, the SLIM 
project, etc.), aimed at extending the limited scope of the BIA. Such a hysteresis 
of initiatives ended up creating an overly confused scenario for EU impact 
assessment – exactly the regulatory creep that impact assessment was supposed 
to counter. For such reason, in 2002 EU institutions agreed on the need for new 
actions in the field of better regulation, with a specific focus on impact 
assessment. 
At the beginning of the past decade, as EU policy-makers were striving to lead 
Europe away from its disappointing economic performance and back on the 
Lisbon track, better regulation became a new mantra, and during the Prodi 
mandate as President of the European Commission the need to strengthen the 
ex ante impact assessment of EU legislation conquered new supporters, who 
saw it as the philosopher’s stone that would improve the quality of EU 
legislation in the following years. Thus, the better regulation agenda strongly 
relied on the successful implementation of an ambitious new Integrated Impact 
Assessment (IIA) model, which entered into force on 1 January 2003 and 
mandated the assessment of the economic, social and environmental impact of 
major new initiatives included in the Annual Policy Strategy or in the annual 
Legislative Work Program.  
As will be observed in more detail in the next sections, the transition towards a 
full-fledged impact assessment system in Europe occurred without a thorough 
reflection on the scope and purpose that this system would exhibit in Europe, 
especially as opposed to its homologous systems in the US and UK. First and 
foremost, while in the US the RIA system applies only for secondary legislation 
proposed by government agencies, and thus is not compulsory for Congress and 
independent agencies, at EU level the system was adopted for all major new 
                                                   
94  For a description of the UK compliance cost assessment, see Renda (2006), pages 26 ff. 
95  See, inter alia, the BIA Final Report, Lessons Learned and the Way Forward, Enterprise 
Paper No. 9, 2002, p. 2. The Commission acknowledged that BIA “has not always worked 
as originally intended... Instead, BIAs are often carried out as an ex-post ‘paper exercise’ on 
already finalised proposals, leading to significant drawbacks with regard to both the quality 
of the analysis made and the possibility of feeding the results into the drafting process”. 
The Final Report also mentioned that “many BIAs are not backed up by objective 
information and impacts on business are rarely quantified”, and that “[t]here is little 
evidence of an institutional learning process from previous BIAs”.  
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initiatives included in the European Commission’s yearly legislative and work 
program: this means that an impact assessment may be performed on 
ambitious, cross-cutting pieces of legislation such as the services directive; on 
pure regulatory decisions such as the technical requirements for narrow tractors 
or the safety of toys; or on high-level strategy documents such as the i2010 
strategy, the thematic air pollution strategy, or even the new legislative 
framework for mutual recognition of goods within the Internal Market. 
Needless to say, the emphasis on the monetization of impacts could not be the 
same as in the US, where specialized regulators are called to perform 
quantitative analysis on policy proposals that fall entirely in their domain of 
technical expertise.  
Second, the different scope of the IA system in Europe reflects also a different 
purpose. While the US RIA system is centered around the logic of delegation of 
powers and oversight, the EU IA system is sometimes presented as a toolkit 
available to European Commission bureaucrats, to help them learn how to draft 
good quality policy proposals. As we will see in the following sections, this is 
probably a very partial explanation of the EU RIA system, which was indeed 
presented to external stakeholders as a tool that would also achieve better 
regulatory outcomes, not only a better quality of the proposals. In addition, the 
“pure learning” explanation was inconsistent with early developments in EU 
institutions, such as the 2003 Inter-Institutional Agreement on Better 
Regulation, in which also the European Parliament and the Council committed 
to the same IA system adopted by the European Commission, as far as their 
major amendments on Commission proposals were concerned. This agreement 
–  renewed and strengthened in 2005 under the term “Common Approach to 
Impact Assessment” – remains to date almost exclusively on paper, as I will 
explain in more detail in the next sections: this also means that whatever effort 
the Commission puts on its on Impact Assessment documents, the final piece of 
legislation, as amended during the co-decision procedure, will never be fully 
associated with the original  IA. In a nutshell, the IA document – which should 
clearly serve purposes other than mere in-house learning – becomes an 
extraordinarily short-lived document, with very rapid obsolescence.  
Third, the different scope and purpose of the EU impact assessment system 
inevitably affected also the methodological arrangements adopted by European 
Commission Directorates General (DGs). However, especially after 2005, and 
even more with the appointment of the Impact Assessment Board (IAB) in 2006 
and the new IA guidelines in 2009, emphasis has been put on the need to 
quantify and monetize impacts, including in most cases also macroeconomic 
impacts of proposed EU policies. In this respect, the European Commission 
seems to be slowly converging with the type of cost-benefit analysis required in 
the United States: however, this approach seems hardly fit for the peculiarities 
of the EU impact assessment system, which requires a way more nuanced 
approach to the methodological choices needed to justify the adoption of a given 
policy proposal – would you use quantitative cost-benefit analysis to choose the 
preferred option when deciding between harmonisation of legislation and 
mutual recognition in the circulation of widgets? 
The introduction of Impact Assessment in the European Commission has 
suffered from this confusion in the scope, purpose and methodology. The 
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situation became even worse when the system was re-launched in 2005 by 
Commission Vice-President Verheugen, who announced that with impact 
assessment Europe would gain awareness of “the full costs and benefits of 
future legislation”96. Against this background, since 2003 Commission DGs 
have carried out impact assessment of White Papers, Directives, Regulations, 
strategy documents, Decisions, expenditure programmes, negotiating guidelines 
for international agreements and other types of documents, often of a non-
binding nature. The system required them to mandate the assessment of the 
economic, social and environmental impacts of proposed new initiatives, and 
introduced a number of “screens” – e.g. competitiveness, proportionality, 
subsidiarity, impact on SMEs, macroeconomic impacts, provisions for ex post 
monitoring, etc. – which diluted, to some extent, the efficiency-oriented nature 
of EU RIA, transforming the system into a sort of panacea, i.e. a tool that, rather 
than containing sound economic analysis, often merely summarizes the 
interests at stake and tries to find a compromise between political and policy 
stances advanced by different stakeholders holding an interest in the rules at 
hand.   
After all, the EU impact assessment system soon exhibited the same problems 
that affected the only available European model, from which the EU system had 
taken several features: the UK RIA system launched in 1998 soon went into 
trouble, sometimes turning into a mere box-ticking exercise. In Europe, 
commentators saw early signs of “plateau-ing” of the EU better regulation 
agenda, also due to a number of bad episodes (i.a., the REACH regulation, the 
services directive, and many others) and to a persistent lack of transparency in 
the final drafting phase of the Commission’s policy process, in particular due to 
the fact that the Commission does not consult on  draft Impact Assessment 
documents.  
Against this background, it is fair to state that the European Commission has 
managed to achieve important progress in the quality of its Impact Assessment 
documents between 2003 and 2010, although a lot seems to depend on the type 
of proposal and on the policy area where the proposal falls. To be sure, such 
progress is unmatched in Europe, as neither the other EU institutions, nor 
Member States have reached any similar result to date. At the same time, it is 
also true that the “regulatory pendulum” in Europe seems to be gradually 
shifting towards other tools, and in particular towards the Standard Cost Model 
for the measurement and reduction of administrative burdens97.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I illustrate the birth and evolution of the EU 
impact assessment system, starting with a brief account of the early experience 
with Business Impact Assessment (Section 3.1.1) and then describing more in 
detail the scope, purpose and governance of the current system, in place since 
2003 (Section 3.1.2). Section 3.2 then looks at the Impact Assessment 
                                                   
96  See Verheugen’s speech at the UK Presidency Conference on Better Regulation, Edinburgh, 
23 September 2005 (available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do? 
reference=SPEECH/05/543&format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en). 
97   See, for an illustration of the Standard Cost Model, Böheim, Renda et al. (2006), Pilot 
Project on Administrative Burdens, Report for the European Commission, DG Enterprise, 
at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/better-regulation/files/pilot-study_en.pdf. 
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guidelines of the European Commission, in their current version dated January 
2009. Section 3.3 provides evidence of the quality of the Commission IA 
documents by illustrating the results of a scorecard analysis of the 475 IAs 
produced by the Commission between 2003 and the end of 2009. Section 3.4 
concludes with some insights from the analysis of the EU IA system and the 
prospect for future reform.  
3.1 History and evolution of the EU impact assessment system 
3.1.1 The early years: The BIA system  
The EU experience in regulatory impact assessment began in 1986, when the 
UK took its turn in the Presidency of the Council. For this reason, the impact 
analysis procedure introduced – called Business Impact Assessment (BIA) – 
closely echoed the UK model of Compliance Cost Assessment.98 The BIA Pilot 
Project aimed at evaluating the impact of a limited number of proposed 
regulations on businesses, expressed in terms of compliance costs. Since 1989, 
the procedure has been put under the competency of DGXXIII (DG Enterprise), 
which coordinated other DGs and selected the proposals included in the 
Commission’s agenda that should be subjected to a BIA test.99 The BIA Pilot 
Project led to a selection of draft proposals from DG Enterprise in the fields of 
detergents, electromagnetic compatibility, environmental impact of electrical 
and electronic equipment (EEE) and pre-packaging, and concentrated on 
examining three major elements of the  impact assessment process, namely 
external consultation, economic analysis and organizational structures.  
Figure 5 illustrates the essential structure and the critical steps of the BIA 
procedure. As shown in the figure, DG Enterprise ensured that a limited 
number of proposals included in the Annual Policy Strategy were scrutinized 
under the BIA procedure. If a proposal was found to exert a substantial impact 
on compliance costs, the proponent administration was required to draft a fiche 
d’impact. The fiche had a standard form, and was introduced with the aim of 
representing the likely impact of the proposal at hand on target firms. First, the 
fiche illustrated the main reasons for intervention. Lead DGs were asked to 
explain the reasons for changing legislation currently in force (or to intervene ex 
novo in unregulated fields). The next step was the identification of businesses 
that would be affected by the proposed intervention, followed by a list of actions 
to be undertaken in order to comply with the changing regulatory environment. 
For each of these actions a cost estimate had to be provided, by specifying 
bureaucratic costs, taxes, monitoring and reporting costs and other compliance 
costs. 
                                                   
98  See Renda (2006), pages 26 ff. for a description of the UK compliance cost assessment 
model. 
99  See the BIA Final Report, supra note 95. 
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The standard fiche d’impact also included an evaluation of the likely 
macroeconomic effects of the proposed regulation, which in turn incorporated 
the impact on employment and on the investments and competitiveness of 
target firms. Finally, the fiche should devote specific attention to assessing the 
expected impact of the proposal on SMEs, in line with the ‘think small first’ 
principle already established at that time100. While drafting the fiche, lead DGs 
were required to consult interested stakeholders. The final document contained 
a summary of the opinions expressed during the consultation process.  
The BIA system was subject to heavy critiques, mostly related to its 
incompleteness and uncertain institutional setting. First, as was already 
recalled, the BIA procedure did not imply the preliminary identification of a 
range of alternative regulatory options, and only entered the stage after the 
Commission had identified the preferred option in its yearly regulatory agenda. 
Secondly, the BIA only contained information on business compliance costs, 
without considering other cost categories or the social impact of the proposed 
regulation, often less easily quantifiable and often not subject to market 
exchange. Furthermore, the EU experience with BIA was characterised by the 
poor quality of the evaluations performed, which casted heavy doubts on the 
reliability of such instrument as a support to EU policy-makers.101 The absence 
of training initiatives for officials of the DGs in charge of BIA contributed 
further to generate widespread pessimism over the prospects for improving the 
                                                   
100  The ‘think small first’ principle was included in the European Charter for Small 
Enterprises, as endorsed by the Heads of State or Government at the Santa Maria da Feira 
European Council of 19-20 June 2000 (Annex III of the conclusions of the Santa Maria da 
Feira European Council). Today, the principle is embedded in the Small Business Act, and 
subject to specific guidance in the European Commission’s Impact Assessment Guidelines. 
See COM(2008)394 A Small Business Act for Europe, and Annex 8 to the IA Guidelines, p. 
32, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/commission_guidelines/docs/iag_2009_annex_en.pdf. 
101  See the BIA Final Report,  supra note 95. 
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quality of performed evaluations in the short run without changing the 
procedure completely.102  
For this reason, the Commission decided during the 1990s to add new tools and 
to launch new projects for the purpose of completing the evaluation of proposals 
carried out under the BIA system. Such initiatives include the SLIM project 
(Simplification of the Legislation on the Internal Market), aimed at 
strengthening the ex post assessment of the quality of regulation; the creation of 
the BEST (Business Environment Simplification Task Force), in 1997; and the 
creation of the Business Test Panel in 1998, with the aim of acting as a 
permanent body for consultation of firms affected by EU regulations.103 Such a 
proliferation of initiatives, however, did not produce the desired outcome, and 
ended up creating an overly fragmented framework for EU impact assessment.  
This impasse led the Commission to issue in 2001 a White Paper on European 
Governance and the Lisbon Council to mandate the creation of a high-level 
advisory group (the so-called ‘Mandelkern Group’) for the drafting of an “action 
plan for better regulation” and the definition of a new model of impact 
assessment to be implemented at Community level. The Mandelkern Group was 
created to “set out by 2001 a strategy for further co-ordinated action to simplify 
the regulatory environment, including the performance of public 
administration, at both national and Community level”, and after the Ministers 
for Public Administration from EU members states had signed the Strasbourg 
Resolution in November 2000, mandating the advisory group to “develop a 
coherent approach to this topic and to submit proposals to the Ministers, 
including the definition of a common method of evaluating the quality of 
regulation.” 
Such model was expected to provide a more complete tool for assessing the 
social, economic and environmental impact of proposed regulations.104  
                                                   
102  Ibid., p. 23, stating the need for a cultural change, both within the institution and in its 
relationships with the public, through the implementation of a series of straightforward 
and common-sense adjustments, which are intended to be neither bureaucratic nor 
complicated to put in place. 
103  As regards the SLIM Pilot Project, see the Commission Communication of 6 November 
1996, COM(96)559 (available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/ 
simplification/docs/com1996-559/com1996-559_en.pdf). The subsequent Commission 
reports are available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
internal_market/simplification/index_en.htm#slim. For what concerns the BEST project, 
the Final Report, issued in May 1998, is available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/enterprise_policy/best.  
104  The Mandelkern Group was made up of representatives of the EU-15 and officials from the 
Commission’s Secretariat-General. An interim report was finalised at the end of February 
2001 and considered by the Heads of State and Government at the Spring European 
Council in Stockholm. The Final Report (so-called ‘Mandelkern Report’) was published in 
November 2001; the majority of recommendations were included in the Commission’s 
2002 Better Regulation Action Plan. 
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3.1.2 The 2001 White Paper and the Mandelkern Report 
The Commission’s 2001 White Paper on European Governance clarified the 
Commission’s agenda for the establishment of new better regulation standards 
in the EU.105 The preparation of the White Paper was coordinated by the former 
‘Governance team’ chaired by Jerome Vignon. The team organised 12 working 
groups dealing with six main working areas. Working Group 2c dealt with issues 
of better regulation and explored possible actions for improving the quality of 
regulation at EU level as well as the implementation of EU legislation at 
member state level. Better regulation was defined in terms of seven dimensions, 
namely proportionality, proximity, legal certainty, coherence, high standards, 
timeliness and enforceability. The need for action at member state level was 
stressed during the preparatory work for the White Paper, in stating that “action 
at Community level alone – and a fortiori by the Commission alone – is certain 
not to succeed”.106 Subsequent developments, unfortunately, confirmed such 
prophecy. 
According to Working Group 2c, BIA was an insufficient tool to appraise the 
expected impact of a regulation for a number of reasons. First, BIA was “only a 
questionnaire, without a proper process and without guidance”.107 This, 
according to the opinion expressed by the working group, could lead to 
significant differences in the quality of the analysis. Moreover, the questions 
were handled only at a late stage of the regulatory process, when political 
pressures are expected to be highest.  
Finally, BIA was found to be inappropriate since the analysis contained in the 
fiche was presented separately from the tests of subsidiarity and proportionality 
and the sectoral provisions in the Treaty, leaving stakeholders and policy-
makers unaware of the relationship between prospective costs arising from the 
proposal for businesses and expected benefits to consumers, the environment or 
SMEs. Accordingly, more sophisticated tools were needed in order to support 
policy-makers with clearer, more relevant and more comprehensive information 
on the prospective cost-benefit balance of regulatory proposals.108  
Importantly, the preparatory report of the working group on evaluation and 
policy also recommended the use of cost-benefit analysis as the most complete 
and accurate methodology in the evaluation of proposed legislations, based on 
the observation of the US and UK systems and the recommendations of the 
OECD.109 However, exact economic calculations were considered not to be the 
most important contributors to regulatory quality. Rather, the working group 
took a ‘lesson-drawing’ approach by stating that observing the international 
                                                   
105  See European Commission, White Paper on European Governance, COM(2001)727, 25 July 
2001. 
106  See the Preparatory Work for the White Paper, European Commission, 2002, p. 119, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/governance/areas/preparatory_work_en.pdf  
107  Ibid., p. 106. 
108  See e.g., J. Pelkmans, S. Labory and G. Majone, “Better EU Regulatory Quality: Assessing 
Current Initiatives and New Proposals”, op. cit. 
109  See Preparatory Work for the White Paper, op. cit., Section 3.2.1, p. 91. 
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experience and undertaking contextualised benchmarking are the most 
important steps towards a compete understanding of the logic of decision-
making. The working group also suggested that monitoring existing EU 
legislation was at least as important as evaluating the expected impact of new 
regulation.110  
The publication of the White Paper on European Governance was followed by a 
fierce debate and a period of frantic institutional tension. The European 
Parliament issued a resolution on governance in the wake of the ‘Kaufmann 
Report’, in which it criticised the lack of cooperation between the Commission 
and the Parliament in defining the EU agenda for better regulation.111 In other 
words, the Parliament complained that, after stating the need for cooperation at 
both horizontal (inter-institutional) and vertical (with member states) level, in 
fact the Commission was ‘playing solo’ on the reform of European governance. 
For such reason, the Parliament warned the Commission “against taking 
measures in the legislative sphere which might affect the roles of Parliament 
and the Council in the legislative process before Parliament has been fully 
consulted”.112 The resolution suggested instead the promotion of stronger inter-
institutional dialogue on governance reform, and welcomed the establishment 
of an inter-institutional working group announced by President Romano Prodi 
on 2 October 2001.  
But the Parliament resolution contained other interesting comments on the 
Commission’s White Paper. In particular, the Parliament considered some of 
the plans formulated by the Commission in the White Paper as patently (and 
sometimes unnecessarily) ambitious. Instruments such as the “online 
consultation through the inter-active policy-making initiative” (Section 3.1 of 
the White Paper) created, in the Parliament’s view, the “risk of an escalation in 
consultation” which would end up being incompatible with the Commission’s 
goal of “reducing the long delays associated with the adoption and 
implementation of Community rules”.113  
A few months after the publication of the White Paper on European 
Governance, the Mandelkern Group on Better Regulation published its final 
report. The report specified some of the features of the prospective new RIA 
model, suggesting its adoption by the Commission before June 2002 and its 
application to all Commission proposals with possible regulatory effects.114 The 
Mandelkern Group also recommended that the Council and the Parliament 
should not consider proposals that had not been subjected to the agreed impact 
                                                   
110  Ibid., Section 3.3.3, p. 92. 
111  European Parliament, Report on the Commission White Paper on European Governance, 
A5-0399/2001, adopted by the European Parliament on 29 November 2001 (OJ C 153E, 27 
June 2002, pp. 314-322). 
112  Ibid., p. 8. 
113  Ibid., p. 8. 
114  Mandelkern Group, Final Report (available at http://www.eulib.com/documents/ 
mandelkern_report_en.pdf).  
54 | IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
LAW AND ECONOMICS IN THE RIA WORLD - © ANDREA RENDA 2011 
assessment system, except in cases of urgency.115 Furthermore, the Mandelkern 
Report highlighted the need for increased participation by member states at an 
early stage of preparation of proposals, as well as the need for each member 
state to adopt its own impact assessment system “adapted to their 
circumstances” by June 2003.  
As regards Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA), the Mandelkern Report 
contained a set of recommendations for an effective implementation of such 
procedure. These included the following steps:116 
x Description of the problem or risk to be addressed;  
x Description of different options considered;  
x Affected parties and at least a qualitative assessment of impact on them;  
x Summary of the consultation process undertaken and of its results;  
x Estimated lifetime of the policy or options;  
x Description of the impact on SMEs or other disproportionately affected 
group;  
x Explanation of how the proposal fits with existing rules and policies; and 
x Description of the methodology adopted. 
The Mandelkern Group also recommended the adoption of a ‘dual stage’ RIA 
model, with a preliminary impact assessment devoted to the analysis of 
alternative regulatory options and an extended impact assessment in which the 
detailed assessment of the benefits and costs of the preferred regulatory option 
is performed. However, the Mandelkern Report did not contain any indication 
on the scope and comprehensiveness of the impact to be assessed.  
The recommendations following from the Final Report represented a fairly 
important input into the Commission’s new impact assessment model. But, as 
will be clearer in the next section, the Commission’s new Better Regulation 
Action Plan and the Communication on impact assessment, both issued in June 
2002, went somehow further than what had been envisaged by the Mandelkern 
Group.   
3.1.3 Away from RIA: Building the Integrated Impact Assessment  
At the European Council meetings of Göteborg and Laeken, the Commission 
announced its Action Plan for Better Regulation, launched in June 2002. The 
new impact assessment model was introduced as part of the wider Action Plan, 
together with a communication aimed at simplifying and improving the 
                                                   
115  On 30 September 2002, the Competitiveness Council stated its intention, in principle, not 
to consider substantial regulatory proposals not accompanied by proportionate impact 
assessments. 
116  See the Mandelkern Report, op. cit., p. 26. 
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regulatory environment and measures aimed at promoting “a culture of 
dialogue and participation” within the EU legislative process. 117  
The Communication on impact assessment was inspired partially from the 
activity of the Mandelkern Group, but also from the commitment undertaken by 
the Commission at the Göteborg Council, to develop a tool for sustainable 
impact assessment.118 As a result, the Commission decided to integrate all forms 
of ex ante evaluation by building an integrated impact assessment model, to 
enter into force on 1 January 2003.119 Such model bears the heavy responsibility 
of ensuring that adequate account is taken at an early stage of the regulatory 
process of both the competitiveness and sustainable development goals, which 
rank amongst the top priorities in the EU agenda.  
The new integrated impact assessment (IIA) model introduced in 2002 – which 
incorporated not only the economic impact, but also the social and 
environmental impact of the proposals concerned – adopted a ‘dual stage’ 
approach. All Commission initiatives proposed for inclusion in the Annual 
Policy Strategy or the Commission Legislative and Work Programme and 
requiring some regulatory measure for their implementation – thus including 
not only regulations and directives, but also White Papers, expenditure 
programmes and negotiating guidelines for the international agreements – 
must undergo a ‘preliminary impact assessment’.120 Moreover, a selected 
number of proposals with large expected impact, are subjected to a more in-
depth analysis called ‘extended impact assessment’.  
                                                   
117  During 2002 and early in 2003, the Commission developed its Action Plan through eight 
targeted Communications, at the same time defining with the European Parliament and the 
Council an overall strategy on better law-making. The Communications addressed the 
following issues: 1) General principles and minimum standards for consultation 
(COM(2002)704); 2) the collection and use of expertise (COM(2002) 713); 3) impact 
assessment (COM(2002) 276), including internal Guidelines; 4) Simplifying and improving 
the regulatory environment (COM(2002) 278); 5) proposal for a new comitology decision 
(COM(2002) 719); 6) operating framework for the European Regulatory Agencies 
(COM(2002) 718); 7) framework for target-based tripartite contracts (COM(2002) 709); 
and 8) Better monitoring of the application of community law (COM(2002) 725). 
118  See Communication COM(2002)276, p. 2. See also the Communication from the 
Commission to the European parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions, Towards a Global Partnership for Sustainable 
Development, COM(2002)82, 12 February 2002.  
119  “Impact assessment is intended to integrate, reinforce, streamline and replace all the 
existing separate impact assessment mechanisms for Commission proposals.” See the 
Commission’s Communication on impact assessment, COM(2002) 276, 5 June 2002, 
Section 1.3.  
120  Proposals that are exempted from impact assessment include: a) Green Papers where the 
policy formulation is still in process; b) periodic Commission decisions and reports; c) 
proposals following international obligations; d) executive decisions, such as 
“implementing decisions, statutory decisions and technical updates, including adaptations 
to technical progress”; and e) Commission measures deriving from its powers of controlling 
the correct implementation of Community Law (although the Commission may in some 
instances decide to carry out an impact assessment). See Communication on impact 
assessment, COM(2002) 276, 5 June 2002, Section 2 (“Coverage”). 
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The selection of proposals for extended impact assessment was part of the 
Commission programming and planning cycle. On the basis of the preliminary 
impact assessment statement, the Commission was asked to decide in the 
Annual Policy Strategy or (later) in its annual Legislative and Work Programme 
which proposals should undergo an extended impact assessment. In deciding, it 
had to take into account whether the proposal would result in substantial 
economic, environmental and/or social impacts on a specific sector or several 
sectors; whether the proposal would have significant impacts on major 
interested parties; and whether the proposal represented a major policy reform 
in one or several sectors. 
The preliminary impact assessment consisted merely in a short statement 
containing an identification of the issue at stake, the regulatory options 
available (including the ‘zero option’ or ‘no policy change’ scenario), preliminary 
indications on the expected impact and an indication of whether an extended 
impact assessment would be needed. There was no clear identification of the 
policy option to be preferred, but only a specification of the options that should 
be excluded at the preliminary stage, taking into account also the subsidiarity 
and the proportionality principle. Overall, the outline for preliminary impact 
assessment did not seem to be particularly informative121.  
The extended impact assessment (ExIA) contained an in-depth evaluation of 
expected social, economic and environmental impact of the various policy 
options associated with the proposal and a summary of the consultation activity, 
which should also focus on political and ethical issues related to the proposal. 
The Commission also specified that the expected impact should be estimated in 
qualitative, quantitative and possibly monetary terms. The alternative policy 
options were to be evaluated according to criteria such as the relevance to the 
problem, the effectiveness in achieving the objectives, the coherence with wider 
economic, social and environmental objectives, the interaction with other 
existing and planned Community interventions, the cost or resources required 
and the user-friendliness of the regulatory option at hand. 
More in detail, the Commission provided a description of what is meant by 
economic, social and environmental impact: 
 The economic impact includes both the macro- and micro-economic 
impact of the selected option, mostly in terms of economic growth and 
competitiveness, i.e. changes in compliance costs, including administrative 
burdens to businesses/SMEs and implementation costs for public 
authorities, impacts on the potential for innovation and technological 
development, changes in investment, market shares and trade patterns as 
well as increases or decreases in consumer prices, etc. 
 The social impact includes the impact of the proposal on human capital, 
on fundamental/human rights, the compatibility of the proposal with the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, but also 
prospective changes in employment levels or job quality, changes affecting 
gender equality, social exclusion and poverty, impacts on health, safety, 
                                                   
121 See Renda (2006). 
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consumer rights, social capital, security (including crime and terrorism), 
education, training and culture, as well as distributional implications such 
as effects on the income of particular sectors, groups of consumers or 
workers, etc. 
 The environmental dimension concerns positive and negative impacts 
associated with the changing status of the environment such as climate 
change, air, water and soil pollution, land-use change and bio-diversity 
loss, changes in public health, etc. 
As clearly emerged from these definitions, the IIA model proposed by the 
Commission appeared as a very complex exercise, aimed at predicting all 
possible consequences of the enactment of a new regulation, with evaluations 
that – whether qualitative or quantitative – would certainly be costly, 
burdensome, highly discretionary and time-consuming for administrations. 
Furthermore, the often denounced lack of training for EU public officials, which 
led to obscure and unreliable assessments at a time when the BIA was the 
prevailing impact assessment tool, were likely to be exacerbated with the entry 
into force of the new procedure, possibly the most complex model implemented 
worldwide at the time. It must be recalled that the Commission decided to 
introduce the new procedure gradually, and expected to reach the planned 
complexity and comprehensiveness only in 2004. Moreover, in September 
2002, the Commission published the first version of its guidelines for the 
implementation of an impact assessment procedure.   
The IIA model introduced by the Commission in 2002 is illustrated in Figure 6. 
As emerges from the figure, the new procedure permeated the whole 
Commission’s Strategic Planning and Programming Cycle (SPPC), from the 
definition of the Annual Policy Strategy (APS) to the publication of the 
Commission’s Work Programme (CWP) that leads to inter-service consultation 
before selected initiatives are undertaken and pursued. Preliminary IAs could be 
included in the APS, but had to be completed at the latest before the publication 
of the CWP. The availability of an extended IA (for proposals selected for such a 
more in-depth analysis) was a necessary precondition for launching inter-
service consultation at the beginning of the year in which the regulation will be 
issued. The ExIA report was then attached to the proposal when it was 
submitted to the Commission for final adoption and adopted as a working 
document of the services. After adoption, the ExIA was sent to other institutions 
along with the proposals and made available online. 
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Figure6–TheIIAsystem,2003Ͳ2005
 
 
3.1.4 The re-launch of the EU IA system in 2005 
The Commission assessed the first results of its new Integrated Impact 
Assessment model in December 2004, by drawing a mixed picture on the 
progress made in improving the quality of EU legislation. At the time, the 
worrying signals shown by the mid-term review of the Lisbon strategy in 
February 2005 called for greater emphasis on fostering employment and growth 
and reducing the administrative burdens of regulation, shifting the focus from 
sustainable development to competitiveness, and from integrated impact 
assessment to economic assessment, when not mere compliance cost 
assessment122.  
This was a key passage for the Commission’s Impact Assessment system, which 
led to more evident convergence towards the US  model – in 2005, the UK was 
also revising its RIA system, which resulted however in a dilution of the 
previous system and the adoption of more pragmatic tools to cut red tape on the 
stock of existing legislation, rather than on the flow of new proposals. 
Importantly, this passage also led to abandoning the dual stage system of 
preliminary and extended IAs, to create a single system dominated by the 
principle of proportionate analysis. Against this background, a first measure 
was to request services to establish ‘Roadmaps’ for the initiatives they have put 
forward for inclusion in the Annual Policy Strategy (APS) and in the 
Commission’s Work Programme.123 Roadmaps, now available online at the end 
of every year, contain indications of the IA activity already carried out, 
                                                   
122  In its Communication to the Spring European Council on “Working together for Growth 
and Jobs – A New Start for the Lisbon Strategy”, COM(2005)24 of 2 February 2005, the 
Commission suggested that “[a] new approach to regulation should seek to remove burdens 
and cut red tape unnecessary for reaching the underlying policy objectives. Better 
Regulation should be a cornerstone for decision making at all levels of the Union.”  
123  See European Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact Assessment: Next Steps, 
SEC(2004)1377, Brussels, 21.10.2004. 
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consultation undertaken, options considered and future work to be 
undertaken124. 
But several sources of pressure were calling for some major effort from the 
Commission in order to significantly improve the momentum of better 
regulation efforts, with specific emphasis on strengthening and improving 
impact assessment methods. First, the Parliament and the Council were urging 
the Commission to accept a greater involvement of all EU institutions in the 
procedure, by extending impact assessment to major amendments and defining 
common methodologies for carrying out assessments in all three institutions. 
Moreover, the failure to achieve the goal of achieving a 25% reduction in the 
volume of the acquis communautaire by 2005, stated by the Prodi Commission, 
suggested the need for new efforts in the field of simplification. Finally, the 
decision to extend the impact assessment procedure to all the initiatives 
included in the Commission’s 2005 Legislative and Work Programme (roughly 
100) starkly contrasted with evidence that the scheduled IAs had not been 
completed and had exhibited significant methodological problems, calling for a 
refinement of the guidelines and a redress of the proportionality principle.  
The Commission took action in March 2005 with a new Communication on 
Better Regulation for Growth and Jobs in the European Union, defining the 
achievements of the first years of implementation of the IIA as “first steps in 
what must be a permanent effort”125. The communication laid down important 
changes in the IIA procedure and re-launched the role of IA and better 
regulation as part of the Lisbon strategy. The Communication’s vibrant 
statement on the need to boost better regulation initiatives at all levels results in 
the launch of three key actions, to be reviewed in 2007, devoted to: a) the design 
and application of better regulation tools at EU level; b) a closer collaboration 
with member states to ensure a consistent application of better regulation 
principles; and c) a stronger, constructive dialogue with all EU regulator, 
member states and other stakeholders.  
The main features of the Commission’s new strategy on impact assessment can 
be summarized as follows: 
 Although the IIA was rooted in the sustainable development principle and 
its integrated nature was not under discussion, there was an urge to 
strengthen the assessment of the economic impact of proposed regulations 
– compared to the social and environmental impact assessments – in view 
of the increased  importance of the competitiveness principle. 
 The Commission started developing a methodology to better integrate the 
measurement of administrative costs in its IA model, and has launched a 
pilot project for the quantification of such burdens that will produce the 
first results in late 2005, together with a trial new methodology named ‘EU 
                                                   
124  See the Roadmaps for every year, available online on the Commission’s website, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/planned_ia/planned_ia_en.htm.  
125  See Better regulation for Growth and Jobs in the European Union, European Commission 
Communication - COM(2005)97 (March 2005).  
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Net administrative cost model’, which later became the EU Standard Cost 
Model.126 
 The Commission launched an independent evaluation of the Impact 
Assessment system, which was then completed by The Evaluation 
Partnership in 2007.127 
 The new IA model was extended to the Parliament and the Council, where 
the co-decision procedure applied, for all major amendments to 
Commission proposals. This, later, became the “Inter-institutional 
Common Approach to Impact Assessment”128.  
 Two networks of experts were created. A first network grouped high-level 
national regulatory experts for the development of a “coherent set of 
common indicators to monitor progress as regards the quality of the 
regulatory environment” both at EU and member state level. In addition. 
another network was created, composed of experts in better regulation 
issues, including academicians and practitioners from the economic, social 
and environmental fields, who will be called to advise the Commission on a 
case-by-case basis as regards the methodology adopted for carrying out the 
IA.  
To those who have followed the debate on the implementation of the 
Commission’s IA model since 2003, these changes came to no surprise. The IA 
was coming back to the somewhat tighter walls of cost-benefit analysis, 
compliance cost assessment and simplification, in line with the established 
experience of other countries, and with the mounting pressure of industry 
stakeholders. The ‘back to basics’ hypothesis was supported by the new 
Guidelines issued by the Commission in June 2005.129 The Technical Annex to 
the Guidelines devoted special attention to methods for assessing the economic 
impact of proposed regulations, in particular the impact on growth, 
competitiveness and employment. A specific section was also dedicated to the 
assessment of administrative costs imposed by legislation (Annex 10 to the 
Guidelines, from March 2006).  
3.1.5 Evolution of the EU impact assessment system since 2005 
The external evaluation of the Commission’s IA system in 2007 concluded that 
the Commission was making progress, by improving the quality of proposals, 
                                                   
126  See Commission Staff Working Paper, Annex to the 2005 Communication on Better 
Regulation for Growth and Jobs in the European Union, Minimizing Administrative Costs 
Imposed by Legislation, Detailed Outline of a Possible EU Net Administrative Cost Model, 
SEC(2005)175, 16 March 2005. Recall, in addition, that the UK Presidency stated its 
intention to develop a common methodology on measuring administrative burdens, based 
on the Standard Cost Model successfully applied in the Netherlands.   
127  Communication on Better Regulation for Growth and Jobs in the European Union,  op. cit., 
p. 6 (emphasis in original).  
128  http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/ia_in_other/docs/ii_common_approach_to_ia_en.pdf. 
129  See European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, SEC(2005)971, 15 June 2005. 
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providing effective aid to decision-making, and enhancing transparency130. The 
evaluation, however, pointed out the need to clarify the concept of 
proportionate analysis (see below), to better identify the initiatives to be 
assessed, to improve the timing of IA, and to reduce the number of impact 
assessments per policy choice. 
More generally, looking back at the suggestions issued in 2001 by the 
Mandelkern Group, it is quite clear that many member states have not followed 
the example of the European Commission, and are still far from adopting a real 
better regulation strategy, let alone a full-fledged IA system. And even in 
countries that have made some progress in this respect, the IA systems 
conceived by national regulators differ so widely that any attempted reductio ad 
unum would inevitably fail131. 
x The European Parliament and the Council have been increasingly involved 
in the better regulation agenda, a tendency which culminated in the 2003 
Inter-Institutional Agreement on Better Lawmaking and the 2005 
agreement on a “common approach” to impact assessment132. 
x In late 2006, the Commission appointed an Impact Assessment Board (IAB), 
responding to repeated calls for better quality assurance mechanisms and 
stronger coordination in the ex ante assessment activities carried out by the 
various DGs133.  
x In January 2007, the Commission launched its Action Programme for the 
measurement and reduction of administrative burdens generated by EU 
legislation134. As recalled by Dunlop et al. (2009) and by Wegrich (2009), 
while RIA was the most important instrument in better regulation policies 
between 1995 and 2005, over the past few years other instruments, such as 
the standard cost model used for the reduction of administrative burdens, 
have become more pivotal. 
x The European Commission published an updated and improved version of 
the IA Guidelines in January 2009, followed a few months later by an ad hoc 
guidance document on the assessment of social impacts, an aspect that was 
perceived to be particularly weak in the IA documents produced by the 
European Commission.  
x A consultation on the future of the smart regulation agenda in the EU was 
launched in 2010, with a view to collecting stakeholder views on how to 
improve the system in the years to come.  
Today, the Commission IA system is firmly nested into the Commission’s policy 
cycle. The second Barroso Commission has so far placed emphasis on the need 
                                                   
130  See http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/docs/key_docs/tep_eias_final_report.pdf.  
131  Radaelli (2007), presented at the ENBR workshop in Lisbon.  
132  Both documents can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/ 
ii_coord_en.htm. 
133  For a short description of the IAB, see http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/ 
iab_en.htm.  
134  COM(2007)23 final, 24 January 2007. 
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to perform ex post evaluation before any new IA is undertaken (which reinforces 
the analysis of the status quo and calls for the completion of the policy cycle). 
The IA procedure, coupled with stakeholder consultation, takes approximately 
52 weeks to be completed, before the Commission proposal can indeed be 
finalized and sent – where appropriate – to other EU institutions. Figure 7 
below shows the Commission policy process and the corresponding timing of 
IA.  
Figure7–CountdownforpreparingIAintheEuropeanCommission
 
Source: European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, 15 January 2009 
 
Of the abovementioned changes, perhaps the most important ones – the ones 
that left a mark on the overall design of the system – are the adoption of the 
2009 IA guidelines, the creation of the IAB, and the launch of the Action 
Programme for the measurement and reduction of administrative burdens. 
Below, I elaborate briefly on the issue of oversight on the Commission’s IA 
activity. For an account of the relevance and methodological features of the 
Standard Cost Model, see Böheim, Renda et al. (2006), Renda (2008) and Allio 
and Renda (2010).  
3.1.6 The 2009 Impact Assessment Guidelines: features and scope of 
the EU IA system 
Reading the 2009 Impact Assessment Guidelines of the European Commission 
is an interesting way of discovering the current vision of the Brussels executive 
on the scope and purpose of the IA document, as well as grasping the 
differences with the US approach as described in OIRA Circular A-4. In 
particular, a number of aspects are worth being briefly recalled.  
First, the definition of impact assessment in the US and EU differs noticeably. 
In the US, RIA is defined as “a tool regulatory agencies use to anticipate and 
evaluate the likely consequences of rules”, which “provides a formal way of 
organizing the evidence on the key effects (good and bad) of the various 
alternatives that should be considered in developing regulations”, and has a 
main motivation “to (1) learn if the benefits of an action are likely to justify the 
costs or (2) discover which of various possible alternatives would be the most 
cost-effective”. In the EU Guidelines, IA is “a set of logical steps to be followed 
when you prepare policy proposals”, and “a process that prepares evidence for 
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political decision-makers on the advantages and disadvantages of possible 
policy options by assessing their potential impacts”. This different definition 
supports the view that impact assessment in the EU is way less geared towards 
the quantification of impacts and the calculation of net benefits compared to the 
US one. As the US RIA is tailored to the production of secondary legislation, the 
element of “informing the legislator” is less present than in the EU, where the 
first recipients of most Commission IAs are the democratically elected EU 
institutions that are called to participate in the co-decision process.  
Likewise, the EU impact assessment guidelines seem to imply that quantitative 
cost-benefit analysis or cost-effectiveness analysis are not always needed. For 
example, the Guidelines state that “[f]ull cost-benefit analysis should be used 
when the most significant part of both costs and benefits can be quantified and 
monetised, and when there is a certain degree of choice as regards the extent to 
which objectives should be met (as a function of the costs associated with the 
proposed measures)”. At the same time, the Guidelines invite services to 
perform a multi-criteria assessment by keeping the three pillars (economic, 
social, environmental) separate:  
As a first step, you should summarise the impacts of each option by 
area of impact (economic, social, environmental) and even by sub-
impacts. In this summary, the impacts should not be aggregated; 
negative and positive impacts should be stated next to each other. 
In some cases, it may be possible to assess net impacts per area of 
impact and to provide an assessment of the overall net impact 
(positive impact minus negative impact) of each option. However, 
when this type of cumulative presentation of impacts is made, you 
should be careful not to give the impression that impacts are zero or 
low when, in fact, it is a case of significant positive and negative 
impacts of the same type having simply cancelled each other out. 
However, in another section the Guidelines also state that, in comparing the 
options, “[t]he aim of all interventions is of course to provide benefits that 
exceed any possible negative impacts. In the terminology of cost-benefit analysis 
this means that you should select options that promise the greatest net 
benefits”. Accordingly, there is confusion in the Guidelines as regards the role of 
net benefits: if full cost-benefit analysis is not always needed and multi-criteria 
analysis is supposed to keep impacts separate, one could infer that net benefits 
are not the core of the IA document, and that the document is prepared to 
inform policymakers about a range of impacts of different kind. However, the 
need to select options that bring net benefits seems to clash with the previous 
statement.  
The Guidelines are accompanied by as many as 14 annexes, which add a lot of 
detail to the information available to Commission services and external 
stakeholders as regards the expected content of an IA document. What seems to 
be missing in the Annexes – which describe, i.a., several types of impacts and 
generic regulatory options to be considered – is an attention towards 
implementation, enforcement and compliance as key elements in the 
comparison of options. I will come back to this point in Section 4 below, in 
explaining how law and economics can inform better choices by shifting the 
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focus beyond the formulation of a legal rule, into the effectiveness of its 
implementation in real life.  
3.1.7 The oversight querelle 
The problem of strengthening oversight to improve the quality of IAs has long 
been discussed in Brussels. For example, already in the Final Report on the 
Business Impact Assessment (BIA) system – the “predecessor” of IA – the 
Commission had stated that “weaknesses identified in the BIA system, 
particularly as regards the identification of proposals that should be subject to 
BIA and the quality check on the analysis carried out, indicate that a dedicated 
structure is needed to support an impact assessment process. This is also in 
accordance with international practice.” The Commission also acknowledged 
that such a structure should be given mandate for issuing guidance and 
checking that the quality of the analysis is satisfactory, and suggested that 
“[p]referably, it should be situated centrally within the Commission in order to 
ensure transparency and coordination”. Further support to the creation of 
dedicated oversight bodies came from OECD since the late 1990s. OECD reports 
have always stated the importance of linking impact assessment to an oversight 
body as a key enabler of the success of regulatory impact analysis models135.   
Back in 2005, when the Commission IA system was at the end of its pilot phase, 
Renda (2006) observed that stronger oversight and quality control was needed 
at EU level, especially in order to strengthen the incentives of DGs in the 
drafting of IAs, from a principal-agent perspective. Also scholars like Robert 
Hahn and Robert Litan were advocating for the creation of a “strong centralized 
oversight unit to help evaluate significant regulatory proposals” at EU level136. 
Hahn and Litan also specified that the centralized unit should have a status 
similar to the units it will have to discipline (i.e., lead DGs); that the unit should 
take on a leadership role in establishing information quality and regulatory 
guidelines both for EU and member state policymakers; that the unit should be 
given the power to challenge proposals that do not carry a sufficient or 
satisfactory estimate of net benefits; that it should publish its findings on the 
Internet; that it should publish a comprehensive annual report on the costs and 
benefits of EU regulation; and that it should be adequately funded in order to 
provide training for EU regulators and better information to MEPs.  
The Commission’s reaction was initially negative: internal quality checks 
through inter-service consultation and the internal coordination function of the 
Secretariat General were considered to be sufficient to ensure the quality of IAs 
produced. However, at the end of 2006 things started to change, and eventually 
an Impact Assessment Board (IAB) was created within the Secretariat General, 
                                                   
135  For example, Josef Konvitz recalled that “[t]he relationship between an effective, 
comprehensive regulatory policy and the existence of a central oversight body appears to be 
strong.” Konvitz, J. (2004), “The Institutional Context for Better Regulation”, paper 
presented at the Conference on Simple is Better: Effective Regulation for a More 
Competitive Europe, Amsterdam, 7-8 October 2004. 
136  Hahn, R.W. and R.E. Litan, “Counting Regulatory Benefits and Costs: Lessons for the U.S. 
and Europe”, Journal of International Economic Law, 2005, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 473-508. 
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grouping five top-level officials from the SecGen, DG Enterprise, DG 
Employment, DG Internal Market, DG Environment – although the members of 
the Board act in their personal capacity, not representing their own DGs. 
3.1.7.1 Intra-institutional oversight: the Impact Assessment Board 
The IAB was created with very little resources within the Secretariat general of 
the European Commission. Its members are essentially five (plus a small 
secretariat): the Deputy Secretary-General responsible for better regulation and 
one permanent official at Director level from the Commission departments with 
the most direct expertise in the three pillars – economic, social, environment - 
of integrated impact assessment, namely DG ENV, DG ECFIN, DG EMPL, DG 
ENTR. Interestingly, the DG dedicated to the Internal Market (MARKT) was not 
included in the IAB. And even more interestingly, the Members of the IAB 
perform their activity on top of their ordinary professional duties within their 
Directorate Generals: “members have been appointed in a personal capacity and 
on the basis of their expert knowledge”137.  
The opinions of the Board are not binding. As in the case of OIRA in the United 
States, the positioning of the IAB at the centre of government, in a position that 
is more super partes than inter pares, makes the binding nature of decisions 
almost superfluous: more important is the moral suasion that the IAB can exert 
on the DGs138. Ultimately, it is the Commission itself that decides whether or not 
an initiative should be adopted, and this also on the basis of the IA and the IAB 
opinion. 
Since it began scrutinizing the Impact Assessments prepared by Commission 
services, the IAB has left a clear mark on the whole IA system in Brussels, also 
thanks to the energy and competence of its Chairman Alexander Italianer. As I 
had the chance to experience in several occasions, the principal-agent 
mechanism established with the creation of an internal oversight body has 
emerged as one of the key features of the Brussels IA system today, to the extent 
that Commission officials in charge of drafting IA documents eventually do it 
“for the IAB”, rather than for the EU institutions that will have to discuss the 
proposals. And many of them are indeed terrified by the prospect of having the 
“fab five” scrutinizing every detail of their IAs.   
In the first three years of activity IAB opinions have focused mostly on problems 
in the analysis of impacts, on the definition of the baseline and objectives, on 
the identification, analysis and comparison of policy options, as well as on 
procedural issues and on the content of the executive summary. Overall, the 
impact of the IAB seems positive, although many commentators and industry 
                                                   
137  See description at http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/iab/iab_en.htm.  
138  On the differences and similarities in the role played by the OIRA and IAB in the US and 
EU, respectively, see Wiener, J.B. and A. Alemanno (2010), Comparing Regulatory 
Oversight Bodies Across the Atlantic: The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in 
the US and the Impact Assessment Board in the EU, in Rose-Ackerman, S. & Peter 
Lindseth, eds., “Comparative Administrative Law”, Edward Elgar.  
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stakeholders consider that stronger, possibly independent oversight bodies 
would be needed at EU level.  
However, the level of administrative complexity associated with the creation of a 
new independent agency in charge of external oversight is certainly high. A 
suitable alternative to the creation of an oversight body would be an increased 
transparency of the Commission’s policy process – in particular, the 
Commission could publish draft IAs for consultation before the IAB opinion, so 
that the industry could be given the chance to comment on the quality of the 
data, on the selection of policy options, and on the analysis itself, before the IAB 
gives its opinion on the quality of the document. This would also be important 
since the IAB, even if composed by very experienced members, cannot possess 
the knowledge needed to scrutinize the quality of the substantial analysis 
provided by Commission DGs in their IAs; and also since the limited staff 
available to the IAB, according to a recent draft report circulated by the 
European Court of Auditors, leaves its Members an average four person/days to 
read each draft IA and comment139. 
So far, so good. However, as the Commission’s effort towards expanding the use 
of IA becomes stronger, and the number of IAs produced every year increase at 
breakneck pace (see infra, Figure 8), the sustainability of the IAB model as it is 
already comes into question: could such a small body sustain the review of so 
many IAs per year? Is it efficient and cost-effective to have the IAB scrutinize 
each and every IA, and would this have an impact on the quality of the 
individual opinions issued by the IAB? In some respects, this recalls the 
situation of the OIRA in the US before the Clinton administration decided to 
introduce a minimum threshold for mandatory RIA. Before Executive Order 
12,866, issued in 1993, with just 40 employees, the US central oversight body 
had reviewed on average more than 2,200 federal regulations every year, and 
could not sustain the burden anymore without losing quality. In the case of the 
IAB, with an equivalent of 15 full time staff, scrutiny of a draft impact 
assessment has to be finalized within an average of 3-4 weeks, and in case of 
urgency, this has been shortened to 5-7 working days in 2007. This also means 
that the IAB has to work in parallel at least on 2-3 IAs to evaluate the quality of 
all IAs foreseen for 2008.  
Apart from sustaining such a mounting workload, the internal oversight model 
chosen by the Commission only ensures, to some degree, quality control. This, 
looking at the IAB’s opinion issued so far, mostly revolves around whether all 
impacts have been adequately taken into account, whether the IA at hand 
followed the guidelines, whether case-by-case adjustments are needed, and 
whether more quantification would be appropriate140. As reported by the IAB, in 
2007 the most common recommendations referred to the selection and/or 
analysis of the policy options; the need for reinforcement of the analysis of 
social impacts and distributional impacts, as part of a more balanced approach 
                                                   
139  See the Report of the European Court of Auditors, Impact Assessment in the EU 
Institutions: do they support decision-making?, Special Report 3/2010.  
140  See the Report of the Impact Assessment Board for 2007, available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/docs/key_docs/sec_2008_0120_en.pdf.  
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to the three pillars of impact assessment (economic, social, environmental); the 
need to substantiate the tests of whether the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality are respected; and the need for analysis of simplification 
potential, presentation of corresponding benefits and calculation of impact on 
administrative burden (including measurement with the EU Standard Cost 
Model, whenever administrative burden impacts are likely to be significant). 
This also means that the IAB performs only some of the key functions that could 
be assigned to an oversight body to ensure the quality of lawmaking, i.e. 
guidance, consulting, challenge, coordination of existing activities and yearly 
reporting. The IAB does very little on advocacy, training and keeping 
institutional relations. Of these, the advocacy role seems particularly crucial, 
and could be conferred with more emphasis on the IAB, especially at the early 
stage of the policy process, in which the depth and scope of analysis, together 
with compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, should be thoroughly 
assessed. Advocacy may also include the increased use of (variants of) tools such 
as “prompt letters”, such as the ones issued by the OIRA in the US, or 
“Legislative Reform Orders” in the UK.  
The “missing functions” of the IAB as an oversight body are mostly related to 
the often recalled problem of the lack of “identity” of the EU IA system. This 
question can also be translated into the usual querelle on who controls the 
policy process in the EU. This problem, originally mentioned already by 
Giandomenico Majone in 1999 and recently highlighted also by Radaelli and 
Meuwese (2008), remains one of the key pending issues within the whole better 
regulation agenda of the European Union. As will be argued in Section 4 below, 
the answer most probably lies in the delicate balance between; (i) the need to 
empower the IAB with the more concrete role of translating Council priorities 
into proposals for concrete action; (ii) the need to expand the Commission’s 
competencies throughout the co-decision procedure, especially in the revision of 
IAs that are severely amended by the Parliament and/or the Council; and (iii) 
the need for more control over a more powerful Commission.  
3.2 Evaluating the practice of Impact Assessment in EU 
institutions: a look at the evidence  
The EU experience with IA is considered as being fairly successful, but margins 
for improvement certainly exist. As confirmed also by the 70 opinions gathered 
by the Commission during the consultation on the future of smart regulation 
that ran between 23 April and 25 June 2010, the issues to be tackled in the years 
to come include the need to improve the methodology and soundness of the 
economic analysis, the efficient use of resources devoted to Impact Assessment 
and ex post evaluation in the European Commission, the urge to involve other 
EU institutions and national governments in the drafting of IAs, etc.141 These 
views also echo the comments formulated over the past years by a number of 
                                                   
141 The consultation document and opinions expressed can be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/smart_regulation/consultation_en.ht
m.  
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commentators, which were a bit less generous than the ex post evaluation 
carried out for the Commission by TEP. For example, in 2006 Ragnar Löfstedt 
argued that the EU better regulation agenda, after reaching a peak, had 
eventually “plateau-ed”, after attempts to fully transform it into a paradigm for 
EU policymaking142. Wiener (2007) suggested a number of changes in the EU 
better regulation agenda – on which he expressed a positive overall judgment – 
entailing the adoption of strategies such as “enlarging the scope of impact 
assessment and benefit-cost analysis toward a broader, “warmer” and more 
even-handed application of these tools”, “moving beyond a narrow focus on 
cutting administrative costs or simplification for their own sake, toward criteria 
that address benefits as well as costs” and “centralizing expert oversight so that 
impact assessments actually influence decisions, both to say ‘no’ to bad ideas 
and ‘yes’ to good ideas”. In 2008, the final policy paper of the EU-funded EVIA 
project suggested, i.a., that “IAs should support the decision-making throughout 
the whole policy cycle”, and that “it seems useful to define an overall broad 
scope, but to implement it through targeted analytical methods and tools”. 
Finally,  Radaelli and Meuwese (2008) argued that the future of IA in the 
European Commission still faced a number of hard questions, mostly related to 
the need to define who controls the policy process at EU level143. In several 
papers, Claudio Radaelli (together with several co-authors) argued that the IA 
system in the EU should be more targeted, as it eventually applies to too many 
policy proposals, of which only a few would actually deserve an IA144. Likewise, 
Meuwese (2008) makes the case for IA as a tool to inform the policymaker, but 
with an elusive meaning – in some cases taking the form of “speaking the truth 
to power”, in others as “letting stakeholders have a say in the policy process”145. 
Finally, suggestions for reform of the IA system in the EU are also contained in 
Renda (2008) and Renda et al. (2009). 
One methodology that is frequently used to assess the quality of IAs – better, 
their completeness and their respondence to the IA guidelines – is the scorecard 
                                                   
142  See Löfstedt, R. (2007), The 'Plateau-ing' of the European Better Regulation Agenda: An 
Analysis of Activities Carried out by the Barroso Commission, Journal of Risk Research, 
vol. 10 (4), 423-447. 
143  See Radaelli, C.M. and A. C. M.Meuwese (2010), Hard questions, and equally hard 
solutions? Proceduralization through impact assessment in the European Union, West 
European Politics 33, 136–53.  
144  Radaelli, C.M. and A.C.M. Meuwese (2009), Better Regulation in Europe: Between Public 
Management and Regulatory Reform, Public Administration 87, 639–54. Radaelli, C.M., 
F. De Francesco and V.E. Troeger (2007) The implementation of Regulatory Impact 
Assessment in Europe, Paper presented at the European Network for Better Regulation, 
Workshop on Regulatory Quality: Developing tools, approaches and sources for research on 
impact assessment, University of Exeter, Exeter 27 and 28 March 2007.  
145  More in detail, Meuwese (2008) distinguishes between four different meanings of RIA as 
"instrument that informs the decisionmaker": (a) to speak the truth to power; (b) to use 
RIA to highlight trade-offs in lawmaking; (c) to provide a forum for the input of a wide 
range of stakeholders; and (d) to give reasons for legislative decisions. Meuwese then 
argues that there is no agreement among EU institutions about which notion is really 
predominant, which lead RIA to constantly fluctuate in search of an identity. See Meuwese 
(2008), supra note 22.  
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analysis introduced in this field by Robert Hahn146. Below, I describe some of 
the early attempts to provide a scorecard analysis of Commission IAs, and then 
provide an updated scorecard on all the IAs published by the Commission 
between 2003 and 2009, with the ultimate purpose of tracking progress and 
identifying weaknesses in the current system.   
3.2.1 Previous scorecards and evaluations 
Scholars that have undertaken a tentative assessment of the first IAs undertaken 
by European Commission’s DGs have reported quite puzzling results. For 
example, Lee and Kirkpatrick (2004) have scrutinized the first six Extended IAs 
(as they were called at that time) completed by the Commission in 2003, 
reporting a number of weaknesses and an overall heterogeneity in the quality of 
the assessment performed. Methodological weaknesses included an unclear 
description of the problem, obscure ranking of the objectives, a relatively 
narrow range of alternative policy options considered, an unbalanced coverage 
of different types of impact (e.g. economic, social, environmental), unreliable 
assessment findings, deficiencies in the presentation of report findings, 
insufficient time and resources available to complete a sufficiently detailed 
analysis, lack of transparency in the process and inadequate arrangements for 
external consultation.147  
Similarly, Vibert (2004) analyzed the first 20 Extended IAs performed by the 
Commission, by applying a scorecard approach similar to that developed by 
Robert Hahn.148 Out of 20 Extended IAs, only 10 quantified (and only 9 
monetized) costs and benefits, only 11 carried data on market alternatives and 
only 2 contained a provision for peer review. Finally, all 20 proposals subjected 
to IA were finally approved, and 10 were re-designed as a consequence of the 
results obtained in the IA process. The author concluded that the EU IA model 
deserved a positive initial evaluation, in particular because it added a lesson-
learning dimension to the formulation of Commission’s legislative initiatives. 
However, the unreliability and heterogeneity of the cost-benefit analysis 
severely undermined the actual contribution that the new procedure can 
provide to EU competitiveness and sustainable development in the medium 
range.  
                                                   
146  See supra note 24 for an extensive list of references.  
147  Lee, N. and C. Kirkpatrick (2004), A Pilot Study of the Quality of European Commission 
Extended Impact Assessments, IARC Working Paper Series No. 8, 2004, p. 27.  
148  F. Vibert (2004), The EU’s New System of Regulatory Impact Assessment – A Scorecard, 
European Policy Forum, London. See also Robert W. Hahn and Patrick M. Dudley 82004), 
How Well Does the Government Do Cost-Benefit Analysis?, Working Paper No. 04-01, 
AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Washington, D.C.; Hahn, R.W. and 
Robert E. Litan (2005), Counting Regulatory Benefits and Costs: Lessons for the U.S. and 
Europe, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2005, pp. 473-508; and, for 
a more recent comparison of scorecards for US and EU, see Cecot, Caroline, Hahn, Robert 
W., Renda, Andrea and Schrefler, Lorna (2008), An Evaluation of the Quality of Impact 
Assessment in the European Union with Lessons for the U.S. and the EU, Regulation & 
Governance, Vol .2, No. 4, December 2008 , pp. 405-424(20). 
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Other early scorecards include Opoku and Jordan (2004), who analyze all the 41 
Extended IAs completed by lead DGs in 2003 and 2004, by focusing in 
particular on the consideration of the external dimension and on the detailed 
scoring of a more limited set of ExIAs, related to the sugar regime, the tobacco 
regime, the REACH Directive, the Kyoto Protocol, the ‘Youth in Action’ program 
and the ‘Lifelong learning’ program. They concluded that a number of measures 
would be required to improve the consideration of the external dimension in 
Extended IAs. These included “updating the guidelines with more explicit 
instructions to consider the external dimension in all sections of the IA; the 
clarification of which aspects of the guidelines are mandatory and which are 
discretionary; the allocation of resources for undertaking the IAs; the clear 
application of selection criteria for choosing policy proposals to undergo an 
extended IA; and also the thorough consultation of all interested parties 
including DGs and outside actors (especially NGOs).”149 
Lussis (2004) applies a check-list model for the purpose of comparing 13 
Extended IAs completed between 2003 and 2004. He finds that “most of the 
ExIA define policy alternatives and assess them. However, there is obviously a 
‘methodological hole’ in the areas of impact identification, prediction and 
assessment. In addition, ... most ExIAs do not bring up a clear comparison of 
the alternatives regarding the impact assessment.”150 
More recently, Renda (2006) compared empirical results on the first 75 IAs 
completed by the Commission in 2003-2005 with the expectations raised at 
political level, and concluded that the first years had resulted in a “sea of 
disappointment”. The same paper concluded that the system had to be revised, 
i.a. by strengthening central oversight. Similar results were found in more 
recent years by Cecot, Hahn, Renda and Schrefler (2007), who draw some 
lessons for the US from a scorecard analysis of Commission IAs completed 
between 2003 and 2006.  
3.2.2 An updated scorecard 
The European Commission has achieved significant results in mainstreaming IA 
into its policymaking process, though important margins for improvement 
remain. At the end of 2009, the European Commission had completed 475 IAs, 
distributed as in Figure 8 below.  
                                                   
149  See C. Opoku and A. Jordan (2004), Impact Assessment in the EU: A Global Sustainable 
Development Perspective, paper presented at the Berlin Conference on the Human 
Dimension of Global Environmental Change, 3-4 December 2004 (available at 
http://www.fu-berlin.de/ffu/akumwelt/bc2004/download/opoku_jordan_f.pdf).  
150  See B. Lussis (2004), EU Extended Impact Assessment Review, Institut pour un 
Développement Durable Working Paper, 9 December 2004 (available at 
http://users.skynet.be/idd/documents/EIDDD/WP01.pdf).   
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Figure8–NumberofIAsperyearattheEuropeanCommission,2003Ͳ2010
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
(2010 data estimated from Commission roadmaps) 
 
The number of IAs has been increasing significantly since 2006, although 2009 
marked a slow-down due mostly to the transition towards a new European 
Commission and a new European Parliament. In 2010, at least 140 IAs are 
expected according to the available 2010 roadmaps151. 
However, not all Commission DGs have been involved in the process in the 
same way. Figure 9 below shows that some DGs – i.e. Transport and Energy 
(TREN), Environment (ENV), Justice Liberty and Security (JLS), Enterprise 
and Industry (ENTR) and Internal Market (MARKT) – completed more than 
60% of all Commission IAs, and other DGs only performed a few IAs over the 
2003-2009 timeframe.  
 
                                                   
151 See http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/planned_ia/roadmaps_2010_en.htm.  
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Figure9–NumberofIAsperDG,atDecember2009
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
In any event, available data confirm that the Commission IAs have become 
more complete and transparent over time. In particular, a scorecard recently 
completed by the Centre for European Policy Studies (unpublished) on the 475 
IAs completed between 2003 and 2009 revealed a number of interesting 
insights, which are summarized below.  
3.2.2.1 Types of proposals 
An analysis of the types of initiatives subject to IA in the European Commission 
in the period 2003-2009 reveals that, with the increase in the volume of IAs 
performed, the percentage accounted for by cross-cutting policy proposals (CC) 
has been decreasing. Figure 10 below shows that, on the contrary, non-binding 
communications (COM) and narrow policy initiatives (NA) account for the lion’s 
share of Commission’s impact assessments. This is particularly important, 
especially as regards the application of the principle of proportionate analysis 
and the consequence depth of analysis and degree of quantification to be 
expected.  
15
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Figure10–TypeofinitiativesubjecttoIA,2003Ͳ2009
(a)Typeofproposal
 
(b)Typeofbindingproposal
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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3.2.2.2 Assessment of impacts 
The assessment (qualitative or quantitative) of economic, social and 
environmental impacts has become more systematic between 2003 and 2009. 
Figure 11 below shows that in 2005, less than 30% of the IAs assessed the 
environmental impact, whereas economic and social impacts were considered in 
less than 70% of the IAs. In 2009, environmental impacts were assessed in 60% 
of the IAs and economic and social impacts were assessed in almost all IAs. 
Figure11–Assessmentofimpacts,CommissionIAs,2003Ͳ2009
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
More in detail, figure 12 below shows some data on the frequency of assessment 
of economic impacts, including the impact on competitiveness, on SMEs, on the 
single market and the macroeconomic impacts of the proposal. The figure shows 
some remarkable improvements in the completeness of IA documents: for 
example, the fact that more than 60% of all IAs on binding proposals carried an 
assessment of the impact on competitiveness is, by itself, a remarkable result, 
although the quality of such assessment is not always superb.  
21
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Figure12–frequencyofassessmentofspecificeconomicimpacts
(a)–AllIAs
 
(b)onlybindingproposals
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
A similar trend is visible looking at social impacts, as in figure 14. Impacts such 
as health, employment, social inclusion and fundamental rights are increasingly 
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considered by the European Commission DGs when drafting Impact 
Assessments.  
Figure13–frequencyofassessmentofspecificsocialimpacts
(a)–AllIAs
 
(b)onlybindingproposals
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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Finally, environmental impacts have also become more frequently assessed by 
the Commission DGs, although the trend towards greater frequency of 
assessment is less evident than for economic and social impacts. 
Figure14–frequencyofassessmentofspecificenvironmentalimpacts
(a)–AllIAs
  
(b)onlybindingproposals
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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3.2.2.3 Assessment of alternatives 
The assessment of alternatives seems to have become more systematic. As 
shown in figure 15 below, the costs and benefits of alternative policy options are 
more frequently quantified and monetized in Commission IAs, especially 
compared to the 2004-2005 period, in which the assessment of alternatives was 
very limited. Today, in approximately 30% of the cases the European 
Commission provides an indication of the net benefits or cost-effectiveness of 
the policy options considered – a figure that must be appraised also in light of 
the fact that not all Commission IAs are related to binding policy actions.  
Figure15–Assessmentofalternativepolicyoptions,CommissionIAs,2003Ͳ2009
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
3.2.2.4 Methodology 
Available data confirm that the Commission IA system is less geared towards 
cost-benefit analysis and the adoption of similar (but simpler) methodologies 
such as cost-effectiveness analysis.  
24
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Figure16–netbenefitsandcostͲeffectivenesscalculation
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
The degree of sophistication of Commission IAs is anyway on the increase. 
Figure 17 shows the number of IAs that embarked in difficult economic analyses 
such as the calculation of the number of lives saved by a given policy option is 
increasing year on year. At the same time, the Commission makes more use of 
discount rates when assessing future impacts; performs risk assessment more 
often; and offers a sensitivity analysis to check the robustness of its 
assumptions.  
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Figure17–SophisticationofCommissionIAs,2003Ͳ2009(selectedindicators)
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
3.2.3 Other EU institutions 
While the European Commission has managed to make systematic use of IA 
tools, it is no mystery that other EU institutions such as the European 
Parliament and the Council have largely failed to achieve the objective of 
performing assessments on their major amendments on Commission’s 
proposals, despite their commitments expressed in the 2003 “Inter-
Institutional agreement on better lawmaking”, and in the 2005 “Common 
Approach to Impact Assessment”. This also means that European Commission 
IAs, once the proposal is amended during the co-decision procedure, lose their 
representativeness and their usefulness for potential users such as national 
governments.  
The European Parliament has gradually replaced the practice of IA with the 
commissioning of external background studies and briefing notes, which 
normally are not linked with the original Commission IA, and do not feature the 
structure of an IA document. The Council is reportedly making more use of 
Commission IAs, but after a pilot project on a limited number of amendments 
back in 2004, has dropped completely the production of IAs.  
In a recent publication, Renda et al. (2009) debate whether the failure of the 
Common Approach to IA should lead to a new approach to inter-institutional 
dialogue at the EU level152. Below, we briefly discuss this issue together with the 
other emerging trends in EU impact assessment.  
                                                   
152  Renda, A. et al. (2009), Policymaking in the EU; achievements, challenges and proposals 
for reform, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels. 
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3.3 EU impact assessment: towards reform? 
The trajectory of Impact Assessment in the European Union is at least tortuous, 
and a mix of success and failure. The main success lies in the fact that Impact 
Assessment is – at least partly – changing the way in which bureaucrats in 
Brussels think about policymaking and the need to motivate the need for policy 
action, and the form of action that is preferable to others. Only partly, because 
instances of IAs that fall randomly on the shoulders of unaware officials who 
have little or no knowledge of economics, as well as cases in which IA is done 
with a passive box-ticking attitude are still frequent in many DGs. In addition, 
the fact that certain DGs (MARKT, ENTR) are working on their own version of 
the guidelines to improve the quality of their own IAs is symptomatic of a drive 
towards improvement and increased IA quality.  
The main problem that remains inside the European Commission’s IA system is 
the lack of a clear focus. Being clear that the EU IA system does not follow the 
same logic of the US one, and is less geared towards the monetization of all 
impacts through Kaldor-Hicks cost-benefit analysis, it remains unclear whether 
the IA document produced by Commission DGs and validated by the Board 
should abide by any specific methodology or need for quantification. In other 
words, it is unclear what is the benchmark when the IAB scrutinizes IAs, if not 
the (still quite generic) IA Guidelines. Perhaps, given the fact that the European 
Commission has several goals and a generalized lack of policy coordination 
across different actions, the lack of focus of the IA document simply reflects the 
lack of policy coherence in Brussels.  
To be sure, the IA document, far from being a panacea, let alone a piece of 
highly scientific analysis, is now becoming a sort of synecdoche, a document 
that contains a summary of all the competing and contrasting interests that 
surround the formulation and discussion of the policy proposal. This, in turn, 
makes it very difficult to distinguish the IA document from an explanatory 
memorandum, even if decorated with tables, some numbers and bit more 
structure. The fact that the IA document does not adopt a clearly recognizable 
viewpoint – for example, the result of a quantitative cost-benefit analysis – 
weakens the process irremediably.  
In addition, the fact that the IA system is still relatively weak in Brussels reflect 
the fact that the European Commission is still relatively weak from an 
institutional perspective. If the IA could be used by the Commission to resist 
amendments imposed by the Parliament and the Council, which clearly go 
against the economic evidence, then the role of the Commission would partly 
become that of real “guardian of the Treaty”, and at the same time watchdog in 
charge of monitoring the behavior of other EU institutions and ensure that, 
whenever they seriously amend a Commission proposal against the evidence, 
they do it by taking full political responsibility for such choice.  
Finally, the European Commission needs to re-organize its IA system to make 
sure it uses resources efficiently, and possibly in a more targeted way. The 
increased amount of IAs that are being produced by Commission DGs threatens 
the sustainability of the IAB: in addition, the principle of proportionate analysis 
seems to be followed very imperfectly, and Commission IAs do not seem to 
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respond to the well-know adagio of “asking the right things, at the right time, in 
the right sequence” that was mentioned already in the Mandelkern Report. 
More in detail, the sequence of questions that the Commission asks during the 
policy cycle (from the impact assessment of the White Paper through to the IA 
on a framework directive, and the IAs on implementing regulations) sometimes 
translates into overlapping questions and cases in which the Commission, after 
having gone through a full-fledged RIA in an early stage, reinvents the wheel in 
subsequent stages.  
The Commission seems to have taken action to solve some of these problems 
with the Communication on Smart Regulation in the European Union, adopted 
in October 2010153. There, the Commission announces its intention to “close the 
policy cycle” by providing for ex post evaluations of existing legislation before 
any new ex ante IA can be performed. Likewise, the Commission plans to 
strengthen the ex ante consideration of transposition, implementation, 
enforcement, and make use of implementation plans at national level.  At the 
same time, the Commission wishes to move beyond the narrow focus of current 
IAs, which necessarily refers to individual policy initiatives, and engage more in 
“fitness checks” covering entire policy domains – the first ones were launched in 
the fields of environment, transport, employment/social policy and industrial 
policy, but new areas will be identified in 2011.  
But obviously, the real problem with impact assessment do not lie inside 
Berlaymont or Charlemagne, but rather inside Justus Lipsius. The fact that the 
IA document is never updated during the co-decision procedure is a major 
obstacle to the development of multi-level evidence-based policymaking in the 
EU. And this is also a major challenge for the Barroso Commission in the years 
to come.  
In Section 6 I will come back to some of these problems to offer a solution that 
is grounded in law and economics, as well as in past experience with the IA 
system in Europe. Section 3.4 below briefly illustrates the current state of 
Impact Assessment development at national level in EU member states. 
3.4 RIA in EU member states: emerging trends 
In the international regulatory reform community, as well as in many circles of 
political science, Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) is considered as one of 
the most useful and effective tools for the scrutiny of the flow of regulation, as 
well as a powerful regulatory governance instrument. Several countries around 
the world feature some form of RIA, which may serve different purposes 
depending on the context in which the procedure is introduced. Compared with 
other tools such as the increasingly widespread measurement of administrative 
burdens, consultation procedures or ex post monitoring and evaluation, RIA 
appears to require a more profound change in the culture of public 
administrations and bureaucrats, and has therefore encountered significant 
problems in its implementation around the world. From an international 
perspective, the first countries that managed to mainstream RIA into their 
                                                   
153 COM(2010)543, 11 October 2010. 
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policymaking process were notably common law countries, especially within the 
broader context of public management reforms – e.g. the New Public 
Management wave in the UK, the Reinventing Government in the United 
States154. Other countries, in particular civil law countries, have committed 
resources to the development of ex ante RIA practices, but for many years have 
failed to fully implement RIA for a substantial part of their flow of legislation. 
Accordingly, a conspicuous adoption-implementation gap has emerged, as 
observed by several scholars in the past few years155.  
Against this background, the international RIA landscape appears more like a 
patchwork of very different experiences and alternate fortunes, rather than a 
consistent and parallel development. One scholar has compared the practice of 
comparing RIA systems around the world to that of comparing apples and 
pears, given the existing divergence in the way national governments have 
attempted to mainstream this procedure in their policymaking process156.  
More in detail, RIA systems differ according to a number of characteristics, 
including the following: 
 Scope. Some countries have introduced mandatory RIA only for secondary 
legislation (e.g. the United States), whereas other legal systems require it 
also for primary legislation or even for non-binding policy documents (e.g. 
the European Union). Some countries limit RIA to certain sectors (e.g. 
network industries, or proposals to implement EU legislation), whereas 
others apply them to all the new legal proposals. Some countries have 
enacted thresholds to select the proposals that should undergo RIA (e.g., the 
US, the UK), whereas in other systems there is no such threshold, and the 
selection follows other principles, including that of proportionate analysis 
(e.g. the EU).  
 Purpose. In some countries RIA serves the main purpose of enabling the 
monitoring of the performance of bureaucrats, within a principal-agent 
scheme between the government and its administration (e.g. the United 
States). To the contrary, in other legal systems the main purpose has been 
in-house learning (the EU), or specific targets to contrast poverty (Ireland), 
reduce administrative burdens (the Netherlands, Germany), allow for 
dialogue with the business sector (Sweden) or even the reduction of 
corruption through greater transparency and accountability (as in several 
developing countries).  
 Methodology and quantification. Different scopes and different 
purposes are also reflected in a different emphasis being placed on the 
quantification and monetization of impacts in different countries. Eastern 
European countries, such as Poland and in particular Ukraine, have 
                                                   
154  See Renda, Impact Assessment in the EU, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels 
(2006). 
155  See Radaelli, De Francesco and Troeger, supra note 144. And Radaelli, C. M. (2005). 
Diffusion without convergence: How political context shapes the adoption of regulatory 
impact assessment. Journal of European Public Policy, 12(5), 924-943. 
156  Radaelli, C. M. (2009). Desperately seeking regulatory impact assessments: Diary of a 
reflective researcher. Evaluation, 15(1), 31-48. 
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traditionally placed more emphasis on RIA as an explanatory document, and 
as such have made limited use of quantitative cost-benefit analysis in their 
RIA documents; on the other hand, the United States have devoted growing 
efforts to the monetization of impacts, including non-market goods such as 
biodiversity or the value of human lives, in order to increase the 
transparency of decision-making and the measurability of impacts over time. 
Also the European Commission has strengthened the emphasis on 
quantitative analysis since 2005, and later with the appointment of the 
Impact Assessment Board.  
 Governance and oversight. In several countries there is a single, 
dedicated unit nested in the centre of government, with the role of 
consultant, advisor and/or adversarial gatekeeper for the departments, 
ministries or other bodies in charge of drafting the RIA document. In some 
countries the whole RIA process is managed by the Cabinet Office (e.g., the 
UK, Italy), in others by the Ministry of Economy or Finance (e.g., the 
Netherlands, Slovakia), in others by the Ministry of Justice (e.g., Hungary) 
or the Ministry of Interior (the Czech Republic), depending on the purpose 
and scope of the RIA system. In addition, some countries have appointed ad 
hoc external oversight bodies in charge of monitoring the RIA activity 
performed by the government: in most cases these bodies – such as Actal in 
the Netherlands, the Normenkontrollrat in Germany or the Regulatory 
Policy Commission in the United Kingdom – have a more specific mandate 
confined to the measurement of administrative burdens or the compliance 
costs of legislation. Finally, in some countries other bodies, such as courts of 
auditors, perform an ex post oversight function (e.g. the NAO in the UK, the 
GAO in the US, the Dutch Court of Audit, the European Court of Auditors, 
etc.). 
 Effective implementation. Past research projects such as the European 
Network for Better Regulation (ENBR) have shown that, despite a general 
trend towards the adoption of the RIA system, only a fistful of European 
countries have effectively reached a significant number of RIAs published 
(see Section 3 below). Cases in which RIA has emerged as a key step in the 
policy process include to some extent the United Kingdom and non-EU 
countries such as Ukraine. In all other countries, the situation was less 
encouraging, although the past 2-3 years have shown some sign of 
development in countries like Sweden, Ireland, the Netherlands and, most 
recently, France.  
This section aims at introducing the complex universe of RIA in a non-technical 
way, with specific focus on its scope, purpose and methodological 
underpinnings in the United States and in Europe. More in detail, I draw on the 
experience of the DIADEM database within ENBR and also on similar research 
projects (including EVIA, the SSIA project for the European Commission DG 
EMPL, the IA-TOOLS project of the European Commission’s Joint Research 
Centre, etc.) to describe the current trends in the adoption and implementation 
of RIA in European countries and beyond. In particular, Section 2.1 below 
provides a description of the RIA system in the United States, whereas section 
2.2 describes the EU impact assessment experience and illustrates data on the 
475 IAs completed by the European Commission between 2003 and end 2009. 
LAW AND ECONOMICS IN THE RIA WORLD | 85 
LAW AND ECONOMICS IN THE RIA WORLD - © ANDREA RENDA 2011  
Section 2.3 briefly looks at the characteristics of RIA in the EU27, and focuses 
on specific trends emerged in the past few years, such as the need for centralized 
oversight, the focus on administrative and compliance costs, the refinement of 
methodological guidance, the completion of the policy cycle with monitoring 
and ex post evaluation, and appointment of external oversight bodies in charge 
of overseeing the governmental RIA activity. Section 2.4 concludes by offering 
some thoughts on the current state of the debate on RIA, including the oft-
neglected problem of how to improve the methodological approach to ex ante 
policy appraisal.  
Compared to the progress achieved by the European Commission in ex ante 
impact assessment, most EU member states appear to significantly lag behind. 
While one country, the UK, clearly took the lead in Europe, significantly 
determining the launch of the IA system in Europe, to date in several Member 
States IA is still on paper, or has even not been launched. A snapshot of the 
current adoption-implementation gap is provided by the comparison of Figure 
18 and Figure 19 below. In Figure 18, the results of the OECD “government at a 
glance” in 2009 are reported, with specific focus on explicit requirements for 
RIA processes in Central government. These variables describe the extent to 
which RIA is sponsored and formally adopted in central governmental 
structures. 
 
Figure18–RequirementsforRIAincentralgovernments,withsensitivityanalysis,2005v.2008
 
Source: OECD, Government at a glance, 2009 
 
When looking at the actual implementation of RIA in practice, it is important to 
define RIA in the first place. The ENBR project back in 2005 hosted a 
discussion between experts on what can constitute a valid definition of RIA. 
According to ENBR experts, a RIA has four components (ENBR Handbook on 
Methodology 2006:6): 
1) A systematic, mandatory, and consistent assessment of aspects of social, 
economic, or environmental impacts such as benefits and/or costs. This 
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means that an IA is part of a system of impact analysis based on clear scope 
and directions. The scope can be narrow or broad, but it is clear that an IA is 
not an intermittent or voluntary effort to examine impacts.  
2) Affecting interests external to the government. The purpose of IA is to 
expand the range of impacts relevant to decisions to external impacts. An 
assessment only of fiscal or government budget implications is an input into 
traditional fiscal policy, and is not IA in the modern sense. 
3) Of proposed regulations and other kinds of legal and policy instruments. 
Governments use many policy instruments to implement policy, and ex ante 
assessment of impacts can be used for most or all of those instruments.  
4) To i) inform policy decisions before a regulation, legal instrument, or policy 
is adopted; or ii) assess external impacts of a group of laws or regulations 
to support reforms; or iii) assess the accuracy of an earlier IA.  
This definition, in and of itself, led ENBR researchers to exclude many 
documents published by national governments, which appear to lack some of 
the typical features of a RIA. This already created concerns in the real nature of 
the documents being produced by national governments in Europe, which are 
termed as RIA, but in fact are something different from a systematic 
requirement to perform ex ante impact assessment of proposed legislation. 
Figure 19 below shows the number of actual IA documents produced by 
governments that matched the ENBR definition illustrated above at the end of 
2008, for each of the countries covered by the ENBR DIADEM database. As 
shown in the picture, only the UK, Ukraine and the European Commission 
could be said to have reached a sufficient level of RIA documents – with many 
differences – among the countries covered.  
 
Figure19–ImpactAssessmentsintheDIADEMdatabase,endof2008
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Source: DIADEM database, www.enbr.org  
 
Interesting and more updated results were found, for a more limited number of 
countries, by Staronova (2010) for the Central and Eastern European Countries, 
and by the OECD EU15 project157. Overall, the review of better regulation in the 
15 countries has revealed the existence of a number of problems in the 
implementation of ex ante impact assessment, including, most notably, the need 
to clarify the link between IA and administrative burden reduction programmes, 
which appear more widespread and more strongly implemented at national 
level. The reason for this may well be that the Standard Cost Model (SCM), on 
which burdens reduction programmes are based, is a less intrusive model as it 
does not require a real change in the culture of public administrations; and also 
because it is easier to communicate to stakeholders, as it leads to clearly 
identifiable reduction proposals. At the same time, however the SCM has a 
much narrower scope than ex ante IA, since it only looks at administrative 
burdens and can potentially extended to compliance costs, but does not look at 
the benefits of legislation in place or alternative policy options.  
Looking at the EU27 landscape, it is possible to distinguish different types of 
countries as regards their experience on IA procedures.  
 Pioneers. As already explained, one country – the UK – can be defined as 
pioneer in Europe, having experimented with IA practices since the 1980s 
and with a more full-fledged IA since 1998. Other countries, i.e. Denmark, 
Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Sweden have been defined as 
pioneering countries, since they formally adopted RIA before the OECD 
agreement on regulatory reform. However, in none of these countries RIA 
has been successfully implemented in the policy process.  
 CEE countries. Finally, some Central and Eastern European countries – also 
pushed by the OECD Sigma project – have launched RIA pilots back in the 
1990s. This is the case, in particular, of Hungary and Estonia, which 
started experimenting with RIA in 1994 and 1999, respectively (Staronova, 
2010); in the Czech Republic, the Legislative Rules of Government 
introduced a RIA requirement in 1998 but it only entered into force in 2007. 
In Slovakia, requirements for RIA were introduced in November 2001 via 
an amendment of the Legislative Rules of the Government, following 
recommendations by the Audit of State Administration. In 2004, the 
Slovenian government signed The Act on Cooperation between the 
National Assembly and the Government in EU Affairs, which obliges the 
Government to carry out assessments of the impact and implications of draft 
EU-related measures. In Poland, already at the end of 2001 IA became 
compulsory for all the legislative drafts adopted by the Council of Ministers, 
and a Department for impact assessment was established at the Government 
Legislation Centre. Early starters have, however, faced several difficulties in 
effectively implementing RIA in their policy cycle. For example, Hungary, 
                                                   
157  See Staronova, K. (2010), Regulatory Impact Assessment: Formal Institutionalization and 
Practice, Journal of Public Policy, 30, 1, 117-136. And the main report of the OECD EU15 
project at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/14/45115076.pdf. 
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despite its early attempt in 1994, has never managed to produce good quality 
RIA documents over time, and reportedly lags behind other CEE countries in 
several respects, including consultation, the identification and analysis of 
impacts, and the overall quality of the assessment. Estonia, on the other 
hand, has gradually managed to improve the system and was later joined by 
the Czech Republic, where only a few, high quality RIAs have been produced 
to date158. 
 Late adopters often have the advantage of learning from other countries’ 
mistakes, and can achieve better outcomes within a lower time frame. A first 
consequence of this has been the emergence of a group of successful late 
adopters in the EU27. For example, Ireland has abandoned its fragmented 
system that entailed separate assessments of various impacts (including 
poverty impact assessment) to launch a more comprehensive RIA system in 
2007. Similarly, the government of The Netherlands is considering the 
launch of a comprehensive RIA system that replaces the previous three-
pronged ex ante assessment model, based on business impacts, 
environmental impacts and the practicability and enforcement assessment 
in use since 1994. Sweden has made enormous progress in its adoption and 
implementation of RIA, and in December 2007, the Government issued a 
Regulatory Impact Assessment Ordinance, which supersedes the Ordinance 
on Special Impact Assessment of the Effects of Rules on Conditions for Small 
Enterprises, which previously regulated IA work. The new Ordinance states 
that IA must now be carried out for every new or amended regulation. The 
watchdog set up by the business confederation, the NNR, has observed that 
in the past eight years IA has progressed noticeably in Sweden, but also 
stated that too few good RIAs are being produced. Finally, after years in 
which the RIA system had faced significant adoption problems, let alone 
implementation, France has launched a new system of impact studies since 
1 September 2009: the system possesses a unique feature in Europe, as 
impact studies have been made a constitutional requirement. Absent a 
(sufficiently detailed) RIA document attached to bills sent by the 
Government to parliament, the Speakers of either of the two assemblies may 
refuse to place the related policy item on the agenda, including if they find it 
inadequate.  
 Countries dominated by the “cutting red tape” agenda. There is a clearly 
emerging group of countries where the better regulation rhetoric has evolved 
into a de-regulation and simplification one, leading to the blossoming of 
programs aimed at cutting red tape, and to gradually shift the focus towards 
administrative burdens reduction, and away from more full-fledged RIA. 
These countries certainly include Germany, where the formal adoption of 
RIA – very much in line with the original OECD approach – never led to a 
real implementation of RIA in practice, while the Standard Cost Model has 
successfully permeated the regulatory agenda, and is currently being revised 
to cover, more generally, regulatory costs to businesses. Similar 
developments can be observed in Denmark, due to an early and very 
                                                   
158  Staronova, K. (2010), supra note 157. 
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successful implementation of the SCM; in Finland and in Austria, where 
business associations and a fistful of courageous academics are trying to 
create momentum for RIA in an environment in which the dominant form of 
policymaking does not accommodate for real transparency159.  
 Finally, a group of laggard countries seems to face important problems in 
mainstreaming RIA into their often complex policymaking process. Italy, 
for example, adopted the RIA procedure quite early (in 1999), but has never 
managed to really implement it to date, if not limited to one independent 
sectoral regulator and a fistful of regional governments – the regulatory 
framework to support RIA adoption in Central Government was completed 
only in the spring of 2009. On the other end of the spectrum, Greece 
decided to start experimenting with RIA in 2007, but launched an overly 
ambitious project, which ended up almost impossible to take up all at 
once.160 Finally, Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, Spain and 
Portugal seem light years away from a successful implementation of RIA. 
Similar issues could be said about Luxembourg, Malta and Cyprus.  
Table 1 below summarizes my conclusions in terms of grouping of countries 
according to their RIA implementation. It bears observing, in this respect, that  
implementation should not be equated with success, but only with the 
achievement of a regular production of RIA documents as a mandatory 
requirement, supported by guidance on how to produce the analysis, and 
subject to scrutiny and internal or external quality control. Examples of 
countries that have adopted RIA but not implemented it are, unfortunately, 
abundant; in addition, countries that have indeed implemented RIA have 
sometimes failed, sometimes only partly succeeded: the example of the UK, 
where efforts to mainstream RIA in the policy process have led to overlapping 
generations of regulatory reforms, patchy and fragmented implementation, 
tendency towards box-ticking, limited quantification of impacts, and finally a 
remarkable shift towards the reduction of administrative burdens generated by 
the stock of legislation is not necessarily the most successful case study one can 
think of.  
 
                                                   
159  See Weigel, W. (2008), The Standard Cost Model - A Critical Appraisal. 25th Annual 
Conference of the European Association of Law and Economics, 2008. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1295861.; Biegelbauer, P. and S. Mayer, (2007), RIA or no RIA: 
the Dialogue Between Policymakers and Stakeholders in the Regulatory Process in 
Austria, ENBR Working Paper No.10; and Biegelbauer, P., and S. Mayer, (2008), 
Regulatory Impact Assessment in Austria: Promising Regulations, Disappointing 
Practices, in: Critical Policy Analysis 2(2), pp. 118-142. 
160  Hatzis, A. N. and S. Nalpantidou (2007), From Nothing to Too Much: Regulatory Reform 
in Greece. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1075963 
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Table 1 – Groups of countries according to effective implementation of RIA 
Pioneers CEE countries 
with RIA 
development 
Late adopters Red-tape-
dominated 
Laggards 
United Kingdom Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia  
France, Ireland, 
The Netherlands, 
Sweden, Belgium 
(Flanders) 
Austria, Belgium 
(Central gov), 
Denmark, Finland, 
Germany  
Bulgaria, Greece, 
Italy, Lithuania, 
Latvia, 
Luxembourg, 
Malta, Portugal, 
Romania, Spain  
Cyprus 
Source: Author’s elaboration from several sources. 
 
Notwithstanding the rather depressing picture that emerges from the current 
implementation of RIA in the EU27, several lessons can be drawn from the 
experience of past research projects, direct field experience, academic literature 
and reports by international organisations such as the OECD and the World 
Bank. I try to briefly summarise them below.  
 Political commitment remains essential. Typical examples are those of 
France and The Netherlands, where comprehensive RIA systems have been 
or are being launched as a result of a solid demand for regulatory governance 
and reform. Where commitment has been limited or absent (e.g. Italy, 
Poland, Germany), even the most ambitious RIA strategy has failed. 
 Oversight and coordination. The invaluable role of central watchdogs has 
led several countries (but also the European Commission) to recognise the 
need for a centralised gatekeeper entrusted with the task of managing the 
RIA process and its development. Even where this has happened, the level of 
commitment and investment has markedly differed: Radaelli et al. (2007) 
reported that in four countries (Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands and 
Spain) the number of employees dedicated to RIA is unknown 
notwithstanding the presence of a central unit; whereas Ireland and Italy 
have a very light central unit with 1.5 employees respectively. To the 
contrary, larger units exist in Czech Republic (9 employees), Poland (10), 
Sweden (12), and Belgium (20); whereas the UK stands as an outlier with 
approximately 70 employees. 
 Hierarchy. Another important lesson that can be drawn is related to the 
relative positioning of the central coordinating body vis à vis 
administrations in charge of RIA. In countries where the oversight unit has 
been put at the same level of administrations in charge of producing RIAs, as 
unus inter pares, the moral suasion impact of its decisions has been 
limited161. To the contrary, where the watchdog acts from the centre of 
government, with a somewhat superior authority, there is often no need to 
grant the watchdog powers to formally reject proposal: as in the case of the 
US OIRA and the EU IAB, moral suasion is enough, no administration would 
dare to neglect the gentle advice of the watchdog.  
                                                   
161 Staronova (2010), supra note 157. 
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 Expectations. Some national governments have made the mistake of 
launching an overly ambitious RIA system, and/or raised too high 
expectations among stakeholders. Examples, as already mentioned, include 
the European Commission (due to initial promises of full quantification), 
Italy, and Greece. Given that RIA takes several years to produce meaningful 
results, including i.a. enhanced predictability, transparency and 
accountability of policymaking, as well as greater policy coherence, it is 
important that reforms are communicated with a word of caution and by 
keeping in mind a reasonably long time horizon. Otherwise, the first 
episodes of disappointment among stakeholders may jeopardize the entire 
process.  
 Gradual introduction v. big bang. Connected to the problem of expectations 
is the problem of how and when to introduce RIA. The experience of 
countries such as the UK, France and the Netherlands suggests that it may 
take several years before a system of partial, narrower-scope assessments 
can generated momentum and demand for a more comprehensive RIA 
system. Also the European Commission has gone through years of separate 
assessments (the BIA, the environmental and sustainability impact 
assessments developed by different DGs) before moving to an integrated 
system: and yet it took several years before the Commission services got 
used and acquainted with the specifics and the technicalities of IA.  
 Exploit the link with the Standard Cost Model (SCM) for the measurement 
of administrative burdens. Faced with problems in generating the cultural 
change needed in public administrations, several governments have opted 
for reforms related to simplification and the reduction of administrative 
burdens. Given the political commitment required for the implementation of 
the SCM – i.e. the ex ante commitment to reduce burdens by a given 
percentage before actually measuring them – the SCM has proven easier to 
communicate to business stakeholders. At the same time, the SCM does not 
require revolutionary changes in the way bureaucrats behave, as most of the 
process is carried out in conjunction with external consultants and is aimed 
at the stock, rather than the flow of legislation. That said, once 
administrative burdens have been measured, reduction proposals must be 
assessed as regards their potential costs and benefits for society as a whole. 
As explained in Allio and Renda (2010), IA procedures are required to 
successfully complete the implementation of the SCM: accordingly, a new 
momentum for introducing a comprehensive IA system may emerge in all 
those countries – practically, all EU member states – that have decided to 
embark in the measurement of administrative burdens, especially after the 
Spring Council in 2007.  
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4 EX ANTE POLICY APPRAISAL: INSIGHTS FROM 
POSITIVE, NORMATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL 
SCHOOLS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
In the first part of this work, we have analyzed the evolution and current 
features of ex ante policy appraisal in two of the world largest legal systems, the 
United States and the European Union. What emerged from that account of the 
“RIA world” is that, although with substantial differences, in both cases the 
practice of ex ante impact analysis is subject to fierce criticisms both in terms of 
their methodological shortcomings and for reasons related to governance. 
Overall, it comes to no surprise that authors have hardly managed to 
demonstrate that RIA makes a difference in terms of legal quality, but also in 
terms of growth and competitiveness around the world, despite attempts 
(especially by the OECD) to prove that countries that have undergone regulatory 
reform grow faster than countries that don’t: this may be true for regulatory 
reform, it is not for RIA – at best, there is no conclusive evidence162.  
Against this background, there is an obvious appeal to the idea of putting in 
place a system aimed at improving the quality of legal rules through the 
provision of detailed, inspired economic analysis. In principle, RIA should 
become the engine of a more transparent policymaking process, and possibly 
also a more participative, efficient and effective one. So, why has RIA failed in 
most countries so far? Well, one could say that the introduction of this tool is 
relatively recent in many countries, and thirty years ago even budgeting was 
hardly known and accepted in government administrations, whereas today 
bureaucrats have learned how to live with it, and happily. Will the same happen 
to RIA in the next decade or so? 
One way of looking at current RIA practice, which may help in the 
understanding whether current systems are headed in a satisfactory direction, is 
to go back to the roots of the academic elaboration on the economic analysis of 
legal rules, and assess whether current RIA practice conforms with the key 
insights that decades of law and economics scholarship have developed and 
brought to the attention of field experts and scholars. Accordingly, this section 
attempts to build a bridge between theory and practice by describing some of 
the main insights developed by the law and economics literature in the past 
decades, and their possible applications as improvements of the current 
economic analysis provided in RIA documents in the US and the EU.  
This Section contributes to the main research questions of this Thesis by 
describing the many ways in which law and economics can inspire a more 
informed and thorough ex ante policy appraisal. More in detail, the aim is to 
inform the discussion of the an (should we use more law and economics in 
                                                   
162  Hahn and Tetlock (2008) do not find sufficient evidence to conclude unambiguously that 
RIA has an effect on economic outcomes such as growth. Hahn, R. W. and P. Tetlock 
(2008), Has Economic Analysis Improved Regulatory Decisions?, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Volume 22, Number 1, Winter 2008, Pages 67–84. See also Baldwin, R. 
(2005), Is better regulation smarter regulation? Public Law (Autumn), 485-511. 
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RIA?), quomodo (how can we apply law and economics in RIA) and quantum 
(when and to what extent should we apply law and economics in RIA).  
Section 4.1 below provides a brief introduction to the history and evolution of 
law and economics. Section 4.2 then explores the main achievements of 
“positive” law and economics, mostly focusing on the understanding of 
individual and collective rationality, the functioning of markets and market-
based instruments and the allocation of legal entitlements. In other word, the 
section addresses the issue whether, given a defined set of goals that the legal 
system is supposed to pursue, how can we ensure that legal rules are designed in 
a way that effectively achieves those goals. Section 4.3 discusses the “normative” 
version of law and economics, which looks at the way in which legal rules should 
be designed, or, as often mentioned, what the law “ought to be”, rather than 
what it is: in particular, the section focuses on the evolution of the debate on the 
role of wealth maximization as an “ancillary paradigm of justice” and, more 
generally, of the legal system as a whole; in addition, the section explores the 
various interpretations that have been given to the goals of the legal system, 
including various efficiency criteria, as well as theories of justice. Section 4.4 
then analyzes the “functional” school of law and economics, in particular as 
regards the view of RIA and cost-benefit analysis as procedural mechanisms  
aimed at facilitating control of bureaucrats under a system of delegation and 
oversight; and as a way to “nudge” both administrations and citizens to induce 
the achievement of desired policy outcomes. Section 4.5 briefly concludes by 
summarizing the main lessons learned from this chapter.  
4.1 From Bentham to Sunstein: a brief, “instrumental” 
account of the evolution of law and economics 
The law and economics movement has been defined as one of the “greatest 
intellectual triumphs of social science”, and “the foremost intellectual 
movement in law in the last half century”163. Especially in the US, the subject 
matter is now deeply entrenched in university faculties and in courts, in 
particular in domains such as contracts, torts, property, but also competition 
and regulation164.  
The idea that the body of (mostly neoclassical) economics could be the 
foundation for a more thorough understanding of how legal rules are 
formulated has been gaining adepts in fields such as property law, contract law 
and the law of torts. In particular, the first contributions of modern law and 
economics originated in the Chicago School since the 1940s, thanks to the work 
undertaken by Aaron Director and others. At that time, the scope of the analysis 
                                                   
163  See Andrei Shleifer and Richard Posner, respectively, on the back cover of Steven Shavell’s 
Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law.  
164  In a recent contribution, Stephen Medema measures the success of the economic approach 
to law by observing the gradual decline and fragmentation of its most important challenger, 
i.e. the Critical legal Studies movement. See Medema, S. G.  (2010), From Dismal to 
Dominance? Law and Economics and the Values of Imperial Science, in Hatzis, A. (Ed.), 
“Norms and Values in Law and Economics”. London: Routledge, forthcoming 2011. 
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was chiefly aimed at demonstrating that the Common Law system was oriented 
towards the selection of efficient rules. In doing this, Chicagoans mostly 
adopted Marshallian price theory and relied on theories of public intervention 
that were rooted in the work of economists such as Pigou.  
4.1.1 The pioneers 
From a very general – and certainly overly simplified – perspective, law and 
economics has always been characterized by its instrumental vision of the 
law165. More precisely, traditional law and economics views law as functional to 
the definition of relative prices that affect the choices made by rational decision-
makers, be they individuals, groups, corporations, or even governments. Given 
its instrumentalist approach, the law and economics movement has been traced 
back to the early contributions of philosophers such as Cesare Beccaria, David 
Hume, Jeremy Bentham, Nicolò Macchiavelli and Henry Sidgwick166. In 
particular, the utilitarian nature of human behavior as portrayed in the law and 
economics literature inevitably led to identifying Bentham as a prominent and 
influential ancestor of modern legal economists167. The links between 
utilitarianism and law and economics became evident when, at the beginning of 
the 1960s, the seminal contributions of Ronald Coase (1960), Guido Calabresi 
(1961) and Gary Becker (1968) paved the way for the development of 
contemporary law and economics168.  
4.1.1.1 Coase, Calabresi, Becker 
At the outset, law and economics was essentially “positive”, meaning that it 
implied the use of economic theory – mostly rooted in Neoclassical, 
“Marshallian” price theory – to predict the effects of various legal rules and 
assess whether the legal system was automatically geared towards the selection 
of efficient rules. This stream of law and economics was essentially assuming 
that individuals would behave rationally, and would then decide whether and 
how to comply with legal rules after a thorough, informed cost-benefit analysis. 
The allocation of rights and the emergence of final allocation of entitlements 
and resources followed from the meeting of the minds of rational players. For 
example, the “strong” version of the Coase theorem highlights the irrelevance of 
the initial allocation of entitlements whenever transaction costs are equal to 
zero.  
                                                   
165  See K.N. Hylton (2004), Calabresi and the Intellectual History of Law and Economics, 
Working Paper Series Law and Economics 04-04, Boston University, School of Law (2004). 
166  See Posner, Richard A. ‘The Law and Economics Movement: From Bentham to Becker’, in 
F. Parisi and C.K. Rowley (eds.) The Origins of Law and Economics: Essays by the 
Founding Fathers (Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, MA: Elgar 2005) 328. 
167  Ibid.  
168  This is what Posner defines as the “second wave” of law and economics. For a more 
extensive account of the history of law and economics, see Mackaay (2000); Parisi (2004); 
Medema (2010); Hylton (2004); and Veljanosky (1982).   
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However, in recognizing the importance of legal remedies when transaction 
costs are significant, Ronald Coase already made the case for a normative 
version of law and economics, moving from a descriptive version of his theorem 
to a prescriptive one, which pointed at the need to formulate legal rules in a way 
that minimizes the impact of transaction costs on the final allocation of rights169. 
This recognition that “legal rules do matter” is indeed the foundation of the 
normative version of law and economics, which does not aim at describing how 
the rule is, but rather looks at how the law ought to be in order to generate 
certain efficient outcomes.  
The contribution of Ronald Coase – himself a student of Pigou – to the analysis 
of the sein and the sollen of legal rules marked a departure from the “Pigouvian” 
approach to public policy, which relied on taxation as the most important tool 
for policymakers wishing to achieve income redistribution. As in his 1959 paper 
on “The Federal Communications Commission”, in which he effectively paved 
the way towards modern spectrum policy in telecommunications, with “The 
Problem of Social Cost” Coase managed to shift the attention towards public 
policy as a way to eliminate obstacles for private individuals and firms to freely 
exchange entitlements in the marketplace, which according to Coase 
represented the most expedite way to achieve allocative efficiency (Coase, 1960). 
In doing this, he managed to achieve a twofold result: placing emphasis on 
private players and their interaction in markets as actors of public policy, but 
also equating market efficiency with morality, at least under certain 
circumstances. The former insight, however, ended up being more fortunate 
than the latter170. 
At the same time, in his parallel work to that of Coase, Guido Calabresi had the 
enormous merit of showing how tort law can be framed in economic terms, by 
accounting for the incentives of individuals to take due care under different 
liability regimes, and providing guidance on how to select a legal regime that 
minimizes the cost of accidents, regardless of the fairness of the system in legal 
terms. Again, Calabresi’s early work was already deep into normative analysis. 
Very much rooted in Bentham’s utilitarianism, Calabresi was essentially 
advocating for the replacement of the negligence regime for tort law with strict 
liability, subject to certain conditions171. The idea of the “cheapest cost avoider”, 
                                                   
169  See i.a. Cooter, R. and T. Ulen (2004), Law and Economics, 4th edn, Addison-Wesley 
Longman. 
170  Coase’s conclusion that market outcomes are always efficient, and that economic efficiency 
should be the ultimate goal of public policy is neither straightforward nor easy to digest for 
many scholars. On the one hand, the “Coase theorem” carried an underlying assumption, 
that policymakers and judges should not care about the outcomes of market exchanges, as 
markets “know best” how resources should be allocated. This assumption elicited 
substantial criticism among legal and economic scholars: the so-called Critical Legal 
Studies movement represented i.a. by the work of Duncan Kennedy is a good example of 
disagreement with Coase’s reasoning. See also Arcuri (2002). See Hovenkamp (1994), 
stating that “Coase’s extreme faith in private bargaining blinded him to the problems of 
bargaining in two-person markets that Pigou saw quite clearly and that remain with us to 
this day”. Hovenkamp, H. (1994), The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 
Northwestern University Law Review 4. 
171  See Hylton (2004), supra note 165. 
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who would be called to bear the direct burden of a strict liability regime, was 
very much in line with Bentham’s proposition that rules had to be chiefly simple 
and easy to comply with. In the following years, Calabresi became a pioneer in 
the economic approach to legal remedies, in particular to designing legal rules 
that achieve a “shift” in the timing of the allocation of rights, as well as in the 
choice of the decision-maker (see Section 4.4 below). 
Calabresi (with Douglas Melamed) later overlapped with the Coasian research 
track by adding to the Coase theorem a brilliant analysis of the choice of legal 
remedies, which illustrated the conditions under which a property rule would be 
superior to a liability rule in the resolution of controversies over incompatible 
uses172. This seminal work – perhaps one of the most quoted in the history of 
law economics – has ramifications into several subsequent contributions, from 
Ian Ayres’ “optional law” to access policy regimes in network industries. As will 
be shown in the next chapters, it can also inform the choice and design of 
market-based instruments as a policy options in several regulatory contexts. 
Calabresi’s view of economic efficiency was far more nuanced than the one 
exhibited by Coase and other prominent scholars in the field: the idea that 
justice should be achieved as a major goal, taking precedence also on efficiency, 
exposed Calabresi to major critiques from his fellow lawyer-economists. At the 
same time, Calabresi was often critical of the Coase theorem, in particular as 
regards its applicability to contexts with positive transaction costs: Calabresi’s 
view of the formulation and selection of legal rules appeared from the outset to 
be more complex, articulated, and at the same time less immediately 
prescriptive than the one adopted by Coase and, later, by Richard Posner. In the 
early years of law and economics, Calabresi had already explored at length the 
roles of efficiency, justice, inalienability and (weak and true) paternalism as co-
existing principles within the same legal system, and was advocating the use of 
“conjectures” by the policymaker in order to arrive to an informed judgment 
over the optimal alternative among the ones on the table. In this respect, as will 
be recalled again in Section 4.4 below, Calabresi was a precursor of those 
“nudging” approaches that are pervading the US RIA system under the guidance 
of Cass Sunstein173.  
Finally, Gary Becker was a pioneer in advocating for the use of economics in the 
analysis of non-market behavior. As will be argued in more detail below, his 
writings on the economics of crime and punishment still lie at the core of the 
formulation of legal rules, especially as regards the incentive to comply with the 
law – often a neglected aspect of RIA – and the possibility of effective 
enforcement. Authoritative scholars have highlighted the decisive contribution 
of Gary Becker in the expansion of economic analysis into previously untouched 
domains, including charity, love, addiction, crime, racial discrimination, 
                                                   
172  See Calabresi, G. and A. Douglas Melamed (1972), Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089. 
173  For a very interesting account of Calabresi’s life and contribution, see Grembi, V. (2005), 
Guido Calabresi e L’Analisi Economica del Diritto, Siena Memos and Papers in Law and 
Economics, 41/05, at http://www.unisi.it/lawandeconomics/simple/041_Grembi.pdf. 
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marriage and divorce, etc.174 More malicious commentators charge him with the 
accusation of having fostered the “expansionism” or even the “imperialism” of 
economic theory, i.e. the tendency to apply economics to a range of other 
disciplines, gradually cannibalizing their scientific method and traditional tools. 
And again, Becker’s work on crime and punishment – one of the reasons why he 
was awarded the Nobel Prize for economics in 1992 – was deeply normative, as 
it described i.a. how sanctions should be designed in order to trigger efficient 
behavior in criminal law, but also in other fields such as tort law.  
Now, it is true that much of the conclusions drawn in this initial pieces of 
literature has been surpassed by follow-up contributions, especially those that 
have revisited the concept of rationality to introduce the findings of cognitive 
science in the analysis of human behavior. However, these law and economic 
lessons – that under some conditions markets work better than command and 
control regulation; that legal rules do matter for allocative efficiency; that 
remedies should be designed according to the expected level of transaction 
costs; and that enforcement should take into account the perspective of the 
would-be infringer – still remain among the most insightful contributions that a 
lawyer-economist can bring to the policymakers’ table. I will then get back to 
them in Section 5.4 below given their egregious normative power.   
4.1.1.2 Richard Posner and “Efficiency as Justice” 
During the 1970s, the expansion of law and economics and its ambition to 
transform the way traditional legal scholars think about law became the subject 
of hectic counter-attacks. Ronald Coase himself had stated that “much, and 
perhaps most, of legal scholarship has been stamp collecting. Law and 
economics, however, is likely to challenge all that and, in fact, has begun to do 
so”175.  As explained, i.a., in the preamble to the Hofstra Law Review’s special 
issue on “Efficiency as a Legal Concern” in the spring of 1980,  
The operative definition for the economic analysis of law rests on 
the concept of efficiency … as economic analysis explored new 
avenues and sought to bring an increasing number of formerly 
distinct legal areas within its ambit under a unified analysis, this 
definition proved too crude. While it provided a convenient 
standard for approaching such divers topics as property rules, 
discrimination, breach of contract, and civil procedure, its 
simplicity left it open to attach on descriptive grounds. On a 
normative level, it failed to provide more than the most basic 
justification for its existence. In addition whatever moral claims it 
had rested largely on the strength of utilitarianism, a theory 
                                                   
174  MacKaay, E. (2000), History of Law and Economics, 1 Encyclopedia of Law and 
Economics (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar Publishing). 
175  Coase, R. (1993), Law and Economics at Chicago, 36 Journal of Law and Economics 239 at 
254 (‘Ernest Rutherford said that science is either physics or stamp collecting, by which he 
meant, I take it, that it is either engaged in analysis or operating a filing system. Much, 
perhaps most, legal scholarship has been stamp collecting. Law and economics is likely to 
change all that’.  
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generally viewed as bankrupt. It was in part to flesh out the 
definition and to firmly anchor the theory on defensible normative 
grounds that scholars began addressing the justification for 
economic analysis of law. This has opened a new debate on the 
theory’s philosophical underpinnings and spurred fresh 
examinations, albeit often implicitly, on the question what is law. 
The first and most committed of those attempts to justify the economic analysis 
of law on ethical and philosophical grounds was celebrated with the prolific 
work of Richard Posner176. Posner, almost a mythological character in the 
history of law and economics, attempted to strengthen the link between 
Bentham’s utilitarianism and modern law and economics. While earlier 
Chicagoans generally recognized their limits in developing prescriptive 
recommendations for legal reform, with Posner, law and economics becomes 
normative, and known as the economic analysis of law (EAL)177.  
More in detail, the idea that common law was essentially aiming towards 
efficient solutions – typical of the Chicago School since the early 1960s178 – was 
operationalized by Posner into a rather different concept: that in all areas of 
common law, including legal adjudication, but also government regulation, the 
real objective should be wealth maximization; that economic efficiency is the 
natural way to achieve wealth maximization; and that this goal is justified on 
moral grounds as it is a measure (better, an “ancillary paradigm”) of justice179. 
The direct consequence of the Posnerian view of efficiency was that efficiency 
criteria à la Pareto (including potential Pareto efficiency, or Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency) could be justified on ethical grounds.  
The explanation is relatively simple: moving from an ethical justification of the 
outcome of market transactions on grounds of contractual autonomy and 
individual freedom – a conclusion developed by authors such as Nozick and 
Epstein following a Kantian approach, rather than a utilitarian one à la 
Bentham – Posner developed an idea of justice and happiness as wealth 
maximization, based on individual consent. Since it is impossible to measure 
individual utility and compare utility between individuals, the only possible 
basis for judging on the impact of a given allocation of resources is indeed 
individual consent: if individuals express their agreement to a given reallocation 
of resources, it must mean that the new state of the world makes them happier. 
Since this result is obtained in Pareto efficiency – especially when parties agree 
on a given transaction – then efficiency is a measure of justice, and it should be 
pursued systematically when crafting and enforcing legal rules.  
                                                   
176  See Harnay and Marciano (2009), Posner, Economics and the Law: from Law and 
Economics to an Economic Analysis of Law, Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 
Volume 31, Issue 02 , pp 215 -232.  
177  See Parisi, F. (2004), Positive, Normative and Functional Schools in law and Economics, 
European Journal of Law and Economics Vol. 18, n. 3, December 2004.  
178  Ibid., quoting, i.a. the so-called “efficiency of the common law hypothesis”, as described 
and discussed in Ehrlich and Posner (1974), Rubin (1977) and Priest (1977).  
179  See Klick and Parisi (2003), Functional Law and Economics: The Search for Value-
Neutral Principles of Lawmaking, George Mason University Law and Economics Working 
Paper Series, 03-39. 
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It was clear, however, that moving from the Pareto criterion to the Kaldor-Hicks 
Potential Pareto Superiority would not be easy to justify on ethical grounds. As a 
matter of fact, the Kantian explanation of universal consent as the basis for 
identifying improvements in social welfare did not hold under Kaldor-Hicks, 
where individuals that are left worse-off by a given reallocation of resources 
have not expressed any consent to such reallocation180. According to Posner, 
however, also the Kaldor-Hicks principle could be justified on ethical grounds, 
since individuals would give their ex ante consent to wealth maximization as a 
paramount principle in policies that reallocate resources among individuals. 
This has very important normative implications: for example, as explained in 
Posner (1980), if a negligence system for the case road traffic accidents is 
cheaper than strict liability (counting both the costs of precaution and insurance 
premiums), then if all individuals have the same preferences everybody would 
prefer the former system to the latter. It does not matter, Posner said, if 
individuals have not given their express consent: from the standpoint of law 
making and legal adjudication, as a matter of fact, what matters is that every 
citizen – or a majority of citizens – would have agreed ex ante to institutions 
that regulate in favor of wealth maximization, whatever the final outcome in 
terms of resources allocation. This idea is grounded in what economics call ex 
ante compensation: for example, the uncertainty on future states of the world is 
already discounted by individuals when concluding market transactions – so to 
say, individuals most often self-insure by imposing an adjustment in market 
prices: if I expect a 10% likelihood that someone will build a house between my 
balcony and a gorgeous view, I’ll take this into account before I buy it. Likewise, 
if there’s a chance that I’ll end up in the losers’ group after a Kaldor-Hicks-
superior move, I’ll adjust ex ante.  
Posner’s idea of efficiency as justice was very influential in the United States in 
the mid-1970s, and originated from an attempt to transform the Kaldor-Hicks 
principle into a more universally accepted principle of justice. In more 
philosophical terms, Posner’s elaboration drew its origins on Kant and Bentham 
– in that it was elaborating on the idea of individual autonomy and looked at a 
measure of happiness and pleasure as expressed by individual preferences – but 
was also close to the work of John Rawls, in that it looked for a measure of 
efficiency based on ex ante consent; and shared some similarity to the work of 
John Harsanyi (1953) on cardinal utilities in welfare economics, where the 
future Nobel laureate hinged on the notion of ex ante commitment to average 
utilitarianism. As recalled years later by Jules Coleman (2003) the idea of an ex 
ante commitment to a maximization of utility is the inevitable consequence of 
how the notion of rationality is defined: with the possibility of measuring 
individual utility, from an ex ante perspective rational individuals may choose to 
maximize average utility, just as under the Rawlsian “veil of ignorance”. As in 
Coleman (2003), “one would then have to show what moral value, if any, is 
embodied in this particular conception of rationality”181. 
                                                   
180  See infra, Section 4.3.2 for a more detailed discussion. 
181  See Coleman, J. (2003), The Grounds of Welfare, Review of the article  “Fairness versus 
Welfare by Kaplow, L. and S. Shavell, The Yale Law Journal Vol. 112, No. 6 (Apr., 2003), 
pp. 1511-1543. 
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In any event, at the end of the 1970s Posner’s view of wealth maximization as a 
paradigm of justice was gaining ground among scholars and policymakers. This 
over time evolved as a defense of the Kaldor-Hicks principle as a criterion to be 
used in drafting and enforcing legal rules. As will be shown in the next sections, 
it would be incorrect to state that the economic analysis of law really adopted 
this view outside the work of Richard Posner and a few other scholars. However, 
when the “schism” between EAL and the administrative law and economics took 
place at the end of the 1970s, the latter domain incorporated Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency as a dominant paradigm. As I will explain in the next sections, 
however, while the regulatory review model adopted in 1980 under the Reagan 
administration looked very much in line with Posner’s original claim that wealth 
maximization and the Kaldor-Hicks criterion were the way to justice and 
happiness, since then law and economics scholars (including Hicks and Posner) 
have refined their view of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, and have mostly rejected 
its universal application. They started doing it already in 1980, on the pages of 
the Hofstra Law review and in the Journal of Legal Studies: and they continued 
since then, by developing schools of thought that promise to subvert the role of 
Potential Pareto Superiority as a dominant paradigm for federal regulation, and 
for RIA as a whole.  
4.1.1.3 The “greatest gig in the sky” 
In the Symposium on “Efficiency as a Legal Concern”, recalled at the beginning 
of this Thesis, many of the most authoritative law and economic scholars of that 
time discussed the merit of adopting efficiency criteria in adjudication, and 
ended up digging quite thoroughly into the virtues and hidden traps of the 
Kaldor-Hicks criterion as a normative basis for deciding about complex and 
controversial legal issues. That was also the time in which scholars like Richard 
Posner, William Landes, George Priest and Paul Rubin – all in favor of replacing 
legal criteria in adjudication with Kaldor-Hicks efficiency – were challenged by 
others, such as Ronald Dworkin, Richard Epstein, Anthony Kronman, Jules 
Coleman, Duncan Kennedy, Charles Fried, Gerald O’Driscoll Jr. and Mario 
Rizzo, who considered that efficiency criteria could lead to potential distortions 
in the making of value judgments when adjudicating legal controversies.  
Reading the contributions to that Symposium, the most striking result was that 
the economists were the first to reject the idea that legal adjudication in 
common law could be based on strict efficiency criteria such as the Kaldor-Hicks 
one. For example, Richard Posner stated (and later wrote) that “while Kaldor-
Hicks is not a Pareto criterion as such, it will sometimes function as a tolerable, 
and more to the point, administrable approximation of the Pareto superiority 
criterion”182; whereas the economist Mario Rizzo stated - almost in the form of a 
mea culpa – that “the substantial information requirements that must be 
                                                   
182  Posner R.A. (1980), The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common 
Law Adjudication, 8 Hofstra L. Rev., 1980, p. 487. 
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satisfied in order to identify efficient legal rules make efficiency impractical as a 
standard”183.  
Developments in the law and economics literature since that famous Chicagoan 
symposium have moved in the direction of finding a suitable alternative to the – 
rather rough – potential Pareto superiority criterion. To be sure, the law of 
decreasing marginal utility already condemned the Kaldor-Hicks criterion from 
the outset, by suggesting that net benefit calculation is not as decisive as the 
identity and wealth condition of winners and losers in determining whether a 
change in the rules of the game should be considered as an “improvement” or 
the achievement of a “bigger pie”184. In other words, economists have discovered 
over the past decades that the way in which the pie is distributed affects 
dramatically the size of the pie; whereas the Kaldor-Hicks criterion looked only 
at the size (in “resourcist” terms) by leaning on a mere “potential” for leaving 
each and every individual with at least the same slice he or she had before.  
Secondly, developments in behavioral law and economics, neuroeconomics and 
(more generally) cognitive sciences have gradually led to reconsidering the idea 
that a change in an individual’s endowment of resources, as well as an 
individual’s willingness to exchange the status quo for a different mix of goods 
and money is not as straightforward as one would expect. Theoretical 
achievements such as Brian Arthur’s “path dependence” in human behavior, the 
contributions of Maurice Allais and Herbert Simon on bounded rationality, the 
development of “prospect theory” and the application of cognitive sciences to 
economics (e.g. by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky) potentially leave the 
Kaldor-Hicks criterion down on its knees, both in common law adjudication and 
in regulatory decision-making. Law and economics scholars have made 
important steps forward, for example by conceiving ways of “de-biasing through 
law”185. Measures of the potential other-regarding behavior of individuals in 
some settings have led many economists to depart from the stereotype of homo 
oeconomicus when modeling human behavior186.  
Thirdly, the use of Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) in regulatory decisions has been 
strongly criticized in the economic literature over the past years. Some 
commentators have gone back to decisions taken by the Environmental 
Protection Agency in the “pre-RIA” age, and found that CBA would have led to 
highly undesirable conclusions187. This critique was lately extended to a number 
                                                   
183  See Rizzo, M. J. (1980), The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 Hofstra L. Rev., p. 641. 
184  Bebchuk, L.A. (1980) The Pursuit of a Bigger Pie: Can Everyone Expect a Bigger Slice?, in 
Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 Hofstra Law Review 671-709. 
185  See Jolls, Christine and C. R. Sunstein (2006), Debiasing through Law, Journal of Legal 
Studies, Vol. 35, 1.  
186  See, i.a., Itoh, H. (2004) Moral Hazard and Other-regarding Preferences. 
187  See F. Ackerman, L. Heinzerling and R. Massey, Applying Cost-Benefit to Past Decisions: 
Was Environmental Protection Ever a Good Idea?, Georgetown Public Law Research 
Paper No. 576161, Georgetown University, August 2004; F. Ackerman and L. Heinzerling, 
Priceless: on Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing, New York: The 
New Press, 2004; and See David Driesen’s White Paper, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 
2 February 2005 (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=663602), p. 7. 
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of other regulatory initiatives in the environmental policy field, such as the US 
Clean Air Act, for which the EPA used CBA, but ultimately was glamorously 
captured by partisan interests188. This stream of the debate has culminated in 
Bob Hahn’s recent work in defense of the economic analysis of regulation, which 
adopts the rather “Posnerian” – and also hardly contestable – view that CBA is 
often le meilleur des mondes possibles, as no suitable alternatives have been 
proposed to date in the economic literature189. 
The split between law and economics and RIA practice is evident also in recent 
literature: for example, in 2000 Matthew Adler observed rather bluntly that 
“Kaldor-Hicks efficiency should be removed from our normative vocabulary. It 
lacks the basic status of Pareto efficiency, overall well-being, distributive 
considerations, deontological requirements, and (perhaps) perfectionist 
value.”190 Adler was not alone: suffice it to look at the way in which Jules 
Coleman (2003) reviewed Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell’s “Fairness v. 
Efficiency” a few years ago: “ 
“the book openly endorses precisely the imperialistic claims with 
which others have saddled the law and economics movement, 
often in an effort to discredit it as inadequately catholic or, in the 
extreme, uncivilized. Whereas the vast majority of law-and 
economics scholars have been trying to make the case for 
including efficiency among the factors suitable to assessing legal 
reform proposals, the entire point of the Kaplow and Shavell 
argument is that the only considerations that can figure in a 
rational reform policy are those of human welfare—or efficiency 
properly construed.”191 
Coleman also added that there is no way of justifying the adoption of a Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency criterion on the basis of the fact that it can be seen as a 
Potential Pareto Superiority test: “That they are potentially Pareto superior has 
as much bearing on how they should be treated as the fact that I am potentially 
President of the United States has on how I should be treated now”192. 
                                                   
188  See i.a. Polluted Logic. How EPA’s ozone standard illustrates the flaws of cost-benefit 
analysis in regulatory decision making, Report by OMB Watch, available online  
http://www.ombwatch.org/files/regs/PDFs/PollutedLogic.pdf.  
189  Hahn, R. W. (2005), In Defense of the Economic Analysis of Regulation, American 
Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 2005. Later, however, Hahn wrote a more 
sophisticated paper arguing that refinements in the traditional cost-benefit analysis 
methodology can significantly improve the informative contribution of this tool. See Hahn, 
R.W. (2008), Designing Smarter Regulation with Improved Benefit-Cost Analysis 
(September 8, 2008). Reg-Markets Center Working Paper No. 08-20.  
190  Matthew D. Adler (2000), Beyond Efficiency and Procedure: a Welfarist Theory of 
Regulation, 28 Florida State Univ. L. R.  
191  See Coleman (2003), supra note 181. 
192  Id., at 107. 
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4.1.2 Schools of law and economics today 
Since the 1970s, the law and economics movement has gradually split into a 
number of different schools and approaches, mostly distinct as far as the 
theoretical background in economics and the propensity to formulate 
prescriptive policy suggestions are concerned. A good introduction to this 
increasingly complex galaxy is offered i.a. by Mackaay (2000), Medema (2010) 
and Parisi (2004). Below, I offer a brief description of the main schools of law 
and economics that emanated from the work of the early pioneers, with no 
ambition to develop a comprehensive analysis. A full account would indeed fall 
outside the scope of this Thesis: to the contrary, I will focus on streams of 
literature that may be considered particularly interesting for the future of ex 
ante policy appraisal. Posner and Parisi (1996) and Parisi (2004) recall the 
fundamental distinction between (i) a “positive” school of law and economics 
rooted mostly in the Chicago school; (ii) a “normative” school of law and 
economics that can be attributed mostly to Yale scholars; and (iii) a “functional 
school”, which originated from the Virginia School of Political Economy.  
More in detail, the positive school distinguishes itself for the emphasis placed 
on individual economic agents as key players that decide whether and how to 
comply with legal rules on the basis of a rational decision. This stream of law 
and economics has often been reluctant to enter normative discussions, 
although the normative implications of their main tenets are self-evident: if 
individuals act rationally and – along with the Coase theorem – can enter 
Pareto-efficient transactions to reallocate entitlements and resources up to the 
level that is allocatively efficient, then the role of legal rules is mostly confined to 
the removal of obstacles to those transactions, i.e. the removal of (the impact of) 
transaction costs. In this respect, Chicagoans have been very normative in their 
rejection of public command and control intervention in certain markets – the 
best proof being the impact of the Chicago school on antitrust law and 
economics.  
The faith in the market exhibited by Chicagoans has been criticized on several 
grounds. This led the positive school of law and economics to take on board new 
concepts and refine its original assumptions. A rough way of describing this 
move revolves around the concept of error. As a matter of fact, Chicago scholars 
had to revisit their theories on the basis of evidence that: (i) individuals err in 
their judgment; and (ii) judges and regulators err in their implementation of the 
law. This, in turn, has led to important developments in the field of behavioral 
law and economics, on the one hand; and the so-called “neo-Chicago” approach 
centered on error costs in the formulation and implementation of legal rules193.  
At the same time, the Yale school developed a much stronger skepticism on the 
role of markets and that of efficiency as the ultimate goal of a legal system, both 
in legal adjudication and in regulation. Following the statement of Guido 
Calabresi (1980), that “an increase in wealth cannot constitute a social 
improvement, unless it furthers some other goal, such as utility or equality”, 
                                                   
193 See Padilla, A. J. and D. S. Evans (2005), Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing Unilateral 
Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach, University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 72. 
LAW AND ECONOMICS IN THE RIA WORLD | 105 
LAW AND ECONOMICS IN THE RIA WORLD - © ANDREA RENDA 2011 
Yale scholars have significantly expanded the array of circumstances under 
which the market fails, and there is potentially a need for government 
intervention to achieve more socially desirable outcomes. The reasons for this 
finding include, again, the findings of behavioral (law and) economics, 
especially as factored into the analysis by authors such as Christine Jolls and 
Cass Sunstein, but also Thomas Ulen and Russel Korobkin. Sunstein himself 
stated clearly that “there is no plausible argument that WTP is important in 
itself. If policymakers should attend to it, it is because of its connection to 
welfare”194. 
Finally, a sophisticated hybrid between the Chicago and Yale schools is the 
functional “Virginia” school, which adds public choice theory to law and 
economics. Rooted  in the seminal contribution of James Buchanan, the 
Virginia school rejects the efficiency-as-justice paradigm proposed by Posner 
and postulates that the outcome of policy processes must be appraised in light 
of the interaction between institutions and the rent-seeking behavior of political 
actors and stakeholders195. This so-called “functional” school of law and 
economics bears important consequences on the possibility for economics to 
become the dominant paradigm in policymaking and politics. A notable 
application of this public law and economics perspective, rooted in the 
application of game-theoretical concepts such as principal-agent models, is the 
development of transaction cost politics by early authors such as Niskanen 
(1971), and later by McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (1986), Dixit (1996), Adler 
and Posner (2000), Posner (2001) and Epstein and O’Halloran (2003). 
According to this stream of literature – very closely related to public choice and 
positive political theories – the role of ex ante policy appraisal as a mandatory 
administrative requirement must be seen as a “lubricant” in the decision, by 
Congress or by the central administration, to delegate certain courses of action 
to specialized agencies. This form of “make or buy” decision emerges since: (i) 
the centre-of-government does not possess all the skills and resources to 
regulate in all domains of policymaking; and (ii) in some cases, the centre of 
government does not want to take ultimate political responsibility for taking 
regulatory actions in certain fields, and prefers to leave the blame (if any) to 
agencies. The framing of the delegation and oversight decisions as “make or 
buy” decisions allowed these scholars to draw extensively on previous law and 
economics literature on transaction and administrative costs, starting with 
Coase (1937) and continuing most notably with Oliver Williamson (1979); Klein, 
Crawford and Alchian (1978); and Grossman and Hart (1986)196. 
                                                   
194  Sunstein, C. R. (2007), Willingness to Pay v. Welfare, 1 Harvard Law and Policy Review.   
195  Parisi and Klick (2003), supra note 179.  
196  See Williamson, Oliver E. (1979), Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of 
Contractual Relations, Journal of Law and Economics, XXII, 233–261; and Williamson, 
Oliver E., The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: The Free Press, 1985); 
Grossman, S. J., and O. D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of 
Vertical and Lateral Integration, Journal of Political Economy, XCIV (1986), 691–719; and 
Klein, Benjamin, Robert G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, 
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, Journal of Law and 
Economics, XXI (1978), 297–326. 
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To sum up, the historical development of law and economics testifies of lively 
and insightful developments in the understanding of individual behavior in 
response to the enactment of legal rules; in the design of legal rules themselves; 
and in the understanding of the governance mechanisms that operate behind 
the choice to introduce administrative procedures such as RIA as a way to 
control the effort and behavior of specialized bureaucracy – i.e. controlling 
agencies not based on the outcome of the regulatory process, but on the way in 
which the outcome was chosen197. Sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 below explore in 
more detail the substantive contribution that these streams of law and 
economics literature can provide to the understanding, framing and 
implementation of legal rules and ex ante policy appraisal.  
4.2 Positive law and economics: insights for ex ante policy 
appraisal 
Positive law and economics, in its mainstream definition, looks at human 
behaviour in response to law and the explanation for the law as it is, rather than 
as it ought to be. In this section, I focus in particular, on the former aspect – 
human behaviour – to explain why the advent of behavioral theory had changed 
substantially the perspective of scholars in this field, leading in particular 
Chicago scholars to reconsider many of their original tenets. Section 4.2.1 
focuses on individual decision-making, whereas Section 4.2.2 deals with 
collective decisions.  
4.2.1 Understanding human behavior: from homo oeconomicus to 
neuroeconomics 
Neoclassical economic theory inspired most of the early contributions in law 
and economics, and still permeates most of law and economics papers. The key 
insights of these early writings were that legal rules had a major impact on 
individual incentives, rather than regulatory outcomes. Given the legal rules in 
place, perfectly rational individuals would then decide whether and how to 
comply with legal rules. In other words, rules – in the minds of lawyer-
economists – became the starting point of individual negotiation: once the rule 
provided the setting and the allocation of property rights, private individual 
agents would sort out the most efficient allocation by acting rationally and 
trading rights. For example, in the famous theory of efficient breach in contract 
law, an individual party that committed to perform a contractual obligation 
decides rationally to breach his or her own promise to attain a more rewarding 
outcome198. The breach is efficient whenever the “price” of that breach – i.e. the 
damage compensation imposed by the judge for breach of contract – is high 
enough to compensate the counter-party for the case of non-performance. Given 
that individuals act rationally and are perfectly informed as regards their own 
                                                   
197  See Epstein, D. and S. O’Halloran (1999), Delegating Powers. A Transaction Cost Politics  
Approach to Policymaking under Separate Powers, Cambridge University Press. 
198  See, i.a. Posner, R.A. (1973) Economic Analysis of Law, Boston: Little Brown (1st edition).  
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valuation of different states of the world, whenever damage compensation is set 
at the efficient level (in the simplest scenario, at expectation damages), the final 
outcome of human interaction will be Pareto efficient.  
Likewise, in tort law, the superiority of strict liability over negligence in certain 
domains was explained on the basis of a key assumption – that private agents 
act in a perfectly rational way, and are more informed on the overall cost to 
society of their conduct than judges defining the optimal level of diligence ex 
post. Or, in property law, the Coase theorem relies on private parties as rational 
decision-makers and postulates that the lawmakers should limit themselves to 
minimizing the impact of transaction costs, thus unleashing the full potential of 
rational decisions taken by the agents involved.  
So far, so good. However, already back in the mid-20th century some economists 
had started to challenge the paradigm of a perfectly rational homo oeconomicus 
and the Neoclassical belief in the self-healing virtues of market forces. In 
particular, since the early writings of Maurice Allais (1953), economic theory 
had been struggling with the idea that the proxy chosen for human behavior, 
that of perfect rationality, may not be a good one. The pioneering work of 
Herbert Simon in those same years confirmed that the human brain was 
structurally different from the brain of a homo oeconomicus, and this bore 
epochal consequences for the models used in law and economics – although 
many scholars preferred to ignore those findings for more than two decades. In 
particular, as recalled by Camerer (2007), the “ignorance of psychology” 
postulated by Pareto was strengthened by Chicago scholars such as Milton 
Friedman (1953), who developed the so-called “positive economics”.  
From a logical and chronological perspective, a first important finding that 
threatened the perfect rationality assumption was the relevance of some types of 
transaction costs for the outcome of otherwise rational decisions. For example, 
in the field of consumer protection, the notion of rational ignorance developed 
following the work of George Stigler (1960) led to a reconsideration of the idea 
that weaker contractual parties could be asked to become perfectly aware of all 
the content and consequences of the contract clauses they sign. As a matter of 
fact, since the marginal benefit of acquiring information on a given contractual 
document are often decreasing, whereas the marginal cost of acquiring 
additional “units of information” are increasing, even perfectly rational 
consumers will decide not to become perfectly informed before deciding. 
Especially in business-to-consumer (B2C) transactions, this meant that more 
informed and specialized businesses and professionals will always, inevitably, 
hold an informational advantage over their counter-parts, and may be able to 
exploit that advantage to extract more surplus from consumers, leading them 
into transactions that are not even Pareto-efficient from them. This finding – 
which stands at the core of public intervention to protect consumers in B2C 
transactions, as translated into legislative initiatives such as the German AGBG 
in 1976, the French “Loi Scrivener” in 1978 and later EU initiatives such as i.a. 
the Directive on Unfair terms in Consumer Contracts and the Unfair 
108 | INSIGHTS FROM LAW AND ECONOMICS 
LAW AND ECONOMICS IN THE RIA WORLD - © ANDREA RENDA 2011 
Commercial Practices Directive – already questions the belief that, when let 
alone, individuals enter transactions also when they are Pareto-efficient199.  
After all, the theory of rational ignorance echoed earlier contributions such as 
the Popperian statute de rationalité, in which Karl Popper defends the act of the 
fool as being perfectly rational given the context in which it was undertaken200. 
Even more closely, rational ignorance echoes the findings of Herbert Simon as 
regards the fact that human beings do not take perfectly rational decisions, but 
only satisficing decisions201. This means that, faced with a reality that is too 
complex to be fully elaborated and understood, our brains collect “proxies” (as 
economists would call them) that enable them to adopt a reasonably informed 
decision, and stop collecting and elaborating information the moment this 
activity becomes too lengthy and cumbersome to enable any timely course of 
action. As a matter of fact, Simon’s satisficing behavior did not question the 
perfect rationality of individuals: more precisely, it questioned the rationality of 
the outcomes of their decisions, given the constraint represented by the 
resources available to our brain.  
Even more importantly, Simon drew from his study of the human brain the 
conclusion that the proxies that we collect to be able to make decisions in a 
world that is too complex for us to understand are a mix of past experience and 
external signals. This, in turn, means that our expectations partly govern our 
future actions, and our representation of reality is inevitably path-dependent. In 
this respect, the work of Simon can be closely associated with that of Brian 
Arthur, who – from a completely different perspective – argued that individual 
and collective human behavior exhibit strong path-dependence, mostly due to 
the switching costs associated with changing course of action, as well as to the 
economizing activity of our brain, which “cuts corners” and takes shortcuts in 
making decisions. An ancillary finding of this stream of cognitive science is that, 
in their effort to collect proxies that enable them to take decisions, human 
beings are often affected by the observation of what other people do. This effect, 
sometimes termed “herd behavior” or “bandwagon effect” in economics, does 
not surface only along with direct network externalities: it is an important 
element in many important decisions individuals take every day202.  
                                                   
199  See the French Law 78-22 of 10 January 1978, on the protection and information of 
consumers; German Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen 
Geschäftsbedingungen (AGBG); Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair 
terms in consumer contracts; and Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial 
practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 
97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
200  On the relevance of context, see Korobkin, R. B. and T. S. Ulen (2000), Law and 
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics. 
California Law Review, Vol. 88, at 1102 ff. 
201  Simon, H. A. (1956). Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, Psychological 
Review, Vol. 63 No. 2, 129-138. 
202  See, i.a. Rohlfs, J. (1974) A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications 
Service, Bell Journal of Economics 5, 16-37.  
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The work of pioneers such as Allais, Simon and Arthur constituted a first, major 
attack at the foundations of neoclassical economics and its faith in market 
outcomes. The idea that rationality could be bounded, i.e. prey of an array of 
diverse constraints that limit the potential of individual decision-making, was at 
once devastating and thrilling for economists, and showed that economics was 
not rocket science, since the individual dimension of decision-making made an 
exact forecast of future outcomes impossible. For example, in 1974, while 
receiving the Nobel Prize for Economics, Friederich Von Hayek denounced the 
flaws of neoclassical (macro)economists, who had failed to predict the major 
economic crisis of the early 1970s. In doing so, he reminded the audience that 
economics is not like physics: it is a social, not a natural science, and its 
usefulness and soundness crucially depends on the underlying assumptions that 
are used to approximate and simplify the complexity of the outside world.  In 
doing this, he was pointing the finger at economists like Paul Samuelson, who 
looked at physics as the science for economics to emulate203.  
Subsequent years have led to a major reconsideration of the features of human 
decision-making and its impact on market outcomes. The research on the so-
called “prospect theory” of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, awarded the 
Nobel prize in 2002, was an essential step towards operationalizing the findings 
of cognitive psychology into the portrayal of an array of situations in which 
humans will indeed err, and will do it systematically. Since then, the tenets of 
Neoclassical economics have gradually tumbled down. Examples are manifold. 
Take the so-called “endowment effect" elaborated by Richard Thaler back in 
1980 and extensively studied in modern neuroeconomics204: the fact that people 
attach an asymmetric value to gains and losses based on the situation that they 
consider to be the “default state” challenges several insights from early Chicago 
law and economics, including the theory of efficient breach and the idea of 
liability rules as Pareto-Superior solutions, and extends beacons of skepticism 
over the whole approach to damage compensation. Empirical evidence that 
individuals systematically under-estimate risk in certain circumstances, and 
over-estimate risk in others, bears significant consequences in several areas of 
legislation, in which the optimality of individual decision-making had been an 
essential feature of policy advice. Moreover, “regret theory” shows that 
individuals may prefer courses of actions that minimize their regret, compared 
to other options that, though potentially more rewarding, can also lead to 
missed opportunities205.   
The relevance of behavioral and cognitive studies for several social sciences was 
so strongly felt that some economists decided to go deeper in the analysis of the 
human brain and started testing the major structural biases in human 
rationality through Magnetic Resonance Imaging and similar tools. The branch 
of neuroeconomics has today advanced to the study of neurotransmitters such 
                                                   
203  See, i.a. Lo, A. W. and M. T. Mueller (2010), Warning: Physics Envy May be Hazardous to 
Your Wealth! (March 12, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1563882.  
204  Thaler, R. (1980). Toward a positive theory of consumer choice. Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization, 1, 39-60. 
205  In this respect, regret theory is very related to Rawls’ idea of maximin. See below, Section 
4.3.3.2. 
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as dopamine as key factors that determine the outcome of individual choices206. 
The findings of cognitive sciences and neuroeconomics have recently become 
subject to livelier interest in the policy community. On the one hand, 
competition authorities and consumer protection bodies are trying to 
incorporate these insights in their overall policy approach. At the same time, 
international organizations such as the OECD (2008) have devoted conferences 
to the understanding of the impact that behavioral biases may exert on the 
design and on the effectiveness of policies. The most studied impacts include the 
following207: 
x Choice/information overload: economic models suggest that the benefits 
from extra choice and information are unbounded. Even the theory of 
“bounded rationality” does not suggest that extra choice and information is 
detrimental. Market research however, in products as diverse as jams and 
retirement savings, suggests that past a point, when provided with more 
choice and information, we either walk away from markets, choosing not to 
choose, or we choose randomly.  
x Endowment bias: What one has is valued more than what one might have. 
Consumers are often reluctant to switch suppliers because of a loyalty, which 
may be misplaced, to existing suppliers. This is particularly evident in 
telecommunication and financial services.  
x Overconfidence: in many situations, consumers are overconfident in their 
abilities and in their future fortunes. For example, many people invest, 
believing that they can beat the stock market, or they underestimate the risk 
that illness or unemployment may cause difficulty in repaying a loan. Again, 
this bias is important in financial services.  
x Framing biases: Consumers are influenced not only by the objective 
information provided by suppliers, but also by the “frame” of that 
information. For example, a claim “92% fat free” elicits a different response 
than “8% fat.” 
x Difficulty in handling uncertainty and risk: The frame in which choices are 
considered influences consumer’s perceptions of the consequences of 
uncertain outcomes. When gambles (such as insurance choices) are 
considered in isolation, consumers tend to be irrationally risk averse. When 
consumers consider themselves to be in a loss situation (such as becoming 
heavily overcommitted on a credit card) they tend to behave recklessly. 
Furthermore, consumers often have difficulty in thinking rationally about 
possible outcomes with very low probability.  
x Mis-evaluation of future benefits and costs (hyperbolic discounting, 
myopia): Consumers do not rationally weigh up present against future 
benefits and costs; rather they put too much weight on the immediate. This 
bias is manifest in outcomes such as low retirement savings in the absence of 
compulsion. 
                                                   
206  See i.a. Camerer, C., G. Loewenstein and D. Prelec (2005), Neuroeconomics. How 
Neuroscience can Inform Economics. Journal of Economic Literature 43, 1, 9-64.  
207  Source: OECD 7th Global Forum on Competition, Introductory Note, February 2008. 
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The example of retail financial services is perhaps the most intuitive, when it 
comes to explaining the impact of these decision-making biases. For example, in 
a recent paper on consumer investment decisions, Oehler and Kohlert (2009) 
comment on the information overload effect by arguing that  
“The sheer amount of information the customer has to perceive and 
to process means a high grade of complexity on its own. The number 
of options and corresponding attributes inherent in this quantity of 
information clarifies that. If the individual investment types and 
products, respectively, are considered decision options, the client is 
confronted with about five options alone at the investment type level 
(e.g., liquidity, bonds, stocks, insurance, funds) with different 
subgroups each (e.g., money market funds, bond funds, equity 
funds, real estate funds) of which each again has a much higher 
number of corresponding attributes. The multiplicity of attributes 
can be clarified by considering different attribute levels (e.g., level 1: 
cost, level 2: purchase cost, level 3: indirect cost, level 4: kick-back 
payments). Furthermore, the information the client receives during 
an advising session are highly interrelated ... If we consider that 
humans cannot simultaneously process more than nine information 
units, even less in the case of complex problems ... it is unavoidable 
that the majority of the clients who have little or no knowledge and 
experience in the investment area will suffer from information 
overload”208. 
In addition to this account of rational ignorance, several papers in behavioral 
economics and neuroeconomics illustrate individuals’ decision-making bias 
when facing ambiguous or risky situations209. The main prescriptive result of 
this literature is that financial intermediaries have several options to engage in 
misleading conduct such as steering or churning, and will use their 
informational advantage to extract as much surplus as possible from less 
informed customers210.  
                                                   
208  Oehler, A., and D. Kohlert. (2009), Financial Advice Giving and Taking – Where are the 
Market’s Self-healing Powers and a Functioning Legal Framework When We Need 
Them?, Journal of Consumer Policy 32: 91-116., at 103.  
209  See Barberis, N. and R. Thaler (2002), A Survey of Behavioral Finance, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=327880 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.327880; Bossaerts, P. L. (2009), 
What Decision Neuroscience Teaches Us About Financial Decision Making, Annual Rev. 
Fin. Econ. 2009.1:383-404; Camerer, C. (2008), The Case for Mindful Economics, in 
Caplin, A., and Schotter, A. (ed.), Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Camerer, C.;G. Loewenstein, and D. Prelec (2004), 
Neuroeconomics: Why Economics Needs Brains, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 
106(3), 2004, 555-579; and Camerer, C; G. Loewenstein, and D. Prelec (2005), 
Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics, Journal of Economic 
Literature, 43, March 2005, 9-64. 
210  See Renda et al., (2009), Tying and other potentially unfair commercial practices in retail 
financial services, final report for the European Commission, Dg internal Market and 
Services, available online at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs 
/2010/tying/report_en.pdf. 
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More generally, the law and economics of human behavior has converged on 
three different types of bounds on otherwise rational behavior. First, individuals 
exhibit bounded rationality, which means that their mental resources are 
limited and individuals make judgment errors and systematically depart from 
the expected utility theory. In addition, humans display bounded willpower, 
which captures the fact that people sometimes make choices that are not in their 
long-run interest, and often feature a “multiple-selves” problem211. Finally, 
bounded self-interest incorporates the fact that humans are often willing to 
sacrifice their own interests to help others – i.e. other-regarding behavior is part 
of decisions taken by individuals212.  
In the field of law and economics, some scholars have attempted to translate 
these findings into concrete prescriptive solutions. After the more “exploratory” 
nature of papers such as Ulen and Korobkin (2000), some scholars have 
attempted to illustrate ways to achieve “de-biasing” through law. For example, 
Sunstein and Thaler (2003), Jolls and Sunstein (2005) and Jolls (2006) analyze 
the impact of behavioral law and economics on traditional ways of appraising 
and justifying policy. Jolls (2006) brings examples related to distributional 
impacts in legal rules, discovery rules in litigation, the business judgment rule in 
corporate law, rules on contractual renegotiation and specific rules in consumer 
protection laws. The de-biasing approach implies that policy actions do not try 
to “protect legal outcomes from the effects of the errors”, but instead “by 
operating directly on the errors and attempting to help people either to reduce 
or to eliminate them”213.  
The consequences of realizing that human behavior systematically diverges 
from the prototype of homo oeconomicus are far-reaching, especially when we 
consider cost-benefit analysis as grounds for justifying policy actions and the 
choice of a preferred action over alternative, as done in RIA. This, in turn, shows 
that the evolution of the “positive” school of law and economics” bears 
important normative consequences. At a minimum, it seems fair to state that 
                                                   
211  See, for an early contribution, Posner R.A. (1997), Are We One Self or Multiple Selves? 
Implications for Law and Public Policy, in Legal Theory, 3, pp. 23-35. More recent 
elaborations on the multiple selves problem include Rasmusen, E. (2008), Internalities 
and Paternalism. Applying the Compensation Criterion to Multiple Selves across Time, 
Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and 
Public Policy Working Paper No 2008-13.  
212  In the definition given by Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler (2001), that people display bounded 
rationality is linked to the fact that they suffer from certain biases, such as over-optimism 
and self-serving conceptions of fairness; they follow heuristics, such as availability, that 
lead to mistakes; and they behave in accordance with prospect theory rather than expected 
utility theory. Bounded willpower means that they can be tempted and are sometimes 
myopic. Finally, they are boundedly self-interested, which means that they are concerned 
about the wellbeing of others, even strangers in some circumstances, and this concern and 
their self-conception can lead them in the direction of cooperation at the expense of their 
material self-interest (and sometimes spite, also at the expense of their material self-
interest). See also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The “New” Law and Psychology: A Reply to 
Critics, Skeptics and Cautious Supporters, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 739, 761 (2000). 
213  Jolls, C. (2007), Behavioral law and economics, Chapter 4 in in Diamond, Hannu 
Vartiainen and Yrjö Jahnssonin säätiö (Eds.), Behavioral economics and its applications, 
Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, at 34-35. 
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the Coase theorem should be redefined to accommodate the role of legal rules in 
minimizing the impact of behavioral biases214. But the potential impact of 
behavioralism is more pervasive: suffice it to mention that, according to 
Sunstein and Thaler (2003), in the presence of the endowment effect a “cost-
benefit study cannot be based on willingness to pay (WTP), because WTP will be 
a function of the default rule”. Even outside the realm of cost-benefit analysis 
per se, consequences may be significant: according to Jolls, depending on the 
circumstances, de-biasing can and should be obtained through substantive law, 
through procedural law, or a blend of both. A similar approach to de-biasing 
through law is adopted by Sunstein (2009) in developing the concept of 
“nudging”. Section 4.3.6 below explores the potential consequences of adopting 
a behavioral approach to the design and enforcement of legal rules by describing 
what “nudging” may mean for the design and implementation of RIA practice, 
and how nudging can be usefully introduced in a RIA exercise.   
4.2.2 Norms, groups and institutions: challenging methodological 
individualism 
Traditional law and economics basically rested on two key assumptions: that of 
perfect rationality of individual agents, and methodological individualism. As 
explained in the previous section, law and economics scholars have come to 
grips with cognitive sciences and neuro-anatomy by developing new approaches 
known as behavioral law and economics and neuroeconomics. However, the 
attacks to the neoclassical paradigm do not end there. The second key 
assumption of traditional neoclassical (law and) economics has been subject to 
less well-known, but perhaps more pervasive and disruptive criticism, which 
bears important consequences for our understanding of how modern law and 
economics can contribute to the ex ante appraisal of policy.  
Methodological individualism can be defined in non-technical terms as the 
assumption that individual preferences are dependent on each individual’s 
specific situation, and not on external constraints. More precisely, under a 
methodologically individualist approach marginal utilities – and thus individual 
preferences in market and non-market contexts – “do not depend on what 
society as such has, but on what individual members have”. Following 
Schumpeter (1909), “nobody values bread according to the quantity of it which 
is to be found in his country or in the world, but everybody measures the utility 
of it according to the amount that he has himself, and this in turn depends on 
his general means”215. Chicago-style law and economics fully adopted this 
                                                   
214  Some authors have expressed themselves for a “de-Coasing” of law and economics, at least 
in the environmental field. See Arcuri, A. (2005), A Different Reason for de-Coasing 
Environmental Law and Economics, European Journal of Law and Economics Volume 20, 
Number 2, 225-246. 
215  Schumpeter, J. (1909) On the Concept of Social Value, 23 Q.J. ECON. 213, 231 (1909). 
Even before Schumpeter, the elaboration of methodological individualism can be traced 
back to the work of Ludwig Von Mises and Carl Manger, but also in Jeremy Bentham, John 
Locke, and John Stuart Mill. See Ahdieh, R.B. (2009), Beyond Individualism in Law and 
Economics. Emory Public Law Research Paper No. 9-78; Emory Law and Economics 
Research Paper No. 09-48. 
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approach due to its deep roots in neoclassical economics. Even more generally, 
the study of economics has most often adopted individuals as the basic unit of 
analysis216.  
As illustrated by authors such as Hovenkamp (1994), Udehn (2002), Hodgson 
(2007), and Ahdieh (2009), reliance on methodological individualism is the key 
pillar on which economics builds the analysis of social outcomes, and in 
particular the aggregation of individual preferences into the public good as 
“spontaneous” order. As succinctly put by Robert Ahdieh (2009), “in a 
methodologically individualist approach … analysis of the social must occur by 
way of the individual”. Departing from this assumption, therefore, also means 
undermining the true foundations of the method used by economics to 
formulate normative prescriptions. To the contrary, it leads economic analysis 
closer to the findings of sociology, typically rooted in the study of social 
phenomena from a non-individualist perspective.  
Relaxing methodological individualism to embrace “holism” means departing 
from the assumption of subjectivity of preferences. At a minimum, this means 
that social constraints – including, in particular, social norms and herd behavior 
– shape individual preferences and provide the framework in which such 
preferences are formed. A direct consequence is that one cannot defend the 
rationality of an individual choice on the basis of the subjectivity of preferences 
and the impossibility to calculate utility and engage in inter-personal utility 
comparison. Rather, it is the recognition of the inter-dependence of individual 
preferences that determines an important scholarly conclusion: that contrary to 
the dictates of methodological individualism, the idea of aggregation of 
preferences is misleading, and “for the phenomena to be explained involve 
interdependence of individuals’ actions, not merely aggregated individual 
behavior”217.  
An important consequence of this debate is that, according to psychologists, 
socio-economists and a growing number of lawyer-economists, the way in which 
economics has been aggregating preferences for decades – including, most 
notably, through the Kaldor-Hicks calculation of net benefits in terms of money 
– is flawed, approximate and incomplete. Far from occurring exclusively in the 
economic agent’s mind, the formation of preferences becomes subject to 
important external constraints, up to the point where it originates from a “social 
mind”. The key examples are the role of social norms and that of network 
effects, or – to avoid confusion with market effects depicted in network 
industries – “herd behavior” phenomena in several markets.  
                                                   
216  See, i.a., Arrow (1994) (stating that “it is a touchstone of economics that all explanations 
must run in terms of the actions and reactions of individuals. Our behavior in judging 
economic research, in peer review of papers and research, and in promotions, includes the 
criterion that in principle the behavior we explain and the policies we propose are 
explicable in terms of individuals, not of other social categories”). 
217  See Udehn, L. (2002), The Changing Face of Methodological Individualism, 28 Annual 
Review of Sociology 479, 484. 
LAW AND ECONOMICS IN THE RIA WORLD | 115 
LAW AND ECONOMICS IN THE RIA WORLD - © ANDREA RENDA 2011 
4.2.2.1 Social norms and the law 
Social norms are relevant to the understanding of several aspects of the 
formulation and implementation of legal rules. First, if we accept that social 
norms exert a constrain on individual preferences and choice, the natural 
consequence will be that the same legal rule may exert a different impact 
depending on the type of social context in which the decision to comply will be 
formulated. A similar effect was defined, though in a different stream of 
academic literature, as the “compliance trap”. According to Christine Parker 
(2006), the compliance trap occurs “where there is a lack of political and 
cultural support for the moral seriousness of the law it must enforce”. When this 
is the case, any attempt to enforce the law in a formalistic way is doomed to 
failure, unless the policymaker can promote the “moral” content of the law in a 
way that directly changes the social norms behind it218. The strength of social 
norms can be so decisive that in some environments social norms definitely 
trump legal rules whenever a conflict arises. Examples are manifold, and range 
from the implementation of the ban on smoking in public places (e.g., in 
Jordan) to pooper-scooper norms (Cooter, 1996219) to compliance with the law 
in post-communist countries, and to the violations of copyright in cyberspace220. 
In this respect, perhaps the Internet is the most intuitive example: so far, 
changing the netiquette, which perceived file sharing as perfectly legitimate 
although often illegal, has proven prohibitive through legal means and any 
attempt at changing social norms. Legislators around the world are now trying 
with technology, i.e. changing the constraints on individual choices by changing 
the architecture of the IP-based environment in which they operate. In this 
respect, this confirms what Lessig (1999) stated about law in cyberspace: that 
code, not law, defines what’s possible and acceptable221.  
When social norms diverge from the scope and content of a legal rule, the 
latter’s effectiveness can be significantly undermined. Enforcers will find it often 
inappropriate to apply the rule to a full extent, as they themselves do not share 
the policymaker’s judgment on the morality of the law; recipients will face a 
collective action problem in deciding to comply: since, when everyone complies 
the cost of compliance is lower and the benefit of compliance is greater, the 
                                                   
218  See, i.a. Braithwaite (2002). And Ayres and Braithwaite (1992).  
219  Cooter, Robert D. (1996). Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural 
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 1643-1696. And Scott, Robert E. (2000). The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law 
and Social Norms, 86 Virginia Law Review 1603-1647. 
220  Galligan, D. (2003), The Failure of Law in Post-Communist Countries: A Study of Law 
and Social Norms, in Galligan and Kurkchiyan (Eds.) Law and Informal Practices in Post-
Communist Societies (Oxford UP, 2003). 
221  See i.a. Renda (2009), Achilles and the Turtle (Akilles och sköldpaddan), in “Gratis? Om 
kvalitet, pengar och skapandets villkor” (ed. Strömbäck, Per), Stockholm: Volante QNB, 
2009). (in Swedish language). Information available at http://bokengratis.se/utdrag-
andrea-renda/. 
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individual act of complying creates positive externalities that are never fully 
internalized until others behave similarly222. 
The study of social norms and their interaction with legal rules has been subject 
to an extensive stream of literature in social science. Notable contributions 
include the work of Karl Polanyi on forms of exchange, which shed light on the 
emergence of interactions that take non-contractual forms (e.g. reciprocity), 
which are potentially applicable to contemporary phenomena that are hard to 
categorize under standard law and economics – i.a., open source software223. 
Stewart Macaulay’s classic article “Non-Contractual Relations in Business” 
investigated the contrasting roles of legal and non-legal norms in business 
relationships, showing that the enforceability of contracts under certain 
circumstances was not seen as a major problem by businessmen due to the 
existence of strong social norms224. Similar studies are the ones that focus on 
guanxi, i.e. connections and family ties in Chinese culture as non-legal forms of 
contractual commitment. Reputational effects, repeated game effects, and the 
availability of non-legal sanctions dramatically affect the effectiveness and 
enforceability of commitments, together with the need for strong contractual 
remedies225.  
Closer to the law and economics movement, the work of Douglass North (1990) 
gave rise to a burgeoning literature in New Institutional Economics by defining 
institutions as “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, … the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”226. According to 
North, this theory of institutions based on the foundation of individual choice 
potentially reconciles the differences between economics and other social 
sciences. This also means that integrating individual choices with the 
constraints institutions impose on choice sets is a major step toward unifying 
social science research. Recently, Amir Licht (2008) criticized this approach in 
the Review of Law & Economics exactly by stating that methodological 
individualism is an incomplete approach to the complexity of institutions and 
their impact on human behavior227.  
The relevance of social norms in the study of the impact of legal rules has 
surfaced in the law and economics literature thanks to the work of Oliver 
Williamson (2000). This elaboration implies a taxonomy of levels of social 
institutions. Williamson observes that “Level 1” mostly consists of social 
institutions, including social norms, which lay the foundations for their layers 
                                                   
222  See Cooter, R. D. (2000), Three effects of social norms, Oregon Law Review Vol. 79.  
223  See Polanyi, K. (1944) The Great Transformation, New York: Farrar & Rinehart.  
224  Macaulay, S. (1963), Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study. 28 
American Sociological Review 1963, pp. 55–67. 
225  See Winn, J. K. (1994), Relational Practices and the Marginalization of Law: Informal 
Financial Practices of Small Businesses in Taiwan. 28 Law and Society Review 1994, pp. 
193-241. 
226 North, D. (1990): Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economics Performance. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1990. 
227  Licht, A. (2008), Social Norms and the Law. Why Peoples Obey the Law, Review of Law 
and Economics, 4:3, 715. 
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and deeply affect their working. “Level 2” contains formal legal rules that realize 
the allocation of entitlements, including most notably property. The next level 
(3) deals with the transfer of entitlements and governance of economic 
relationships, including in particular contract law. Finally, level 4 contains the 
so-called marginal analysis, i.e. everything that governs the formation of market 
outcomes. It is not the purpose of this work to discuss in-depth Williamson’s 
taxonomy: suffice here to recall that, according to Williamson, the first level of 
analysis, thus the one dedicated to informal institutions and social norms, is 
normally taken as a given in law and economics, whereas a deeper analysis of 
that level would enrich our understanding of the effectiveness and actual 
interpretation of legal rules in property and contracts, as well as the birth of 
formal institutions.  
The real problem, however, is not solved by Williamson’s taxonomy and a 
greater awareness of the existence of social norms. As a matter of fact, the birth 
of institutions implies the formulation of some sort of social preferences, that 
are the result of social interaction that cannot be explained by keeping the 
individual as the sole unit of analysis. The real obstacle for economists is easily 
referred to Arrow’s impossibility theorem, which draws on an earlier intuition of 
Condorcet (1792) and postulates the impossibility of aggregating individual 
preferences into coherent societal ones228. Authors such as James Buchanan 
and Amartya Sen also expressed serious doubts on the possibility to aggregate 
individual preferences into some notion of societal preference229. In a nutshell, 
while law and economics scholars have recognized the need to expand their 
analysis into social norms and institutions to achieve a better understanding of 
human and social behavior as a response to legal rules, they have not tackled the 
problem of how to aggregate individual preferences into meaningful indicators 
of societal good. Arrow’s impossibility theorem and Sen’s Paradox stand on 
their way to such an achievement, casting dark shadows on the prospects of 
neoclassical economics in this very complex endeavor. 
4.2.2.2 Network effects and herd behavior 
Similarly to social norms, network effects and herd behavior are typical cases in 
which the inter-dependence between individuals and their dynamic interaction 
makes it impossible to follow a mathematical aggregation of individual 
preferences as in neoclassical economics. Different levels of interaction between 
individuals, moreover, imply that coordinated social outcomes will exhibit 
multiple equilibria, something that economics can hardly cope with due to the 
                                                   
228  Arrow’s impossibility theorem states that, when voters have three or more discrete 
alternatives (options), no voting system can convert the ranked preferences of individuals 
into a community-wide ranking while also meeting a certain set of criteria. These criteria 
are called unrestricted domain, non-dictatorship, Pareto efficiency, and independence of 
irrelevant alternatives. See the proof of the thorem in Kelly J. (1988), Social Choice Theory: 
an Introduction, Springer.  
229  Licht (2008) observes that Lewin (1996) traces this problem, which is also dubbed “Sen’s 
paradox,” to the historical roots of the relations between economics and psychology during 
early 20th century (see Rabin, 1998, for an influential review). 
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excessive number of variables230. This general finding is mirrored in the fact 
that games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma have attracted much more attention 
than others – e.g. the hawk-dove game – which, although very important for the 
understanding of human interaction, display a multiplicity of potential 
equilibria231. Coordination games, which stand at the core of the study of social 
interaction and the emergence of social norms – are not the easiest of fields for 
law and economics.  
One additional feature of phenomena such as herd behavior and bandwagon 
effects is their reliance on external constraints. More precisely, while direct and 
indirect network externalities observed in industries such as electronic 
communications have their roots in straightforward functions of the value and 
utility of a given product (e.g., the value of a telephone to its user increases 
exponentially as the number of reachable users increase linearly, and the value 
of a phone to a user when there is no other user around is close to zero); in other 
cases the bandwagon effect originate directly from the observation of social, 
external behavior. For example, if Alice observes that a crowd of people is trying 
to enter Bob’s Restaurant, whereas Charlie’s Diner right across the street is 
empty, she will infer that Bob’s has better food. In this case, the need to collect 
information ex ante on an experience good leads Alice to draw on external 
signals sent by the majority of people she can observe232. In other cases, this 
observation is coupled with some form of external recognition – take the case of 
fashion products, which lose value as the critical mass of consumers move to 
another product, even if there is no intrinsic reason why demand should 
oscillate so significantly.  
In all those cases, collective action and individual emulation evolve and interact, 
forming social phenomena that are difficult to explain by simply relying on the 
individual’s mere endowment. A large portion of these effects can indeed be 
dealt with by economics. What economists have failed to take into account, 
however, is that the happiness or satisfaction of a given individual is most often 
dependant on that individual’s relative, rather than absolute well-being. This, as 
I observe in Section 4.3 below, casts doubts even on the least disputed of 
welfare-maximization criteria used in economics: Pareto efficiency.  
                                                   
230  See Ahdieh, R. B. (2004), Law’s Signal: A Cueing Theory of Law in Market Transition, 77 
Southern California Law Rev. 215.  
231  The Hawk-Dove game was illustrated by John Maynard Smith and G. R. Price. In this 
game, two individuals compete for a resource of a fixed value V – e.g. their survival or 
fitness. One players (hawk) behaves aggressively, not stopping until injured or until one's 
opponent backs down; whereas the other (dove) retreats immediately if her opponent 
initiates aggressive behavior. Over time, the division of roles leads to a stable equilibrium 
between hawks and doves . this is why this repeated game has been one of the bases for 
developing evolutionary game theory. The game is also known as the “chicken game”. See 
Maynard Smith, J. and G.R. Price (1973), The Logic of Animal Conflict, Nature 246, 15-18.  
232  See, for a definition of experience goods, Nelson, P. (1970), Information and Consumer 
Behavior, Journal of Political Economy, 78 - (March-April), 311-29. Nelson, P. (1974), 
Advertising as Information, Journal of Political Economy, 83 (July-August), 729-54. And 
Darby, M. R. and E. Karni (1973), Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 
Journal of Law and Economics, 16 (April), 67-88. 
 
LAW AND ECONOMICS IN THE RIA WORLD | 119 
LAW AND ECONOMICS IN THE RIA WORLD - © ANDREA RENDA 2011 
4.2.2.3 Concluding remarks 
The consequences of the literature on social norms on mainstream law and 
economics seem, at first blush, less revolutionary than what claimed by some 
scholars. As a matter of fact, it is true that economists have regularly 
downplayed the non-individual aspects of human choice; at the same time, the 
fact that external constraints shape individual preferences is already accounted 
for in the behavioral law and economics literature, which draws on the concept 
of bounded rationality. As I explained in section 4.2.1.1 above, studies of the 
human brain confirm that the observation of other’s behavior is an important 
source of inspiration for human decision-making, which compared to the one of 
the homo oeconomicus takes the even-more-dismal form of having to cope with 
an overly complex world with very limited resources. At the same time, the 
studies on the role of “mirror neurons” in human behavior lay the foundations 
for “bounded self-interest” as defined in the previous section, i.e. the fact that 
we are anatomically geared towards empathy, and that other-regarding behavior 
is an integral part of the formation of our individual preferences233. David Hume 
and Adam Smith already referred to sympathy and fellow-feeling as shaping 
human behavior, and the consequences of these sentiments on human behavior 
and on the inter-personal comparison of utility have been studied, i.a. by 
Fontaine (2001)234.  
So far, so good: the need to account for social norms and methodological holism 
can in principle be reconciled with the behavioral critique to neoclassical tenets 
of economics235. But there seems to be more in the critique of methodological 
individualism, which attacks the true foundation of mainstream law and 
economics as we use to define it. It shows that the “Posnerian” economic 
analysis of law – and at the same time, the use of economics to shape legal rules 
and determine the ultimate goal of the state – is more limited in scope than has 
been stated in the past decades, and that economics has to come to grips with 
equally important social sciences such as psychology and sociology, which have 
gone further in adopting a methodologically holistic approach that accounts for 
the social good as something different from the mere sum of its parts – i.e. the 
aggregation of individual preferences236.  
                                                   
233  See, i.a. Kirman A. and M. Techl, Selfish or selfless? The role of empathy in economics, 
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 2010 365, 303-317. And Fontaine, P. (2001), The changing place of 
empathy in welfare economics. Hist. Polit. Econ. 33, 387–409.  
234  See also Khalil, E. (2007), The Mirror-Neuron Paradox: How Far is Sympathy from 
Compassion, Indulgence, and Adulation?, MPRA Paper No. 3961. 
235  See, on methodological holism (or collectivism), Parker, W., Methodological Individualism 
v. Methodological Holism. Neoclassicism, Institutionalism and Socioeconomic Theory, 
available online at http://www.socionomics.org/pdf/neoclassicism_institutionalism.pdf. 
For a complete bibliography on the debate between methodological individualism and 
holism in social sciences, see Lukes, S. (1973), Individualism, reprinted by ECPR Press, 
Colchester, 2006.  
236  See Philippe Fontaine’s explanation of Mancur Olson’s Logic of Collective Action. In 
Fontaine, P. (2007), From Philanthropy to Altruism: Incorporating Unselfish Behavior 
into Economics, 1961-1975, History of Political Economy 2007 39(1):1-46. 
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At the same time, it also means that policymaking should be made dependent 
on something else than what Hovenkamp (1994) critically defines as preference-
based (or “subjective”) welfare judgment. To the contrary, there is room for so-
called “objective welfare judgment”, i.e. the determination of welfare goals and 
the social good with means other than mere reliance on subjective preferences. 
As we will see in Section 4.4 below, this at once determines the limit of the 
expansionist trend of economics into law and other social sciences; and the 
potential justification of “nudging” and intermediate forms of “libertarian 
paternalism” as ways to affect people’s preferences and choice to steer them 
towards “socially desirable” outcomes as defined by policymakers themselves.  
4.3 Normative law and economics: how the law ought to be 
The attacks to traditional law and economics based on the critique to rationality 
and methodological individualism were thorough and almost undisputable 
ones: the predictive power of economics seemed essentially rooted in a 
methodological mystification. As a matter of fact, early Progressives such as 
John Dewey and Clarence Ayres seemed aware of the fact that the key pillars of 
economics were a double-edged sword237: on the one hand, individualism and 
rationality allowed economics to develop a consistent set of principles and an 
appearance of scientific soundness, which ended up being very powerful and 
appealing for policymakers. Economists such as Milton Friedman (1957) 
explicitly treated the problem and rejected any further sophistication of 
neoclassical economics, which would have undermined its phenomenal 
predictive power. Richard Posner entirely followed this approach in proposing 
an economic analysis of the law, which would basically draw on neoclassical 
economics to create a fictional world in which individuals always express their 
preference through market acts.  
However, by striking this Faustian deal with the “neoclassical devil”, law and 
economics also had to leave something aside. In particular, the neoclassical 
fiction could not support any conclusion as regards three of the fundamental 
issues policymakers have to address when crafting policy: happiness, 
distribution of wealth, and money. These three issues are so important for 
understanding the limits of today’s RIA practice, that the whole result of ex ante 
appraisal may be meaningless if the fallacies concerning them are not fixed.  
First, although neoclassical economists generally consider themselves as 
descendants of Jeremy Bentham, Bentham’s vision of the role of public policy 
was one aimed at maximizing “happiness”, rather than “utility” or “welfare”. The 
impossibility of directly measuring happiness, however, led economists to rely 
on proxies such as “revealed preferences”: as a matter of fact, since the direct 
measurement of happiness, as well as the interpersonal comparison of utility, 
                                                   
237  This is why both Dewey and Ayres agreed that economics should cooperate with other 
social sciences, in a continuum. See, i.a. Tilman, R. (1990), New Light on John Dewey, 
Clarence Ayres, and the Development of Evolutionary Economics, Journal of Economic 
Issues Vol. 24, No. 4 (Dec., 1990), pp. 963-979; and Campbell, D. (1994), Ayres versus 
Coase: An Attempt to Recover the Issue of Equality in Law and Economics, Journal of Law 
and Society Vol. 21, No. 4 (Dec., 1994), pp. 434-463. 
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are not technically possible, one could either rely on some form of introspection 
(as some psychologists have tried to advocate238); or revert to external 
manifestations of individual perceptions, such as market behavior. Accordingly, 
if Alice decides to buy a widget for $100, she is implicitly signaling that her 
willingness to pay for the widget is higher than $100. And if Alice and Bob enter 
a contract whereby Bob will purchase the widget from Alice at a price of $120, 
this means that Bob values the widget at least $120 and that the transaction is 
Pareto efficient, since both parties have spontaneously decided to conclude it. 
Accordingly, parties reveal their preferences by acting on the marketplace, and 
all successful negotiations lead to a tentative mapping of the parties’ preferences 
through express consent. 
However, revealed preferences exhibits important shortcomings. First, 
observation of (and reliance on) market behavior inevitably carries a bias in 
favor of those transactions that are actually concluded. The fact that Alice would 
have bought a widget for $100, but the market price was higher than her 
willingness to pay is not taken into account by economics in treating revealed 
preferences. But even more importantly, revealed preferences crucially depend 
on an individual’s willingness and ability to pay – if Alice is poor, she may not 
wish to buy a widget for $100, even if she really likes widgets. Now, if she would 
have valued the good but could not buy it because of insufficient income, should 
we care when crafting policy? 
Put differently, the use of revealed preferences implies reliance on external 
manifestations of individual preferences such as the willingness to pay (WTP). 
But WTP measures exhibit a number of important shortcomings, including in 
primis the dependence on the level of income239. Accordingly, a low WTP for a 
widget does not necessarily signal a low interest. Alice may be highly interested 
in buying the widget, and the possession of the widget may prospectively make 
her very “happy”, but if she does not have enough money to spend her WTP for 
the widget will inevitably remain limited.  
Moreover, following the “prospect theory” developed by Nobel laureates Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky, an individual WTP for a widget is often very 
different from the individual’s willingness to accept compensation (WTA) for 
being deprived of the same widget. Accordingly, assessing the impact of 
redistribution or reallocation of resources in a society is very difficult, if not 
impossible, as individuals will not converge on a single valuation of a good. 
Taking the widget from Bob and reallocating it to Alice for a given price x may 
leave Bob unhappy (since his WTA is higher than the price x) and at times Alice 
also unhappy (if price x is higher than her WTP). Likewise, the efficient resource 
reallocation through private bargaining postulated by the Coase theorem may 
not hold – as demonstrated by Hovenkamp (1994) – whenever the parties do 
not find a price at which a potentially efficient transaction may take place.  
                                                   
238  See James, W. (1890), The Principles of Psychology, also available online at 
http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/James/Principles/.  
239  See, i.a. Heinzerling and Ackerman (2008), on the difference between WTP and ability to 
pay (ATP). 
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This discussion is related to a querelle that has never been resolved in 
economics. Chicago economists are almost silent on distributional issues: and 
for good reasons, since they know that their efficiency criterion – mostly 
Paretian – has nothing to say about distribution. If a cake falls like manna from 
heaven, and Alice and Bob share it, the neoclassical economist has nothing to 
say on how big should the share be for each of them. Likewise, in deciding 
whether the state should transfer a given amount of money to the poor by taxing 
the wealthy, neoclassical economists are at best agnostic on the overall impact 
of that transfer. If anything, if the transfer implies some cost, the overall welfare 
impact will be negative. This is due to the fact that the Pareto criterion looks 
exclusively at the “size of the pie”, rather than at the distribution of the shares. I 
will come back to this issue in the next section.  
At the same time, the discussion calls into question another of the key 
shortcomings of neoclassical economics: that criteria such as Pareto efficiency 
and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency essentially work whenever we are dealing with 
spontaneous transactions; however, when we are using the same criteria for 
forced redistribution of resources, the absence of consent leaves no way of 
demonstrating that the reallocation is increasing or decreasing the size of the 
pie. As will be shown in the next section, Posner tried to overcome this problem 
by assuming that the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is rooted in a general principle of 
justice that is accepted ex ante by citizens in a given society. Accordingly, if they 
could choose which criterion will apply in the future in the making of public 
policies, they would accept a Kaldor-Hicks one.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Chicago economists are incapable of 
dealing with distributional issues because they assume that money is worth to 
people independently of how much they are endowed with. This aspect of 
Chicago economics is striking: as a matter of fact, economists such as Marshall 
and Pigou knew perfectly that income, like any other good, exhibits decreasing 
marginal returns. This means that – with some caveats – one could presume 
that transferring money from a rich to a poor person (who, as Pigou stated, has 
a similar temperament) would increase the size of the pie. But the Chicago 
economists that inspired themselves from the work of these enlightening 
pioneers forgot to follow this precept. This is why these economists have 
absolutely nothing to say about the redistribution of resources: a cent of Euro is 
worth to rich Bob as much as it is to poor Alice. And this is quite strange, as the 
available empirical evidence testifies in favor of decreasing marginal returns of 
income. 
4.3.1 Efficiency, fairness, market outcomes and distribution: a 
simple numerical example 
The impact of happiness, distributional issues and the returns on income on the 
neoclassical cathedral is devastating, and casts serious doubts on the possibility 
of approaching policy-making with the limited and misleading toolkit that 
Chicago law and economics has provided us with. Accordingly, economists and 
philosophers are today split between different visions of the role of the 
policymaker, which involve combinations of efficiency criteria, attitude towards 
redistribution of income, justice goals and happiness metrics. To introduce the 
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reader into this quagmire, let me start with a simple account of the “ultimatum 
game” in game theory. Imagine that Alice and Bob are two cousins that live in 
Europe and are informed that a distant uncle from the United States died. In his 
testament, the generous uncle leaves a sum of $100,000 to the two cousins, with 
the sole condition that they, themselves, agree on how to divide the sum. If they 
fail to agree, none of them will get anything out of the $100,000.  A particular 
fact in this story is that, while Bob is a very rich man, Alice is so poor that she 
has to play hide and seek with her creditors every morning. 
In such context, it is important to answer a number of questions. First, what 
allocation of the $100,000 sum maximizes the utility of this money? Second, 
what allocation would be “fair”? Third, what is the allocation that maximizes the 
happiness of the two cousins? Fourth, what is the allocation that will result from 
the negotiation between Alice and Bob?  
The first question already creates problems in economics. As a matter of fact, as 
mentioned above, for Chicagoans such as Posner all distributions of the 
$100,000 sum are (Pareto) efficient, as they leave the two cousins better off. 
There is no way of ranking various scenarios, and even the case in which 
negotiation fails – if the sum is reallocated to, say, a charity – is equivalent to all 
other outcomes, since in all cases there will be a mere reallocation of an existing 
sum from an individual (the uncle) to someone else (Alice, Bob and maybe the 
charity). But for early neoclassical economists, as well as many contemporary 
philosophers and economists, the allocation of the sum makes a difference in 
terms of maximization of the sum’s utility. Even more, as observed i.a. by 
Easterlin (2005), “Few generalizations in the social sciences enjoy such wide-
ranging support as that of diminishing marginal utility of income”240. 
Accordingly, for many economists a way to maximize the overall utility of the 
$100,000 sum would be to allocate the lion’s share to Alice (the exact amount 
would depend on assumptions on the shape of each cousin’s utility curve and 
their starting financial endowment).  
Second, when it comes to fairness, a “resourcist” principle would look for a 
50:50 allocation, which would leave Alice and Bob each with $50,000241. 
However, according to alternative theories of fairness the distribution should be 
such as to provide each cousin with the same “utility”, rather than the same 
amount of money. This would, again, leave Alice with a larger share than Bob 
(again, the exact distribution depending on the shape of the utility curves). 
Moreover, according to other commentators the “fair” allocation of the sum 
would be the one chosen by an impartial spectator, or by the two cousins in a 
sort of “original” position, i.e. before knowing whether they will be the rich or 
the poor in this situation242.  
                                                   
240  Easterlin, R. A. (2004), Diminishing Marginal Utility of Income? A Caveat. Social 
Indicators Research. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=539262.  
241  This is the so-called “resource egalitarianism”. See Dworkin, R., (1981a), What is Equality? 
Part 1: Equality of Resources, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 10: 185-246. And Dworkin, 
R., (1981b) What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Welfare, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
10: 283-345. 
242  See below, Section 4.3.3.2. 
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Third, when it comes to maximizing the happiness that the sum can bring to the 
two cousins, again if we assume that happiness is positively correlated with 
income, but that it displays decreasing marginal returns on income, then the 
allocation of the sum should mostly focus on Alice, for which every cent is useful 
to repay her debts.  
Finally, when it comes to market outcomes, the result is very different. Although 
neoclassical economics normally places significant emphasis on the efficiency of 
market outcomes and the results of the spontaneous negotiation of the parties, 
in this case the possibility of strategic behavior would tilt the balance towards 
Bob. The reason is that Bob can easily threaten to abandon the negotiation table 
in case Alice proposes to allocate the $100,000 sum efficiently, or fairly. To use 
an acronym proposed by Ayres and Nalebuff (1997), Bob’s BATNA (best 
alternative to negotiated agreement) is much better than Alice’s: this means that 
Bob enjoys a superior bargaining power over Alice, also linked to the fact that 
the marginal utility of the additional portions of income that would accrue to 
Bob as a result to the agreement with Alice are lower than they are for Alice. 
Alice is likely to be terrified by the threat of a negotiation breakdown, and this 
“advantage of threat” will likely lead Bob to appropriate the largest share of the 
$100,000 sum.  
This example shows that, when it comes to policy decisions, it makes a 
difference whether the policymaker seeks to maximize efficiency, fairness, 
happiness; or – given that observing individual utility and happiness is very 
difficult – whether the policymaker is endorsing whatever market outcome 
individuals will reach by spontaneously behaving on the market. In the next 
sections, I will explain in more detail Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 
criteria, their most powerful critiques and most recently proposed refinements, 
and then proceed to briefly explain why fairness, happiness and the orientation 
of people’s preference can affect the basic assumption that de gustibus non est 
disputandum243. 
4.3.2 Efficiency and wealth maximization: from Bentham, to 
Bentham? 
Economists have started thinking about how to judge policy outcomes long 
before Vilfredo Pareto proposed its efficiency criterion. For example, Jeremy 
Bentham equated the goal of public policy as “the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number”, paving the way for the development of modern theories of 
welfare and well-being. As already explained, given the impossibility of 
measuring directly well-being, neoclassical  economists started using resourcist 
efficiency criteria as proxies for the maximization of utility since the end of the 
19th century244. 
                                                   
243  Becker and Stigler (1977), De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, The American Economic 
Review Vol. 67, No. 2 (Mar., 1977), pp. 76-90 
244  See Robbins, L. (1932), An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, 
(holding that economists, as scientists, could say nothing about the relative pleasures of a 
Brahmin and an untouchable). 
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Under the Pareto criterion, a public policy is efficient if, as a result of its 
introduction, at least one member of society is better-off, whereas the policy 
leaves nobody worse-off compared to the status quo ante. When this happens, 
there is a net increase in wealth, which does not disadvantage any member of a 
given society. The first Theorem of Welfare Economics postulates that any 
market will reach a Pareto optimal point, regardless of the initial distribution of 
goods: this means that the market alone can reach a situation where any further 
reallocation of resources would not meet the Pareto efficiency conditions. 
Likewise, the law and economics of contracts and individual negotiation – 
including the Coase theorem – justified the superiority of private bargaining on 
the grounds that it systematically achieves Pareto-optimal results. 
One of the critiques that have been moved to the Pareto criterion looks at the 
“moral neutrality” of the criterion. Pareto efficiency has long been considered as 
the only morally neutral litmus test economists could use to justify public policy 
choices. However, if one relaxes a number of rather unrealistic assumptions, it 
becomes self-evident that the Pareto criterion is far from being morally neutral. 
Firstly, as explained in the previous section, several social sciences and the 
advancement of behavioral economics unanimously point at defining individual 
well-being not only as a function of one’s own endowment of resources and 
income, but also looking at the relative endowment compared to other members 
of the society245. The fact that an individual that earns a $10,000 yearly salary in 
a company where everybody earns $10,000 yearly may be happier than an 
individual that is paid $11,000 when her peers earn $15,000 is widely tested in 
the literature on psychology and cognitive sciences. Accordingly, it is not 
automatically true that a situation in which Pareto efficiency is realized will 
always make everyone happier: this is like stating that welfare – interpreted as 
the endowment of specific resources in absolute terms – is not always a good 
proxy for happiness.  
Secondly, and relatedly, the Pareto criterion implies that the welfare of all 
members of a society can be measured by simply summing up the welfare of all 
its members, as expressed by their revealed preferences. As observed in Section 
4.2.2. above, the methodological individualism that lingers on all neoclassical 
economics finds its limit exactly in this assumption. Not only, on the one hand, 
the observation of preferences through market behavior hides important 
constraints such as the limited availability of income, which in turn affects the 
WTP of individuals on the market; and not only does bounded rationality limit 
the individual’s potential appreciation of the value of a marketed (and worse, of 
a non-marketed) good246; in addition, differences between WTP and WTA and 
the relevance of other-regarding behavior in the formation of people’s 
                                                   
245  See Easterlin, R.A. (1995), Will Raising the Income of All Increase the Happiness of All?, 
27 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 35, 39. 
246  The application of the Pareto criterion relies i.a. on the assumption that preferences are 
based on full information about the known and possible consequences of regulation. See 
Graham (2008), supra note 19, at 408, stating that “individuals are assumed to have the 
cognitive capacity and resources required to process such information and to rationally 
determine their preferences”. 
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preferences and in the determination of people’s happiness play a decisive role 
that Pareto efficiency will never be able to catch.  
So far, nothing really worrisome: in applying Pareto efficiency and optimality, 
one would only need to accept the fact that there is no easier and cheaper way to 
approximate human well-being than to use welfare as an imperfect proxy. 
Besides those critiques, however, the Pareto criterion faces two insurmountable 
and intimately connected problems, related to distributional issues and to the 
criterion’s pointlessness for policy purposes. On the first issue, suffice it to quote 
what Amartya Sen write in its essay on ethics and economics back in 1987: “A 
state can be Pareto optimal with some people in extreme misery and others 
rolling in luxury, so long as the miserable cannot be made better off without 
cutting into the luxury of the rich”247 In other words, the Pareto criterion cannot 
be applied independently of the starting distribution of income to which we 
apply it. Once we start from an initial uneven distribution of income, the effect 
of adopting a Pareto efficiency test would be to crystallize that uneven 
distribution as long as all redistribution efforts would make the rich worse off. 
Only when income can be provided to the poorest category in a population 
without depriving the rich of some resources, Pareto would baptize the change.  
Relatedly, no one can save the Pareto criterion from another critique, which 
refers to its “pointlessness” for  public policymakers, as defined by Guido 
Calabresi on the Yale Law Journal in 1990248. This critique mostly hinges on the 
fact that the Pareto criterion is the equivalent of a unanimity requirement for 
any public intervention, and as such is of very little use for policy purposes: as a 
matter of fact, all public policies imply some form of reallocation of resources, 
which are likely to leave some groups worse-off and others better-off. 
Accordingly, relying only on Pareto as a justification for public intervention 
means shrinking the role of public policy down to almost nil. This, as will be 
explained below, led economists to move towards the application of a variant of 
Paretian efficiency, the so-called “potential Pareto superiority”, or Kaldor-Hick 
test.  
4.3.2.1 The Kaldor-Hicks or “net benefits” principle 
The Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion can be defined also as the “potential 
Pareto efficiency” criterion since, in the form in which it is normally known and 
applied, it requires – just like the Pareto one – that a given policy change 
increases overall welfare measured as the aggregation of individual preferences 
and by summing up the endowments of society members in terms of resources, 
not happiness or well-being249. The difference between the Pareto and the 
                                                   
247   Sen, A.K. (1987), On Ethics and Economics, Basil Blackwell Oxford, 32.  
248  See Calabresi, G. (1991), The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 Yale 
Law Journal, 1211-1237; see also Adler, M. D. and E. A. Posner (1999), Rethinking Cost-
Benefit Analysis (April 1999). University of Chicago Law School, John M. Olin Law & 
Economics Working Paper No. 72.  
249  The Kaldor and the Hicks criteria were indeed two different tests. As recalled by John 
Graham: The Hicks version of the test is the flip side of the Kaldor version. Hicks gives the 
presumption to the lifesaving regulation and asks whether the ex ante losers from the rule 
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Kaldor-Hicks criteria is that in the latter, the possibility that someone is left 
worse-off after an “efficient” policy change is explicitly contemplated. The 
necessary condition is that it would be in principle possible, for those who gain 
from the policy change, to compensate the losers. Accordingly, if a given policy 
change increases the welfare of group A in a society by $100 million and 
decreases the welfare of group B by $90 million, the policy change is an 
improvement since, in principle, groups A members could compensate group B 
members, and this would still leave the former better off by $10 million. When 
this side payment actually takes place, the policy change gets back to a state of 
Pareto efficiency. However as stated by Niklas Kaldor, whether such 
compensation should take place “is a political question on which the economist, 
qua economist, could hardly pronounce an opinion”250. 
As mentioned already in the introductory section of this Thesis, the Kaldor-
Hicks principle is the polar star of current impact assessment practice, 
especially in the United States, where major secondary legislation adopted by 
government agencies is subject to scrutiny according to the ability of those 
agencies to show that their proposed policy actions maximized “net benefits”. 
Accordingly, it is very important to discuss potential shortcomings of this 
principle in light of its relevance for the whole ex ante policy appraisal that takes 
place in the US and elsewhere.  
Needless to say, the Kaldor-Hicks principle features most of the limits and 
problems that the Pareto principle displays. In particular, it is based on the 
assumption that welfare can be a good proxy for well-being and is rooted in 
methodological individualism. A difference between the two criteria is that 
Kaldor-Hicks is not “pointless” for policy purposes. To the contrary, the test 
provides a relatively easy benchmark for policymakers wishing to ensure that 
their actions are not decreasing overall welfare for society. To say it with John 
Graham (who was the Chairman of the OIRA for the 2001-2006 period), the test 
is considered to possess attractive features since it considers the preferences of 
each individual in society, it accounts for the intensity of individual preferences 
and provides an explicit account of the weights attributed to opposing 
preferences in a way that is “explicit, calculable, and scrutable”251. In addition, 
as Graham states, “if adequate information is available on the consequences of a 
rule and the preferences of each citizen, the [Kaldor-Hicks] test is also 
determinate (with regard to efficiency)”252. Finally, the test does not require the 
inter-personal comparison of utility. For those reasons, Kaldor-Hicks is a 
formidable test for policymakers, as it gives them the sensation of being able to 
master the effects of policy.  
                                                                                                                                                     
would be willing to compensate the ex ante beneficiaries for not having the rule. Since in 
some situations the Kaldor and Hicks tests might give different answers, it has been 
suggested that a rule should have to pass both the Kaldor and Hicks tests in order to be 
considered efficient. See Hicks, J.R. (1939), The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 
ECON. J. 696; and Kaldor, N. (1939), Welfare Propositions of Economics and 
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549. 
250  Kaldor (1939), supra note 249, at 550.  
251  See Graham (2008), supra note 19. 
252  Id.  
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However, this advantage, which of course determined the success of the Kaldor-
Hicks test in economics and policy, is also the most dangerous limit of the 
criterion itself. As a matter of fact, by endorsing policy changes that lead to an 
increase in overall welfare (resource-based) for society, the Kaldor-Hicks 
principle uncovers one of the most disquieting aspects of neoclassical economics 
as interpreted in the “welfarist revolution” of the 1950s: the assumption that a 
cent of Euro is worth to every person the same – i.e. that income does not 
exhibit decreasing marginal returns253. Indeed, Kaldor-Hicks justifies a policy 
change that increases the wealth of the wealthy more than it increases the 
poverty of the poor. More concretely, Kaldor-Hicks would justify a policy 
intervention that makes the richest group of a society richer by $100 million 
while depriving the poorer group of $90 million. No compensation (if not a 
potential one) is actually required. In this respect, the test violates the so-called 
Pigou-Dalton Principle in economics, which stipulates – as described by Adler 
(2008) – that shifting utility from someone at a higher utility level to someone 
at a lower level, without changing total utility, must increase the value of the 
[social welfare function”)254. 
Even more basically, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is subject to the so-called 
“Scitovsky Paradox”, which shows that two states of the world can be Kaldor-
Hicks efficient to one another255. This means that, as Jules Coleman once 
observed, “Kaldor-Hicks is not even a weakly transitive ordering 
relationship”256. This also means that it can hardly be defended on utilitarian 
grounds, nor does it lend itself to Kantian or “pre-constitutional” explanations 
such as the one offered by Richard Posner. 
Needless to say, also based on what we explained above, the Kaldor-Hicks test 
faces more insurmountable technical and moral problems than the Pareto ones: 
in particular, the impossibility of inter-personal comparisons of utility; the 
consequent impossibility of preference aggregation and thus the impossibility of 
relying only on methodological individualism; the impossibility of using welfare 
as synonymous of (or proxy for) well-being and happiness; the test’s 
agnosticism on the utility function of income257; and its compatibility with very 
uneven distributions of wealth.  
Furthermore, the Kaldor-Hicks test approximates individual preferences based 
on market behavior, and thus relies on revealed preferences as the benchmark 
for judging the effects on policy decisions. This aspect already creates problems 
from the standpoint of bounded rationality (i.e. people do not always know 
                                                   
253  See above, Section 4.3. 
254  Adler, M. D. (2008) Risk Equity: A New Proposal, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 27. 
255  Scitovsky, T. (1941). A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics, 9 REV. ECON. STUD. 77 
(1941); 
256  Coleman (2003), supra note 181. 
257  Note that this aspect also affects the possibility for the monetary metrics of WTP used in 
Kaldor-Hicks to capture the intensity of preferences. If WTP is heavily affected by the 
availability of income, there is no way of measuring actual preferences with precision by 
simply relying on revealed preferences that result from market transactions.  
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what’s best for them, nor they know how to maximize their utility258): combined 
with the possibility of imposing losses on some members of society, it also calls 
into question the findings of “prospect theory” as illustrated by Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky: if, as already explained, WTP and WTA normally 
differ for any individual, then the amount of compensation that may be required 
to restore the position of a given loser after a policy change will often be higher 
than the loss imposed. Imposing a loss and then (potentially) compensating it is 
not an automatic way to reach Pareto. This issue was solved in modern 
interpretations of the test by imposing that gains are measured by WTP, and 
losses by WTA. 
A related issue, perhaps the most controversial of the Kaldor-Hicks test, is that 
the test is not based on any workable notion of consent. While Pareto could 
potentially be framed in terms of consent, as all the outcomes of market 
transactions are the result of consent and are Pareto efficient, the Kaldor Hicks 
test sacrifices Pareto’s unanimity requirement on the altar of the test’s 
prescriptive power. This problem was very well-known to Richard Posner, who 
tried to frame the Kaldor-Hicks test as a basic principle of justice on which 
individuals beyond a veil of ignorance would give their consent259. To put it 
differently, if asked ex ante to which rules should their ideal society confirm, 
individuals would award their preference to a system governed by a net benefits 
principle, regardless of whether the losers will be compensated for the loss 
sustained, because from an ex ante perspective they would feel that the 
application of that principle would leave them better-off over time260. This 
almost “Rawlsian” attempt to save the Kaldor-hicks principle by using what 
Graham defined as a “pre-constitutional” or “social contract” viewpoint did not 
lead Posner to gain particular reputation in the fields of economics and 
philosophy: as a matter of fact, his defense of the Kaldor-Hicks principle as an 
ancillary paradigm of justice was never convincing for lack of intuitiveness and 
theoretical grounds261. To the contrary, contemporary scholars on cost-benefit 
analysis have observed and extensively proven that “the Kaldor-Hicks test 
should be removed from our normative vocabulary”262. 
It came to no surprise, thus, that in his late years John Hicks himself discarded 
the validity of his own test by showing his skepticism on the whole idea of cost-
benefit analysis. In 1983, Hicks declared that "[i]t is a besetting vice of 
                                                   
258  See Thaler and Sunstein in “Nudge” (describing Humans v. Econs), supra note 3. 
259  See below, at Section 4.3.3.2. 
260  According to Graham (2008), supra note 19, “When citizens evaluate the test in the pre-
constitutional (original) position, behind a veil of ignorance, the case for KH is stronger”. 
However, this rational can be defended only if one adopts methodological individualism 
and accepts that ex ante WTP is a good measure of individual preference, which – as we 
recalled before – is not uncontroversial.  
261  But see Leonard, H. B. and R. J. Zeckhauser, Cost-Benefit Analysis Applied to Risks: Its 
Philosophy and Legitimacy, in VALUES AT RISK 31, 47-48 (Douglas MacLean ed., 1986) 
(providing an ethical defense of “hypothetical consent” to BCA on the ground that “most 
individuals, in forming their social contracts,” would accept society’s need to make 
uncompensated transfers). 
262  Id. 
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economists to over-play their hands … [and] to claim more for their subject 
than they should." In stating this, Hicks observed that the role of economist is 
to:  
“estimate, so far as he can, the gains and losses that are likely to 
accrue, to various classes, or sections of the population, from the 
proposed action.... It is not his business, I would now maintain, to 
weigh up those gains and losses against each other. He can, 
nevertheless, most usefully, take advantage of his estimates to 
suggest improvements in the proposal with which he is confronted. 
Formally, that is to say, he can suggest a second plan, which he 
thinks will have a prospect of offering smaller losses, and larger, or 
not much smaller gains, so that in comparison with the first, it has 
some claim to be more attractive. He cannot prescribe this second 
plan; arts of persuasion will still be required; but he has some 
grounds for his persuading”. 
Looking more carefully into neoclassical economics, more truth surfaces 
through the lines of early scholars. Just as Marshall and Pigou never defended 
the invariance of the marginal utility of income, early neoclassical economists – 
say, during the first two decades after the development of the Kaldor Hicks test 
in 1939 – did not advocate for using Kaldor-Hicks as a necessary and sufficient 
condition for endorsing a given public policy either263. Almost half a century 
later, Hicks himself seemed to downplay its importance for public policy. Then, 
one might wonder what happened during the 1960s and the 1970s, which led to 
embedding the logic of Kaldor-Hicks wealth maximization as the logic of public 
policy action?  
4.3.2.2 The practice of cost-benefit analysis today: the endless quest for prices 
Regardless of the problems identified in the application of the Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency test, the powerful prescriptive power of the test has led to a 
widespread diffusion in governments and regulatory agencies, in particular in 
the United States. This has led to a “routinization” of the application of cost-
benefit analysis in day-to-day regulatory appraisal, and consequently to the 
proliferation of standard methods and steps to go through the analysis. Most 
importantly, this evolution led to the development of different estimation 
approaches, which try to solve a single problem: how to monetize the un-
monetizable.  
As a matter of fact, a full-fledged cost-benefit analysis can be provided only 
when all costs and benefits of a given piece of regulation are quantified and 
monetized. This is what is usually referred to as “hard cost-benefit analysis”, 
and is increasingly sought by some US government agencies. The need to 
                                                   
263  See, e.g., Arrow, K.J. et al. (1996), Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in 
Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation?, 272 Science 221, 222 (“Although formal 
benefit-cost analysis should not be viewed as either necessary or sufficient for designing 
sensible public policy, it can provide an exceptionally useful framework for consistently 
organizing disparate information”). 
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quantify and monetize all impacts faces inevitable problems: as a matter of fact, 
some impacts are easier to monetize than others. More in detail, some cost and 
(less often) benefits items can be derived from the observation of market prices 
or market behavior. For example, if a regulation will force company X to buy a 
new type of equipment to comply with more stringent emission limits, this 
additional cost may be quantified in terms of market prices, if the equipment is 
already sold on the marketplace. If personnel at X has to be trained to use the 
new equipment, the cost of training services and opportunity cost of the time 
spent in the training course can all be rather easily quantified based on market 
prices and based on productivity data. Likewise, benefits that accrue to a firm or 
a citizen in terms of cost savings or time savings are normally easily quantifiable 
– i.e. this is often done through the Standard Cost Model in most European 
countries, when costs are due to red tape and the need to comply with 
information obligations contained in the legislation. 
However, the more policy proposals depart from standard market regulation, 
the stronger is the need to start quantifying non-market goods. Policy domains 
such as those summarized by Graham (2008) as “lifesaving regulation” – 
including health, safety, environmental regulations – are often fraught with 
impacts that are not related to any marketable good. For example, impacts on 
mortality and morbidity in health and environmental regulations, impacts on 
biodiversity, impacts on subjective well-being due to enhanced safety and all 
impacts related to “risk regulation” (from food standards to critical 
infrastructure protection) are very difficult to quantify. This is why modern cost-
benefit analysis has gradually become a quest for prices, be they explicit or only 
“implicit” prices.  
Table 2 below shows some of the most common estimation approaches 
currently used in modern cost-benefit analysis, with focus on the estimation of 
benefits. As shown in the table, in some cases the quantification and 
monetization effort is objectively determined through the observation of market 
prices (e.g. replacement costs, service values, property values); but for several 
benefits the need to build implicit prices by relying on subjective preferences is 
evident.  
Now, how safely can we rely on the use of these estimation techniques? To be 
sure, the need to build implicit prices often leads economists in a neoclassical 
trap, in which they have to purify stated preferences and WTP-based measures 
from the impact that income endowments exert on their estimates. The fact that 
a given individual may be less willing to pay for a given environmental impact is, 
in economics, an indication of a lower intensity of preference for that specific 
impact: however, as explained in the previous sections, this is not always true 
due to the fact that individuals with lower income will also have a lower WTP for 
certain societal and private benefits264. 
                                                   
264  See Heinzerling and Ackerman (2007), on the distinction between WTP and ability to pay 
(WTA). And Sunstein, C. R. (2007) Willingness to Pay vs. Welfare, 1 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 
303, 304 (2007). 
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Table2–Estimationapproachesfordifferentcategoriesofbenefit
Benefit category  Estimation approach  
To individuals   
Mortality  Wage compensation; stated preferences; averting behaviour; 
human capital (foregone earnings); VSL and VSLY 
Morbidity (acute, chronic)  Stated preferences; cost of illness (medical earnings, pain and 
suffering, avoidance); averting behaviour; QALYs; DALYs 
Production/consumption   
Crops/forests/fisheries  Consumer plus producers surplus  
Water-using industry  Consumer plus producers surplus  
Municipal water supply  Opportunity cost (alternative aquifer)  
Authorities  Service replacement (municipal treatment, bottled water)  
Economic assets   
Materials (corrosion, soiling)  Replacement cost, service value, household production 
function  
Property values  Hedonic price models  
Environmental assets   
Recreational use  Unit day, stated preference, property value, travel cost, 
random utility, hedonic prices, travel cost, service 
replacement costs  
Other use (visibility)  Stated preferences, property value  
Passive use (non-use)  Stated preferences  
Source: adapted from Greenman (1993) 
 
Secondly, the current practice of cost-benefit analysis has evolved as an 
aggregation of individual preferences. This is particularly important when we 
deal with public resources such as the environment, safety and public health: in 
these domains, simply aggregating individual preferences would systematically 
fail to capture the externalities produced by individual policy actions, which are 
conducive to an improvement of the environment also for future generations 
and also in portions of the territory that are not regularly inhabited by human 
beings. Against this background, the methodological individualism on which 
neoclassical economics is built is also a key precondition for modern cost-
benefit analysis: no use of objective value judgments is made, and this according 
to many authors is a guarantee that the analysis remains impartial, and can be 
used to “inform” policymakers, rather than to mandate any policy conclusion.  
Thirdly, the current analysis seems to overlook, in most cases, the ability of 
markets and individuals to adapt to changing legal environments. Not only do 
many policy appraisals assume 100% compliance (this is true, i.a., also for the 
Standard Cost Model). Available literature suggests a rather intuitive finding, 
that non-compliance is more likely when compliance costs imposed by a given 
piece of legislation are very high265. As will be observed in Section 4.3 below, 
compliance is also more likely when the technology and mechanisms chosen are 
easier to enforce. Moreover, the dynamic interaction between policymakers and 
                                                   
265  See, Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative 
Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 301-11 (1999). 
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target groups is increasingly considered as a key factor in determining the 
impacts of specific policy options. In particular, the possibility for individuals 
and firms to adapt to legal changes is often overlooked in cost-benefit analysis, 
both from a psychological and purely physiological standpoint. Examples of 
reactions to these problems are two different U-shaped curves: Daniel 
Kahneman’s proposed a U-index curve that reflects the time spent in a given 
state of dissatisfaction;266; and the debate on the role of hormesis in public 
policy (implying a U-shaped dose-response function for exposure to toxic 
substances) as animated i.a. by Calabrese (2001, 2003a, 2003b) and Wiener 
(2004)267.  
Fourthly, modern analysis still faces problems in the comparison of costs and 
benefits, as well as in the definition of the baseline. In particular, even if one 
ignores all theoretical limitations (e.g. the impossibility to aggregate individual 
preferences), reasonable cost-benefit analysis should entail the use of WTP-
based measures for the gainers, and WTA measures for the losers. However, the 
practice has shown that obtaining reliable WTA measures is a nightmare, and 
that in most cases the figures obtained are greatly exaggerated. In other cases, it 
is virtually impossible to disentangle the added value of a given legal change as a 
discrete departure from the baseline.  
Looking at the literature on cost-benefit analysis, the “immateriality” of the 
exercise and the increased sophistication in the use of non-market techniques 
such as econometric estimations of WTP and hedonic pricing models has led to 
a split in the academic community: on the one hand, some commentators 
consider that more sophistication in neoclassical cost-benefit analysis will lead 
to a better approximation of well-being through measurement and aggregation 
of individual preferences; others argue that too sophisticated analysis cannot 
save Kaldor-Hicks from an inevitable death in public policy. Below, I elaborate 
further on this split. 
4.3.2.3 Pricing the priceless? 
In the past decade, defenses of the use of cost-benefit analysis as a way to 
inform policy decisions have been more numerous, testifying of an increased 
pressure on what seems to be a very weak set of arguments in favor of Kaldor-
Hicks. The most notable examples are Bob Hahn’s 2005 pamphlet “In defense 
of economic analysis of regulation”, and Cass Sunstein’s portray of Paretoville in 
                                                   
266  See Kahneman, D., A. B. Krueger, D. A. Schkade, N. Schwarz and A. A. Stone (2006): 
Would You Be Happier If You Were Richer? A Focusing Illusion, Science 312, 1908-1910. 
And Kahneman, D. and A. B. Krueger (2006): Developments in the Measurement of 
Subjective Well-Being, Journal of Economic Perspectives 20, 3-24. 
267  Calabrese E.J. and L. A. Baldwin (2001), The frequency of U-shaped dose responses in the 
toxicological literature. Toxicol. Sci. 2001;62(2):330–338; Calabrese E.J. and L. A. 
Baldwin (2003). Hormesis: the dose-response revolution. Annual Rev. Pharmacol. Toxicol. 
2003;43:175–197; and Calabrese E.J. and L. A. Baldwin (2003). Peptides and hormesis. 
Crit. Rev. Toxicol. 2003;33(3–4):355–405. Finally, for a critical view, see Wiener, J. 
(2004), Hormesis, hotspots and emissions trading, Human & Experimental Toxicology 23: 
289-301. 
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a 2007 article on WTP and welfare, in which he conceded that welfare, rather 
than wealth, should be the ultimate objective of public policy.  
In particular, while Hahn (2005) discusses mostly the anti-regulatory bias many 
critics attach to current practices in cost-benefit analysis, Sunstein depicts what 
he himself defines as a “fairy tale”, i.e. the city of Paretoville inhabited only by 
homines oeconomici in the pure neoclassical meaning. Now, without any doubt 
Sunstein is aware of the fact that Paretoville does not exist: where he disagrees 
with some of his critics is in the usefulness of the Paretoville metaphor to inform 
real-life policymaking. Just like perfect competition does not exist in rerum 
natura, but is used as an ideal market structure that may inform the choices of 
competition policymakers, Paretoville may represent an ideal place for those 
that want to study policy in vitro before applying it in reality. The problem is 
that, for both perfect competition and Paretoville, the time seems ripe in 
economic theory to start reconsidering whether the metaphor is a good one, and 
a useful one. 
In a vibrant response to Sunstein, Lisa Heinzerling and Frank Ackerman (2007) 
recently argued that Paretoville should be taken as an almost negligible spot in 
our rearview mirror, rather than something to tend to268. In particular, the idea 
that WTP measures can ever inform policymakers about any future state of the 
world is fiercely challenged by Heinzerling and her past co-authors, mostly on 
the basis of the impossibility of measuring and aggregating individual 
preferences, the undesirability of using them as a proxy for well-being, and the 
fact that WTP-based measures grossly ignore behavioral misperception and the 
ability to pay of targeted stakeholders. In this respect, in a series of publications 
Heinzerling echoes what Hovenkamp (1994) defines as “egregious systemic 
errors” of the neoclassical approach269.   
Among the most recurring critiques moved by authors such as Lisa Heinzerling 
(and her co-authors, including most notably Frank Ackerman) in a number of 
publications, the following are worth being stated. First, Heinzerling has 
repeatedly argued that policymakers place too low a value on human life by 
adopting a WTP-based measure – the so-called value of a statistical life 
(VSL)270. Second, policymakers ignore the virtuous effects of investing in public 
goods overtime and “shrink the future” enormously in their analyses by 
applying a high inter-temporal discount rate that depresses the estimated 
benefits of investing in environmentally-friendly policy. Third, it is impossible 
to value a shared resource such as the environment, fraught with positive 
externalities, by simply asking individuals how much they would be willing to 
                                                   
268  Lisa Heinzerling & Frank Ackerman, Wasting Away in Paretoville, 1 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 
363-370 (2007). And see Sunstein’s reply, On Fairy Tales, 1 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 371-374 
(2007). 
269  See Hovenkamp, H. (1994), The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 Northwestern 
University Law Review 4, at 6. 
270  For a recent discussion, with a comparison between the VSL concept and quality-adjusted 
life years, see Karapanou, V. and L. T. Visscher (2010), Quality Adjusted Life Years as a 
Way Out of the Impasse between Prevention Theory and Insurance Theory Rotterdam 
Institute of Law and Economics (RILE) Working Paper No. 2010/06.  
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pay to preserve it, or how much they would be willing to accept as compensation 
for being deprived of it.  
All these arguments, in my opinion, have merit and are fully in line with my 
analysis of the flaws in neoclassical economics, and particularly in law and 
economics scholarship from Coase to Posner. What is missing is a  precise 
research agenda for the future, i.e. a clear-cut indication of the direction that 
public policy appraisal should take absent a requirement for cost-benefit 
analysis. To be honest, Ackerman and Heinzerling seem to have more than an 
idea in this respect: her belief in the fact that cost-benefit analysis is deeply 
flawed leads to advocating a different course of action, such as the introduction 
of more objective welfare judgments and the replacement of money with 
expected facts and scientific evidence271. In section 4.4 below, I will get back to 
this proposal to test its relevance under the more procedural view of RIA, which 
takes cost-benefit analysis as a pure way to trigger a virtuous principal-agent 
process of delegation and oversight, as well as possible judicial review of the 
agencies’ activity.  
4.3.3 Alternatives to the “efficiency as justice” paradigm 
Faced with the objective unacceptability of Kaldor-Hicks, recently economists, 
lawyers and philosophers have gotten back to efficiency and justice principles to 
refine the previously used efficiency tests in the direction of more ethically 
defendable tests. The dominant refrain in this attempts is that whatever 
principle is used to identify policies that increase overall well-being (not 
necessarily the same as economic welfare), such principle cannot ignore the 
ethical or distributional impacts of a policy being analyzed. According to many 
of these theories the identity of the winners and losers should be taken into 
account to avoid that the poorest group in a society is put at a further 
disadvantage after the enactment of a new policy. After this first, basic pillar of 
distributive justice, authors differ as to what kind of criterion should guide the 
visible hand of the policymaker. Below, I quickly illustrate the main theories 
that have been proposed as a refinement of (or an alternative to) the Kaldor-
Hicks test. 
4.3.3.1 Refining Kaldor-Hicks to incorporate equity and fairness 
Some authors have tried to solve the evident problems of the Potential Pareto 
efficiency test from the inside. For example, in several publications Richard O. 
Zerbe Jr. et al. (2005) attempted a revision of the Kaldor Hicks test, aimed at 
correcting its complete and explicit ignorance of ethics272. In doing so, Zerbe Jr. 
was implicitly trying to solve a problem embedded in mainstream neoclassical 
                                                   
271  See, i.a., Ackerman, F.  et al. (2005), Applying Cost-Benefit to Past Decisions: Was 
Environmental Protection Ever a Good Idea?, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 155, 186 (2005). 
272  Zerbe Jr., R. O., Y. Bauman and A. Finkle, An Aggregate Measure for Benefit Cost 
Analysis. Ecological Economics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=855384. 
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economics: that individual preferences never account for bounded willpower, 
and in particular all the other-regarding behavior that he defines as “moral 
sentiments” – a rather interesting feature, since Adam Smith himself treated 
this type of behavior as a complement to rationality in all his work, and in 
particular in the “Theory of Moral Sentiments” published in 1759. According to 
Zerbe’s view, moral sentiments should be taken into account when choosing 
between alternative policy options, and this would solve also the problem of 
aggregate welfare values, by including also morality and altruism. However, 
Zerbe’s solution appears circular, as moral sentiments are calculated as long as 
there is a WTP for them: this leads us back to the problem of revealed individual 
preferences, to the difficulty of calculating WTP for non-market values, to the 
problem of preference-based policy and methodological individualism described 
in the previous sections, and ultimately in the feasibility of the test in practice. 
The KHM (Kaldor-Hicks and Moral sentiments) test proposed by Zerbe, thus, 
appears to share many of the inconsistencies of the original test, but adding an 
element of complexity and nebulosity that may end up being unacceptable for 
policy purposes. 
More recently, Graham (2008) provided a thorough analysis of the use of Pareto 
and Kaldor-Hicks principles as the basis for what he calls “lifesaving 
regulation”, i.e. mostly environmental, health and safety regulation. According 
to Graham, the pre-constitutional perspective – which, as observed by Polinsky, 
transforms “certainty in likelihood” in applying Kaldor-Hicks – adds significant 
value to the application of this test. On the one hand, it captures the long-term 
impact of applying the test to every lifesaving decision, which may lead 
individual members of a society to be sometimes gainers, sometimes losers, 
with an overall balancing effect that would most often lead them better off in the 
long run. At the same time, Graham acknowledges that even in the long run the 
Kaldor-Hicks test might generate some losers, and that this may warrant a 
corrective screen that aims at avoiding nefarious impacts on the poorest groups 
in society273. His idea is not entirely new in economic theory, having been the 
subject of analysis by other economists such as Harberger (1978) and Ng (1984): 
however, Graham acknowledged that several problems remain as regards the 
identification of the members of the category of “poorer” individuals that would 
deserve a specific screen in cost-benefit analysis. This step may not require 
simply drawing a line close to the poverty threshold, but also more complex 
scrutiny of other attributes, including consumption, life expectancy, exposure to 
serious risk, etc.  
While it is important to observe that one of the most authoritative scholars in 
the field of cost-benefit analysis in the United States (and a former OIRA 
Chairman) considers the Kaldor-Hicks test as deserving some corrections in the 
direction of accounting for distributional impacts, it must be recalled that any 
ad hoc screen included in the Kaldor-Hicks test would increase its complexity, 
and would not contribute to solving the most evident and disruptive problems 
faced by the test, such as the ones related to methodological individualism and 
                                                   
273  See Graham (2008), supra note 19. at 111. (stating: “I favor an ex ante version of 
welfarism, in which BCA is used as a surrogate for welfarism but is qualified by an 
equity-inspired concern for the welfare of society’s poorest citizens”).  
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the aggregation of preferences. This is why the need for some “objective” welfare 
judgment may still surface in a world where specific pro-poor screens are 
included in the cost-benefit test.  
4.3.3.2  “Pre-constitutional approaches” 
Graham’s perspective on cost-benefit analysis, like Posner’s one, have the merit 
of attempting to “purify” the neoclassical cost-benefit analysis by introducing 
forms of ex ante consent. While their theories are still well rooted in the 
neoclassical approach aimed at achieving welfare maximization, other authors 
have departed from efficiency-oriented analysis to propose more justice-
oriented tests. In particular, John Rawls has proposed a theory of justice based 
on the so-called “original position”. According to this theory, a just distribution 
of resources is the one that would be selected by individuals before knowing 
whether they will end up in a “particular” situation – for example, before 
knowing whether they will be rich or poor. In such a situation, according to 
Rawls, individuals would choose to minimize the risk of extreme poverty, pain 
and suffering, and will then choose principles and rules that, as a basic 
consequence, improve the situation of the poorest individuals. This idea led 
Rawls to advocate for a specific screen in cost-benefit analysis, which can be 
termed as “lexicographical order”. Under this approach, any rule proposed 
should first of all satisfy a basic criterion: that the poorest individuals in society 
are not left worse-off; then, Rawls does not push his argument as far as 
proposing fully egalitarian solutions. Accordingly, his view is in principle 
compatible with the one proposed by John Graham, which entails running and 
satisfying two Kaldor-Hicks tests (one for the poorest, one for society as a 
whole). However, Rawls does not propose a preference-based Kaldor-Hicks test 
for the poorest groups, but instead advocates for a maximin rule that is based 
on a more “objective” moral judgment – i.e. the judgment that would be 
formulated behind a “veil of ignorance”.  
Another authoritative commentator, Herbert Hovenkamp (1994) proposed a 
similar approach, by showing that a pre-constitutional approach should at least 
award priority to improving the situation of the poorest. These views echo an 
early observation by John Harsanyi (1955), who proposed a “requirement of 
impartiality” that reflects the policy option an individual would choose “if he did 
not know what his personal position would be in the new situation chosen”274. 
Hovenkamp proposes a utility function for policy purposes, depicted in Figure 
20 below, which introduces a discontinuity in correspondence to the point 
where individuals have satisfied their primary needs. According to  the author, 
the left part of the graph should be subject to objective welfare judgments, 
rather than merely prey of subjective ones: this would be similar to introducing 
an element of inalienability in the principle that every individual should be 
protected as far as the basic primary needs and respect of fundamental rights 
are concerned.  
                                                   
274  Harsanyi, J. C. (1955), Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal 
Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309.  
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Figure20–Hovenkamp’sutilityfunction
 
Source: Hovenkamp (1994), Figure 1, at 42 
 
Other theories do not even refer to the parties involved in any transaction or 
policy option, regardless of whether the viewpoint adopted is an ex ante or an ex 
post one. These approaches reflect the position of an “impartial spectator” – a 
metaphor already used by Adam Smith – and aim at incorporating individual 
preferences for overall happiness in society. For example, Layard (2005) 
observed that an impartial spectator would surely care more about what 
happened to the miserable person than to the person who was already happy. 
He would therefore give a different ‘weight’ to changes in happiness according 
to how happy the person was already”275.  
Finally, in a recent contribution Amartya K. Sen (2009) has at one praised and 
criticized Rawls’s theory of justice, arguing that its most serious flaw was its 
“transcendental institutionalism”, i.e. its focus on an ideal, perfectly just society, 
which provides little guidance in terms of how to rank suboptimal situations 
and how to conclude that a real-world change has indeed made society more 
just. At the same time, Sen argued that Rawls’s most fragile assumption was the 
uniqueness of the basic principles of justice on which Rawls grounds his whole 
theory of justice, defined by as principles on which everybody would agree if in a 
pre-constitutional position. To the contrary, Sen argued in favor of a concept of 
justice that allows comparisons between sub-optimal states of the world, thus 
helping the achievement of a more just society through the formulation of public 
                                                   
275  Layard, R. (2005), Happiness: Lessons From A New Science, The Penguin Press, at 122. 
See also Adler, M.D. (2003), The Puzzle of “Ex Ante Efficiency”: Does Rational 
Approvability Have Moral Weight?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1255 (2003) (questioning the view 
that ex ante efficiency is morally relevant). 
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policies276. This approach might one day lead to convergence of administrative 
law and economics towards the prescriptions of moral philosophy, which have 
so far remained too abstract to be applied in practice – a good example of 
“moral philosophy in the RIA world”.  
4.3.3.3 Welfare as happiness: back to Bentham? 
The need to refine the analysis and understanding of well-being has led in more 
recent times to a re-discovery of the original quest for “happiness” predicated by 
Bentham himself. In the past decade, development of economic and statistical 
tools to measure subjective well-being have led to promising avenues of 
research in the field of policy evaluation, although it would be exaggerated to 
state that this stream of literature today constitutes a credible alternative to 
cost-benefit analysis à la Kaldor-Hicks. The underlying idea of hedonic 
measures is not different from the one of revealed preferences, since both rely 
extensively on subjective preferences as the basis of public policy. What differs 
is the proxy that these theories use to describe the impact of policy changes: 
while mainstream neoclassical economics uses willingness to pay and market 
behavior as proxies for individual well-being and wealth maximization as a 
proxy for welfare maximization, happiness research seeks the maximization of 
composite indexes of quality of life and overall satisfaction as proxies for welfare 
maximization277.  
There are pros and cons in this evolution of economic analysis of subjective 
well-being. The added value of happiness research is rooted in the fact that it is 
way less reductionist than neoclassical WTP-based measures, and aims to take 
into account the real factors that shape individual happiness and well-being 
according to a broad spectrum of social sciences. In doing this, it is rapidly 
evolving towards a very sophisticated portfolio of methods to estimate the 
impact on different individuals and social groups278. One of the key differences 
between this stream of literature and mainstream economics is that the direct 
relation between income and well-being is relaxed in favor of a more complex 
function of individual satisfaction.  
On the other hand, just as in the case of behavioral economics, it must be 
recalled that hedonic measurements are often way more complex and lengthy 
than standard cost-benefit analysis. As recalled by Richard Posner, “it is easier 
to guess people’s market preferences in areas where the market cannot be made 
to work than to guess what policies will maximize happiness”279. Also Graham 
                                                   
276  Sen, A.K. (2009), The Idea of Justice, the Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA. 
277  See Bronsteen et al. (2010) Welfare as Happiness, Georgetown L. J. Vol. 98, 1583. 
278  Kahneman, D. et al. (2006), Would You Be Happier if You Were Richer? A Focusing 
Illusion, 312 Science 1908, (finding a “weak relation” between income and “experienced 
happiness”). 
279  See Posner R. A. (1981), The Economics Of Justice, Harvard University Press, at 79.  
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(2008) observes that, though promising, this line of research “raises as many 
questions as answers”280. 
To be sure, the literature on the measurement of subjective well-being is 
advancing. For example, Dolan and Metcalfe (2008) compare WTP-based 
measures with subjective well-being measures and find that the former are 
systematically greater than the latter. They argue that WTP responses may be 
affected by loss aversion in the presence of mental accounting and ambiguities 
about the time frame over which individuals assess their life satisfaction. 
However, that of happiness-based metrics is a challenge brought to the 
mainstream cost-benefit analysis methodology from the inside – i.e., whether 
WTP-based measures should be replaced by subjective well-being indicators 
and life satisfaction surveys does not change the overall approach, focused on 
methodological individualism and the aggregation of individual preferences281. 
If anything, this approach has the merit of highlighting the potential for rational 
biases to distort some measurements of non-market goods through WTP-based 
measures, and the need to avoid problems of mental accounting, loss aversion 
and other imperfections of rationality by devising more sophisticated measures 
of analysis.  
4.3.4 RIA and distributional concerns: into the wild 
The previous sections have shown that the case for Kaldor-Hicks cost-benefit 
analysis based on revealed preference of individuals is increasingly weaker in 
academia. That said, Adler and Posner (2000) are right in stating that this 
growing discontent among scholars is striking in light of the increased success 
of cost-benefit analysis in RIA systems in the US and around the world282. The 
list of challenges and complaints is getting longer every day, and touches upon 
several complementary issues, from the basic approach based on 
methodological individualism and perfect rationality, to the methodologies used 
to collect and elaborate data. However, it would be too optimistic to state that a 
comprehensive, well-thought and consistent alternative paradigm has emerged 
in the past few years: as occurred in other fields of economics, perhaps the 
degree of agnosticism instilled by the study of behavioral biases has created 
more problems than it has so far contributed to solve. Only time will tell if a 
more sophisticated and holistic type of economic analysis of law can rise from 
the ashes of Chicago law and economics.  
Many of the critiques moved to the US RIA system can, with a degree of over-
simplification, be related to the fact that cost-benefit analysis touches upon 
impacts that affect individuals with different income levels, and that accordingly 
the “one cent is a cent is a cent” assumption of neoclassical economics will end 
up biasing regulation against the poorer groups in society. In this respect, 
                                                   
280  Graham (2008), supra note 19.  
281  It may, as a matter of fact, also solve the problem of social values, to the extent that they are 
incorporated in life satisfaction indicators.  
282  Adler and Posner (2000), Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis when Preferences are 
Distorted, Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 29, issue 2, pages 1105-47. 
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scholars have been fighting for decades over one single question, which I still 
consider as unsolved as it is fundamental: should ex ante policy appraisal deal 
with distributional issues?  
Countless authors have attempted to give an answer to this question. In early 
neoclassical economics, the view that the legal system would be less efficient 
than income taxation in redistributing resources prevailed. This view – 
endorsed by authors such as Pigou – was later challenged by Chicago law and 
economics, and in particular by Ronald Coase, who claimed that the market 
would be able to reallocate resources in an efficient – better, Pareto-efficient – 
way. Richard Posner also has repeatedly stated that distributional issues should 
not be the primary concern for cost-benefit analysis. In his famous justification 
of cost-benefit analysis, Kornhauser (2000) also stated that “[c]ost-benefit 
analysis does in fact ignore distributional concerns, but one might argue that 
administrative agencies that regulate health and safety ought not to take such 
distributional concerns into account; these concerns should be left to the 
relevant redistributional institutions in the society”283. Similar and even 
stronger statements are also found in Frank (2000), where ignorance of 
distributional effects is explicitly advocated, provided that other means of 
compensation are used284.  
But law and economics went much further than this. Two prominent scholars 
such as Kaplow and Shavell provided an extensive analysis of the relative 
efficiency of income taxes and the legal system in redistributing income. They 
went as far as claiming that the economic notion of welfare already encapsulates 
fairness concerns of the individuals, and that any attempt to conflate standard 
cost-benefit analysis with objective welfare judgments oriented at achieving 
some form of justice would decrease overall welfare; what’s more, in some cases 
everyone will be made worse-off by such a methodological arrangement. Kaplow 
and Shavell continue by arguing that welfare analysis should not be 
contaminated by social values or any other contingent value that generates 
notions of fairness; these values are socially generated and mutable in time, and 
consequently would dilute the “purity” of welfare analysis as a guide to 
policymakers285. All this leads to the development of perhaps the most 
expansionist – or “imperialist” – attempt that law and economics has conceived 
to the detriment of fairness, and consequentialism at the expense of 
                                                   
283  Kornhauser, L. A. (2000), On Justifying Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1037, 
1054 (2000) 
284  Frank, R. H. (2000), Why Is Cost-Benefit Analysis So Controversial?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 
913, 917 (“We can employ unweighted willingness-to-pay measures without apology, and 
use the welfare and tax system to compensate low-income families ex ante for the 
resulting injury”). 
285  See Dorff, M.B. (2002), Why Welfare Depends on Fairness: a Reply to Kaplow and 
Shavell, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 847. (Challenging this view and comparing the Kantian argument 
for individual autonomy against utilitarianism with the mirroring arguments put forward 
by Kaplow and Shavell).  
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deontologism. The attempt was so extreme that even some lawyer-economists 
decided to express their dissent286. Jules Coleman vehemently stated that 
Whereas most deontologists are likely merely to dismiss Kaplow 
and Shavell as unsophisticated and their arguments as inadequately 
nuanced, the majority of law-and-economics scholars are anxious to 
dissociate themselves from a thesis they are convinced is dangerous 
to the cause. Why? The answer is that the book openly endorses 
precisely the imperialistic claims with which others have saddled the 
law and economics movement, often in an effort to discredit it as 
inadequately catholic or, in the extreme, uncivilized287 
Out of the rhetoric and haste that surrounded the debate over Kaplow and 
Shavell after their claim that welfare should be the one and only goal of public 
policy, the merit of this and other claims as regards the superiority of the tax 
system over the legal system in achieving redistribution must be seen on the 
merits. In this respect, several considerations can be put forward. First, any 
redistribution that employs the tax system after legal rules have been enacted 
(arguably with uneven social impacts) would be an ex post attempt to restore 
situations that may have been altered in a very complex way: for example, a rule 
may have had a different impact on different social groups, territories, age 
groups, etc.; and the tax system may not be the most precise policy tool to single 
out those that have to be compensated. Second, any compensation would have 
to take into account the fact that WTP and WTA are different measures, and any 
attempt to measure the amount to be compensated would require anyway a 
careful measure of WTA. Third, tax redistribution cannot easily solve ex post 
problems of uncertainty and risk exposure, where the WTA of “losers” is such 
that compensation would approximate infinite values288. Fourth, ex post tax 
redistribution may fall short of the behavioral responses of individuals to the 
substitution of the tax289. Fifth, and more generally, behavioral responses may 
affect the outcome of legal rules anyway, if affected individuals anticipate the 
fact that there will be redistribution ex post. The list of potential arguments is 
virtually endless, in the law and economics literature as well as in philosophy.  
In summary, there seems to be abundant evidence against the idea that 
welfarism should survive the evolution of economic theory and legal scholarship 
in the past decades. To put it simply, every single recent development in social 
sciences points against the persistence of an exclusively pro-efficiency stance in 
the formulation of legal rules. And all developments in this stream of law and 
economics literature in the past decades, after the first Posnerian attempt to 
prove the relevance of efficiency as justice, have not helped law and economics 
                                                   
286  Chang, H. F. (2000a), A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the 
Pareto Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 173. Chang, H. F. (2000b), The Possibility of a Fair 
Paretian, 110 Yale L.J.251. 
287  Coleman (2003), supra note 181. 
288  Adler, M. D. and C. W. Sanchirico (2006), Inequality and Uncertainty: Theory and Legal 
Applications. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 155, p. 279. 
289  Sanchirico, C. W. (2001), Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, Cornell Law 
Review 86(6): pp. 1003-1089. 
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in coming closer to the complexity and sophistication of other social sciences. 
That said, the fact that a strong pars destruens can be built against welfarism 
does not mean that we can avail of a more practical alternative in procedural 
terms: it may well be that all alternatives proposed by scholars would be too 
costly and sophisticated to be transformed into a procedural requirement to be 
followed by government agencies, such as RIA is in the US. In the next section, I 
explore cost-benefit analysis under a different lens, i.e. the proceduralist stance 
of cost-benefit analysis as an ingredient of a system of delegation and oversight.  
4.4 Functional approaches: emerging patterns in public law 
and economics 
The third school of law and economics that we have introduced at the beginning 
of this Section 5 is the so-called “functional” school, intimately related with the 
birth of public choice and the seminal work of James Buchanan and Gordon 
Tullock290. Although some authors would not classify this as a real “law and 
economics” school – and indeed, I am not interested in achieving a definitive 
taxonomy of such schools in this Thesis – the combination of individual 
incentives and governance structures into a vision of public law and economics 
makes it a very important stream of literature for the study of RIA systems, with 
important interactions with positive political theory and regulatory governance 
studies. Below, in Section 4.4.1, I illustrate the explanatory and prescriptive 
power of adopting a more “macro” approach to cost-benefit analysis and RIA; 
Section 4.4.2 then assumes that public policymakers can finally avail of some 
objective welfare judgment, and explore the potential for law and economics 
insights to inspire the selection of regulatory alternatives by means such as 
time-shifting, mechanism choice, framing of individual incentives,  and others. 
4.4.1 Nudging administrations: RIA as a means 
Cost-benefit analysis is not only the subject of endless discussions between 
economists, philosophers, environmentalists, legal scholars and many other 
social and increasingly natural scientists. Cost-benefit analysis (as the basis of 
RIA systems) is indeed an explicit procedural requirement for government 
agencies in the US and increasingly for ministries and sometimes also 
Parliaments in an number of other countries. Is it sponsored by international 
organizations as an instrument of transparency, effectiveness, efficiency and 
accountability of policymaking around the world. It leads countries to improve 
their ranking in OECD measuring government and reviews of regulatory 
reforms every year; it even leads to becoming top reformers in the World Bank’s 
Doing Business if coupled with business simplification.  
The procedural aspect of cost-benefit analysis has been analyzed in the law and 
economics literature, and in particular within the so-called “public law and 
economics” stream of literature that some authors have broadly equated with 
                                                   
290  Buchanan, J. and G. Tullock (1962), The Calculus of Consent, Ann Arbor, University of 
Michigan Press.  
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the Virginia “functional” school of law and economics291. From this perspective, 
cost-benefit analysis must be framed within the more general system of 
delegation and oversight that constitutes a landmark of the US organization of 
government292. Under a system that features delegation of powers, Congress 
and central government may have strong incentives to delegate the 
discretionary power to regulate certain policy areas to specialized agencies – be 
that due to lack of information and skills, or to the need to avoid responsibility 
for unpopular choices. In this respect, legislative powers have to solve a “make 
or buy” dilemma that is very similar to that described by Coase and later Oliver 
Williamson in describing the nature of the firm, the relevance of transaction 
costs in the setting up of administrative structures such as a corporation and the 
outcome of decisions such as the externalization of phases of the value chain. 
This led some scholars to coin the term “transaction cost politics” to mirror the 
relevance of those arguments in the context of legislative delegation and 
oversight293.   
The basic theoretical framework in which the use of cost-benefit analysis can be 
framed is thus one of principal-agent relationships between central government 
and delegated powers (the bureaucracy). Within this framework, the role of RIA 
is similar to that of several other tools that have been introduced during the 
New Public Management reforms that blossomed from the UK during the 
1980s, and the Reinventing Government initiative launched by the Clinton 
administration in the early 1990s in the US. The idea that bureaucrats should be 
kept under control in order to avoid excessive regulatory creep and legislative 
inflation (the “regulators like to regulate” adagio) was translated into 
performance-based contracting, increased use of rewards for productivity, 
efforts to change the culture of administrations and even regulatory budgets 
made dependant on the adoption of specific indicators, such as the cost 
reductions achieved. Authors such as Niskanen (1971) paved the way towards an 
economic analysis of the behavioral incentives of bureaucrats: for example, 
Niskanen argued that, absent strong monitoring and sanction/reward 
mechanisms, bureaucrats would have an incentive to inflate their budget in a 
way that principals would not be able to detect.  
In the past decade, authors such as Matthew Adler and Eric Posner have 
extensively analyzed the role of cost-benefit analysis as a way to monitor the 
effort of bureaucracies and avoid bureaucratic drift in the daily operation of 
governments, with focus on the US administration, where cost-benefit analysis 
has become increasingly widespread in agencies in the past years. In particular, 
Eric Posner (2001) observes that cost-benefit analysis should not be considered 
“as a normative criterion but as an analytic concept in a positive analysis”294. 
Assuming self-interested actors in the delegation and oversight game, it is 
                                                   
291  See Parisi, F. (2004), supra note 177. 
292  For a comprehensive account, see Epstein and O’Halloran (1999), supra note 197; and Eric 
Posner (2001), supra note 86. 
293  See also Williamson, O. (1999). Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost 
Economics Perspective, 15 J.L. Econ & Org. 306. 
294  Posner E. A. (2001), supra note 86, at 10. 
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possible to conclude that cost-benefit analysis may become something else than 
an instrument of efficiency, with mixed results for the desirability of RIA-based 
monitoring. 
The argument proceeds as follows, with two actors that, for simplicity’s sake, I 
call Central Government (CG) and delegated agency (DA). Since both CG and 
DA are self-motivated, they may have goals that differ from that of achieving 
efficient outcomes (for example, CG may look at re-election or pursuing some 
social or economic agenda, DA may seek more regulation, including inefficient 
regulation, to strengthen its power). Absent any other form of control, CG may 
find it useful to mandate cost-benefit analysis as a backing of rules proposed by 
DA for several reasons. First, since it is CG’s prerogative to sanction DA for 
insufficient or flawed cost-benefit analysis, CG may decide to support also badly 
justified rules that converge with its own agenda. In any event, if the analysis 
will be recognized as flawed in the future, responsibility will fall on DA rather 
than on CG, since the former was the more specialized agency in charge of 
producing economic analysis. Accordingly, as stated by Eric Posner, 
“government principals who are interested in goals other than efficiency will in 
many situations want agencies to perform cost-benefit analysis, even though 
cost-benefit analysis evaluates projects on the basis of efficiency or a close 
approximation”295. 
Paradoxically, this finding may even be less undesirable than it may appear at 
first blush. In a world with imperfect information, and given that cost-benefit 
analysis in and of itself is an imperfect way to select optimal policy, one could 
defend the narrowing of procedures induced by the mandatory adoption of RIA 
as a way to achieve policy coherence and dynamically align the goals of CG and 
DA even away from a pure welfarist approach to government296. In other words, 
to the extent that RIA rooted in cost-benefit analysis proves to be the cheapest 
way to exert a disciplining effect on bureaucracies and realize virtuous results in 
terms of policy coherence, then even the most neoclassical approach to cost-
benefit analysis may be seen as a desirable procedural requirement. The 
introduction of models borrowed from positive political theory and public 
choice, such as interest group competition, produces similar outcomes as 
clarified by Becker (2000)297.  
Under this different lens, the relevance of a RIA system crucially depends on the 
system of checks and balances that are established in a given government 
                                                   
295  Id. 
296  See Adler, M.D. and E. A. Posner (2000), Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When 
Preferences are Distorted, 29 J Legal Stud 1105, 1116–25.  
297  Becker, G.S. (2000), A Comment on the Conference on Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J Legal 
Stud 1151–52 (discussing cost-benefit analysis as it applies in the interest group 
competition model of political choice). There is also an extensive literature on the selection 
of types of regulatory remedies and solutions out of the policymaker’s toolbox, related to 
positive and normative mechanisms choice. For an extensive overview, see Wiener, J. B. 
and Barak D. Richman, Mechanism Choice (July 1, 2009). Public Choice and Public Law, 
Daniel A. Farber and Anne Joseph O'Connell, eds., Forthcoming; Duke Law School Public 
Law & Legal Theory Paper No. 250. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1408163. 
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setting298. The results obtained by Eric Posner (2001) may be significantly 
altered when draft RIAs are published for consultation before CG can scrutinize 
their content and decide about their quality: this actually happens in the US, 
where the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act mandates that notices of 
proposed rulemaking be submitted for notice and comment before being 
approved. The internal dialogue and commingling of interest between CG and 
DA may be fundamentally altered by the visibility of the draft RIA on the 
stakeholder side: well-organized stakeholders may denounce bad RIAs before 
they are finalized, and call on CG to impose their revision. This is one of the 
reasons why the transparency of RIAs and the availability of consultation before 
the oversight body reaches a final decision is perhaps the most fundamental 
ingredient of a sound RIA system. That said, if the result is to de facto bind 
policy decisions to Kaldor-Hicks cost-benefit analysis, such an efficient RIA 
system may perform worse than a more hidden system in which DA anticipates 
the will of CG and both players act strategically to strengthen their position in 
the policy cycle. In any event, my preference always goes to a better-quality cost-
benefit analysis, which overcomes the countless problems faced by pure 
welfarist models and moves in the directions outlined in the previous sections 
and is made transparent to stakeholders to strengthen the commitment of both 
DA and CG to high quality ex ante policy appraisal.  
In addition, this analysis also reveals that in political contexts such as the US 
one, the delegation and oversight mechanism can be “lubricated” through the 
introduction of governance mechanisms such as ex post oversight by a third 
body (e.g. the CBO, the GAO). This is what increasingly happens in the US, as 
observed supra in Section 2.2.2. At the same time, this specific analytical 
perspective can inspire judgment on what “type” of watchdog would be most 
appropriate in a quality RIA system. Evidence that OIRA in the US has been 
“changing skin” during different administrations, transforming itself from 
consultant to adversarial gatekeeper may suggest that the task delegation game 
has turned into a closer oversight aimed at achieving the goals pursued by 
central government, rather than strengthening the powers of the agencies. The 
revival of return letters and the introduction of prompt letters between 2001 
and 2006 confirms this view of a stronger OIRA in the US, which – again – may 
lead to more quantified costs and benefits in legislation, but does not necessarily 
guarantee high quality, distribution-aware cost-benefit analysis299.  
The “functional” approach to RIA sheds light on a number of other aspects of 
the RIA system, especially related to the EU context. First, as will be illustrated 
in more detail in Section 7 below, the quality and usefulness of the EU impact 
                                                   
298  For a sophisticated analysis of the mechanisms at play within RIA systems in four 
jurisdictions, see Radaelli et al. (2010), How to Learn From International Experience: 
Impact Assessment in the Netherlands, study for the Dutch government, available at 
http://www.eerstekamer.nl/behandeling/20100527/how_to_learn_from_the/f=/vifklgll6
miz.pdf.  
299  See Graham, J. (2007), The Evolving Regulatory Role of the U.S. Office of Management 
and Budget, Review of Environmental Economics and Policy. No. 1: 171-191. Susan E. 
Dudley & Angela Antonelli, Congress and the Clinton OMB: Unwilling Partners in 
Regulatory Oversight?, Regulation, Fall 1997, at 17-18. 
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assessment system is deeply jeopardized for two essential reasons: (i) the 
principal and the agent are the same political actor, with strong incentives to 
achieve alignment of final decisions; (ii) the absence of consultation on draft IAs 
makes it impossible for stakeholders to put pressure on the oversight body (the 
Impact Assessment Board) to induce improvements in the quality of analysis, 
and even the consideration of policy alternatives that have been unduly 
discarded. In addition, other aspects of the system are significantly under-
researched: the specific constraints exerted by other institutions (the High-Level 
Group on administrative burdens, the European Court of Auditors, the 
European Parliament and the Council of the EU) are in most cases still being 
defined and shaped; the fact that the EU IA system is not primarily rooted on 
cost-benefit analysis, and is not only focused on secondary legislation, may 
dilute the signaling nature of RIA as well as the monitoring capabilities of the 
central oversight body (no clear standard on which to base the assessment); and 
the fact that IA is applied also outside binding regulation – i.e., it is an IA and 
not a RIA system – may lead to imperfect signals between the principal, the 
agent, and stakeholders, as well as casting doubts on the usefulness of cost-
benefit analysis when requested – as it increasingly is.  
The current OIRA administrator Cass R. Sunstein argued back in 2000 that 
cost-benefit analysis may be justified because its narrow procedures help 
overcome the cognitive biases of the public and of administrative officials, in 
particular by helping administrations to better focus on their priorities and also 
overcome collective irrationality by providing stronger arguments in favor of 
apparently nonsensical legislation300. In this respect, even more than its 
“functional” role, RIA may become useful mostly due to its “persuasive” role. 
Also from this peculiar viewpoint, transparency and public consultation become 
essential, especially due to the fact that the added value of RIA (and the time 
and money spent on it) becomes otherwise almost impossible to communicate. 
4.4.1.1 The architecture of RIA: a “behavioral” approach 
Looking at the RIA system and the use of cost-benefit analysis from a functional 
perspective allows a different use of behavioral biases applied to public 
authorities. If one considers investing in RIA as a costly exercise – often 
requiring hundreds of thousands of dollars and several person/months for 
bureaucrats, consultants and oversight bodies – as well as a fact-finding 
exercise on the way towards more informed decision-making, then the question 
of the an, the quantum and the quomodo of engaging in policy appraisal 
becomes essential. In this respect, the same behavioral analysis that is applied 
to individuals can mutatis mutandis be also applied to public bodies. In 
particular, one can approach the development of policy solutions from the 
standpoint of rational ignorance and bounded rationality as described in Section 
4.2.1 above. Below, I sketch a sort of meta-RIA, in order to find out when the 
RIA system would be an efficient option compared to “no RIA”.  
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The question “if” policymakers should engage in RIA for a given policy proposal 
can indeed be governed by a cost-benefit comparison: if the expected benefits of 
having a RIA on that given policy proposal are likely to more-than-compensate 
the cost of undertaking the exercise, then RIA should be carried out. However, 
this decision is more complex that it might appear at first blush. In particular, 
the benefits can be seen as a function of the importance of the proposal per se; 
of the quality of the prospective analysis; of the controversial nature of the 
proposal (is it merely a minor revision of a previous regulation? Is there an 
umbrella regulation shaping already the direction and operational toolkit of this 
piece of legislation? Are stakeholders likely to complain if there will be no RIA 
supporting the proposal? Are there important implementation modalities or 
specific key impacts to be ascertained?; etc.) At the same time, the costs depend 
on the depth of the analysis, and this may be kept as a fixed variable (as in the 
US), or left to the decision of the body that supervises the process (as in the EU). 
As a matter of fact, the two legal systems analyzed in this Thesis – the US and 
the EU – have solved the problem in a completely different way. On the one 
hand, the US feature a system where RIA is almost invariable in terms of depth, 
and the criteria to select proposals that should undergo RIA are set301. In the 
EU, the set of proposals is much broader, there is not basic requirement – as a 
matter of fact, even the focus on initiatives included in the Commission 
legislative and work programme is virtually ignored – but the principle of 
proportionate analysis described in the IA guidelines should guide the official in 
charge in selecting the prospective depth of the IA to be undertaken. Especially 
in the case of the EU, the refinement of this set of criteria seems necessary, as 
will be explained in more detail in part III below.  
Another important aspect of this question is how much to invest at each stage of 
the policy cycle. In the US this choice is a pure dichotomy between the ex ante 
preparation and the ex post evaluation of the same regulation, and the focus is 
clearly placed on the ex ante phase due to the strong principal-agent nature of 
the system302. In the EU, to the contrary, IA can be performed as many as three 
times on the same proposal at different stages – white paper, communication, 
proposed binding legislation – and then evaluated ex post before a new proposal 
is tabled. Accordingly, the question of what to ask at what stage becomes even 
more complicated: as I will explain below in Part III of this Thesis, the 
European Commission has not satisfactorily solved this puzzle to date.  
The issue of “asking the right question, at the right time, in the right sequence” 
was already mentioned in the Mandelkern Report back in 2001. In my opinion, 
                                                   
301  Proposals with annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in 
a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the 
environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities; 
proposals that create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfered with an action taken or 
planned by another agency; proposals that materially alter the budgetary impact of 
entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients 
thereof; or proposals that raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the 
President's priorities, or the principles set forth in EO 12,866. 
302  For example, of the more than 100 major rules issued by EPA from 1981 to 1998, only five 
were subject to ex post evaluation (GAO 1999). 
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this is essentially a matter of allocating resources efficiently. Our brain does it 
all the time, after all. Evidence that human beings only take satisficing decisions 
can be applied also to public officials in charge of RIA: asking them to collect all 
relevant information on all consequences of a regulatory decision beforehand is 
as illogical as asking consumers to read and understand all contract terms when 
dealing with standard form contracts or click-wrap licenses. To the contrary, it 
would be more efficient to collect and analyze evidence up to the point when the 
marginal social benefit of such an exercise equates the marginal cost: the 
problem is that such a choice cannot be left to the private individual, as the 
marginal private benefit of performing RIA will likely be much lower that the 
social one. In Part III below, I propose a “staged approach” to IA in the 
European Union that responds to the need to allocate resources efficiently.  
4.4.2 Nudging people: Law as a means 
In Section 4.4 above, I have explored the issue of whether public policymakers 
should aim at the achievement of certain goals in society, which are not 
automatically selected by citizens in their daily interactions. Pure welfarism 
would suggest that such goal is wealth maximization, and this is what citizens 
want – some say that they want it ex ante, meaning that individuals would 
choose to live in a world where policymakers seek to maximize average utility by 
approximating it with wealth – the size of the pie. However, we have found out 
that in many circumstances mere reliance on individual preferences would lead 
to an unduly reductionist and profoundly mistaken approach, especially when 
public goods and externalities are at play.  
Now, forget about this querelle for a second, and imagine a policymaker that has 
an objective that market behavior by itself would not be able to reach. This may 
be a simple case of market failure, or a case in which the policymaker indeed 
wants to impose a given policy outcome, even against the will of its 
constituency. How can legal rules be framed in a way that minimizes the 
intrusive nature of such policies, without undermining their effectiveness?  
As a matter of fact, many commentators have realized that it takes much less 
than a fan of planned economies to advocate for objective welfare judgments in 
public policy. Individuals act irrationally in most circumstances; and markets 
follow the same track (think about herd behavior effects during the recent 
financial crisis); compliance with legislation often requires such a coordinated 
collective effort than no one wants to make the first move; social norms often 
work against the achievement of given social changes for the good. At the same 
time, a policymaker may want to achieve a given outcome, but may have too 
little resources, information, time or capacity to be able to impose individual 
behavior and enforce it throughout the territory on which she has authority. 
And after all, people hate being told what to do – in political, economic and 
philosophical terms, dictating behavior is at once ineffective and dangerous.  
However, a policymaker with a clear objective can still use the law as a means. 
In particular, as a means to provide individuals with incentives to behave in a 
way that ultimately achieves the pre-determined objective or makes it more 
likely. In other words, it can make the visible hand of the government invisible 
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enough to leave individuals still free to choose. From this standpoint, law and 
economics has proven of invaluable help in offering policymakers guidance on 
how to shape legal rules “as means”. Below, I illustrate some of the most 
insightful ways in which law and economics scholars have helped in the 
understanding of incentives and how to frame individual decision settings. All 
these tools can be in principle framed within a logic of libertarian paternalism – 
i.e., cases in which the law is conceived to steer individual behavior towards 
given directions, be them efficiency or distributive goals. In particular, I refer to 
“time-shifting”, “mechanism choices”, “framing of individual incentives”, 
“debiasing through law”; “reliance on technology”, and “nudging”. 
4.4.2.1 Overcoming informational deficits in policy: time-shifting rules, 
optional law, and “pragmatic libertarianism”  
In traditional top-down, “command and control” policymaking the legislator is 
assumed to possess reasonable information about the most appropriate 
allocation of entitlements, i.e. which rights should be assigned, and how should 
they be protected. In this over-simplified view of lawmaking, a legislator 
chooses outcome x based on a mix of legal tradition, ideals of justice and – when 
appropriate – economic or social policy, and proceeds to impose the selected 
outcome on citizens.  
In law and economics, the view is completely different. First, lawmakers are 
assumed not to possess sufficient information to be able to impose given market 
outcomes from the outset: therefore, relying on their ability to do so would be 
hazardous at best. Second, individuals do not take legal rules as given: they can 
bargain around legal rules in order to achieve Pareto improvements over the 
initially set allocation of entitlements. Third, and consequently, legal rules may 
not have as their primary goal the identification of the best solution tout court, 
but the creation of an environment in which parties can easily bargain on their 
entitlements and reach superior results due to their superior awareness of the 
contingent circumstances, compared to the policymaker. Put differently, it is 
possible to devise mechanisms to make sure that the most informed parties 
eventually decide on which entitlement should be protected, and how. Since the 
most informed parties are in most cases the ones that will actually experience 
situations in which legal entitlements are at stake, it is efficient to leave them 
with as much discretion as possible to reach a final solution on the allocation of 
those rights.    
A situation in which the lawmaker chooses the initial entitlement to protect and 
leaves as much discretion as possible to private players on the best way to solve 
inter-individual negotiation is what I define as “time-shifting”: as a matter of 
fact, part of the decision on how the entitlement will be protected is postponed 
to the moment in which individuals will experience a relevant situation of 
conflicting rights. As I will briefly explain in this section, time-shifting can take 
several forms, mostly related to the introduction of liability rules as opposed to 
property rules as alternative ways to protect given entitlements.  
Perhaps the most well-known example of time-shifting in early law and 
economics scholarship is the “ex ante view of the cathedral” that Guido 
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Calabresi and Douglas Melamed described back in 1972. One of the key insights 
of this seminal paper was that, when transaction costs are low, the best way to 
protect an entitlement is to delegate the choice of its allocation to private 
negotiation: this means that – in line with the Coase theorem – a legislator may 
allocate the entitlement also to the person that deserves it less, since private 
parties will be able to reach a final allocation through mutually beneficial 
transactions. The relevance of the initial allocation of the entitlement would, 
then, be limited to the final distribution of the surplus from negotiation – i.e. 
the party protected by the legal rule will be able to capture a larger share of the 
surplus. Accordingly, and very much in line with Calabresi’s view of justice 
before efficiency, the allocation of entitlements should reflect in primis 
principles of justice and the identification of the allocation that minimizes 
transaction costs. Likewise, in his analysis of the cost of accidents, Calabresi 
explained that the choice between strict liability and negligence should not be 
guided by the desire to impose liability based on principles of justice; to the 
contrary, the overall cost of the legal system of accident liability should be 
minimized by attributing liability to the so-called “cheapest cost avoider” or the 
“superior insurer”. As recalled i.a. by Faure (2008), Calabresi offers a few hints 
on how to identify the mythical figure of the cheapest cost avoider. Well aware 
of the behavioral consequences of legal rules, Calabresi argued in favor of an 
initial rough guess aimed at ruling out from the potential loss bearers activities 
that could reduce the costs being allocated only at great expense303. In addition, 
lawmakers should seek the allocation of responsibility that achieves the 
maximum degree of internalization of costs. Overall the choice has to be made 
in order to minimize the sum of social costs arising from accidents, the costs of 
precaution and the cost of administering the rule304.  
When put into practice, the cheapest cost avoider principle has proven superior 
to alternative models such as the polluter-pays-principle in environmental 
regulation. In particular, for the purposes of this Thesis, the ex ante 
determination of the cheapest cost avoider is what matters in terms of 
minimization of the overall cost of the legal system. Under this approach, “if 
either of two parties can reduce the occurred damage, the party which is able to 
do so with the lowest cost should act, as long as this cost is lower than the 
benefit” 305. This requires following four discrete steps: (i) identifying the 
possible actors who can influence the outcome (e.g. polluters, the pollutees, or a 
third party, like government); (ii) identifying alternative ways in which the 
outcome can be altered; (iii) assessing the minimum costs of the various 
methods figured out; and (iv) identifying the least cost method and the actor 
connected to it, which is indeed the cheapest cost avoider. 
                                                   
303  Calabresi, G. (1970), The Costs of Accidents. A Legal and Economic Analysis, New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 
304  According to Calabresi, if there is uncertainty about who is the cheapest cost avoider, 
accident costs should be charged to the person who can enter into transactions more 
cheaply: what Calabresi refers to as ‘the best briber’. 
305  Schmidtchen et al. (2008), The Internalisation of External Costs in Transport: From the 
Polluter Pays to the Cheapest Cost Avoider Principle, German Working Papers in law and 
Economics, Paper 1.  
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Similarly, in cases of strict liability for dangerous activities or liability for third 
party damages, the behavioral response of targeted agents is taken into account. 
Calabresi himself has shed light on the role of the “superior insurer” or “deep 
pocket” in securing efficient strict liability in these circumstances. The time-
shifting effect here rests in the decision by the legislator to refrain from seeking 
the efficient outcome from the outset; to the contrary, the legal rule only looks at 
ways to minimize the total cost of the legal rule, and delegates to those private 
parties that can do it in the most effective way the decision to purchase 
insurance to limit their exposure to risk.  
Even more interestingly, an important corollary contained in the paper written 
by Calabresi and Melamed on the “cathedral” is that, when transaction costs are 
likely to be high, insisting on protecting the entitlement through a property rule 
will not achieve the desired result, as parties will fail to negotiate to reach the 
Pareto frontier. This view of the cathedral is perhaps the most useful for modern 
law and economics scholars, as it can potentially host consideration of all the 
limits to human rationality and the bounded willpower that are considered to 
draw the line between homo oeconomicus and homo sapiens. Under this view, 
liability rules can be efficiently used to avoid that the parties engage in costly 
and unfruitful negotiation to change an initial allocation of entitlements. Here, a 
real time-shifting effect occurs, together with a sort of “Kantian” revolution, in 
which the decision on the final allocation is moved from the observation (or 
prediction) of reality to the mind of the non-entitled party, who has to decide 
whether to exercise an option to “buy” the entitlement at a given (regulated) 
price. Whenever the circumstances suggest that the choice by the non-protected 
party is likely to be a reasonably informed one, and the price set by the 
policymaker is such that it reasonably reflects the WTA of the party protected by 
the entitlement, this time-shifting effect can prove more efficient and desirable 
than any top-down imposition of resource allocation306.  
The view of liability rules as call options (i.e., options to buy an entitlement 
without having to negotiate the purchase) elicited insightful elaborations in the 
law and economics literature, and bears still under-researched applications in 
practical policy. In terms of subsequent literature, the study of liability rules as 
options has been advanced significantly by authors such as Lucien Ayre 
Bebchuk, Ian Ayres, Eric Talley, Louis Kaplow, Steven Shavell, James Krier, 
Stewart Schab and Lee Ann Fennell307. I will only refer to three of these 
                                                   
306  Note, in addition, that in proposing the use of liability rules whenever transaction costs are 
significant, Calabresi and Melamed (1972) are already one step away form the notion of 
mutual consent that has shaped the idea of Pareto efficient negotiation between private 
parties in Coase’s The problem of social cost. In this respect, the use of liability rules is 
potentially compatible with objective judgments, and “nudging”.  
307  The literature blossomed from the Calabresi-Melamed paper is so numerous that even 
Guido Calabresi declared himself surprised. Relevant papers include Ayres, Ian. 1998. 
Protecting Property with Puts. Valparaiso University Law Review 32:793; Ayres, Ian. 
2005. Optional law: the structure of legal entitlements. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press; Ayres, Ian, and J. M. Balkin. 1996. Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Beyond. Yale Law Journal 106 (3):703-50; Ayres, Ian, and Paul M. 
Goldbart. 2001. Optimal Delegation and Decoupling in the Design of Liability Rules. 
Michigan Law Review 100 (1):1-79; Ayres, Ian, and Paul M. Goldbart, 2003. Correlated 
Values in the Theory of Property and Liability Rules. Journal of Legal Studies 32 (1):121-
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contributions below, as dealing with the issue in-depth would deserve a separate 
volume.  
Perhaps the most insightful re-elaboration of the Calabresi-Melamed framework 
is Ayres’ idea of optional law, where the legendary “four rules” identified by 
Calabresi and Melamed in a standard nuisance context – two property rules and 
two liability rules, protecting either the polluter or the pollutee – are redefined 
and expanded. In particular, Ayres (2005) explains that if liability rules that 
imply an option to purchase an entitlement can be interpreted as call options, 
then there might be also a way to protect entitlements through a put option, i.e. 
a situation in which the time-shifting mechanisms under high transaction costs 
may efficiently give the party protected through an entitlement the option to 
force its counter-party to purchase the entitlement at a pre-determined price, i.e 
an option to sell one’s own alienable right. When the legislator aims at 
protecting one of the parties in a specific situation, but wants to make sure that 
the protection does not crystallize inefficient allocations of entitlements due to 
prohibitive transaction costs, then the choice of one of these optional rules may 
be warranted308. And indeed, the effort by some academics to trace in common 
and civil law jurisdictions legal rules that correspond to Ayres’ rule 5 and 6 has 
led to very interesting results in the past few years309. 
Another important development in the literature has been the attempt by 
Lucien Bebchuk (2002a, 2002b) to approach the cathedral from an ex ante 
perspective, by looking at the potential impact of the “grid of rules” elaborated 
by Calabresi and Melamed on the parties’ incentives to invest in given economic 
activities – the approach is easily extended also to the other rules identified a 
few years later in Ayres (2005). Bebchuk (2002a) suggests that the choice of the 
rule that will govern the interaction between individuals in contexts with 
conflicting uses of property can be inspired by the legislator’s desire to 
encourage either of the uses, or to place the decision on the prevailing use on 
                                                                                                                                                     
51; Ayres, Ian, and Eric Talley. 1995. Distinguishing between Consensual and 
Nonconsensual Advantages of Liability Rules. Yale Law Journal 105 (1):235-53; Ayres, Ian, 
and Eric Talley, 1995. Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate 
Coasean Trade, Yale Law Journal 104 (5):1027-1117; Epstein, Richard A. 1997. A Clear 
View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, Yale Law Journal 106 (7):2091-
2120; Epstein, Richard A. 1998. Protecting Property Rights with Legal Remedies: A 
Common Sense Reply to Professor Ayres. Val. University Law Review 32:833. Farnsworth, 
Ward. 1999. Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain after Judgment? A Glimpse inside the 
Cathedral. The University of Chicago Law Review 66 (2):373-436. Fennell, Lee Anne. 2005. 
Revealing Options. Harvard Law Review 118 (5):1401-1488. Kaplow, Louis, and Steven 
Shavell. 1996. Property Rules versus Liability Rules. Harvard Law Review 109:713. 
Kornhauser, Lewis A. 1986. An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract 
Remedies. University of Colorado Law Review 57 (4):683-725. Krier, James E., and Stewart 
J. Schwab. 1995. Property Rules and Liability Rules: The cathedral in another light. New 
York University Law Review 70 (May):440. Krier, James E., and Stewart J. Schwab. 1997. 
The Cathedral at Twenty-Five: Citations and Impressions. Yale Law Journal 106 (7):2121-
47. 
308  Ayres, I. (2005), Optional Law: the Structure of Legal Entitlements, University Of Chicago 
Press; 1 edition (June 15, 2005). 
309  See e.g. Nicita Pardolesi Rizzolli, http://www.side-isle.it/wp/05/nicita-pardolesi-
rizzolli.pdf  
154 | INSIGHTS FROM LAW AND ECONOMICS 
LAW AND ECONOMICS IN THE RIA WORLD - © ANDREA RENDA 2011 
the entity that can reach the most efficient decision most cost-effectively. In my 
opinion, future elaboration of these theoretical insights will lead to a better 
framing of regulatory problems such as blocking patents, access policy in 
network industries, or the resolution of conflicting uses of spectrum, as will be 
shown in Section 5 below. Even more broadly, fiercely debated issues such as 
i.a. investment in next-generation access network in telecommunications, 
network neutrality on the Internet, refusal to grant interoperability with de 
facto industry standards, the governance of patent pools, the reallocation of 
airport slots, access to essential drugs and the compulsory licensing of climate-
friendly technologies can be usefully and decisively inspired by this type of 
approach310.  
Finally, Lee Ann Fennell (2005) has provided a useful refinement to the 
framework of optional law by discussing behavioral rules that do not even 
require that the legislator possesses sufficient information to be able to set the 
price of the call and put options in a way that triggers efficient decisions by the 
private players involved. In certain circumstances, according to Fennell, parties 
can be put in the same situation of the players in the “cake slicing” game, which 
closely recalls the pre-constitutional approaches proposed (in a different context 
and with different features) by Rawls, Harsanyi and Posner. The cake-slicing 
game is a simple theoretical setting in which a self-motivated young kid is asked 
to cut the cake in two slices, but is also warned that his little sister will be the 
one choosing which slice to eat.  Under these conditions, the little kid does not 
know whether he will end up being the giver or the taker of the slice he is 
cutting, and is therefore in a sort of “original position”: then the best thing he 
can do as a self-motivated player is to cut the cake in two equal pieces – i.e. 
under those conditions the best way to behave selfishly is to adopt what will 
appear as a very cooperative move. Fennell uses this metaphor to propose a 
“Texas shoot-out rule” for given situations of conflicts in property uses311.   
All these are very good examples of insights offered by the law and economics 
literature on how to efficiently allocate decision-making responsibility between 
the legislator and private parties to create a suitable setting for reaching 
efficient results. As a matter of fact, these rules obviously face the problem of 
self-valuation by private parties, which may incur in behavioral problems such 
as those described in Section 4.2.1 of this Thesis. Accordingly, these rules must 
be appraised also in light of the potential biases that may emerge in the 
formulation of private judgments312. In all those rules, and even more evidently 
in the case of Fennell’s Texas shootout rule, important features are the emphasis 
on what happens after the rule is enacted; and the creation of mechanisms in 
which private parties can be induced to the selection of a desirable course of 
                                                   
310  Merges; Castro; etc.  
311  The example reported by Fennell refers to a simple two-partner setting, in which partner P1 
must name a price for her share of the partnership venture, whereas partner P2 can choose 
to pay that price to acquire P1’s share of the venture or can instead require P1 to buy out his 
share (that is, P2’s own share) at that same price.  See also Renda (2006), L’Importanza di 
Essere Onesto. Come Trasformare un Benthamiano in un Rawlsiano, Rivista della Scuola 
Superiore dell’Economia e delle Finanze, 2006, Issue 3, at 175. 
312  See, broadly, Arcuri, A. (2002), supra note 214.  
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action. This insight, as will be clarified in the next section, has evolved into more 
comprehensive policy approaches in the literature, including the creation of 
choice architectures and the nudging of private actors in the direction of socially 
desirable behavior. 
4.4.2.2 Enforcement and compliance: exploring the missing link 
As explained by Anthony Ogus back in 1998, the “original sin” of regulatory 
appraisal, and its missing link with law and economics, are related to the fact 
that contemporary RIA applies to legal initiatives the same set of principles that 
are normally applied to ex ante project evaluation. However, while project 
evaluation often revolves around assessing whether the value of assets would 
change following a certain event, “the first-order effects of legal reform depend 
primarily on the level of compliance by private actors”313. This is a key problem 
in regulatory appraisal, which has hardly been tackled, let alone solved, by 
current RIA practices. 
As already mentioned in Section 4.1.1.1 above, one early contribution of law and 
economics scholars in the field of contracts and torts is the development of 
theories of optimal deterrence due to the seminal work of Gary Becker (1968). 
The idea that the deterrence effect obtains by applying sanctions that multiply 
the expected damage by the inverse of the likelihood of being caught has 
spurred endless refinements in the literature, which cannot be fully analyzed in 
this Thesis314. Suffice it to recall, in this context, that several rules are still 
analyzed and compared in RIA documents with very little attention to 
fundamental questions such as who is going to enforce them, at what cost, and 
with what degree of effectiveness. For example, as will be illustrated in more 
detail in Section 5 below by means of examples, rules on financial monitoring 
and large exposure reporting in the EU Basel II framework, as well as i.a. tort 
rules and antitrust law in EU member states suffer from the very limited 
attention placed by public authorities on the actual degree of deterrence these 
rules foster. Furthermore, the popular Standard Cost Model used to assess the 
administrative burdens generated by existing and prospective legislation in the 
EU and practically all its member states assumes 100% compliance without 
even approaching the problem.  
                                                   
313  See Ogus, A. (1998), Regulatory Appraisal: A Neglected Opportunity for Law and 
Economics, European Journal of Law and Economics, Volume 6, Number 1, July 1998 , pp. 
53-68(16). 
314  See the seminal contributions of G. S. Becker, (1968), Crime and Punishment: An 
Economic Approach, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 76. Pages 169-217. G. S. Becker and 
G. J. Stigler, (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance and Compensation of Enforcers, 
Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 3. Pages 1-18. W. M. Landes and R. A. Posner (1975), The 
Private Enforcement of Law, Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 4. Pages 1-46. D. D. Friedman, 
(1984), Efficient Institutions for the Private Enforcement of Law, Journal of Legal Studies, 
Vol. 13. Pages 379-397. A. M. Polinsky and S. Shavell (1999), The Economic Theory of 
Public Enforcement of Law, Journal of Economic Literature, forthcoming. For a literature 
review, see Renda et al. (2008), Making private antitrust damages actions more effective 
in Europe, Report for the European Commission, DG Competition,  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/impact_study.pdf. 
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The key to solving this puzzle is again formulating assumptions on the 
incentives that will be faced by private actors when confronted with the decision 
whether to comply with the rule. In line with the developments in law and 
economics scholarships described in the previous sections, also in this case 
behavioral law and economics profoundly affected the prescriptive power of 
early contributions. However, in the case of the theory of optimal deterrence 
these critiques do not shake the foundations of the overall approach: rather, 
they inform the work of the policymaker in a way that better approximates 
reality315. 
Even more broadly, when looking at the effectiveness of enforcement under the 
lens of behavioral biases, it is important to consider that, as recalled by Nuno 
Garoupa (2003), “once criminals are not fully rational, so are not victims, 
enforcers, and politicians”. In a recent review of the literature, McAdams and 
Ulen (2008) show, i.a. that potential victims of criminal acts may feature over-
optimism and thus adopt insufficient precaution; policemen, inspectors and 
judges may be constrained and affected by “implicit bias” as well as “hindsight 
bias”, which determines the path-dependency of legal adjudication beyond the 
merits of the individual case at hand316; and the costs of litigation may very 
often lead to settlement, which in turn dilutes both the prospective cost of 
infringing the law on the side of the would-be infringer, and the benefit of suing 
for damage compensation on the side of the victim. Finally, any well-designed 
rule in many fields in which damages actions and injunctive relief are key 
elements of litigation must control for the incentive of non-victims to 
strategically use the legal system in order to secure strategic settlements for 
undeserving (frivolous) lawsuits317. 
Realizing that the implementation phase of a legal rule is as important as its 
implicit design is key to the development of effective policy options. A rule may 
appear optimal in theory but may be very difficult to correctly implement in 
practice: examples certainly include the EU Markets in Financial Services 
Directive (MiFiD), which imposed an exchange of information and extensive 
profiling and disclosure between the financial intermediary and its customers, 
in a context in which asymmetric information is so deeply entrenched in the 
                                                   
315  See e.g. Sunstein, C. R., D. Schkade, and D. Kahneman (1999), Do People Want Optimal 
Deterrence? University of Chicago Law School, John M. Olin Law & Economics Working 
Paper No. 77.  
316  See McAdams, R. H. and T. S. Ulen (2008), Behavioral Criminal Law and Economics, U of 
Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 440; U of Chicago, Public Law 
Working Paper No. 244; U Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper No. LE08-035. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1299963. And see also Sunstein, C.R., D. 
Kahneman, D. Schkade & I. Ritov (2002), Predictably Incoherent Judgments, Stan. L. Rev. 
54, 1153; Jolls, C. (2004), On Law Enforcement With Boundedly Rational Actors, Harvard 
L&E Discussion paper No. 494; and Jolls, C. and C.R. Sunstein (2006), The Law of Implicit 
Bias, Cal. L. Rev., 94, 969-996. 
317  See i.a. Bebchuk, L.A. (1998), Negative Expected Value Suits, NBER Working Paper No. 
W6474. 
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relationship that any form of steering and churning may nevertheless take 
place318.  
Finally, as already recalled in Section 4.2.2.1 above, policymakers should gauge 
the likelihood of compliance also on the basis of existing social norms – i.e. not 
only the “deterrence trap”, but also the “compliance trap” may emerge as a 
result of a badly conceived rule319. Policymakers that have dealt with cyberspace 
in the past few years, including those that have tried to criminalize illegal music 
downloads through the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act and those that 
are trying to implement the HADOPI law in France know well how difficult it is 
to overcome social norms320. Close to this approach is the extensive literature on 
responsive regulation as originally defined by Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite 
(1992), who build a model in which regulators interact with regulated firms by 
using various regulatory measures from the least to the most intrusive, and are 
called to investigate first of all on the reasons for non-compliance before moving 
to pure deterrence-based approaches321. The domain of responsive regulation 
and its relatively more recent branches of smart regulation and risk-based 
regulation, mostly originating in the UK debate over regulatory reform, offer a 
more nuanced menu of tools compared to the standard Beckerian dichotomy 
between compliance and deterrence. 
The combined result of these streams of literature is that any well-conceived 
RIA guidance around the world should devote an extensive section to nudge 
proponent administrations to ask the preliminary question “how is this 
regulatory option going to be enforced? And with what expected results? How 
can we avoid the deterrence trap and the compliance trap? Why has compliance 
been so low in the past?” In certain fields of law, answering such a question may 
lead to U-turns in the way legal rules are conceived.  
4.4.2.3 “De-biasing through law” and libertarian welfarism theories 
Laws that directly affect individual behavior often display varying degrees of 
effectiveness due to the behavioral response of individuals. In particular, rules 
that try to promote healthy or safe behavior such as refraining from smoking, 
getting vaccination or wearing helmets while riding motorbikes have often failed 
to achieve full compliance due to the difficulty of convincing individuals to 
adapt their behavior. This is often due to both individual behavioral biases and 
                                                   
318  See Directive 2004/39/Ec of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 
on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 
93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC. 
319  See, i.a. Parker, C. (2006), The Compliance Trap: The Moral Message in Responsive 
Regulatory Enforcement. U. of Melbourne Legal Studies Research Paper No. 163; See also 
Braithwaite (2002); and Ayres and Braithwaite (1992).  
320  See Section 5.8 below for a more detailed description of the French HADOPI law and 
similar initiatives on the protection of copyright in cyberspace.  
321  Even this stream of literature has moves towards behavioral studies. See i.a. Baldwin, R. 
and J. Black (2007), Really Responsive Regulation, LSE Law, Economy and Society 
working Papers 15/2007. 
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social norms. The literature on “de-biasing through law” looks mostly at the 
former type of distortions, and tries to devise strategies to limit the impact of 
behavioral biases in the decision to comply – i.e. it takes the imperfections of 
our brain as a given, and tries to minimize their impacts just as Coase advocated 
the minimization of the impact on transaction costs.  
The simplest version of de-biasing through law is through educational and 
informational campaigns, the simplest ones being pure messages sent to the eye 
of the individual at the right moment (such as Sunstein’s example of the “look 
right” message shown on boardwalks in the UK to avoid that tourists cross the 
street looking left as in their own countries322). In crafting more sophisticated 
campaigns, messages may be framed in a way that captures the attention of the 
individual and affects her own mental accounting and risk expectation323. A vast 
literature has blossomed in the past few years on how to inform consumers in a 
way that pushes them to change their behavior. I will show a similar example in 
Section 5 below, on the energy efficiency of refrigerators.  
However, when pure informational remedies are not sufficient, de-biasing may 
act in other ways. For example, a typical de-biasing form of regulation is the 
introduction of default rules, which change individuals’ focal point when 
negotiating contracts, providing them with an easy reference on potentially 
reasonable clauses. Korobkin (2009) observes that, as a result of the status quo 
bias, more people are likely to choose an option if they consider it a constituent 
part of the status quo than if they view it as inconsistent with it. However, this 
and other similar options discussed by Korobkin (2009) – such as frame 
alteration tools – already fall in the realm of paternalism, since they presuppose 
that the policymaker wants to nudge consumers towards the adoption of a given 
behavior.  
Another well-known set of rules that aim at de-biasing individual choice is 
consumer protection. Today, there is very little disagreement on the fact that 
behavioral law and economics should be the foundation of a well-designed 
consumer protection strategy. International organizations such as the OECD, 
the European Commission, competition authorities such as the OFT in the UK, 
the FTC in the US and many other institutions have dedicated studies and 
workshops to the issue of behavioral tools to achieve better consumer 
protection. This approach bears the heavy responsibility of saving the whole 
consumer protection movement from its evident failures in the past decades. 
For example, in a restrospective analysis of the famous Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture case addressed in 1965 by the US Supreme Court, Korobkin 
(2004) explains the different results that unconscionability analysis yields if 
observed under the lens of behavioral law and economics compared to the 
original approach adopted by the Court324. Likewise, recent analyses of early 
                                                   
322  See Sunstein and Thaler, Nudge, supra note 3. 
323  See e.g. Jolls (2010), Governing America: the Emerging of Behavioral Law and 
Economics.  
324  Korobkin, R. B. (2009), A ‘Traditional’ and ‘Behavioral’ Law-and-Economics Analysis of 
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company. University of Hawaii Law Review, Vol. 
26, p. 441, 2004; UCLA School of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 03-24. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=471961 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.471961 
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attempts to protect consumers from abusive behavior of their professional 
counter-parties in contracts of adhesion have rejected previous remedies based 
on the provision of information, and considered more aggressive strategies 
aimed at banning certain clauses and framing consumer decisions in a way that 
triggers better awareness325. The future of consumer protection is likely to 
involve more “structural” remedies such as banning of certain behavior and 
adoption of default rules, rather than disclosure obligations that fall on contract 
terms that would take a “three day seminar” to be fully understood by the 
average consumer. Similarly, a behavioral approach to cooling-off periods must 
necessarily take into account the fact that consumers, once they have purchased, 
may be less willing to change their mind, as their mindset and their perceived 
status quo has already changed.  
As long as the rules analyzed do not challenge established social norms, but 
simply aim at correcting behavioral biases towards the adoption of 
spontaneously efficient decisions, it is fair to state that we are located in that 
area of law that Korobkin (2009) has defined “Libertarian welfarism”. Very 
close to traditional law and economics, libertarian welfarism is a milder form of 
departure from mainstream neoclassical economics, of which it can be 
considered as a mere refinement.  
4.4.2.4 Libertarian paternalism: who’s afraid of “nudge”? 
A different approach to policymaking that draws on behavioralism, but 
recognizes the need for weak paternalism and objective judgments is what Cass 
Sunstein and Richard Thaler have termed “Libertarian Paternalism”, and is 
similar to what Camerer et al. (2003) call “asymmetric paternalism”326. Sunstein 
and Thaler, in particular, have used this overall approach to justify policy 
intervention aimed at nudging individuals towards choices that correspond to 
desirable outcomes in the mind of the policymaker. The term libertarian refers 
to the fact that individuals are merely nudged, but they can still choose whether 
to follow the nudge, or make their own choice.  
The nudging approach is particularly important for a number of reasons. First, 
because it is advocated i.a. by the scholar that is now holding the post of 
“regulatory czar” in the Obama administrations. Second, because it is the result 
of a long elaboration in law and economics, which has gradually opened the 
door to objective judgment and to partly abandoning the methodological 
individualism and the preference-based approach that have characterized 
neoclassical and Chicago law and Economics for many decades, towards some 
recognition of the social good and the need to gently steer individual autonomy 
                                                   
325  See, i.a. Renda et al. (1009), “Tying and Other Potentially Unfair Commercial Practices in 
Retail Financial Services”, Final Report for the European Commission DG MARKT, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/tying/report_en.pdf;  And see 
Becher (2008), at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1744-
1714.2008.00068.x/abstract.  
326  Sunstein and Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is not an Oxymoron, … Camerer et a. 
(2003), Regulation For Conservatives: Behavioral Economics And The Case For 
“Asymmetric Paternalism”, U. Penn. L. Rev. 151: 1211.  
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towards that goal. Third, because it aims at helping individuals solve problems 
of externality and collective action (such as compliance with the law) through 
behavioral means, and as such can lead law and economics into higher ground. 
Fourth, because it respects – or tries to respect – the individual freedom to 
choose the course of action that she deems more appropriate and maximizes her 
subjective expected utility, of course within the boundaries of imperative norms. 
In other words, the nudging approach appears at first blush as the perfect 
summary of everything that law and economics has learnt since 1960 (and – 
incidentally – that Guido Calabresi seemed to know from the very beginning). 
However, there are still some doubts as to how prominent nudging will become 
as a regulatory approach in the years to come, and whether such an approach 
would face problems of application. In particular, the focus of nudging is clearly 
on individual behavior, and as such appears way more suited for health and 
safety regulation than it would be for the regulation of market behavior by 
companies, or environmental protection (even though Sunstein and Thaler use 
cases on environmental policy in their book). In this respect, future research 
might usefully bridge “nudging” in certain areas of law with “responsive 
regulation” in market regulation and the related enforcement: such a 
combination of virtually homologous enforcement strategies may lead to a more 
complete and consistent policy framework for future generations.  
At the same time, nudging has been criticized because it presupposes that the 
“nudgers” are well informed about what is good and what is bad327. This 
“indeterminacy” problem (not knowing exactly “what to nudge for”) may lead to 
inconsistent and suboptimal policy. Personally, I consider this to be a minor 
critique, as in many cases the policymaker will indeed be nudging individuals to 
avoid immediate loss (“look right”); towards compliance with under-enforced 
rules (the “pooper-scooper” rule); towards behavior that scientific research has 
shown to be healthier (as in Sunstein and Thaler’s example of the Cafeteria in 
“Nudge”); or in any event towards the preservation of a public good in cases 
where externalities and collective action determine a discrepancy between 
individual expected utility and the social optimality of certain behaviors.  
4.5 Non-concluding remarks: the residual role of law and 
economics in ex ante policy appraisal 
Back in the 1970s, during the “expansionist” period of the law and economics 
movement, the Chicago school had developed an apparently solid and holistic 
approach to the making and implementation of the law, which seemed to stand 
as a fully alternative paradigm to traditional scholarship and established 
practice. This is also the time in which the US decided to create the RIA 
mechanism as a way to support delegation and oversight within government, 
and decided to base it on the Kaldor-Hicks criterion as the dominant litmus test 
to decide if a course of regulatory action would be viable or not.  
                                                   
327  Korobkin, R. B. (2009), Libertarian Welfarism. California Law Review, Vol. 97, No. 6, 
2009; UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 09-09.  
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Years after this decision, the law and economics movement appears to have 
developed more sophisticated, nuanced, and potentially insightful results. 
However, at the same time, the advent of behavioralism and a significant degree 
of relativism as regards the actual impact that rules will have on individual 
market and non-market interactions seems to cast a dark shadow on the 
potential for law and economics to deliver answers to the most pressing 
regulatory and policy questions. In a nutshell, diluting the Neoclassical 
paradigm has made law and economics dangerously agnostic. This is due to the 
undeniable fact that most of the original tenets of the Chicago school proved 
wrong, and mostly due to the reconsideration of the initial faith in individual 
rationality and (consequently) in the self-healing virtues of market forces.  
As was observed by some scholars, including Richard Posner himself, the 
problem with behavioralism is that it never evolved into a consistent theoretical 
framework, and still relies mostly on individual findings from cognitive 
sciences, which may guide the legislator, at best, under rather restrictive 
conditions328. Behavioral (law and) economics has been extremely powerful in 
showing that, contrary to what the Neoclassical view of homo oeconomicus 
postulated, individuals make systematic mistakes and markets follow those 
imperfections by reflecting systematically sub-optimal outcomes. However, 
behavioralists have so far failed to produce a comprehensive agenda for reform, 
and this is indeed their major challenge for the years ahead.  
This section has reached a number of findings. First, the evolution of law and 
economics condemns current cost-benefit analysis as obsolete and 
methodologically flawed. This is due to assumptions of perfect rationality, but 
most importantly to the reliance on methodological individualism and the 
comparison and aggregation of individual preferences.  
Second, law and economics seems to be converging towards the conclusion that 
cost-benefit analysis should account for distributional issues. Although the 
influence of Chicago is still pervasive in the literature, for the reasons discussed 
above the approach that is more likely to survive the next generation is 
Calabresi’s justice before efficiency rather than Posner’s efficiency as justice. 
And even Coase’s departure from the original ideas of Pigou, in retrospective, 
seem hardly justified on the basis of economic theory329.  
Third, since law and economics is drowning in behavioralism and in the decline 
of neoclassical economics, only methodological holism and a more nuanced and 
humble approach to other social sciences and policy goals other than efficiency 
and wealth maximization can save law and economics in the years to come330. In 
this respect, it is fair to state that the age of the expansionism of economics to 
the detriment of other social sciences has come to an end. Since this means that 
law and economics will inevitably become more “agnostic”, its predictive power 
                                                   
328  See Hayden, G.M. and S. E. Ellis (2007), Law and Economics After Behavioral Economics, 
University of Kansas Law Review, 55:3 (April 2007): 629-675. 
329  Hovenkamp (1994), supra note 269. 
330  See, for a similar position, Arcuri, A. (2008), Eclecticism in Law and Economics. Erasmus 
Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 3. 
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is likely to decline in the years to come, in exchange for more methodological 
soundness. 
Fourth, modern law and economics can justify resourcist cost-benefit analysis 
only as a procedural requirement to “nudge” government agencies, or better to 
keep them under control. However, it remains to be ascertained whether using 
Kaldor-Hicks cost-benefit analysis as a signal and a monitoring tool within the 
delegation and oversight structure of policymaking is likely to distort the 
incentives of involved players and create equally distorted expectations on 
external stakeholders. 
Fifth, where law and economics can still be of invaluable help for the 
policymaker is in a number of phases of RIA, where law and economics can 
often enlighten the identification, analysis and comparison of options. The areas 
in which this is more likely to occur are: (i) the definition of rules that overcome 
the policymaker’s informational deficit (such as time-shifting rules, optional 
law, and “pragmatically libertarian rules”); (ii) the analysis of enforcement and 
compliance (including developments in the analysis of responsive regulation; 
(iii) the behavioral approaches aimed at de-biasing through law; and (iv) the 
“nudging” approach developed by Sunstein and Thaler, but also by authoritative 
scholars in the field of neureconomics. 
Finally, it is very likely that future approaches to better regulation will indeed 
reflect a mix of the four abovementioned areas of development. Social sciences 
in general seem to be moving, in any event, towards a broader acceptance of 
weak forms of paternalism in the development and enforcement of public 
policy. Whether this approach will come to dominate the scene also in law and 
economics – perhaps, also due to the heavy legacy of the current financial and 
economic crisis – only time will tell. 
 
5 INFORMING RIA THROUGH SOUND LAW AND 
ECONOMICS: MISCELLANEOUS EXAMPLES 
In the previous section of this Thesis, I have discussed the potential for law and 
economics to inform the ex ante impact assessment of proposed policy 
initiatives. The main finding is that law and economics can prove particularly 
useful in suggesting efficient policy solutions that affect individual incentives, 
but so far largely failed in its attempt to provide adequate tools and criteria to 
assess the expected impact of policies in terms of social welfare. This section is 
based on the previous discussion on “if” law and economics can be helpful for ex 
ante policy appraisal (i.e. the an), and provides concrete examples of “how” law 
and economics can help, i.e. of the many ways in which law and economics can 
inform a better impact assessment of public policies (the quomodo). The 
specific examples are briefly illustrated in order to avoid imposing undue 
burdens on the reader: references are provided in order to ensure that the 
reader can easily find more food for thought on each of the issues presented.  
5.1 Thinking “outside the box” with law and economics: 
optional law in spectrum policy 
The management and allocation of radio frequencies for the supply of electronic 
communications services is today a very prominent policy issue, worth at least 
2.5% of GDP in the EU. Communicating data over the ether has become so 
important in the age of smartphones, wi-fi connections and digital television, 
that ensuring an efficient allocation of a scarce resource such as suitable 
spectrum bands has become a key policy priority. Reaching allocative efficiency 
in spectrum allocation is made even more difficult by the fact that the bands 
that can be used for electronic communications (say, from 30Mhz to 30 GHz) 
are not created equal: generally, lower frequencies imply a higher coverage of 
antennas; to the contrary, higher frequencies allow greater capacity to transport 
data. In addition, as technology advances, relatively low frequency bands can be 
used also for bandwidth-intensive uses, such as Internet connections331. In 
summary, identifying the best uses of each of the suitable spectrum bands is a 
complex exercise for a public authority, as the “best” use changes along with 
frequencies and with time.  
Against this background, since the birth of modern communications, spectrum 
policy has always implied a top-down allocation of licenses by administrative 
authorities for the provision of specific services in specific frequencies. Such a 
“command and control” policy approach was chiefly dictated by the need to 
avoid interference between conflicting uses. In this respect, use of the spectrum, 
                                                   
331  See, i.a., Bohlin, E., C. Blackman, S. Forge and A. Renda (2008), A Common European 
Spectrum Policy: barriers and prospects, study for the European Parliament, ITRE 
Committee, January 2008, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/itre_st_2007_spec
trum_poli/ITRE_ST_2007_SPECTRUM_POLICY.pdf.  
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especially at certain frequencies, can create situations of “nuisance” very similar 
to those that arise in property law. Based on these potential interference 
problems, until the 1950s there was very little debate on the ways in which 
spectrum could be allocated: given the relative under-development of wireless 
communications and the existence of (mostly state-owned) monopolies in 
telecommunications and audiovisual services, regulators simply decided “who” 
should use “which” portion of the spectrum, to deliver “what” services, and 
“how” (i.e. with what technology).  
During those years Leo Herzel (1951) started questioning this approach332. In 
1959, Ronald Coase wrote an important article, simply titled “The Federal 
Communications Commission”, where he argued in favor of a market for trading 
property rights on the radio spectrum. Knowing what Coase wrote only one year 
later in “The Problem of Social Cost”, it is easy to understand what he was 
proposing in his paper on the Federal Communications Commission: compared 
to a scenario in which the state allocates spectrum rights with a top-down, 
command and control procedure, market forces can perform better due to 
superior information. Since the government is not expected to have enough 
information to understand who will be able to use each portion of the spectrum  
most efficiently, and how this changes over time, reliance on market forces to 
achieve allocative efficiency would have been the best way to unleash the 
extraordinary economic potential of the airwaves. As is well-known, Coase’s 
argument was not welcome by regulators: asked to testify at a hearing, he was 
greeted by a member of the Commission: “Good morning, Professor Coase. 
Please tell us, is this all a big joke?”333 Today, spectrum markets are at the core 
of the policy agenda in at least some industrialized countries (e.g., US, UK, 
EU)334. 
Coase’s article on the FCC was almost as influential as “The Problem of Social 
Cost”, but it took several years before public authorities decided to open up the 
airwaves to market mechanisms. However, although several economists had 
hailed the advent of “propertized” spectrum as the beginning of a more efficient 
way of approaching spectrum policy in key bands, the results were 
disappointing. The volume of spectrum trading observed was very low in 
pioneer countries such as New Zealand, Australia, the US and more recently the 
UK. Nevertheless, the European Commission since 2005 started advocating for 
secondary trading of spectrum rights and flexible market-based mechanisms as 
the recipe for unleashing the potential of spectrum in the modern digital 
economy335. A study carried out for the Commission on spectrum trading back 
                                                   
332  See Herzel, L. (1951), “Public Interest” and the Market in Color Television Regulation, 18 
Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 802.  
333  See Hazlett, T. (2002), Washington Wireless Wars, Washington Institute Forum, August 
2002. Available online at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/mif2.pdf. 
334  See Bohlin, Blackman, Forge and Renda (2008), A Common EU spectrum policy: Barriers 
and Prospects, report for the European Parliament, ITRE Committee, available online at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studiesCom/download.do?file=189
31.  
335  See Communication COM(2005)400 final from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
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in 2004 estimated that for the EU and the EEA Member States the net gain 
resulting from the introduction of spectrum trading combined with flexible 
usage rights would amount to €8-9 billion per year336. Spectrum-dependent 
technologies are now estimated to account for as much as 2.2% of the EU GDP, 
or €250 billion. None of these benefits have materialized to date, and this also 
due to the fact that the European Commission never managed to really affect 
spectrum policy in Member States. The latest attempt to launch a five-year 
spectrum policy plan to help the EU27 achieve the ambitious goals set in the 
digital agenda is still pending in the European parliament, and most 
importantly still far from being approved by the Member State governments. 
The policy problem is easily identified: spectrum has always been considered as 
a scarce resource, but for any given moment of time, only approximately 5-10% 
of it is used, whereas the rest remains idle. Moreover, spectrum policy has 
normally been carried out to avoid interference between uses rigidly allocated 
by the government. Against this background, the most important problem of the 
introduction of market based mechanisms in spectrum policy is not that 
markets have to fully experiment with it; the real problem is that market-based 
mechanisms simply haven’t worked so far. This suggests that the reliance on 
market forces exhibited by Ronald Coase in his 1959 and 1960 scholarly papers 
was excessive337. Several aspects of the foreseen market transactions make them 
unlikely to happen on a mass scale. First, selling a usage right on a given 
frequency means, for the seller, either abandoning the market completely, or 
creating a competitor338. This, in turn, means that the opportunity cost of selling 
a spectrum usage right is prohibitive, and creates an obstacle to the reallocation 
of resources to the highest-value users. Second, this same situation creates a 
problem in terms of divergence between the willingness to pay of a potential 
buyer of spectrum usage rights, and the willingness to accept compensation of 
the potential seller. This also means that there may not be a price at which the 
parties will decide to conclude an efficient transaction and reallocate the usage 
right. Finally, spectrum trading mechanisms should always be accompanied by 
rules on interference, and the potential for technologies to interfere with each 
other depends enormously on the type of frequency, the type of technology, and 
the type of service provided with that technology. Absent a top-down control by 
the state, it is difficult to rely exclusively on market forces, at least for valuable 
frequencies such as the ones between 30MHz and 3GHz, and in particular the 
UHF band.  
                                                                                                                                                     
Committee of the Regions - A market-based approach to spectrum management in the 
European Union.  
336  Study “Conditions and options in introducing secondary trading of radio spectrum in the 
European Community”, by Analysys, Dotecon and Hogan & Hartson, available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/radio_spectrum/_document_sto
rage/studies/secondary_trading/secontrad_final.pdf.  
337  See Hazlett, T, (2001), The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the Spectrum 
Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's "Big Jokes": An Essay on Airwave 
Allocation Policy, Harvard J. Law & Tech, 14(2), Spring, 335-545. 
338  The rationale is similar to the one developed for Airport slots. See the UK Civil Aviation 
Authority, Property Rights in Airport Slots. A Discussion paper, at 
http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/5/ergdocs/slotsnov01.pdf.  
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To be sure, Coase’s insight is essential to understand spectrum policy as it 
stands today. But law and economics has gone much further than Coase, as 
recalled in the previous sections of this Thesis. In particular, the idea that 
assigning entitlements protected by a property rule is the most efficient way to 
reach an efficient allocation of scarce resources has been refined by many 
authors since Calabresi and Melamed’s “View of the Cathedral”, but also at a 
later stage, by Ayres and Talley (1995), Bebchuk (2004), and Ayres (2005)339. 
Many of these papers elaborate on the concept of property v. liability rules, and 
conclude that under certain circumstances transaction costs would be 
prohibitively high, and that as a consequence trading of property rights would 
not lead to a sufficient volume of exchanges to enable efficient allocation of 
resources. In the spectrum world, this would simply mean that rigidities in the 
market trading and, more generally, high transaction costs are often an obstacle 
to reaching an efficient spectrum allocation, and that market-based mechanisms 
would fail to enable spectrum usage to adapt to the evolution of technology 
overtime. This mostly depends on the fact that giving away spectrum often bears 
a significant opportunity cost, and can lead to the creation of undesired 
competitors: strategic bargaining and divergence of valuations and interests can 
also lead to the failure of some otherwise efficiency-enhancing transactions. 
This, at the same time, leads to a situation in which the initial allocation of 
entitlements is not irrelevant both from an efficiency and a distributional 
perspective340.  
To the contrary, when transaction costs are high, a liability rule is normally seen 
as more efficient than a property rule. It may sound rather straightforward for a 
law and economics student: it is not, for a spectrum policymaker. For this 
reason, a RIA on spectrum policy today would simply revolve around the three 
main modes of spectrum assignment: (i) the “command and control” approach; 
(ii) the market-based, “Coasian” approach; and (iii) the commons approach, 
where no entitlements are allocated341.  
Are there alternative policy options that such RIA would overlook? Yes. Take, as 
an example, the L&E literature on conflicting uses of property, which was 
elaborated initially with reference to nuisance law. Interference between uses of 
adjacent spectrum bands is, for a law and economics scholar, very similar to 
nuisance in property. But it exhibits some important features as regards 
transaction costs, as testified by the fact that spectrum trading, though allowed 
                                                   
339  Ayres, I., and E. Talley (1995), Distinguishing between Consensual and Nonconsensual 
Advantages of Liability Rules, Yale Law Journal 105 (1):235-53; and Ayres, I., and E. 
Talley. 1995, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean 
Trade, Yale Law Journal 104 (5):1027-1117. 
340  See also infra, Section 5.2, on the importance of the initial allocation of allowances in the 
emissions trading regime.  
341  The “commons” option is increasingly advocated by engineers and also economists. 
However, the commons (or unlicensed spectrum) is more appropriate for relatively high 
frequencies, i.e. portions of spectrum in which the coverage of individual antennas is not 
too wide. Key examples are remote controls, intelligent parking sensors on cars, and also 
wi-fi hotspots. In the future, it is more likely that the portion of spectrum that will be left to 
a commons mechanism will expand, as agile radio technologies and cognitive radio 
develop.  
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in some national jurisdictions, has yielded rather disappointing results. The 
L&E literature would thus recommend the addition of a number of policy 
alternatives to the policymaker’s initial battery. Authoritative scholars such as 
Ayres (2005) have shown that standard liability rules – i.e. allocating the 
entitlement to the right owner in a given band, but with a call option held by 
other players, that can exercise the right to buy the entitlement at a regulated 
price – can prove superior to property rules when transaction costs are high, as 
they economize on information costs and leave (at least one of) the parties 
involved with the possibility to choose at a later stage whether to exercise an 
option or not.  
In the case of spectrum, however, this option may prove difficult, as the related 
uncertainty it would engender could jeopardize incentives to invest in a given 
band. And choosing the right option price may also reproduce the difficulties of 
command and control regimes, as it would leave government with the task of 
identifying the “right” value of the band342. However, the law and economics 
literature has gone even further than this. The L&E literature on optional law 
has, at least partially, solved the problem of option prices. In the Texas Shootout 
Rule described by Fennell (2004), one of the players (the spectrum licensee) 
would be called to set a price for the band she is using, whereas other players 
could be called to choose whether to leave the band to the licensee (put option), 
or to buy it from her (call option). This way, the spectrum holder would have to 
choose the price without knowing whether she will ultimately act as a buyer or a 
seller, and accordingly will simulate a collaborative outcome without having to 
negotiate with any other player. This outcome – similar to the outcome of the 
more famous “cake slicing game”, replicates in practical terms the Rawlsian 
concept of “veil of ignorance” – in other words, it simulates a fully cooperative 
outcome without imposing cooperation on the parties343. Finally, the law and 
economics literature has made very important steps in understanding mixed 
forms of governance between the commons and property rights, such as “mini-
commons” and “semi-commons” theories that perfectly match the spectrum 
world.  
Is any of these policy choices currently reflected in the way spectrum policy is 
being approached by policymakers? Certainly not in Europe. In the US, where 
the law and economics literature is more integrated with policymaking, the 
concept of “easement” in spectrum usage can be said to reflect, at least to some 
extent, the concept of a permanent, limited call option assigned to non-
licensees.  
In summary, in our example of spectrum policy, whereas policymakers are still 
trying to get to grips with Coasian insights on the functioning of private 
bargaining, the L&E literature is so far ahead that it would take decades, for 
administrations, to catch up. And meanwhile, many important opportunities for 
efficient and effective policymaking would be lost. Against this background, it 
                                                   
342  See, for a brief application of the Calabresi-Melamed framework to spectrum policy, 
Lemley, M. A. and P. Weiser (2007), Should Property or Liability Rules Govern 
Information?. Texas Law Review, Vol. 85, p. 783.  
343  See supra, Section 4.3.3.2. 
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would be very interesting to see the European Commission studying and 
discussing mechanisms aimed at ensuring that spectrum is not fully 
propertized, but is subject to regular reallocation based on optional rules similar 
to Fennell’s “Texas shoot-out”: although a full analysis of the potential impacts 
would fall outside the scope of this Thesis, the potential inspiration that law and 
economics scholarship may offer in terms of helping administrations “think 
outside the box” would be remarkable.  
5.2 Emissions trading: a tale of serendipity and opportunity 
costs  
When policymakers opt for a market-based mechanism, mainstream 
economists always celebrate. Just like in the case of spectrum (see Section 5.1 
above), a trading system was also advocated by lawyer-economists for CO2 
emissions: the main reason for claiming the superior efficiency of this system 
over traditional environmental taxes or standards is that, since the optimal level 
of pollution in a society is inevitably above zero, an emissions trading 
mechanisms can ensure that, for every particle of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emitted, the social value of production will be maximized344. More precisely, 
since the first experiments with pollution permits in the United States, the 
underlying rationale for trading emissions is that, the more a business is willing 
to pay to buy a pollution permit, the higher the social value associated with the 
pollution that will be generated by the firm. At the same time, given that 
pollution permits are costly, businesses will have an incentive to invest in 
environment-friendly technologies to be able to minimize their need to purchase 
permits in the marketplace. In a nutshell, emissions trading leads to allocative 
efficiency: to believe in emissions trading, you must believe in the market 
mechanism, just like Ronald Coase did.  
In 2005, the EU launched an Emissions Trading System (ETS) that now 
operates in 30 countries (the 27 EU Member States plus Iceland, Liechtenstein 
and Norway), covering CO2 emissions from installations such as power stations, 
combustion plants, oil refineries and iron and steel works, as well as factories 
making cement, glass, lime, bricks, ceramics, pulp, paper and board345. The EU 
ETS works on a “cap and trade” basis – i.e. there is a “cap”, or limit, on the total 
amount of certain greenhouse gases that can be emitted by the factories, power 
plants and other installations in the system. Within the cap, businesses receive 
emission allowances that they can trade on the marketplace. The limit on the 
total number of allowances available corresponds to the level of pollution 
                                                   
344  See, for an enlightening illustration, Pearce, D.W. and R. K. Turner (1990). Economics of 
Natural Resources and the Environment, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.  
345  Nitrous oxide emissions from certain processes are also covered. Between them, the 
installations currently in the scheme account for almost half of the EU's CO2 emissions and 
40% of its total greenhouse gas emissions. Airlines will join the scheme in 2012. The EU 
ETS will be further expanded to the petrochemicals, ammonia and aluminium industries 
and to additional gases in 2013, when the third trading period will start. At the same time a 
series of important changes to the way the EU ETS works will take effect in order to 
strengthen the system. 
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desired. At the end of each year each company must surrender enough 
allowances to cover all its emissions, otherwise heavy fines are imposed. The 
number of allowances is reduced over time so that total emissions fall. For 
example, the European Commission announced that in 2020 emissions will be 
21% lower than in 2005346. 
An important feature of the EU ETS system is that it was originally based, just 
like the US SO2 trading system, on a grandfathering rule: polluters received 
most emission rights free of charge based on their historical emissions, so that 
they did not have to buy those rights in an auction. In the EU, every Member 
State allocated at least 95% of its allowances free of charge in the period 2005-
2007 and at least 90% in the period 2008-2012347. This choice, though evidently 
increasing the political acceptability of establishing an ETS system, was fiercely 
criticized by field experts on the basis that it would run contrary to the well-
acknowledged polluter-pays-principle, which is considered as the basis of the 
internalization of externalities and the correct attribution of incentives, and is 
now even rooted in the EU Treaty since the creation of a separate chapter on 
climate change in 1986 with the Single European Act. The rationale is 
apparently crystal clear: if polluters don’t pay, they will not internalize the 
negative externalities they impose on society, and will thus tend to produce 
above the socially optimal level; at the same time, given the existence of the EU 
ETS, they may even have an incentive to pass-on downstream the value of the 
emission allowance, thus even profiting from the existence of the ETS without 
paying for it.  
In light of this problem, the European Commission has been seeking changes to 
the ETS: in 2008, it stated in a rather sophisticated impact assessment 
document that “the overall functioning of the Emissions Trading Scheme can be 
improved in a number of aspects”, and that “allocating allowances for free has 
reduced the efficiency of the ETS”348. However, what had already emerged in the 
literature is that, on efficiency grounds, an auctioning system is not always 
preferable to a grandfathering one. The key misunderstanding in this respect 
was that, given the establishment of an emission trading mechanism, the 
allocation of allowances is not entirely free of charge for pollution emitters, but 
carries an “opportunity cost”, i.e. the cost of not trading in the market the freely 
allocated pollution permit. This, more simply, means that polluters virtually 
face a cost of retaining the permit, equal to the foregone profit of selling it on the 
market.  
As a result, the quest for the most efficient solution is way more open that the 
Commission initially thought. In recent papers, such as i.a. Woerdman et al. 
(2008), Goeree et al. (2009), Botelho et al. (2010) and Clò (2010), the 
                                                   
346  See http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm.  
347  See Woerdman, E., A. Arcuri and S. Clò (2007), Emissions Trading and the Polluter-Pays 
Principle: Do Polluters Pay under Grandfathering?. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1271843.  
348  See COM(2008)16 final of 27 February 2008, and the accompanying impact assessment, 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/ia_carried_out/docs/ia_2008/climate_package_
ia_annex.pdf.  
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comparison between the two allocation methods has been brought back to a 
more economically sound framework, which denies the superior efficiency of the 
auctioning system per se, and looks at the effects that are likely to be generated 
by the two alternative methods on the basis of the incentives, for market 
players, to approximate allocative efficiency.  
Against this background, several issues have to be considered before one 
allocation method can be seen as preferable to its alternative. First, auctioning is 
likely to be more expensive than grandfathering for public administrations, 
given the cost of organising, designing and running the auctions. At the same 
time, auctions can be more costly for polluters, if the competitive process that 
leads to the allocation of permits can drive prices above the opportunity cost of 
holding a permit under grandfathering. When transaction costs are positive, this 
is likely to be the case, since polluters will prefer to be awarded a permit in the 
first place, instead of waiting for the allocation to then rely on the secondary 
market to secure an allowance. The ultimate impact of such a difference should 
be estimated depending on the expected level of transaction costs, the relative 
competitiveness of markets and other market features that potentially affect the 
result of auctions.  
At the same time, auction design is essential for the final outcome, and it is a 
fairly difficult task. The experience with 3G auctions in telecommunications, 
which ended up destroying the European leadership achieved in this field 
during the 2G (GSM) era, is telling in this respect. If national governments are 
given the freedom to design the auctions, outcomes may differ so widely that the 
efficient reallocation of allowances in the Internal market may be jeopardized, 
and with it the goal of achieving allocative efficiency. One might then wonder 
whether there could ever be any added value from auctioning, absent a 
centralization of the auctioning process and design.  
Moreover, a more complex set of problems may emerge since auctioning does 
not allow a selection of the initial allocation of rights, whereas grandfathering 
inevitably pre-selects initial distribution. Following the Coase theorem, the 
initial distribution should be essentially irrelevant for the achievement of the 
efficient allocation of allowances in the marketplace: however, there are very 
good reasons to doubt that the invariance proposition in the Coase theorem 
would hold in the context of environmental policy, and particularly when an 
auction mechanism has been put in place to determine the initial allocation of 
entitlements349.  
A full treatment of the efficiency and fairness consequences of the EU ETS 
scheme would require a dedicated volume, and would certainly fall outside the 
scope of this Thesis350. What bears mention here is that the costs generated by 
the alternative systems, the relevance of the initial allocation of rights, the 
                                                   
349  See Arcuri, A. (2005), A Different Reason for “De-Coasing” Environmental Law and 
Economics, European Journal of Law and Economics, 20: 225–246, 2005. 
350  See, for an in-depth view from a law and economics perspective, Clò, S. (2010), Economic 
Analysis of the European Climate Policy: the European emissions trading scheme, 
http://publishing.eur.nl/ir/repub/asset/20717/Proefschrift%20Stefano%20Clo%20BW%5
Blr%5D.pdf 
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likelihood that a more efficient allocation will be reached under auctioning, and 
the risk of failure of the auction mechanism did not play a major role in the 
Commission’s thick impact assessment document. To the contrary, other, more 
stylized impacts, such as windfall profits generated by grandfathering, were 
given more prominence. This does not mean that the Commission made the 
wrong choice in selecting a gradual transition towards 100% auctioning of 
allowances: as a matter of fact, scholarly papers that have run experimental 
analysis tend to point at auctioning as potentially superior to grandfathering351. 
But the reasons for preferring auctioning over grandfathering (mostly, related to 
stability, predictability and certainty) are not the same ones quoted by the 
Commission in its impact assessment (efficiency-related ones): in other words, 
if the Commission ended up choosing the best option, this was more accidental 
than intentional – a good example of serendipity in policy-making. A 
serendipity that the impact assessment process did not manage to prevent.  
In conclusion, just as in the case of spectrum allocation treated in Section 5.1 
above, a more sophisticated understanding of law and economics can help 
policymakers design better policies: on the other hand, neoclassical law and 
economics can prove misleading for policymakers. 
5.3 Asking the right questions in impact assessment: the case 
of private antitrust damages actions  
A famous motto attributed to the Mandelkern report is that one of the main 
virtues of RIA is to help administrations “ask the right questions, at the right 
time, and in the right sequence”352. However, without full support of law and 
economics, often RIA ends up in a “monetization craze” that bears little 
relevance for the purpose of legislating better.  
One example in point is certainly private antitrust enforcement. A few years ago, 
after the Modernization of EU antitrust policy with Regulation 1/2003, the 
European Commission started looking at a specific problem that had emerged in 
the application of EU antitrust law since the Treaty of Rome that established the 
European Community back in 1957. As a matter of fact, even if it had always 
been possible for victims of antitrust infringement to sue infringers before 
national judges to obtain damage compensation, available evidence revealed 
                                                   
351  Botelho, A., E. Fernandes and L. Pinto (2010) conclude that “the EU ETS has the potential 
to reduce CO2 emissions, achieving targets considerably more restrictive than the current 
ones at high efficiency levels, both with auctioned and free emission permits” See Botelho 
et al. (2010), An experimental analysis of grandfathering vs dynamic auctioning in the 
EU ETS, Working Paper n. 39/2010, Núcleo de Investigação em Microeconomia Aplicada 
Universidade do Minho. Goeree et al. (2010) conclude that under grandfathering permit 
prices “were well above competitive (supply and demand) predictions”, whereas “permit 
prices tended to converge to competitive levels when permits were assigned by auction”. 
See Goeree, J.K., C. A. Holt, K. Palmer, W. Shobe and D. Burtraw (2010), An Experimental 
Study of Auctions Versus Grandfathering to Assign Pollution Permits, Journal of the 
European Economic Association April/May 2010, Vol. 8, No. 2-3, Pages 514-525. 
352  Renda, A. et al. (2009), Policymaking in the EU; achievements, challenges and proposals 
for reform, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels. 
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that very few such cases had occurred, and that the number of cases that had 
resulted in actual compensation of damages was less than a fistful. A study 
carried out in 2004 for the European Commission revealed a situation of “total 
underdevelopment” in private antitrust damages actions, which created a 
specific policy problem: if there is a right to compensation rooted in the Treaty, 
why was the right so under-exercised? And should something be done to ensure 
that the right is exercised more effectively in the future? 
Since the issue was to be addressed by means of a White Paper, included in the 
Commission’s Legislative and Work Programme, this became the subject of a 
Commission Impact Assessment. There, the European Commission asked a 
team of external consultants to help in the assessment of the potential 
consequences of a number of potential policy actions aimed at encouraging 
meritorious damages actions. I had the honor of leading that team of 
courageous researchers: they were all coming from a law and economics 
background, and due to this rather fortunate circumstance I can now tell 
something about using law and economics in the RIA world.  
The European Commission entrusted our team with two different tasks. The 
first task was to assess the potential social impact of more effective private 
antitrust enforcement in the European Union. Already looking at this task, a 
major problem emerged. How can one calculate the potential impact of a “more 
effective private antitrust enforcement” on social welfare, if the way to achieve 
such result has not been identified in the first place? This is potentially a major 
problem in an impact assessment, since the result (especially the level of costs) 
depends enormously on the options chosen to achieve it. In any event, the 
European Commission needed that figure, i.a., to show the Impact Assessment 
Board that they had quantified and monetized expected impacts, and that the 
proposed policy action would display “net benefits”. At the end of our analysis, 
based mostly on a comparison with the US system (where private enforcement 
is way more developed than in Europe) we concluded that if private antitrust 
damages actions would not become more effective, foregone benefits for victims 
of antitrust infringement would range between €5.7 billion and €23.3 billion; at 
the same time, while expected costs are significant, they would never offset the 
corrective justice impact of enhanced private antitrust enforcement353.  
The second task was to analyze a set of seven possible policy actions, and 
compare available options for each of those actions. Actions to be assessed 
included alternative policy options on damage compensation; on the costs and 
rewards of filing an private antitrust damage action; on several forms of 
collective actions; on ways to calculate damages; on different rules for access to 
evidence; on the treatment of leniency applicants as regards their exposure to 
liability in court; and on the legal approach to the so-called “passing-on 
defense”354. For each of those actions, 4-5 policy options were identified, leading 
                                                   
353  For example, lawyers’ fees and court fees, which are by far the largest portion of expected 
costs, would amount to approximately 15%-20% of damage recovery (this result was 
reached using US data as a benchmark, as no EU data were available). For a full account, 
see the report by Renda et al. (2008), supra note 21.  
354  See Renda et al. (2008), supra note 21, Section II.5. 
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to an incredible number of possible scenarios – in the interim report of our 
Impact Assessment, we showed the Commission a table that ranked 1,728 
possible policy scenarios in terms of certain categories of benefits and costs – 
and the “no policy action” scenario was ranking among the best! 
For the purposes of this Thesis, the most important issue to be described is that, 
while the European Commission was chiefly interested in producing the 
“figure”, i.e. the numerical demonstration that more effective private 
enforcement would be needed, it was quite clear that the monetization of the 
overall impact on social welfare was not the most important part of that impact 
assessment exercise. To the contrary, what was really important was to 
understand whether certain legal changes would have encouraged more 
meritorious private antitrust damages actions, without unduly facilitating also 
frivolous suits by non-victims, aimed at achieving strategic advantages (e.g. an 
inefficient settlement, or the disclosure of confidential information, or merely 
negatively affecting the reputation of a rival). Even if this part of the analysis 
does not produce a final “figure” in terms of net benefits, it is a way more useful 
approach to enable an informed political judgment than merely imagining a 
world with more effective private enforcement – regardless of how this world is 
achieved – and then check whether this world would be better for the European 
society.  
The two most important reasons why the European Commission (despite the 
fact that the team that was following the study was perhaps the most competent 
one I have ever worked with) was placing more emphasis on quantification of 
abstract impacts over the modeling of human behavior were: (i) the need to 
prove net benefits before the Impact Assessment Board; and (ii) the fact that 
modeling human behavior would have been impossible, if the Commission had 
relied on standard impact assessment tools such as cost-benefit analysis: in 
order to model human behavior, you need a law and economics approach. To 
put it simply, the main difference between the two approaches is that the law 
and economics approach, instead of providing a cost-benefit analysis upfront, 
assumes that players involved will adopt certain actions if a cost-benefit analysis 
will suggest them to do so.  
We based our law and economics on two main formulas, which represented the 
incentives of the main players involved. First, we described the ex ante incentive 
of an undertaking that is about to decide whether to infringe competition law or 
not, to see whether private enforcement would add to the “deterrence” of 
competition law compared to the status quo and the baseline scenarios. Second, 
we used a formula to describe the victim’s incentive to sue for damage 
compensation.  
As regards the incentive to infringe the law, a decisional model based on 
benefit-cost analysis had already been developed by many scholars, especially as 
regards the decision whether to form a (or join an existing) cartel. The theory of 
optimal fines, which can be traced back to Becker’s early writings, depicts a 
world in which the impossibility to achieve a reasonably high probability of 
detection leads to the setting of too high fines, which would prove too 
burdensome for infringers that are actually convicted. In this respect, private 
enforcement effectively acts as a complement to public enforcement in a 
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second-best context, where the optimal solution is impossible to achieve. In our 
impact study, we proved that private antitrust enforcement contributes to more 
effective deterrence by: (i) increasing the probability of detection; and (ii) 
increasing the infringer’s prospective liability by adding expected damage 
awards to the prospective fines imposed by public enforcers – depending on 
whether a private suit is stand-alone or follow-on.  
For example, a cartelist in a jurisdiction with both public and private 
enforcement would face the following benefit-cost calculation: 
 
E(L) = pgcgE(F) + ppcpE(S) + E(R) 
 
Thus, the expected liability faced ex ante by a cartelist is the sum of expected 
public penalties (E(F)), expected private damage settlements (E(S)) and 
expected (negative) reputational effects (E(R)). This also implies that if the 
probability of detection with private and public enforcement is greater than 
under pure public enforcement – and the prospective damage award is 
significant – then deterrence can be achieved more effectively with both private 
and public enforcement.  
A simple example would help in clarifying this point. Let 15% be the 
detection/conviction rate under pure public enforcement (pgcg), and 10% the 
additional detection/conviction rate with private enforcement (ppcp). Further, 
assume that the prospective settlement value totals 100 million, whereas the 
expected fine would not be greater than 50 million. This being the case, the 
deterrence effect contribution under both public and private enforcement would 
be 1.33 times greater than under pure public enforcement. A widely 
acknowledged tenet in the literature on optimal fines is that, given the 
impossibility to raise fines over certain levels, an increase in the probability of 
detection is more important than the increase in the amount of fines and 
sanctions in order to achieve more effective deterrence of anticompetitive 
conduct. Absent this finding, public and private enforcement do not differ 
noticeably in terms of deterrence potential, and the only advantage of private 
over public enforcement would lie in the greater potential for corrective justice.  
Several refinements are needed in order to approximate this very simple model 
to reality. In order to provide a more detailed assessment of the probability that 
a conduct is detected and the victim actually decides to sue, an additional 
formula had to be specified, which looked at the issue from the standpoint of the 
would-be claimant.  
Assume that the prospective costs for a plaintiff are the opportunity cost of time 
spent in litigation (OCt) or settlement (OCs), costs of access to courts (AC) and – 
depending on the fee allocation rule chosen – legal costs for litigation (LCt) and 
settlement (LCs). Expected rewards are the damages claimed (D), times the 
probability of winning at trial (w), and the expected settlement amount (S), 
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times the probability to settle the claim before trial (1 – p).355 The plaintiff will 
then sue whenever 
 
(1)                    p[wD – (OCt + LCt + AC)] + (1 – p)[S – (OCs + LCs)] > 0 
 
where OCs < OCt; LCs < LCt;  and S < D.356 In other words, the plaintiff’s net 
expected reward from filing suit has two main components: the reward from 
settlement and the reward from trial. The relative weight of these two 
components, of course, depends on the (perceived) likelihood of settlement and 
trial.  
Based on the formula above, we considered the impact that different procedural 
rules or damage multiples can exert on the plaintiff’s incentive to sue. For 
example: 
x Multiple damages increase the incentive to sue, as they increase D.  
x A reversal of the burden of proof in favor of the plaintiff increases the 
incentives to sue, alongside with w.  
x A one-way fee-shifting rule increases incentives to sue, as it removes LCt and 
AC from the equation.  
x All the rules that increase the probability of victory for the plaintiff (w) or 
increase the prospective cost of the defendant, in turn, have the effect of 
increasing the probability that the case will settle (1 – p), and also the 
settlement amount (S). 
x All means of funding private litigation increase the probability that the 
plaintiff will sue, of course, as they would reduce or eliminate LCt and AC.  
The plaintiff’s decision to sue depends in primis on her subjective perception of 
p, w and S. With imperfect information and behavioral bias, several cases may 
arise, including cases in which the plaintiff overestimates the probability of 
winning at trial (w), or the plaintiff mistakenly estimates the probability of 
settling the case (1 - p). The defendant’s expected reaction is also important for 
the plaintiff’s decision. If the defendant signals her nature of “tough negotiator”, 
the plaintiff may overestimate p, and may refrain from suing in order to avoid a 
costly and lengthy litigation. 
Now, while the reader interested in the law and economics analysis of private 
antitrust enforcement is warmly invited to visit the European Commission’s 
                                                   
355 The expected reward can also be different from the damage award. For example, it could be a 
settlement that takes place at some time prior to the trial, or include an increase in the 
plaintiff’s business reputation.  
356 We assume that both the opportunity cost of litigation and the legal fees paid for litigating the 
case are greater than in the case of settlement. Consideration of time is also important, as 
the legal fees are to be paid upfront, whereas damages are awarded after the case has been 
adjudicated or settled. 
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website where the final impact study is posted357, in this Thesis I wish to focus 
on a tiny fraction of what we learned during that heroic effort.  
Using the two formulas above and several contributions in the law and 
economics literature, including the literature on multi-stage litigation, on fee-
shifting rules, on discovery abuse, limitation periods and many others, we could 
provide the policymakers with a (qualitative) indication of the expected impact 
of certain rules on deterrence, on corrective justice, on the risk of frivolous suits, 
on potential costs in terms of legal expenses, administrative burdens and even 
harmonization costs that would be borne by Member States in case a procedural 
change was introduced. We then wrapped all these results into composite 
scenarios, and developed methodologies to compare “bundles of options” based 
on a qualitative scorecard analysis, which was eventually praised by the Impact 
Assessment Board358. The discussion in the European Parliament led to an 
unexpected vote: a good impact assessment had significantly strengthened the 
persuasive power of the Commission vis-à-vis an inevitably skeptical 
Parliament.  
Which were the real questions to be answered in the Impact Assessment on 
private antitrust enforcement? Not the ones that a typical US RIA would look at. 
It was way more useful, for a policymaker, to know which specific impacts could 
be expected in the incentives of individual players after the introduction of a 
number of legal changes, rather than knowing what the potential welfare impact 
of a more effective system would be. Policy action requires a direction, and 
whenever individual incentives are at stake, law and economics is of invaluable 
help to policymakers. The impact assessment on private antitrust damages 
actions proved exactly this: law and economics is superior to cost-benefit 
analysis whenever legal rules are expected to model individual behavior. The 
better the law and economics approach used, the more useful will the impact 
assessment be.  
A corollary of this conclusion can also be related to our discussion of 
distributional impacts in Section 3 above. Given the difficulty of evaluating and 
aggregating individual preferences and the limits of methodological 
individualism in Kaldor-Hicks benefit-cost analysis, simply estimating the 
additional deterrence and the income transfer that would occur under more 
effective private enforcement says very little on the actual welfare impact of this 
state of the world compared to the baseline. Simply knowing what the potential 
magnitude of compensated damages would be is merely a communication tool, 
which adds very little to the soundness of the economic analysis – it would lends 
itself to “knowing the price of everything and the value of nothing” critique. To 
the contrary, knowing that (i) a combination of legal changes can increase the 
attractiveness of a meritorious lawsuit, thus increasing both deterrence and 
compensation; (ii) that frivolous lawsuits would not be significantly encouraged, 
and; (iii) that associated costs, including one-off costs of changing national legal 
                                                   
357  See Renda et al. (2008), supra note 21. 
358  The IA on private antitrust damages actions features several times in the list of best 
practices available at Annex 14 of the Commission’s Impact Assessment guidelines. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/commission_guidelines/best_pract_lib_en.htm.  
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rules, would not be prohibitive is exactly what political decision-makers need to 
convince themselves and their constituencies that moving to the new regime is 
worth. In our example, this meant for the European Commission the proposal of 
a new set of rules which entails a discretionary one-way fee-shifting rule, two 
forms of collective action rules (including an unprecedented “opt-out” 
representative action), more relaxed rules on access to evidence and provisions 
on limitation periods. Other scenarios were considered to be viable, but either 
too risky or costly, or ineffective compared to the goal set, i.e. making 
meritorious antitrust damages actions more effective in the EU.  
5.4 Distributional issues and the 2007 roaming regulation 
Professors of EU law normally have a fistful of ready-made examples to show 
the added value of the EU Internal Market. And this happens quite often also to 
EU politicians, such as the President of the European Commission or the 
various Commissioners. Besides the simplification of cross-border bank 
transfers between EU member states, perhaps the only other straightforward 
example is the regulation of wholesale roaming tariffs, a very ambitious project 
of the European Commission that saw the light in 2007, with the first regulation 
that set a cap on both wholesale and retail tariffs applied by mobile operators in 
the EU27. With the “roaming regulation”, European citizens are much less 
exposed to outrageous mobile phone bills when travelling to another Member 
State of the European Union. 
Needless to say, such an important regulation from 2007 was subject to a 
detailed impact assessment – one of those IAs that are quoted as “best 
practices” among the more than 500 IAs completed so far by the European 
Commission359. Even more importantly, the IA contained an apparently 
sophisticated cost-benefit analysis, which also incorporated a sensitivity 
analysis, i.e. the Commission used three possible measures of demand elasticity 
to calculate what the reaction of end users to lower roaming tariffs would be. As 
a matter of fact, the Commission eventually applied a Kaldor-Hicks cost-benefit 
analysis and justified the adoption of a double layer of regulation – at the 
wholesale and retail level – by showing that net benefits would be maximized 
under that option compared to all alternatives.  
The Commission shows the potential impact of various policy options, from the 
status quo option to the adoption of the European Home Market Approach, 
Commissioner Reding’s initial preferred option, the regulation at wholesale 
level only, and the finally retained option (regulation at wholesale and retail 
level). The figure below reports graphically the Commission’s conclusions for 
the retained policy options.  
This description of “net benefits” portrayed by the European Commission, 
however, was telling only part of the story. Had the Commission fully taken into 
                                                   
359  Commission Staff Working Paper - Impact Assessment of Policy Options in Relation to a 
Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Roaming on Public Mobile Networks Within the Community, COM(2006) 382 final, 
SEC(2006) 925, Brussels, 12.7.2006 
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account the insights of economic theory and the law and economics approach, a 
number of hidden impacts might have surfaced. Below, I try to illustrate the 
problem shortly.  
The market for international roaming featured very peculiar characteristics 
compared to the total mobile telecoms market: only 147 million users out of 
approximately 450 million European citizens were involved in that market in 
2006; 75% of those users (110 million) were business customers, whose bill was 
most likely paid by their employers. The remaining 25% were mostly frequent 
leisure travelers and relatively wealthy consumers. Accordingly, the European 
Commission acknowledged that, with policy actions to cut roaming charges, 
some customers would have benefitted more than others. In other words, 
distributional impacts might have surfaced.  
“Mobile services are consumed by many different types of 
customers. As a result of regulation, will some groups be made 
better off than others? Obviously, the customer segment benefiting 
most from a reduction in roaming charges will be high-frequency 
roamers. With many customers rarely or never consuming roaming 
services (66% of all mobile customers never roam according to A.T. 
Kearney), the welfare gains of high-frequency roamers would be 
substantial, as they would be able to reap the overwhelming part of 
the resulting changes in consumer surplus (see analysis of 
preceding sections). Other things being equal, it is to be expected 
that business customers who currently are not on large-scale 
competitive contracts (as would be the case for most SMEs), high-
frequency leisure travellers and people living in border regions 
would profit most from a reduction in roaming charges”360. 
Figure21–netbenefitsofretailandwholesalecapping
 
Source: Commission Impact Assessment, SEC (2006) 925, 12 July 2006 
 
                                                   
360  Id., Section 4.3.3, at 53.  
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When we look at the results of the cost-benefit analysis, are we sure that the 
redistribution of income from firms to consumers will be neutral from the 
standpoint of social welfare? And, even more importantly, are we sure that the 
“delta consumer surplus” does not hide income transfers between consumers? 
More sound economics would have led the Commission to notice the following 
potential impacts. First, in the economics of mobile telephony a prominent role 
is played by the so-called “waterbed effect”361: based on this effect, mobile 
operators tend to redistribute revenues by setting above-cost prices for services 
that face a relatively rigid demand, and by setting below-cost, aggressive prices 
for other services where they face strong competition. Especially in the context 
of the EU27, where the calling-party-pays principle is applied and termination 
rates are everywhere regulated, mobile operators compete aggressively by trying 
to attract customers through generous handset subsidies and very aggressive 
domestic tariff plans. On the other hand they charge roamers above cost.  
Based on the above, one would expect that, if mobile operators compete 
aggressively to attract customers in EU member states, then any regulation of 
wholesale and retail roaming charges would lead those companies to face some 
loss, or to cut R&D costs, or to increase the only tariffs that are not regulated 
(i.e., retail domestic tariffs). If this really happens, we would end up in a rather 
odd situation: a price regulation of roaming charges would favor business 
customers and rich leisure customers, but may significantly harm either mobile 
operators (if they sustain a loss), or end customers (if there is reduced 
innovation due to cuts in R&D expenditure, or even more directly if domestic 
prices increase).  
The Commission seems to acknowledge this possibility in the Impact 
Assessment: 
“To the extent that overall revenues of the mobile industry would 
come down as a result of regulation under some of the policy 
options, and to the extent that the revenue streams affected would 
be particularly high-margin ones, other things being equal it is 
reasonable to assume some reduction of investment … 
… It is reasonable to assume that while at the margin some 
rebalancing of tariffs will occur, a general increase in the price level 
for other services, given intense competition in major markets, is 
highly unlikely”362.  
                                                   
361  The “waterbed effect” is the effect whereby regulation of one of the prices of a multiproduct 
firm causes one or more of its other unregulated prices to change as a result of the firm’s 
profit-maximizing behavior. The term “waterbed effect” was used for the first time in 1997 
during an investigation of the British Monopolies and Mergers Commission, and was 
extensively recalled in the debate over the regulation of mobile termination rates and also 
during the recent debate on the regulation of wholesale and retail roaming charges in the 
European Union since 2007. Genakos and Valletti (2008) provide a survey of the literature 
and empirical data on the existence of the waterbed effect in the EU mobile industry, which 
they find to be strong. See Genakos, Christos and Valletti, Tommaso M., Testing the 
'Waterbed' Effect in Mobile Telephony (January 2008). CEIS Working Paper No. 110. 
362  Commission Impact Assessment, supra note 359, at 52.  
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Accordingly, it is fair to state that, while drafting the impact assessment 
document, the Commission was aware of the following facts: (i) that the mobile 
sector was highly competitive; (ii) that regulating roaming would create some 
reduction of investment in this highly dynamic sector – a key sector for the 
competitiveness of the EU economy; and (iii) that even some rebalancing of 
tariffs, with a potential increase of domestic retail tariffs, could occur, but the 
intense competition between mobile operators would have kept such increase at 
a minimum.  
However, this consideration did not change the Commission’s final decision as 
to which policy option was to be preferred. As a result, the impact assessment 
contained a pure resourcist cost-benefit analysis, which ignored the fact that the 
policy option would have favored business and rich leisure customers, 
potentially to the detriment of ordinary users. In this specific case, the European 
Commission failed to take distributional issues into due account when crafting 
future policy interventions: and by providing a cost-benefit analysis which looks 
merely at a static vision of the “size of the pie” to judge whether a policy 
proposal must be considered preferable to alternatives, or not. Interestingly, the 
consultation run by the European Commission on the 2007 Roaming regulation 
led to a finding that was in line with the waterbed effect: operators were relying 
on revenues from retail SMS tariffs to partly compensate the lost revenues in 
voice. This led to an extension of the roaming regulation to SMS and data 
services in 2008: but in the new Impact Assessment, the potential negative 
impacts on innovation and on domestic prices are not even mentioned. A 
consultation was run by the Commission in 2008 to find out, i.a. about the 
possible increase in domestic prices following the 2007 roaming regulation. The 
result reported by the Commission was that “it would be very difficult to 
pinpoint any increase in domestic tariffs directly due to the introduction of the 
Regulation”. In addition, the group of European Regulators observed that “it is 
unlikely that domestic mobile prices will rise, because they are the main focus of 
competition for consumers”. Again, no mention was given to the potential 
impact that the regulation might exert on R&D and innovation in a sector that is 
considered to be highly competitive, yet is regulated with various instruments 
and tools and in a number of different markets.   
To sum up, the roaming regulation provides a good example of cost-benefit 
analysis that misguides policymakers as it willingly neglects distributional 
issues. A closer look at the short-term and dynamic effects of the regulation 
might have suggested a different policy conclusion.  
5.5 The very strange case of large exposure reporting 
When, in May 2009, the European Parliament passed a legislative statement for 
“New rules to avoid future financial crisis” – which proposed stricter rules on 
large exposure reporting to save Europe from the risk of future credit crunches 
– many eyebrows went up in the Brussels community363. Such a strange destiny, 
                                                   
363  See the Press release of the European Parliament. At http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
sides/getDoc.do?type=IM-PRESS&reference=20090505IPR55119& language=EN. 
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that of large exposure reporting: to understand why, you have to look a couple 
of years back.  
Large exposure reporting is a prudential measure that is in force for a 
compelling reason: in cases where financial institutions are widely exposed to a 
single client, they could incur large losses as a result of the failure of an 
individual client or a group of connected clients. The same can happen when 
banks trade their exposures between themselves: the failure of one institution 
can cause the failure of others. Rules on large exposure reporting were 
introduced in the European Union with Council Directive 92/121/EEC of 21 
December 1992 on the monitoring and control of large exposures of credit 
institutions. Later, these rules were included in the (in)famous “Basel II” 
package: Art. 110 (1) of Dir. 2006/48 prescribed that a credit institution shall 
report every large exposure to the competent authorities; likewise, Article 30 (2) 
Dir 2006/49 prescribed that institutions’ overall exposures to individual clients 
and groups of connected clients calculated in accordance with paragraph 4 shall 
be reported in accordance with Article 110 of Directive 2006/48/EC364.  
Back in 2004-2005, when the Basel II package was being prepared by the 
European Commission, EU institutions seemed to believe in the salvific virtues 
of large exposure reporting obligations. This, at least, is what can be inferred 
from the wording of the Impact Assessment on the Capital Adequacy Directive, 
drafted by the European Commission in support of its “Basel II” proposals in 
2004365. There, the Commission could count on as many as three “Quantitative 
Impact Studies” (termed QIS1, QIS2 and QIS3 in the Impact Assessment) and 
one additional study by PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC). Compared to the 
former studies, the latter was more optimistic as regards the extent to which 
“Basel II” rules could protect Europe from future financial crises. The 
Commission opted for this optimistic vision and reported that “PWC’s study 
observes that even if no regulatory regime is able to completely eliminate the 
possibility for banking crisis, the new framework should nevertheless help 
reduce the frequency of such incidents”366. 
At the same time, the industry was way more skeptical about the possibility of 
creating a viable system of large exposure reporting. For example, the  industry-
led “Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group II” (CRMPG II) Report in 
2005 considered “the question of whether some form of a large-exposure 
regulatory reporting system directed at regulated financial institutions might 
play a constructive role in helping to better anticipate and mitigate systemic 
                                                   
364  Member States shall provide that reporting is to be carried out, at their discretion, in 
accordance with one of the following two methods: (a) reporting of all large exposures at 
least once a year, combined with reporting during the year of all new large exposures and 
any increases in existing large exposures of at least 20% with respect to the previous 
communication; or (b) reporting of all large exposures at least four times a year. 
365  SEC (2004)921, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast), 14 July 
2007, http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/ia_carried_out/docs/ia_2004/sec_2004_0921_en.pdf. 
366  Id. at 30. 
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risks”367. The report warned that “the members of the Policy Group are keenly 
aware of the formidable and practical challenges associated with designing and 
implementing an efficient and effective framework of large-exposure reporting 
requirements”. Nevertheless, they concluded that “if an effective system of 
large-exposure reporting could be created, the potential benefits of such a 
system could be significant”. 
These were still happy days for the banking sector, and also for large exposure 
reporting. However, quite soon the simplification wave of the “Barroso I” 
Commission hit also this prudential rule. In April 2007, the European 
Commission asked me to look at the administrative burdens generated by the 
large exposure regime as provided by Directives 48/2006 and 49/2006.  They 
also added that the view of the banking sector was that the rule should be 
relaxed, if not eliminated: and the Commission was interested in exploring this 
avenue, since it had just promised to cut administrative burdens by 25% before 
the end of 2012.  
So, in 2007 part of the European Commission was open to the possibility of 
eliminating those same rules that stood as a safeguard against the risk of future 
financial crises. In mid-2007, my team and I started applying the Standard Cost 
Model to find out about the cost of this legal provision for the banking sector368. 
This implied, i.a. organizing face-to-face and telephone interviews to gather 
information about the amount of time spent in complying with the major 
information obligations connected with large exposure reporting369. What we 
found was shocking. Many of the (then) bigger banks told us that the system 
was not working for two very simple reasons. First, the banks themselves had 
very limited knowledge of their overall risk exposure, since the market was not 
generating sufficient information on the existence of toxic assets, and they were 
not able to value structured financial products. Second, the banks knew that, 
regardless of how incomplete their information was on their own large 
exposure, supervisory authorities were even less aware of the level of risk 
exposure in their national markets: accordingly, they could report whatever they 
wanted, and supervisory authorities would not have been able to check.  
This problem entered the public domain shortly thereafter, in the summer of 
2007, when BNP Paribas froze redemptions for three investment funds, citing 
                                                   
367  Toward Greater Financial Stability: A Private Sector Perspective, The Report of the CRMPG 
II, July 27, 2005. Available online at http://www.isda.org/educat/pdf/CRMPGII_7-22-
05_FINAL_v6_wcover.pdf 
368  For a full description of the Standard Cost Model, see Boeheim, Renda at al. (2006), Pilot 
Project on Administrative Burdens, Report for the European Commission, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/better-regulation/files/pilot-study_en.pdf.  
369  The information obligations identified were: (1) Reporting of large exposures to competent 
authorities; (2) Keeping records concerning non-/less often-reported large exposures for 
inspection by competent authorities; (3) Reporting of exposures exceeding large exposure 
limits; (4) Application for authorization to have funded credit protection recognized in the 
context of the limits of Art. 111; (5) Reporting on results of stress-testing to public 
authorities; (6) Reporting on transfers having the effect of avoiding the additional capital 
requirements; and (7) Reporting significant findings on possible concentrations among 
collateral issuers.  
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its inability to value structured products370. This led to a huge increase in 
counterparty risk, as testified by the soaring rates charged by banks to each 
other for short-term loans371. A few months after, the failures of European banks 
– starting with Northern Rock and Landesbank Sachsen – testified that 
something, in the European rules that should have prevented contagion, had 
failed. The rest is history. 
While performing my contractual obligations for the European Commission, I 
realized that there was very little that the Standard Cost Model (SCM) could do 
to help policymakers solve the structural failure of the EU large exposure 
regime, let alone the fact that the European Commission’s prominent interest at 
that time was not to improve its functioning, but rather to repeal the system 
altogether (or at least, drastically simplify it).  
First, the SCM only looks at certain categories of costs (administrative burdens), 
and does not consider benefits at all. This, in turn, means that the SCM does not 
provide adequate guidance on whether, in trying to reduce administrative 
burdens, policymakers are also achieving the highly undesirable result of cutting 
benefits to an even larger extent372. At the same time, the SCM does not help 
policymakers find out whether, along with a reduction in administrative 
burdens, a simplification proposal would also increase enforcement cost for 
public authorities, thus simply shifting costs from one side to the other. This 
would certainly have been the case of large exposure reporting obligations: if 
banks do not report anymore, supervisory authorities will have to collect the 
needed information through inspections and stronger enforcement: if they are 
less informed than the banks themselves, this may also represent a net 
additional cost for society – although banks, overall, will be left better off by the 
simplification of large exposure reporting, at least in the short term.  
Second, there was not much the SCM could do to save European banks from the 
failure of the large exposure reporting system. As a matter of fact, the SCM 
assumes 100% compliance: even if I had collected information on the egregious 
lack of compliance with the requirements of the rule, I had to report the cost 
associated with the system as if all banks were fully complying with its 
requirements.  
Was this sound policymaking? Between overly optimistic impact assessments, 
lack of compliance with the rules, and perhaps a bad design of the rules 
themselves, there was plenty for commentators and scholars to complain about. 
In my opinion, a more sound approach to the design and the performance of the 
legal provisions on large exposure reporting would have helped EU 
policymakers craft better rules and shield more effectively European banks from 
                                                   
370  Brunnermeier, M.K. (2009). Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 23(1), 77–100. 
371  For an illustration, see European Commission, Economic Crisis in Europe: Causes, 
Consequences and Responses, European Economy 7, 2009, at 21. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication15887_en.pdf.  
372  See Allio, L. and A. Renda, Evaluation of Administrative Burden Reduction Programmes 
and their Impacts, Report for OECD Cutting Red Tape II series, forthcoming. 
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the dramatic contagion that has left many European countries in dire straits. 
Below, I outline some basic principles of this sound approach. 
First, a legal rule is efficiently and effectively designed only if it can be efficiently 
and effectively enforced. This is an often ignored principle in policymaking, and 
this depends mostly on the fact that the implementation and enforcement 
phases are normally neglected tout court in ex ante impact assessment. If 
legislators had looked more in-depth at the incentives of the key players affected 
by the large exposure reporting rules, they would have spotted in the first place 
that the asymmetric information between banks and their supervisors 
warranted a different treatment of large exposure, and potentially a more 
standardized, internationally coordinated approach to the identification of risk 
thresholds and capital adequacy rules that can lead to a more stable – better, a 
more resilient – financial infrastructure. No trace of such an approach was 
found in the work of major EU and US institutions before and during the crisis.  
Second, instead of shopping around for simplification opportunities, the 
European Commission should have explored resilience opportunities. Faced 
with evidence of limited compliance with the system and excessive 
fragmentation of the legal regimes, the Commission should have first of all 
answered the question: why is there so limited compliance with large exposure 
reporting obligations? The causes of non-compliance were the same causes that 
led to the spread of the credit crunch in European banks. In this respect, the 
application of principles of “responsive regulation”, as theorized by Ian Ayres 
and John Braithwaite, would have led to a much better and earlier 
understanding of where systemic weaknesses and failures lied in the European 
prudential regulation for the banking sector373.  
Third, the strange case of large exposure reporting is also a case of excessive 
faith in the market. The idea that markets could keep risk exposure to 
sustainable levels, given that financial intermediaries and gatekeepers such as 
credit rating agencies had countervailing interests compared to more risky asset 
holders was fundamentally undermined by the massive use of structured 
finance, coupled with very badly designed governance arrangements, especially 
as far as rating agencies were concerned. Once and again, this was an additional 
proof that in some cases, the invisible hand of the market leads to very visible 
disasters, and that regulation, if effectively and efficiently designed to affect the 
incentives of key market players, is the only way to salvation. Put differently, the 
financial crisis of these past few years perfectly illustrates the case for public 
policy that departs from the mere short-term interest of affected stakeholders: if 
you had asked bankers what their willingness to pay would be for stricter and 
more effective prudential rules before the crisis, they would have said nil. An ex 
ante impact assessment that assessed the benefit of such an option based on 
stated preferences would have largely failed to spot its usefulness and efficiency. 
Once again, since resilience is a public good, policymakers are called to depart 
from the mere satisfaction of stakeholders’ individual preferences when crafting 
future rules: as for other critical infrastructure, resilience of the financial sector 
                                                   
373 See Ayres and Braithwaite (1992), cit.  
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is crucial to the sustainable development of our economies374. Current cost-
benefit analysis practices are not sufficient to lead us to the most sustainable 
path today.  
To get back from where I began this story, this is why eyebrows went up when 
the European Parliament announced a proposal for stricter large exposure 
reporting rules. No one questions that such rules are potentially very important 
to ensure the stability of EU financial markets: to the contrary, the emphasis on 
the need for stricter rules in this field reflects a remarkable change in the 
regulatory approach between pre- and post-crisis periods. But the European 
Parliament seemed to have passed that legislative proposal without knowing 
that large exposure reporting rules had been part of the EU acquis for seventeen 
years; that failure to implement them had been a major cause of the “European 
contagion”; and that failure to account for individual incentives had been a 
major cause of that problem. Looking more closely, the legislative proposal by 
the European Parliament simply stated that “a bank would not be able to expose 
more than 25% of its own funds to a client or a group of clients” and that 
“exceeding this threshold will only be possible for exposure between credit 
institutions and for not more than Euro 150 million”. Is this going to save us 
“again” from future crises, just like the previous regime? 
5.6 Who protects consumers from consumer protection? The 
European Commission and retail financial services 
Achieving strong consumer protection has been one of the most active policy 
commitments of EU institutions since the 1980s, with the debate on standard 
form contracts that led to the enactment of Directive 93/13 on unfair clauses in 
consumer contracts. In light of the evolution of the law and economics 
literature, the attention of policymakers around the world has shifted gradually 
from a formalistic approach, focused on the moment in which unfair clauses are 
enshrined into the final contractual document, to a more behavioral approach, 
aimed at capturing information manipulation by service providers to the 
detriment of less informed consumers. In 2005, the Directive on Unfair 
Commercial Practices (UCPD) focused on the pre-contractual phase and aimed 
at contrasting misleading and aggressive behavior that affects the formation of 
the consumer’s will375. This second-generation consumer protection tried to 
incorporate the findings of behavioral economics, which pointed at the pre-
contractual phase as the moment in which the structural asymmetries between 
businesses and consumers could lead to sub-optimal and sometimes tragic 
choices on the side of consumers. This more holistic approach to consumer 
                                                   
374  See Renda, A. (Rapporteur), Critical Infrastructure Protection in the European Union, 
CEPS Task Force Report, December 2010, available online at 
http://www.ceps.eu/book/protecting-critical-infrastructure-eu.  
375  Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 
concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and 
amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 149, 11.6.2005, p. 22–39. 
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policy is well summarized by recent definitions, which refer to consumer policy 
as “preventing sellers from increasing sales by lying about their products or by 
engaging in unfair practices such as unilateral breach of contract or 
unauthorized billing”376; and chiefly aimed at preventing, curing or remedying: 
“(i) duress and undue sales pressure; (ii) information problems pre-purchase; 
and (iii) undue surprises post-purchase”377. 
In addition, the new wave of consumer legislation tried to adopt a wiser 
approach to the protection of consumers: on the one hand, the “maximum 
harmonization” clause aimed at the achievement of the internal market and, at 
the same time, the avoidance of unnecessarily strict rules in some countries378; 
on the other hand, the behavioral approach marked a departure from previous 
legislative initiatives, which ended up imposing additional costs on the industry 
and, consequently, also on final consumer prices. This, in turn, tried to remedy 
the concerns of several academics, who during the 1990s often repeated “who 
protects consumers from consumer protection?”379 
The more behavioral economics permeated the mainstream approach to 
consumer protection, the more retail financial services began to appear as a 
peculiar policy domain, warranting ad hoc treatment. This was partly due to the 
fact that nowhere as in this field, the informational asymmetry between the 
financial service provider and the individual customer can determine the latter’s 
unwanted exposure to financial risk. Given that in retail financial services, 
decisions under risk and ambiguity are the norm, the European Commission 
started to consider that a stricter approach could be warranted in this field, 
compared to all other fields of business-to-consumer contracts. Needless to say, 
the explosion of the subprime mortgage crisis confirmed the Commission’s view 
that the retail financial services sector was a unique one, to be kept under strict 
supervision. Behavioral economists have gained in importance since the 
inception of the crisis, claiming that a more behavioral (and interventionist) 
approach would have helped avoiding the crisis altogether380. And even Cass 
Sunstein and Richard Thaler decided to add a post scriptum in their latest 
edition of Nudge, advocating a nuanced approach to consumer protection in 
                                                   
376  Muris, T. (2002), The Interface of Competition and Consumer Protection, Paper presented 
at Fordham Corporate Law Institute’s 29th Annual Conference on International Antitrust 
Law and Policy, New York (Oct. 31, 2002). See also Armstrong (2008). Interaction between 
Competition and Consumer Policy, a report for the OFT, OFT 991. 
377  Vickers, J. (2004), Economics for Consumer Policy, 125 Proc. Brit. Acad. 287-310, 289. 
378  See, i.a., Mak, V. (2008), Review of the Consumer Acquis - Towards Maximum 
Harmonisation?, TICOM Working Paper on Comparative and Transnational Law No. 
2008/6; European Review of Private Law, 1/2009.  
379  See, i.a., Van den Bergh, R.J. (1997), Wer schützt die europäischen Verbraucher vor dem 
Brüsseler Verbraucherschutz? Zu den möglichen adversen Effekten der europäischen 
Richtlinien zum Schutze des Verbrauchers’, in C. Ott und H.-B. Schaefer (eds.) Effiziente 
Verhaltenssteuerung und Kooperation im Zivilrecht (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 1997) 77-
102. A typical example is that of the Directive on the Sale of Goods and Associated 
Guarantees. Directive 99/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 
1999 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees.  
380  See in particular Shiller, R. (2008), The Subprime Solution, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
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investment decisions, based on transparency and disclosure requirements, 
coupled with the public provision of information381.  
In all this, the European Commission had already paved the way for such a 
separate treatment. The UCPD clarified that the maximum harmonization 
clause applied to all economic sectors, but not to retail financial services382. At 
the same time, the Commission (DG Competition) launched a sectoral inquiry 
on the retail financial services sector in June 2005, pursuant to Article 17 of 
Regulation (EC) No 1/2003383. The inquiry, opened in June 2005 and closed in 
2007, highlighted a low level of mobility of European customers384. Amongst 
the main factors identified as reducing customer mobility in the sector’s inquiry, 
were the cross-selling and conditioning of banking products, which were found 
to be widespread across EU Member States385. Following the sector inquiry, a 
Green Paper on Retail Financial Services in the Single Market was adopted386, 
accompanied by the launch of a public consultation. On the specific issue of 
tying, responses stressed the reduction of price transparency, making it more 
difficult for consumers to compare offers387. The overall results of this 
consultation were finally included in the Single Market Review adopted in 
November 2007388. The latter recalls the potential anti-competitive harm 
resulting from tying practices, issues raised within the sector inquiry and the 
Green Paper consultation. Several effects are likely to restrict customer choice, 
by altering price transparency and/or raising switching costs; in other cases, 
conducts may hamper competition on the market by discouraging the entry of 
new players. 
Since then, the cross-selling (“tying”) of retail financial services has become the 
enemy to beat. And in the middle of the financial crisis, in early 2008, the 
                                                   
381  See Sunstein and Thaler (2008), Nudge, cit. supra note 3, at 255-260.  
382  As stated in Recital 9 and prescribed in Article 3(9), specifically for financial services (and 
for immovable property), the UCPD is “without prejudice to the right of Member States to 
go beyond its provisions to protect the economic interests of consumers”; accordingly, 
“Member States may impose requirements which are more restrictive or prescriptive than 
this Directive in the field which it approximates”. 
383  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 04.01.2003, p. 1-
25. See Section 1.3 below for a detailed illustration of the scope and results of the sectoral 
inquiry. 
384  Two types of indicators illustrate customer mobility. They are referred as “churn” and 
“longevity”. See European Commission, Interim report II : Current accounts and related 
services, Sector Inquiry under Article 17 Regulation 1/2003 on retail banking, 17 July 2006. 
385  For instance nearly two third (63%) of European banks require SMEs seeking a loan to also 
open a current account. See Report on the Retail Banking Sector Inquiry. 
386  See European Commission, Green Paper on Retail Financial Services in the Single Market, 
COM(2007) 226 final, 30 April 2007. 
387  See European Commission, Summary of the written contributions received on the Green 
Paper on retail financial services, 18 September 2007. The full text is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/docs/baeg/summary_consultation_en.pdf. 
388  See European Commission, Staff working document, accompanying the document ‘A single 
market for the 21st century Europe’, Initiatives in the area of retail financial services, 
SEC(2007) 1520, 20 November 2007. 
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Commission launched an external study to assess the welfare impact of the 
persistence of tying and other “potentially unfair” commercial practices in the 
field of retail financial services. The objective of the Commission was essentially 
to verify whether the case could be made for ad hoc policy measures aimed at 
banning tying in this specific field of the economy: if the study had made such a 
case, then the Commission could have exploited the exception to the maximum 
harmonization rule in the UCPD to mandate such prohibition.  
As a matter of fact, this was a rather strange policy issue. On the one hand, in 
the United States mainstream law and economics had led to abandoning a per 
se ban on tying in antitrust cases already in 1984, with Jefferson Parish 
Hospital District. Since 2005, the European Commission had repeatedly 
signaled its intention to move to a more effects-based approach to tying as a 
potential exclusionary abuse in antitrust: such an approach would then be 
formalized with the Guidance Paper on the treatment of exclusionary abuses 
under Article 82 EC Treaty (now 102 TFEU).389 In other words, in antitrust, 
tying was being increasingly considered as a lawful conduct, to be challenged by 
antitrust authorities only under specific circumstances. On the other hand, the 
European Commission was looking at the possibility of applying a per se rule on 
tying regardless of the market power held by the financial institution that 
engaged in this practice. The paradoxical result would have been that what was 
considered in principle lawful under Community competition law would have 
been subject to a per se rule under sectoral consumer protection legislation.  
As odd as it might seem, this is what happened. The study was delivered to the 
Commission by a group of external researchers at the end of 2009390. Among 
the main findings of the study was that tying can increase switching costs and, 
consequently, reduce customer mobility. This effect depends also on what 
products or services are included in the bundle: for example, when products 
have different durations, the customer may be reluctant to switch to an 
alternative provider of a product with a shorter duration, even if this would be 
easy absent the tying or pure bundling practice. The lifespan of the contractual 
relationship thus tends to become equal to that of the product or service with 
the longest duration. For this reason, products such as mortgage loans are often 
used as “gateway” products by service providers wishing to retain their 
customers through cross-selling strategies.  
In addition, the study highlighted that the impact of tying on switching costs 
depends on the “thickness” of the contractual relationship391: once the customer 
has invested in a relationship with a personal banker or financial advisor, he or 
she may find it beneficial to enter into multiple contracts and services with the 
                                                   
389  See Temple Lang, J. and A. Renda (2008), Treatment of Exclusionary Abuses under 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty: Comments on the European Commission's Guidance Paper, 
Report of a CEPS Task Force, October 2008, at http://www.ceps.be/book/treatment-
exclusionary-abuses-under-article-82-ec-treaty-comments-european-commissions-
guidance.  
390  See Renda, A. et al. (2009), Tying and other potentially unfair commercial practices in the 
retail financial services sector, report for the European Commission, available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/tying/report_en.pdf.  
391  Id., In particular at Section 2.2. 
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same provider: at the same time, this also means that switching would be more 
complicated, as it would entail losing the investment associated with building a 
relationship with the service provider, and having to bear the additional cost of 
searching for an alternative one, and testing over time the quality of the new 
service provider392.  
That is, in retail financial services customers normally “love” tying. Even if it can 
reduce price transparency and price comparability, customers are reluctant to 
mix and match products by purchasing every financial service from a different 
provider. They hate mixing and matching. Accordingly, beyond offering better 
deals, competitors wishing to gain new customers would have to compensate 
them for the sunk, “transaction-specific” investment they have faced to enter the 
current contractual relationship, as well as for the risk associated with entering 
a new contract or set of contracts. This can represent an important obstacle to 
customer mobility in the market, and is a structural friction that is very difficult 
to overcome in the retail financial services market.  
The external study also revealed that price comparability is further jeopardized 
by practices such as “confusopoly”, i.e. situations where the competing offers on 
the marketplace are structured so differently that it is impossible for an average 
consumer to compare them393. But even in this case, reducing price 
transparency can help financial service providers in introducing cross-subsidies 
between different products, in particular in the case of add-on contracts: for 
example, sellers may entice customers to buy a particular product through a low 
“introductory” price, knowing that they will be able to sell a number of 
additional products once the customer has entered the relationship394. Sellers 
wishing to compete for only one of the bundled products may have to offer a 
product below their own cost in order to entice customers to switch. 
At the same time, however, there is widespread consensus that tying can also 
bring benefits for both providers and consumers, thus potentially warranting a 
rule of reason approach395. The potential beneficial effects of tying practices 
                                                   
392  A recent study for the European Commission by Decision Technology Ltd. conducted an 
online survey of 6,000 customers, which revealed that (i) consumers are often confused 
about the true nature of their investment; (ii) although investments are usually triggered by 
a change of life circumstances and not marketing, information search is very limited; (iii) 
Advice is ubiquitous in the retail investment market, with nearly 80% of investments made 
in a face-to-face setting; and (iv) trust in advisors is high – the majority of investors mostly 
or completely trust the advice they receive, and do not perceive their advisor to be biased. 
See Consumer Decision-Making in Retail Investment Services: A Behavioural Economics 
Perspective, available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/docs/final_report_en.pdf.  
393  Gans, J. (2005), The Road to Confusopoly, available on the ACCC conference website 
(slides), http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/658141/fromItemId/  
394  See Gans, J. (2005), ‘Protecting consumers by protecting competition’: Does behavioural 
economics support this contention?, 13 Competition & Consumer Law Journal. In the 
literature, this has been referred to as “acquisition pricing” or “introductory pricing”. See, 
i.a., Blattberg, Getz & Thomas (2001), Customer Equity: Building and Managing 
Relationships as Valuable Assets, Harvard business publishing, at pages 47 ff. 
395  For example, as recently explained by Choi (2004), “the welfare implications of tying 
arrangements are in general ambiguous because tying could have efficiency effects even 
when it has harmful exclusionary effects”. See Choi, J. P. (2004), Antitrust Analysis of 
Tying Arrangements, CESifo Working Paper, N. 1336, November 2004.  
190 | MISCELLANEOUS EXAMPLES 
LAW AND ECONOMICS IN THE RIA WORLD - © ANDREA RENDA 2011 
include cost savings through economies of scope, more efficient pricing 
schemes, and “portfolio effects” or “one-stop-shop” effects for customers.  
In summary, the external study found very little grounds for banning tying, as 
this would have meant depriving consumers of beneficial effects on price and 
other contractual conditions. To the contrary the study found evidence that 
other widespread practices, such as “churning” and “steering” had to be banned 
as being stereotypical cases of aggressive and misleading practices, as such 
falling inevitably under the scope of the UCPD396.  
But, for the purposes of this Thesis, the most important finding of this external 
study was a different one. Only partly conquered by behavioral economics, the 
European Commission missed the forest for the trees, and failed to see that, due 
to behavioral effects featured by relationship finance, banning tying would have 
meant nothing to customers, unless also other practices, such as mixed 
bundling and conditional rebates were also prohibited. Unless what occurs from 
a legal, contractual perspective, from a behavioral economics perspective there 
is almost no difference between offering a bundle of products tout court and 
offering a discount for the purchase of two combined products397. If the 
financial service provider presents the combined offer as “standard bank 
policy”, as is often the case i.a. for Payment Protection Insurance (PPI) sold 
together with a mortgage loan, the customer will perceive the offer almost as 
having binding force.  
Accordingly, banning tying was simply the wrong solution. Evidence from a 
survey of the EU member states confirmed that, in those countries that had 
decided to ban tying, mixed bundling had largely replaced it; and that even 
where tying was in principle feasible, banks resorted more often to mixed 
bundling: there’s no need to force customers into an unwanted tie-in, if you can 
nudge your customers into a more apparently spontaneous choice. In this 
respect, banks had invented libertarian paternalism long before Cass Sunstein.  
This tortuous story bears, in my opinion, important lessons. First, behavioral 
law and economics can teach policymakers how to avoid meaningless and 
ineffective rules. Second, banning contractual behavior that can be mutually 
beneficial is unlikely to be an efficient solution, especially in consumer policy. 
Third, other remedies – coupled with rules aimed at contrasting churning, 
                                                   
396  “Churning” is a legal term used to define a practice imported from securities regulation. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) defined it as an “excessive buying and 
selling of securities in your account by your broker, for the purpose of generating 
commissions and without regard to your investment objectives”. See i.a. A.M. Pacces, 
Financial intermediation in the securities markets law and economics of conduct of 
business regulation, International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 20, 2000, pp. 479-
510; Walter I., “Strategies in Banking and Financial Services Firms: A Survey”, December 
2003, available at www.ssrn.com. “Steering”, on the other hand, is a practice especially 
used in the mortgages market, consisting of stressing the credit risk of a potential borrower 
to steer him\her to higher cost loans. “Steering incentives” are officially prohibited in the 
US by the new Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, Sec. 103(c) H.R. 1728, 
May 2009. 
397  The difference is mostly due to the fact that, in tying, customers can be forced to purchase 
products they would not have purchased otherwise. This, in any event, did not appear as a 
widespread problem at the time the study was conducted.  
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steering and similar practices – would prove way more effective, as testified by 
the analysis of national legislation in the EU27: for example, establishing 
switching facilities and web portals for customers wishing to switch to a new 
mortgage lender, as in the Netherlands, seems way more effective than 
prohibiting tying, as in France or Belgium. And more generally, increasing the 
“public and private” production of third-party information is a better way to 
break the fiduciary tie established between consumers and their counterparts, 
rather than imposing 20-minute questionnaires as a proof that the service 
provider has checked the level of financial education and overall risk attitude of 
his client: the latter remedy, introduced by recent financial regulation such as 
the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), are so strikingly 
contrary to the findings of behavioral economics that their failure came no one’s 
surprise.   
5.7 Nudging and energy efficiency: the behavioral economics 
of cheap reforms 
Meeting the ambitious EU goals to increase energy efficiency and tackle climate 
change in the years to come is increasingly recognized as a multi-stakeholder 
effort, requiring contributions from all the actors involved. On the supply side, 
discussions have revolved around reforms that are likely to be costly for society, 
from the imposition of taxes to the creation of primary and secondary markets 
for GHG allowances, to the debate on government subsidies or other supply-
side incentives to simulate the transition towards climate-friendly technologies. 
At the same time, however, also non-price mechanisms can be put in place on 
the demand side to stimulate more energy-efficient behavior – an option that 
has been only partly explored to date, and is firmly rooted in behavioral 
economics.  
Traditionally, attempts to induce energy-efficient behavior have been only 
partly successful, especially when the overall goal of policymakers was clashing 
with established social norms. From the need to improve buildings’ insulation 
and persuading consumers to buy fluorescent light bulbs to more recent 
attempts to persuade consumers to buy hybrid cars and more energy-efficient 
appliances, results have always been less encouraging than politicians had 
hoped. Many European citizens – but results are not different in other parts of 
the world – have not taken any such measure to date, despite efforts at national 
and EU level.  
Once the most straightforward possibilities have been ruled out – for example, 
making it mandatory for producers to adopt eco-design criteria and putting all 
other products out of the market – policymakers are left only with one chance: 
changing social norms and the context of consumption decisions to “nudge” 
consumers into energy-efficient behavior. The good news is that these reforms 
are potentially viable and entirely costless; the bad news is that no such policy 
has been successfully adopted to date, leading to doubts among commentators 
and scholars as regard the feasibility of such a behavioral approach. 
Two anecdotes can illustrate the potential of nudging in achieving more energy-
efficient behavior. The first is reported by Allcott and Mullainathan (2010), who 
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describes a recent experiment run by an energy-efficiency software company 
called OPOWER, which presents itself as a group of “home energy gurus”, able 
to achieve enormous savings on the energy bill398. OPOWER partnered with 
utilities in a number of states in the US and started sending energy use reports 
to residential electricity and natural gas consumers. These reports did not only 
contain data on energy consumption, but also a comparison with similar 
households in the same area. In addition, the bill contained energy conservation 
tips. When comparing trends in energy consumption of those households that 
had received the OPOWER bill with other households, data showed a 2% energy 
consumption reduction, and greater values for high-consumption households. 
Allcott and Mullainathan (2010) observed that, scaled nationwide, “a program 
like this could reduce U.S. carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from electric power 
by 0.5 percent, while actually saving $165 per metric ton of reductions. This 
compares very favorably with other, more traditional strategies to reduce carbon 
emissions; wind power, carbon capture and storage added to new coal power 
plants, and plug-in hybrid vehicles are estimated to cost $20, $44, and $15 per 
metric ton of CO2 abated”399. 
Now, convincing households to behave more efficiently through social 
comparison and “social learning” may in principle be feasible: but how can we 
convince energy providers to convince their customers? Providers’ incentives 
might be diverging from the socially optimal level of energy consumption – after 
all, the goal of an energy provider is to make profits, not to save the earth. This 
is why research on possible policy solutions that would be likely to achieve a 
realignment of incentives has been carried out. One possibility would be to 
adopt “decoupling” solutions, as was experimentally done in some US states, 
such as Michigan and Minnesota400.  
The simple lesson that can be drawn from this brief anecdote is as revolutionary 
as it is straightforward: if one wants to fight inefficient energy consumption, one 
has to understand the social and behavioral factors that affect it. Awareness of 
the drivers of inefficient behavior is the first step towards an effective policy401. 
And social comparisons stimulate healthy virtual competition between 
individuals to perform better than average, and possibly better than their 
neighbors.  
                                                   
398  See www.opower.com.  
399  See Allcott (2010), quoting McKinsey and Company (2008). Reducing U.S. Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions: How Much and at What Cost?, available online at 
http://www.mckinsey.com/clientservice/ccsi/pdf/US_ghg_final_report.pdf 
400  See http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/08/pdf/good_jobs_new_markets.pdf; 
In a November 2, 2009 order for Consumers Energy, and a January 11, 2010 order for 
Detroit Edison, the Michigan Public Service Commission authorized these utilities to 
develop pilot symmetrical decoupling mechanisms in order to improve the ability of energy 
efficiency and distributed generation to operate within the utility environment. See also 
http://www.raponline.org/Pubs/MN-RAP_Decoupling_Rpt_6-2008.pdf.  
401  Allcott and Mullainathan (2010) report that “A bill under consideration in the U.S. House 
of Representatives, HR 3247, would establish a program at the Department of Energy to 
understand behavioral factors that influence energy conservation and speed the adoption of 
promising initiatives”. 
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A similar story is reported by Goldstein et al. (2008), who describe the results of 
an interesting experiment: in some hotel rooms a card headlined “Help Save the 
Environment” was left, which urged visitors to “show your respect for nature” by 
reusing towels. In other rooms, a different card, “Join Your Fellow Guests in 
Helping to Save the Environment” was placed. Again, exposing guests to the 
peer pressure made them 25% more likely to reuse towels402.  
Another experiment reported by Cialdini and Schultz (2004) and later discussed 
i.a. in Nolan et al. (2008) was run in San Marcos, California403. Five different 
types of hang-tags were used to encourage the community households to 
conserve energy. As shown below, one of the messages imposed peer pressure 
on the household by informing them implicitly that their neighbors were already 
adopting energy-saving behavior (77% of your neighbors already use fans 
instead of air conditioning – it’s your community’s popular choice!). Other 
messages hinted at the possibility of saving money (save $54 a month on your 
utility bill!); contributing to the preservation of the environment (prevent the 
release of 262 pounds of greenhouse gases per month); social responsibility 
(It’s the socially responsible thing to do!). After four weeks, data on the relative 
effectiveness of the different types of messages were collected by the researchers 
involved. The result was that consumers presented with the “peer pressure” 
hang-tag reduced their energy consumption by an average of 10%, compared to 
3% or less reduction in energy consumption for any of the other hang-tags.  
This new wave of energy-efficiency policy has not yet reached Europe, although 
the bulk of European consumers still shows very little interest for energy-
efficient behavior. The awareness of the importance of the message conveyed 
with labeling became visible in the European Commission’s impact assessment 
on the “Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the indication by labelling and standard product information of the 
consumption of energy and other resources by energy-related products”404. 
There, the Commission observes that “many past evaluations of labelling 
programs have focused on consumer awareness of the label but have not 
explicitly linked the label to actual behaviour (i.e., to the efficiency of the 
appliances purchased and to the most likely purchase if there had been no 
label). Future evaluations should be more comprehensive than has been the 
case so far”. However, the usefulness of peer pressure as a way to achieve more 
effective results has not surfaced in the debate on EU energy efficiency policy to 
date: given the mounting interest for nudging and behavioral economics at the 
European Commission, it is likely that this new approach to energy efficiency 
policy will soon join the roster of policy options considered by the European 
Commission in its Impact Assessment documents. In addition, the ongoing 
development of smart grids will empower administrations with the possibility to 
send signals on the relative energy consumption of neighboring households: 
                                                   
402  http://www.csom.umn.edu/assets/118359.pdf.  
403  Nolan, J.M., P.W. Schultz, R.B. Cialdini, N.J. Goldstein and V. Griskevicius (2008), 
Normative Social Influence is Underdetected, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 
2008; 34; 913. 
404  SEC(2008) 2862, 13 November 2008.  
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within the boundaries of privacy protection, forms of peer pressure and 
indication of the relative consumption patterns might become a very effective 
way of stimulating energy efficient behavior.  
Figure22–TypesofhangͲtagsandconservationofenergy
 
 
Source: Cialdini and Schultz (2004) 
 
What lessons can be learned from these stories? First, in certain policy domains 
understanding the drivers and motivations underlying human behavior is 
essential for the design of efficient and effective policies: simply assuming that 
consumers will behave rationally would be very shortsighted. Second, nudging 
requires some independent value judgment, such as the definition of socially 
desirable behavior, and the recognition that social norms affect individual 
satisfaction – something that pure methodological individualists would never be 
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able to accept. Third, the scope of nudging is still limited to consumer policy and 
the realignment of individual behavior with the need to preserve public goods 
such as the environment or public health. Fourth, impact assessments based on 
quantitative cost-benefit analysis are very unlikely to capture the need to focus 
on individual behavior, change social norms, use peer pressure and, ultimately, 
fine-tune incentives to lead people to behave in a “socially sustainable” manner.  
5.8 Achilles and the turtle: ten years of failed attempts to 
enforce copyright in cyberspace 
The importance of individual incentives, social norms and the context of human 
behavior in determining the effectiveness of legal rules is nowhere as tangible as 
in the intangible world, i.e. as in cyberspace. The “network of networks” that 
today governs a growing portion of our life emerged as a sort of free zone, in 
which the end-to-end nature of the network and its packet-based traffic 
determined the impossibility for any central intelligence to detect illegal 
behavior in time to stop it. This is why, already at the end of the 1990s, Carol 
Rose defined cyberspace as unsafe as “Central Park after dark”405. The key 
revolutionary potential of the Web was indeed the result of a number of 
concurring factors, which include the possibility to ship information in digital 
format (which made the copy impossible to distinguish from the original); the 
spread of broadband connections in e-communications; and the end-to-end 
architecture that researchers such as Tim Berners Lee designed for the World 
Wide Web, making it possible for every end user to communicate with its peers.  
When the World Wide Web entered the scene, the academic and policy 
communities entered a phase of deep turbulence. The Web looked like a 
Maghreb suq, with sellers, magicians, shamans, prophets, gurus, each with an 
own, revolutionary idea on how things would develop in the years to come. For 
example, Stanford scholar Paul Goldstein predicted that the Internet would 
become like a “celestial jukebox”, in which the possibility of charging users for 
each and every download and access to an information good – e.g. a song or a 
movie – would finally become reality406. No transaction costs, monitoring or 
“cyberpolice” were needed on the network of networks: the same blanket 
licensing mechanism that had made piano rolls and jukeboxes so popular in 
different epochs of the 20th Century were now to conquer the new environment 
of the 21st. This would have been the triumph of copyright on the Internet – a 
rather easy victory, after all. 
But many others disagreed. For example, a former lyricist for the famous rock  
band “Greatful Dead”, named John Perry Barlow, swiftly announced that the 
Internet era would have marked the death of copyright407, and that the interests 
                                                   
405  See Rose, C. (1998), The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, 
Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 129.  
406  Si veda Goldstein, P. (1994), Copyright's Highway: the Law and Lore of Copyright from 
Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox, Hill & Wang, New York, NY. 
407  See, e.g. Barlow, J. P. (1994), The Economy of Ideas: Selling Wine without Bottles, 2.03 
Wired 84, 1994. 
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of authors and users would be assured “by the following practical values: 
relationship, convenience, interactivity, service, and ethics”. But no copyright 
would be enforced in cyberspace, since the moment an information is 
disseminated to the public, the public can and should be able to share it and 
joyfully make use of it. Barlow was only the tip of an iceberg. Other authors were 
counting on the end of copyright, and not only in the media domain. Eric S. 
Raymond was working on his paper “The cathedral and the bazaar”, in which 
he praised the emergence of open source licenses and “copyleft” – as opposed to 
copyright – as the way forward in software computing408.  
Meanwhile, cyber gurus such as Lawrence Lessig were engaging in somewhat 
more sophisticated elaborations. As he stated in his enlightening book “Code”, a 
peculiarity of cyberspace is that it is not primarily law, nor any ethical code, that 
defines the boundaries of possible. Code, the architecture of cyberspace, affects 
users’ behavior more than anything else. This also meant that code is more 
powerful than legal rules in enforcing rights in cyberspace, and that any 
meaningful way of reproducing the set of entitlements we had in the “real life” 
would have to be translated and enforced with the help of technology to become 
viable in cyberspace. Lessig observed already in 1996 that  
“Code is an efficient means of regulation. But its perfection makes it 
something different. One obeys these laws as code not because one 
should; one obeys these laws as code because one can do nothing 
else. There is no choice about whether to yield to the demand for a 
password; one complies if one wants to enter the system. In the well 
implemented system, there is no civil disobedience. Law as code is a 
start to the perfect technology of justice”409. 
This meant that when traditional enforcement of legal rules is insufficient, 
putting structural (“architectural”) constraints to user behavior is the only way 
of securing that laws are indeed enforced on the Web. This is not entirely a new 
feature: for example, if you don’t want cell phones to ring loudly in an 
auditorium, you can post a sign telling users to switch off their mobile phones, 
but you can also isolate the building, so that cell phones won’t work; likewise, 
you can count on police and legal entitlements to protect your car from thieves, 
but an alarm and a couple of lockers do the job more effectively in many cases. 
But in cyberspace, the possibility of circumventing the law had become so 
overwhelmingly greater than the possibility to enforce legal rules, that the 
design and architecture of the cyber world was way more important than the 
mere setting of legal entitlements. 
Moreover, the Web had been given an end-to-end architecture in which all bits, 
in principle, should be treated equally. Its creator Tim Berners Lee was so smart 
to devise a system in which all end users could communicate and share files 
with other end users, and intelligence was mostly concentrated at the edges of 
the network, not in the core backbone. The underlying idea was that, the more 
the Web acted as a “dumb pipe”, the greater the network effects and the value of 
                                                   
408  See Raymond (2001), The Cathedral & the Bazaar: Musings on Linux and Open Source by 
an Accidental Revolutionary, O’Reilly Media. 
409  Lessig, L. (1996), The Zones of Cyberspace, Stanford Law Review (48), p. 1408. 
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the network itself. A corollary of this principle was that control over the content 
that flowed over the Internet would have to be weak – the dumber the pipe, the 
freer the user.  
These were some of the main voices animating the birth of the Web in the mid-
1990s. A landmark example of that era is the famous cartoon posted by Peter 
Steiner on The New Yorker on 5 July 1993, where a dog sitting on a chair in 
front of a computer was enthusiastically telling a second dog sitting on the floor 
that “On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog!” Freedom, anonymity, and a 
lot of legal uncertainty were the headlines in this rather remote story.  
After more than a decade, who was right, and who was wrong?  
Well, a few years after the birth of the Web, it seemed fair to state that the 
prophets of the “death of copyright” were right, and the advocates of the 
“celestial jukebox” had simply gotten it wrong. The reason was simple, and 
related to the combination of three different factors. First, content was flowing 
in digitized form over the Web, and for the first time the copy was identical to 
the original – some authors even started to state that on the Web, the “license is 
the product”, meaning that access rights are what counts, and the product itself 
does not exist anymore. Second, the end-to-end architecture allowed end users 
to exchange files (regardless of whether they were copyrighted or not) without 
having to pass any filter, as the pipe was “dumb” and the “code” of cyberspace 
allowed them to do it. Third, broadband connections were becoming more 
widespread, and increased connectivity made it easier for end users to share 
content on the Web by shipping large files.  
The result of all this was what we today call “file sharing”. Copyright owners 
completely lost control of the use and distribution of their content on the Web, 
and cybernauts started to create a huge and uncontrollable secondary market 
for digital content. At the extreme, content owners would have been able to sell 
only one copy of their product: once sold, the digital copy could have been 
reproduced and shipped millions of times on the Web without significant losses 
in quality. Copyright enforcement as we had known it since then, in a word, had 
been killed by the Internet architecture. And this is why I refer to the battle that 
followed as the battle between architecture and control.  
In policy terms, something had to be done. The music majors anticipated the 
“copyright problem” by extensively lobbying the US congress to form a 
Commission – later named the “Lehman commission” – that suggested the 
criminalization of all copying on the Internet410. But this would have meant 
killing the Internet architecture, as surfing requires making a copy of the web 
pages on the cache memory of our PCs – it would have become impractical to 
even think about surfing the Web. And saving control would have led to 
throwing the baby away with the bath water. The opposing interests found a 
rather unsatisfactory compromise with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in 
1998. The DMCA did not criminalize copying; on the other hand, it allowed 
whatever form of anti-circumvention technique, including technological 
protection measures aimed at restoring control over digital content.  
                                                   
410  See, i.a., Litman, J. (2001), Digital Copyright, Prometeus Books. 
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But this was just the beginning. Attempts to strengthen controls have been 
virtually endless in those years, especially in the US. Already in 1998, the Sonny 
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act extended the validity of copyright to 70 
years after the author’s death. It was ironically termed the “Disney Act”, as 
copyright law tends to be reformed in the US whenever rights on Mickey Mouse 
are about to expire. 
These and other episodes mark an era in which the industry’s response to the 
birth of the Web was focused mostly on lobbying for stricter rules and equally 
strict enforcement. But when the 20-year old Irish-American student Shawn 
Fanning started experimenting with Napster on the web, the majors realized 
that simply passing a new law would not make much sense. Napster filled the 
only remaining gap in the Web: even with high-speed broadband, digital 
content and an end-to-end architecture, users still needed a facilitator, and 
intermediary that could help locating “who had what” and kick-start file sharing 
on a large scale. Napster was simply this: a centralized directory that collected 
information on “who had what”. But all exchanges took place between end 
users, eventually, so Napster was not really guilty of copyright infringement.  
How to react? As users were the real infringers, initially the majors started to 
sue directly those who downloaded illegal content. But it was immediately clear 
that they could not chase each and every geek in town – famous cases include a 
lawsuit against a few girl scouts, guilty of having played pirated songs while 
camping on a sunny afternoon411. That was not really a practical solution. 
Majors then started to look for a solution: chasing “facilitators”, instead of 
infringers. 
But copyright law, as shaped by decades of debate and case-law in the US, was 
not really suited to punish “facilitators”, i.e. intermediaries. Two doctrines were 
available – contributory infringement and vicarious liability. But in any event, 
shutting down a “facilitator” would have to pass muster under a Supreme Court 
precedent – the 1984 decision in Sony v. Universal Studios412. Altogether, this 
meant that: 
x Content owners could hold facilitators of infringement liable of contributory 
infringement if they proved that they had actual knowledge of the fact that 
subscribers infringed copyright, and also provided a material contribution to 
the infringement, for example by providing “site and facilities” for users to 
infringe. 
x Alternatively, they could have held intermediaries vicariously liable if they 
proved that: (i) the intermediary obtained a financial benefit from the 
conduct; and (ii) besides having actual knowledge of the infringing conduct, 
it could also control such conduct, and could stop it in real time.  
x In any event, to convince the judge to grant an injunction inhibiting the 
intermediary’s conduct, content owners should have respected the 1984 Sony 
                                                   
411  See ASCAP’s lawsuit against Girl Scouts. For a coment, see Lisa Bannon, The Birds May 
Sing, but Campers Can’t Unless They Pay Up, Wall Street Journal, 21 agosto 1996; and 
Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture, at http://free-culture.cc/notes/. 
412  Sony Corp. of American v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
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precedent, which stated that if a device or platform that facilitates 
infringement is also “capable of substantial non-infringing uses”, then it 
should not be banned from the market or shut down.  
This was the perimeter of the Napster case back in 2001. And it was quite clear 
from the outset that, based on these three pillars, shutting down Napster was 
impossible. As a matter of fact, Napster had no actual knowledge of the 
infringing conduct – it only kept a centralized directory, which provided only 
information, not files. In addition, it drew no financial benefit from the 
infringing conduct – no banners, no subscription fees. And it was heavily 
debated whether Napster could actually stop the infringing conduct in real time, 
if not shutting its server down. Moreover, Napster was capable of substantial 
non-infringing uses – sharing comments, preferences, old bootlegs, non-
copyrighted recordings, making friends, etc. – and as such did not meet the 
Sony conditions.  
But it came out that, if Napster’s server had been shut down, users would not 
have been able to engage in massive copyright infringement. It was indeed this 
latter issue that led the Supreme Court to decide against Napster in the end – 
many of us remember those days in which the famous website was about to 
close. And it was quite clear that the decision had unacceptably stretched the 
Sony precedent and the boundaries of copyright law. But that was it. And the 
end of the Napster case was perhaps the only moment in the past few years in 
which content owners have thought they had won the battle.  
However, as Joshua Cooper Ramo recalls in his recent The Age of the 
Unthinkable, to win the battle against revolutionaries, you have to think like one 
of them – and majors were not ready to go that way413. During 2001, I was in 
New York City visiting a local university, and ended up in a rather restricted 
workshop of quasi-hackers. There, I realized that Napster was only the 
beginning, and that the turtle had already advanced one step away from 
Achilles. I saw a big blackboard full of potential network architectures and each 
of them was scored according to a number of features: the last one indicated 
whether that type of network architecture was “lawsuit-proof”. And some of 
them were. 
A couple of years later, Los Angeles federal court judge Stephen Wilson opened 
a trial against two successors of Napster, called Grokster and Morpheus. The 
Hollywood Studios and the recording majors were complaining that these 
software platforms behaved exactly like Napster. It was thus apparently an easy 
case – apply the Napster precedent, and shut them down right away. But things 
were not as easy as Judge Wilson may have thought at the outset: it came out 
that neither Grokster nor Morpheus matched the features of the Napster case. 
In particular, Grokster was only a very light software that connected the user to 
a network called FastTrack, which operated independently from Grokster and 
linked also other services. FastTrack selected every morning some users’ PCs as 
“supernodes”, and it was supernodes that went around to look for the 
                                                   
413  See Cooper Ramo, J. (2009), The Age of the Unthinkable: Why the New World Disorder 
Constantly Surprises Us And What We Can Do About It, Hachette Book Group, 23 March 
2009. 
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information to enable file-sharing, not Grokster. So, Grokster had no actual 
knowledge, provided no “site and facilities”, had no financial benefit, etc. When 
it came to Morpheus, things went even worse. Morpheus was an open source 
software linking users to the Gnutella network – a sort of passe-parole between 
users helped identifying “who had what”. Most importantly, contrary to 
Napster, you could have switched off Grokster and Morpheus, and the users 
would have continued exchanging their files.  
Again, how to react? Judge Wilson took it seriously, and concluded in 2003 that  
“[t]he Court is not blind to the possibility that Defendants may have 
intentionally structured their businesses to avoid secondary liability 
for copyright infringement… To justify a judicial remedy, however, 
Plaintiffs invite this Court to expand existing copyright law beyond 
its well-drawn boundaries“414.  
In a nutshell, this is matter for Congress, not for a federal court judge. If majors 
wanted to beat Grokster, Morpheus and the dozens of their homologues, they 
had to lobby Congress to change the law. Absent a change in the law, the turtle 
could thrive. 
Content owners have slowly realized that the strategy to counter peer-to-peer 
file sharing cannot rely only on the law. You can beat technology only with 
technology. There’s no way to beat virus developers by simply enacting a law 
that states that disseminating viruses is illegal. You need anti-viruses. For file-
sharing, the majors’ revenge has taken different forms. The first is the 
development of new forms of cyber-attacks, such as “spoofing” technologies: 
legitimated by the DMCA, firms like Media Defender and Overpeer started using 
whatever means to discourage users from engaging in illegal download, 
including shipping viruses right to end users’ PCs to “punish one, educate a 
hundred”. And they were not garage software houses – the CEO of Media 
Defender was the former head of ASCAP, a well-known chap in the field.  
Then came a new era of lobbying to enable technological protection measures: 
attempts include the Berman Bill415; the Consumer Broadband and Digital 
Television Promotion Act416; the Family Entertainment and Copyright Act417; 
and the “broadcast flag”418.  
                                                   
414  Conclusions of Judge Wilson in MGM et al. v. Grokster et al., US District Court, Central 
District of California, judgment granted in part to defendants, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. 
Cal. 2003). 
415  The Berman Bill was presented to Congress on 25 July 2002, which would have allowed 
content owners to block file sharing systems even absent any evidence of copyright 
infringement, on the basis of a mere presumption of infringing conduct, creating a “Far 
West” in which all means to avoid infringement were legal, as long as attacks – as they were 
defined – did not damage directly users’ PCs; were proportionate; did not cause more than 
$50 damage to the intermediary for each attack; and were notified in advance to the 
Attorney General one week before. A proposal that Mark Lemley, one of the most 
authoritative experts in this field, defined simply as “a nightmare”. 
416  The Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act (CBDTPA) was presented 
to the US Senate in March 2002. It banned the sale of whatever device that could support 
non-technologically-protected content, and punished all infringements with imprisonment 
for 5 to 20 years and fines between $50,000 and one million dollars. 
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Finally, just as Congress was debating an Inducement Act that would have 
realized the expansion of the scope of copyright protection Judge Wilson was 
referring to, the Supreme Court of the United States finally decided that, even 
without overruling Sony v. Universal Studios, Grokster could have been held 
vicariously liable anyway on the basis of an “inducement theory”. And this 
because “[n]othing in Sony requires courts to ignore evidence of intent to 
promote infringement if such evidence exists. In addition to intent … the 
inducement theory requires evidence of actual infringement … There is 
evidence of such infringement on a gigantic scale. Because substantial 
evidence supports MGM on all elements, summary judgment for respondents 
was error”. 
With this judgment, the tide had turned. From that day, hundreds of p2p 
download systems have shut down, including famous ones such as WinMX, 
BearShare and LimeWire. And the content industry took a deep breath.  
The battle was won, at the end, but the war still raged. Soon after, even more 
sophisticated systems such as Bit Torrent entered the stage. Torrents live a life 
of their own: simply, there is evidence of massive infringement, but no 
“facilitator” - at least not a human one: technology does it alone just as in 
science-fiction. No one has found a way to challenge these anonymous, amoebic, 
ever-changing, nomadic chains of files as belonging to anyone, at least until the 
Swedish Pirate Bay case.  
As illegal file-sharing had not been fully stopped, the content industry decided 
to resort to another set of weapons to win the war. And they started to think like 
a revolutionary. To tell the truth, it was Apple, not a major recording company 
or one of the Hollywood studios, the first to realize that the only way to win the 
war against illegal downloading was not to criminalize the act of downloading, 
but to create room for legal downloading, and to make it enticing enough that 
users would decide to stop infringing copyright and convert themselves to the 
bright side of the Force.  
In 2004, a study by INDICARE suggested that a sufficient number of users 
(current p2p downloaders, but also other users that were not using the internet 
to get music) would have started to use an online music store if the price for a 
single song did not exceed 1 Euro. Apple decided to stick to that figure – the 
would-be iTunes would have never succeeded with songs sold at more than €1. 
But record companies did not want to license their repertoires if not for a very 
high price, and only under the condition that songs could not be shared. That’s 
why iTunes came out as it is: a system in which: (i) songs cost less than €1; (ii) a 
                                                                                                                                                     
417  The Family Entertainment and Copyright Act was finally approved in 2005. On the basis 
of this Act, those that distribute even one single non-authorized copy of a movie on the Web 
can be put to jail for a maximum of three years. 
418  In 2005, the FCC mandated that no personal computers and digital TV recorders could be 
sold without carrying a “broadcast flag”. The broadcast flag allowed only the reproduction 
of DRM-protected content on devices like PCs or the TiVo418. According to the rule, 
hardware must “actively thwart” piracy. But the US Court of Appeals later rules that the 
FCC had exceeded its authority by prohibiting the manufacture of hardware without copy 
protection technology. But the broadcast flag came back in subsequent attempts, such as 
the Communications, Consumer’s Choice, and Broadband Deployment Act of 2006. 
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Digital Rights Management System called Fair Play restrict the possibility of 
sharing the file and burn CDs419; and (iii) songs downloaded from iTunes can 
only be listened to on the iPod – Apple had to secure an additional source of 
revenues, as €1 per song did not cover the cost of obtaining all the licenses.  
Since when the iTunes-iPod system entered the market, DRMs have become the 
“new kid in town”, and potentially a panacea against the perils of enduring 
illegal file-sharing. In 2005 a report by an ad hoc High-Level Group on digital 
rights management appointed by the European Commission concluded that  
“EU Institutions and Member States [must] reflect in their policy 
positions that copyright abuse will not be tolerated, and that 
protection of content delivered via DRM is the way forward”420.  
But that, again, was only a chimera. Even the most sophisticated protection 
mechanism ever conceived, such as DRM, combining both technological and 
legal protection measures, has failed. Billions of users have bought the iPod, but 
they have mostly used it to listen to illegally downloaded songs. iTunes has been 
a failure, and Steve Jobs himself has declared that, was it for him, he’d get rid of 
the DRM altogether. In an open letter dated 6 February 2007, he stated 
“DRMs haven't worked, and may never work, to halt music piracy. 
... Much of the concern over DRM systems has arisen in European 
countries. Perhaps those unhappy with the current situation should 
redirect their energies towards persuading the music companies to 
sell their music DRM-free. ... Convincing them to license their music 
to Apple and others DRM-free will create a truly interoperable 
music marketplace. Apple will embrace this wholeheartedly”421.  
Now, Steve Jobs was probably right if one looks at DRMs as tools like Apple’s 
Fair Play. I am not quite sure his statement holds if one looks at the use of 
technology to monitor the flow of content on the Internet, without charging for 
each time content is shared. But I will get back to this in the next section.  
After 15 years in which the advocates of IPR control and defenders of the 
internet architecture have chased each other like Achilles chases the turtle in 
Zeno’s famous paradox of motion, what have we learnt? Apparently very little, 
especially if one looks at recent happenings in EU countries. On the one hand, 
the recent Pirate Bay case in Sweden has marked another ephemeral victory of 
control over architecture. With Pirate Bay, Sweden has gotten as far as the US 
Supreme Court went in Grokster: it condemned the four operators of the 
                                                   
419  DRMs are defined by the US NIST as “a system of information technology (IT) components 
and services along with corresponding law, policies and business models which strive to 
distribute and control intellectual property (IP) and its rights”. More in detail, they consist 
of lines of code attached to individual files, which define what uses of the file are allowed; a 
clickwrap license signed by users, which binds them legally against any attempt to 
circumvent the DRM protection; and a license agreement with device producers, which 
again binds them legally if their devices are massively used to infringe copyright.  
420  See the Final Report of the High Level Group on Digital Rights Management, 2004, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/2005/all_about/digital_rights_man/do
c/040709_hlg_drm_2nd_meeting_final_report.pdf. 
421  Steve Jobs, Thoughts on Music, at http://www.apple.com/hotnews/thoughtsonmusic/.  
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famous website for facilitating – better, “inducing” – massive copyright 
infringement. And since some time has elapsed, the trial ended up capturing a 
technology that had been considered almost “lawsuit-proof” to date, such as the 
Torrent one.  
A couple of weeks later, in May 2009, France passed a controversial “content 
and creation” law that called for the creation of the Haute Autorité pour la 
Diffusion des Oeuvres et la Protection des droits sur Internet (HADOPI), a new 
agency with a mandate to sanction those accused of illegal file-sharing. The law 
introduced a “three strikes” rule according to which Internet Service Providers 
should monitor infringing conduct by their subscribers, and after two warnings 
put them on a black list and block their account for up to one year. The “three-
strikers” would, by the way, continue to pay while being disconnected. The 
French government went as far as trying to include this rule in the review of the 
EU telecoms package – this attempt led Europe to a stall in the already quite 
complex negotiations for the new package. This further delay was even more 
paradoxical since on June 10, 2009, the Constitutional Council of France ruled 
against HADOPI’s central provision, which allowed ISPs to impose sanctions on 
end users accused (even if not yet convicted) of copyright violations. The Court 
stated that “the Internet is a component of the freedom of expression” and that 
“in French law the presumption of innocence prevails”. Moreover, as the Court 
reiterated, even in a country with a long and established tradition of 
administrative law like France, only a judge can impose sanctions under the law. 
More recently, on 22 October 2009, a “HADOPI 2” law was passed, this time 
with the approval of the French Constitutional Council: the new law requires 
judicial review before revoking a person’s internet access, but otherwise keeps 
the original provisions contained in the first HADOPI law. The interesting fact 
was that, despite this unprecedentedly harsh measure, the HADOPI 2 “three-
strikes” law seems to have led to an increase in illegal downloading. In March 
2010, researchers at the University of Rennes found that since the HADOPI 2 
law was passed, illegal downloading had grown by 3%. Those that had 
abandoned file-sharing had gone into streaming or direct downloads from web 
servers. Even if the law has been fully implemented only in October 2010, there 
seems to be little prospects for full compliance by end users422.  
The French law has inspired similar initiatives in other countries, including 
most notably the UK, where the Digital Economy Act 2010 introduced a similar 
“three-strikes” rule. The Act was even subject to an impact assessment, in which 
the UK government explains that the new rule will lead media companies to 
recover £1.7 billion of displaced sales (corresponding to £200 million of annual 
benefits): an estimate that seems to rest on rather fragile assumptions, 
especially since the Impact Assessment document observes that “the measures 
set out in the Digital Economy Act … were designed specifically to address the 
particular characteristics of unlawful P2P file-sharing but could be applied to 
counteract other forms of on-line copyright infringement if deemed an efficient 
and effective way of doing so. However, for most other forms of on-line 
                                                   
422  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/19/technology/internet/19iht-CACHE.html.  
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copyright infringement they are likely to prove less effective”423. The available 
data for France reveal that the substitution effect with illegal direct downloads 
and streaming would be quite likely, leaving copyright owners with little 
improvement over the status quo.  
Looking at the evolution of the problem in the past decade, it is fair to state that 
both approaches to policy, the Swedish and the French/British, seem to miss the 
broader picture. And the reasons are quite simple. First, technology will 
continue to circumvent these rules – as from Napster users moved to Grokster, 
and from Grokster to eMule or Pirate Bay, they’ll find another, smarter 
technological solution to avoid being jailed and having to pay damages. If they 
are put on the black list by ISPs, they will use other accounts to surf the internet, 
and eventually disappear under anonymity. After all, it is code, not law, that 
defines what’s possible on the Internet.  
Second, it is a very well-known tenet of social sciences that only “morally 
acceptable” rules are likely to be complied with by their recipients424. And both 
Pirate Bay and the French/British “three-strikes” rule are inconsistent with the 
Netiquette, the ethical code of Internet users. They simply consider it unfair to 
be subject to such an aggressive dawn raid, they reject the idea of ISPs as cyber-
police. And they disagree so strongly that they ended up forming a political 
representation, the Piratpartiet, that won more than 7% of the Swedish votes in 
the recent elections for the European Parliament, and will fight to reform (or 
kill) copyright in the years to come, directly from Strasbourg. 
More than the underlying design of the law, it is enforcement that deserves 
serious reconsideration. 15 years of attempts have produced nothing: according 
to a recent study by Jupiter Research, for each song sold, 100 more were stolen; 
and 94% of online music consumers declared to be unwilling to pay for music. 
Against this background, current attempts such as the French “three strikes” or 
the US and Swedish “inducement theories” are doomed to represent mere 
placebos or at best temporary relief – but no long-term solution.  
In order to identify some building blocks for the future, a few lessons must be 
kept in mind. 
x Avoid micropayments. The Web is the domain of flat pricing, not 
micropayments. Users will never accept any legal download service if they 
know they will not be able to experiment with new content and share it with 
peers. So, whatever solution is found for the future, it should be such that 
users are left free to behave like cybernauts. 
x Use technology to combat technology. DRMs still have a role to play, as the 
only possibility to track the relative success of a piece of content over others. 
But DRMs must be used as an ingredient in blanket licensing systems, 
where flat fees are paid by users for access to a whole repertoire. DRM 
                                                   
423  See http://interactive.bis.gov.uk/digitalbritain/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/Digital-
Economy-Act-IAs-final.pdf, at 56.  
424  See Christine Parker, The Compliance Trap:; the moral message in responsive regulatory 
enforcement, Law & Society Review, Volume 40, Number 3, September 2006 , pp. 591-
622(32). 
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systems should thus not be directly linked to revenue collection, as in 
iTunes, but as information collectors on which authors should be 
remunerated, and to what extent. DRM-based, flat-fee services such as the 
new Napster, Qtrax, Snocap have gone this way in past years, and are likely 
to be followed soon by giants like Google’s YouTube – especially if content 
majors surrender to reality, and contribute to the endeavour.  
x Empower ISPs, but not as policemen. In the aftermath of the European 
debate on net neutrality, ISPs are likely to be entrusted with more powers to 
inspect and prioritize packets on the Internet. This will also lead us in a 
privileged position to detect whether illegal downloads are taking place. 
Blocking IP accounts is not likely to work, but a warning system and a 
quality of service degradation for illegal content are more likely to succeed. 
In a nutshell, the user experience must be significantly better in legal 
downloads than for illegal ones. 
x Enter the NGN era. Content providers and ISPs should work together to 
make sure that in the near future, when users will be “always on”, and 
always at high-speed, content is made available almost exclusively for 
streaming rather than owning or burning. In the transition from the iPod to 
the iPhone, this will be increasingly possible. Users will buy “access” to 
songs, movies, libraries and videogames, rather than owning a copy. As Bob 
Gomulkiewicz already stated in 1998, on the internet “The license is the 
product”425. If code allows only streaming, and streaming does not lead 
always to additional micropayments, Cybernauts will find it “moral” to join 
the system. After all, on the Internet the word “free” is not intended as “free 
lunch”, but mostly as “free speech” – users feel free when they can 
communicate without barriers. 
x “Hide” the cost of legal download services. If ISPs can degrade the quality 
of service for illegally streamed content, DRM is used only to track content, 
and content is available almost exclusively for streaming in an “always on” 
environment, then the blanket license fees paid by users to access content 
can be directly included in the Internet subscription fee. Although it may 
seem too malicious, I am sure legal downloads can work on the Internet 
only if users are not constantly confronted with the fact that they are paying 
to access content. 
If these principles are taken into account, I am sure we can soon strike a deal 
between the content industry and ISPs to establish a pro-copyright partnership. 
And after 15 years, we will realize that almost everybody was right: Goldstein’s 
celestial jukebox will be replaced by a big flat pricing system; Barlow’s “death of 
copyright” will become the “death of copyright enforcement as we know it”; 
Lessig’s “code as law” will lead to drawing new rules of the game for cybernauts; 
and on the Internet, nobody will know that you are a dog: after all, even 
Steiner’s pet surfer must have paid a subscription fee at some point. 
                                                   
425  Gomulkiewicz R. W. (1998), The License Is the Product: Comments on the Promise of 
Article 2B for Software and Information Licensing, 13 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 891. 
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The never-ending saga of copyright protection in cyberspace highlights the 
impossibility of regulating against social norms, however virtual they may be. A 
more thorough understanding of human behavior and the patterns of social 
interaction in cyberspace can suggest more effective ways of regulating 
cyberspace, and in particular access to content. Past attempts suggest that, if 
social norms are not taken into account – even better, if regulation is not aimed 
at affecting social norms with the help of technology – even the most draconian 
sanctions will not scare Internet users.  
5.9 Conclusions: the many facets of law and economics in the 
RIA world 
The previous pages have reported eight different stories that revolve around the 
problem of how to craft effective rules, and how to use law and economics in an 
impact assessment to inform better policy decisions. The first four stories are 
related to the use of law and economics in the impact assessment methodology, 
and spot mistakes and imperfections that have been made in the performance of 
an impact assessment, due to the lack of a sound law and economics approach. 
The spectrum allocation story revealed that sophisticated law and economics 
can help policymakers “think outside the box”. If transaction costs, prospect 
theory, diverging valuations and strategic behavior are taken into account, 
policymakers can devise more effective rules, such as the Texas Shootout, to 
ensure that spectrum is not propertized, and industry players can place a value 
on its availability at regular intervals, thus making it possible to reallocate 
frequencies when they are being inefficiently used. The story about private 
antitrust damages actions highlighted that, when individual incentives are at 
stake, an impact assessment becomes more useful when it uses law and 
economics concepts, rather than when it attaches arbitrary values to prospective 
costs and benefits. The example of the roaming regulation warned against the 
arbitrary use of cost-benefit analysis by civil servants. Hiding distributional 
effects may lead to merely taking the wrong decision in an impact assessment: 
accordingly, this story testified of the needs for better economics in IA, and for a 
careful consideration of distributional effects when drafting IA documents.   
The fifth story stands as a tale of the changing approach to regulation during 
and after the financial crisis. The story of how the approach to reporting 
changed over time is both sweet and sour, since it highlighted a better 
awareness of the importance of reporting for market surveillance purposes, but 
also the persisting lack of responsive regulation in investigating reasons for non-
compliance. 
The last three stories highlight the importance of considering both social norms 
and human behavior in crafting certain types of policies – indeed, an expanding 
portion of public policies. The case of tying in the retail financial services sector 
highlighted the importance of behavioral economics in the design of effective 
rules: trying to ban tying without expecting a rapid substitution of tying with 
practices with similar practices that exploit the supply-side and demand-side 
efficiencies generated by cross-selling is truly shortsighted policy. The energy 
efficiency examples are the most typical application of nudging à la Cass 
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Sunstein, but also add the importance of peer pressure as an essential tool to 
convince individuals to adopt socially sustainable behavior. Finally, the saga of 
copyright in cyberspace is the most extreme case of resistant social norms: a 
decade of failed attempts to replace a social norm that is inconsistent with 
copyright law, from which policymakers and media companies still seem to have 
learned very little.  
More stories could have been included in this section, in support of a sound use 
of law and economics in phases of ex ante impact assessment such as problem 
definition, identification of viable options, analysis of likely impacts, and 
enforcement solutions. The most important conclusion that can be drawn from 
the observation of current practice is in line with our conclusions in the previous 
Section of this Thesis: on the one hand, law and economics can usefully inspire 
the daily work of the policymaker, especially when individual incentives, human 
behavior and social norms are at stake; on the other hand, this requires 
abandoning the emphasis on Kaldor-Hicks cost-benefit analysis and exclusive 
reliance on methodological individualism, to embrace a more sophisticated 
approach to the causes and determinants of human action – in a word, the 
“context” in which policy outcomes materialize.  
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6 THE FUTURE OF RIA – AND HOW CAN LAW AND 
ECONOMICS HELP 
This Thesis was essentially conceived as a tale of two crises. On the one hand, 
the crisis of neoclassical law and economics, attacked on many fronts by 
behavioral economics, neo-institutional economics and scholars in other social 
(and sometimes natural) sciences. On the other hand, the crisis of RIA, an ex 
ante policy appraisal tool based on neoclassical economics that is at once a great 
success in terms of formal adoption, and a widespread failure in terms of actual 
implementation. In this section, I try to answer the basic research questions 
outlined in the first chapter of this Thesis, and by answering those I also address 
an apparently simpler question: can the combination of two crises yield a 
success? Or, at least, can we solve two problems with one solution – i.e., 
improving our use of law and economics in policy? 
Section 6.1 below addresses the “an”, i.e. whether this Thesis has concluded that 
law and economics should indeed be more integrated with RIA. Section 6.2 
show “how” can this marriage take place (“quomodo”). Section 6.3 discusses the 
potential contribution of law and economics in term of the organization of RIA 
systems around the world. Section 6.4 draws more concrete policy suggestions 
for the US and EU systems as described in sections 2 and 3, and on the basis of 
the findings of Sections 4 and 5. Finally, Section 6.5 concludes by outlining 
future research questions and paving the way for new work that can be 
originated by the findings of this Thesis.  
6.1 Should law and economics be more integrated with the 
practice of ex ante impact assessment?  
As shown in Sections 2 and 3 of this Thesis, ex ante impact assessment often 
ignores the issue of individual incentives altogether. In particular, the lack of 
attention towards the need to consider the individual incentives to comply with 
legal rules is a major flaw in current IA work, especially in the European Union, 
and becomes almost pathologic when one looks at the Standard Cost Model, 
which assumes 100% compliance without spotting problems of inadequate 
enforcement or limited respect for the rule. The problem is more likely to 
emerge whenever the legal rule considered in an IA significantly depends on 
human behavior: absent available arrangements that would lead individuals to 
align with the objectives of the legal rule, choosing other alternatives – such as 
changing the environment in which human behavior takes place – may be 
preferable and more effective.  
This is where law and economics can especially help ex ante impact assessment. 
The mainstream definition of law and economics, i.e. a discipline that treats 
legal rules as means to affect individual incentives, here reaches the maximum 
relevance: when incentives are at stake, a legal and economic analysis that 
shows how incentives would be affected is way more useful and important than 
quantitative cost-benefit analysis. Since, in any event, law and economics can 
encompass both types of assessment, it is fair to state that the answer to this 
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basic research question is yes. Law and economics can and should help RIA in 
the years to come, but with a big caveat: it all depends on “which” law and 
economics we are talking about.  
Our discussion in Section 4 highlighted that neoclassical law and economics has 
fully permeated RIA practice, especially in the United States, but that this type 
of analysis has been largely overcome by subsequent developments in social 
sciences: today, the most important problems legislators have to solve through 
ex ante impact assessment cannot be usefully addressed through neoclassical 
law and economics and Kaldor-Hicks cost-benefit analysis. The type of law and 
economics that RIA needs is a more refined, inter-disciplinary and context-
aware version of the law and economics we have been using for years. This is 
why the answer to this research question can only be a “conditional yes”. Law 
and economics can be usefully employed in support of ex ante impact 
assessment to the extent that it is able to incorporate the main insights from 
behavioral science, from methodological collectivism and the formulation of 
subjective value judgments, corresponding to long-term objectives set by 
politicians and policymakers. Put differently, law and economics can help RIA 
survive its flawed, blurred image of “number cruncher”, and achieve a new role 
of instrument of accountability, transparency and policy coherence.  
6.2 In what ways can law and economics contribute to the 
quality, usefulness and effectiveness of ex ante impact 
assessment?  
Once we have answered the previous question with a “conditional yes”, 
answering this further question deserves a number of qualifications. In 
particular, Sections 4 and 5 of this Thesis have reached a number of findings 
that help addressing this question in detail. Below, I distinguish between phases 
of the ex ante impact assessment process to explain how law and economics can 
help. 
First, law and economics can help RIA in the initial phase of problem 
identification. In many instances, lack of compliance is not subject to careful 
investigation, or is completely unknown to policymakers. My example on large 
exposure reporting in Section 5.5 above showed that lack of awareness of the 
reasons for non-compliance can lead to very serious consequences. More recent 
examples, such as the ongoing revision of the EU radio and telecommunications 
terminal equipment (R&TTE) Directive, show an equally worrying lack of 
attention for the causes or non-compliance426. Even beyond non-compliance, a 
refined approach to law and economics can help policymakers understand the 
                                                   
426  See Directive of 9 March 1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Radio 
Equipment and Telecommunications Terminal Equipment and the mutual recognition of 
their conformity (1999-04-07 OJ No L 91/10). A public consultation was opened by the 
Commission in 2010 (see http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/rtte/public-
consultation/index_en.htm) and the revision of the Directive is ongoing. The roadmap for 
the revision, which highlights the “low level of compliance”, is available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/planned_ia/docs/197_entr_radio_equipment_en.
pdf.  
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drivers of human behavior that explain the limited success of existing policies: 
the example of energy efficiency in Section 5.7, as well as the story of copyright 
in cyberspace in Section 5.8 add more detail to this finding: identifying the 
problem in an ex ante impact assessment should mean investigating the causes 
and drivers of emerging (suboptimal) outcomes, and – where human behavior is 
a major cause – analyzing the potential behavioral biases and other market 
imperfections that hamper the achievement of more socially optimal results.  
Second, law and economics can help policymakers in the identification of viable  
policy alternatives. My past experience suggests that this already occurs as a 
result of better problem identification. In addition, a law and economics 
approach can help in the assessment of the basic preconditions for seeking 
certain non-regulatory solutions, as well as in the identification of types of 
remedies and rules that have already been identified in the literature. The 
former case occurs whenever policymakers – as they increasingly do, especially 
in Brussels – explore the possibility for self- and co-regulation as possible 
solutions to an existing policy problem. Assessing the effectiveness and likely 
efficiency of those policy alternatives requires a structured analysis, aimed at 
verifying the extent to which the interest of private regulators would be in line 
with that of society as a whole; this assessment would include, i.a. an 
assessment of the governance of private regulatory arrangements, the likely 
effects on competition in affected markets, the representation of all interests in 
the activity of the private regulatory body, and the possibility of monitoring and 
evaluating over time the outcomes of this form of regulation427. In addition, as 
already mentioned, policymakers can use law and economics to identify 
otherwise unknown policy alternatives: my example of spectrum policy in 
Section 5.1 above shows how previous taxonomies identified in law and 
economics – from the four rules in Calabresi and Melamed (1972) to the six 
rules in Ayres (2005) and further optional rules in Fennell (2002), to time-
shifting rules, optional law, and “pragmatically libertarian rules” – can at least 
propose viable alternatives, irrespective of whether such policy options will 
ultimately be chosen or not.  
Third, what I have termed a more refined, inter-disciplinary and context-aware 
version of the law and economics can – or better, should – help RIA out of the 
tight boundaries of Neoclassical law and economics in assessing the impact of 
alternative policy options. This depends on several findings in this Thesis, which 
suggest that Kaldor-Hicks cost-benefit analysis should be kept as only one of 
several criteria to be used in ex ante policy appraisal. Today, law and economics 
scholarship mostly condemns this form of cost-benefit analysis as obsolete and 
methodologically flawed due to the reliance on perfect rationality and 
methodological individualism, and due to the need to compare and aggregate 
individual preferences. To the contrary, the analysis of incentives, though not 
always conducive to a monetization of benefits and costs, can prove way more 
useful in guiding policymakers towards spotting the best policy decision, as our 
                                                   
427  See, in particular on transnational private regulation, Cafaggi, F. (2010), New Foundations 
for Transnational Private Regulation, EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2010/53. See also Fuchs, 
D. and A. Kalfagianni (2010), The Causes and Consequences of Private Food Governance, 
Business and Politics 12(3). http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol12/iss3/art5/  
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examples on private antitrust enforcement and tying of retail financial services 
in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 above showed.  
To be sure, this requires that law and economics helps RIA deal with 
distributional issues, since, contrary to what Chicago economists have stated for 
decades, the allocation of the slices dramatically affects the size of the pie. 
However, I am afraid that, at this stage, the evolution of this discipline has not 
led to significant scientific results. As stated above, at the end of Section 4, the 
scientific approach that is more likely to survive the next generation is Guido 
Calabresi’s justice before efficiency rather than Posner’s efficiency as justice, 
also in line with developments in other social sciences, which seem to point at a 
broader acceptance of weak forms of paternalism in the making of public policy.  
Finally, where law and economics does not help public policymakers in the ex 
ante phase is in the definition of the ultimate objectives of policy intervention. 
This conclusion is not straightforward, if one thinks that the main attempt of 
neoclassical law and economics was to suggest a single goal for public policy, i.e. 
economic efficiency and the maximization of wealth as a proxy for welfare. To 
the contrary, today lawyer-economists increasingly recognize that there is no 
such thing as a single policy goal, and that the main role of ex ante assessment 
should be that of paving the way for better policy appraisal throughout the 
policy process, and thus not only at the ex ante, but also at the interim and ex 
post phases of the policy cycle.  
The combination of these suggestions will be seen as somewhat revolutionary by 
the readers that have been following the debate on RIA in the past decades. The 
mainstream scholarly and political approaches to RIA have so far highlighted 
the potential for RIA in setting objectives, at the same time downplaying the 
usefulness of RIA in the analysis of distributional impacts. I would argue the 
opposite applies: politicians should set objectives, and RIA – together with 
other, complementary forms of evaluations – should help achieve them. 
Summing up, the answer to this research question is again mixed: as it stands, 
law and economics can help already understand the policy problem and identify 
a broader set of alternatives. Law and economics can also be of invaluable help 
in replacing the monetization of costs and benefits with an insightful analysis of 
individual incentives. In addition, law and economics should develop in a way 
that helps policymakers deal with distributional impacts and increasingly 
recognizes the importance of social norms. But law and economics should not 
help in the identification of broader policy objectives (if not operational 
objectives closely linked to the proposed policy’s scope). In this respect, I fully 
subscribe to what Robert Pirsig stated in his highly praised “Zen and the Art of 
Motorcycle Maintenance: 
Traditional scientific method has always been at the very best, 
20-20 hindsight. It's good for seeing where you’ve been. It's good 
for testing the truth of what you think you know, but it can't tell 
you where you ought to go428.  
                                                   
428  Pirsig, R. (1974), Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, William Morrow & Company, 
New York, pt 3, ch.24. 
LAW AND ECONOMICS IN THE RIA WORLD | 213 
LAW AND ECONOMICS IN THE RIA WORLD - © ANDREA RENDA 2011 
6.3 What does the law and economics literature imply for the 
design and organization of policy evaluation within 
government?  
Based on the findings of this Thesis, it seems fair to state that the functional 
school of law and economics has already provided some valuable contribution to 
the debate on the role and function of RIA in a chain of delegation and oversight 
aimed at the making of efficient public policy, especially thanks to the work of 
Matthew Adler and Eric Posner429. However, there is more that law and 
economics can contribute to the design and organization of RIA in the years to 
come, based also on the findings of this Thesis. 
A first lesson that can be drawn is related to the role of ex ante impact 
assessment within the overall organization of policymaking in a legal system. 
The view emerged in this Thesis is that RIA should be used chiefly as an 
instrument of policy coherence. This means that the role of RIA should mostly 
revolve around the basic principle of accountability, since ex ante impact 
assessment – regardless of whether benefits and costs are quantified and 
monetized – illustrates the underlying rationale of policy solutions enshrined in 
legislative proposals. More precisely, policymakers are often elected on the basis 
of a given political program, which requires the setting of objectives and long-
term goals: the extent to which individual legislative proposals contribute to 
those goals should become a key factor in future ex ante impact assessment. 
Governments elected on the basis of political agendas that devote significant 
attention to distributional issues will have to motivate how their policy decisions 
contribute to socially desirable outcomes; governments committed towards 
improving the environment should explain how they plan to achieve their goals 
through the ex ante impact assessment process, as well as with subsequent 
policy appraisal tools. Governments committed to increasing the 
competitiveness of certain economic sectors will explain in ex ante RIA what 
they expect to achieve with their proposals. Since most governments around the 
world are committed on all those fronts, ex ante RIA (together with a carefully 
planned and widely disclosed legislative planning) should incorporate an 
analysis of the expected outcomes of legislation, potential risks connected to 
unforeseen factors or unexpected behavioral responses, etc. Accountability also 
means that stakeholders should be able to observe how a given government 
agenda unfolds through individual legislative proposals, and the reason why 
government is proposing certain policy actions to achieve its goals: in this 
respect, especially in presidential democracies, RIA can serve its purpose much 
more effectively if it is taken as an instrument of policy coherence, rather than 
pure number crunching (and often, number guessing). This, in turn, forces 
policymakers to disclose their ultimate goals, rather than hide between a fake 
representation of the ultimate objectives of their policies (economic efficiency).  
That said, RIA does not only take place in governments. The issue whether 
independent agencies and Parliaments should undertake RIA has remained 
outside the scope of this Thesis. To be sure, there seems to be no reason why 
                                                   
429 See Section 4.4.1 above for a more detailed explanation.  
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more sophisticated law and economic analysis of legislation should not be used 
to enlighten the expected outcomes and impacts of proposed policies, also in 
sectoral regulation or in issues debate within Congress. Against this 
background, extending RIA beyond mere secondary legislation makes sense. 
The “RIA as policy coherence” approach fits much better the daily working of 
parliaments than the “RIA as efficiency” one. As is slowly happening at least in 
EU policymaking, the IA document can gradually become a representation of 
the main expectations, concerns, plans and goals that the proposing institution 
is attaching to a given policy proposal, incorporating over time the information 
provided by all stakeholders and an updated view of the effects that the policy 
action at hand is likely to produce in the future. Accordingly, there seems to be 
room for this type of RIA also in Parliaments: on the other hand, if RIA is 
presented as rocket science, not only the political dialogue is polluted by a 
distorted message (RIA is never rocket science), but also parliamentarians and 
congressmen are unlikely to welcome it, since it is proposed as a key reference 
that should constrain their freedom to vote.  
In the case of independent (i.e. non-governmental) agencies, RIA is already 
widely used in a limited number of countries (e.g. the United Kingdom, but also 
Italy). In many cases, especially when RIA is applied to sectoral regulation, 
emphasis on market efficiency is likely to play a bigger role. At the same time, 
more socially relevant issues (e.g. universal service in the provision of services 
of general interest) should be kept in the picture as mandatory goals. Sectoral 
legislation normally contains already this form of political compromise: 
accordingly, the role of an independent sectoral regulator in performing RIA 
should be that of explaining to the targeted stakeholders how a given regulatory 
proposal is likely to contribute to the overall goals set in the framework 
legislation that guides the regulator’s activity in that specific policy domain. 
Financial regulators will have the key role of developing a RIA model that 
accounts for impacts on financial stability, rather than mere efficiency (see the 
example on large exposure reporting in Section 5.5 above). Many regulators in 
network industries will have the key task of reconciling economic efficiency with 
the need to secure long-term resilience of critical infrastructure, especially if 
framework regulations in their sector of activity will incorporate these 
stances430.  
For what the issue of “nudging administrations”, as illustrated in Section 4.4.1 
above, the use of RIA as an instrument of policy coherence requires strong 
oversight at the highest political level. While, on the one hand, using Kaldor-
Hicks cost-benefit analysis as a signal and a monitoring tool can distort the 
incentives of involved players and create equally distorted expectations on 
external stakeholders, a viable alternative has not been fully developed to date, 
and should be subject to more careful elaboration at national level, based on the 
specific legal and policy context featured by every country. To be sure, 
                                                   
430  For example, the EU Digital Agenda has now fully incorporated the need to protect critical 
infrastructure. See Actions 28-41, at http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/ 
cf/pillar.cfm?pillar_id=45. For a detailed overview, see Renda, A. and B. Hämmerli (2010), 
Protecting Critical Infrastructure in the EU, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 
December 2010.  
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administrations cannot be nudged only with Kaldor-Hicks: showing net benefits 
is not only easy (it takes some quick manipulation of the economics), it is also 
useless and sometimes dangerous.  
This issue brings me to three supplementary considerations, related to the role 
of oversight, the use of ex post evaluation and the need for additional 
institutional gatekeepers. As regards oversight, implementing a more 
sophisticated RIA system based (also) on law and economics in a government 
administration means that there should be a central oversight body endowed 
with sufficient capacity to detect the soundness of the scientific approach 
adopted, as well as the consistency between the impact assessment and long-
term policy goals set by the government. This implies that the central oversight 
body is skilled in law and economics, as well as in several technical fields of 
legislation (the current OIRA hosts not only economists and lawyers, but also 
toxicologists, environmental experts, and many other professionals). It also 
implies that the oversight body is rooted in the centre-of-government: an 
external oversight body (or a body of experts) would not be able to assess the 
policy coherence aspect of RIA, and would not increase the “ownership” of the 
policy proposal by the government itself; at the same time, an oversight body 
rooted in the centre of government, but unable to check the soundness of the 
underlying legal and economic approach to the impact assessment would simply 
become a club of readers, unable to provide any guidance on how to translate 
policy problems into political solutions.  
At the same time, this emerging view of RIA as an instrument of policy 
coherence requires that the interim and the ex post phases of policy appraisal be 
strengthened. The European Commission seems to be potentially converging 
towards this policy coherence approach much more than the US, at least based 
on some recent developments in the EU better regulation agenda. Policy 
coherence must be checked along the implementation phases of the policy cycle, 
and be translated into feedback for future regulatory initiatives. Behavioral 
effects and the evolution of social norms must be monitored over time to ensure 
the effectiveness of policy decisions, and evaluated ex post to ensure that policy 
learning takes place. That said, the current evaluation practice mostly looks at 
another aspect of policy: whether the quantification and monetization of 
benefits and costs was correct. This is, in my opinion, a futile exercise, since the 
ex ante estimates are unlikely to be precise. What really counts is assessing if 
those estimates led to adopting a wise policy option, and whether the current 
policy in place is helping the achievement of policy goals.  
For what concerns the role of additional institutional gatekeepers, the “RIA as 
policy coherence” approach might make it more difficult to challenge RIA in 
court on the basis of failure to perform full-fledged cost-benefit analysis. At the 
same time, judicial oversight could be introduced for the mere failure to 
perform impact assessment. In addition, the need to create forms of external ex 
post oversight of the soundness of the regulatory appraisal process leaves room 
for the Courts of Auditors, external expert groups representing various 
stakeholders, competition authorities and groups of academic advisors to act as 
gatekeepers of the system, helping a more constructive dialogue through an 
analysis of the impact assessments performed in support of policy decisions.  
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Finally, as I observed in Section 4 above, it is important to provide a clear 
answer to the question “if” and “when” policymakers should engage in RIA for a 
given policy proposal. My “meta-RIA” approach as illustrated in Section 4.4.1 
above led to concluding that the principle of proportionate analysis should be 
better qualified: depending on the stage of the policy process, the questions to 
be addressed should differ, and the extent to which certain answers are 
delegated to the ex post phase should be addressed more carefully, in order to 
enable a more efficient use of resources to be allocated to the policy appraisal 
process. I will get back to this issue in the next section, especially looking at the 
future of the EU impact assessment system. 
6.4 What would a stronger integration between law and 
economics and RIA mean for the US and EU impact 
assessment systems? 
The two RIA systems analyzed in Sections 2 and 3 of this Thesis – the US and 
EU – are radically different in scope, purpose, methodology, number of 
analyses, oversight and also overall “success” – defined as the extent to which 
the system is mainstreamed in the policy process. Accordingly, the conclusions 
drawn in this Thesis cannot be said to potentially affect the two systems in one 
and the same way. To the contrary, the lessons that can be drawn for the US 
system are to a large extent different from those that can be addressed to the EU 
system. Below, I discuss briefly the potential lesson for the United States, and 
focus more on the European Union, a system that I have gotten to know more 
directly in the past few years.  
The US RIA system is currently under attack for at least three different reasons: 
its scope, its methodology, and the use of nudging. As regards the first two, they 
seem to be intimately related: the exclusive application of RIA to secondary 
legislation makes it easier to use Kaldor-Hicks cost-benefit analysis as a 
reference methodology, under the assumption that such methodology is a viable 
tool to enable principal-agent monitoring. However, two important caveats 
much be spelled out. First, in certain fields secondary legislation poses 
important distributional issues, as well as problems with social norms and 
public goods; when these problems are at hand, the use of neoclassical 
economics as a theoretical framework seems likely to hamper the effectiveness 
of the principal-agent scheme that underlies US RIA. Put differently, controlling 
the Environmental Protection Agency by simply checking that rules have 
satisfied Kaldor-Hicks does not ensure that the need to preserve the 
environment of biodiversity has been fully taken into account; controlling the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration in this way does not sufficiently 
guarantee safety. Accordingly, this Thesis leads to concluding that the Kaldor-
Hicks cost-benefit analysis should be replaced with a more refined and updated 
methodology also in the US RIA system.  
Moreover, this Thesis also concluded that (a more sophisticated version of) RIA 
can be usefully implemented also outside the rather narrow scope of secondary 
legislation, and permeate parliaments and independent agencies. If this were 
the case in the United States, then the current version of RIA, tailored for 
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government agencies, could not be usefully transplanted. Major changes are 
needed to make RIA useful and compatible with the context of independent 
agencies and (even more importantly) parliaments: without those changes, the 
transplant would lead to an immediate, inevitable rejection. The changes that 
would be needed imply, alas, abandoning the current emphasis on cost-benefit 
analysis, and embracing a more useful concept of policy coherence, as well as 
openness to stakeholder opinions and interests.   
Finally, as regards the use of nudging techniques, my impression is that this use 
of “gentle push” can be interpreted in at least two different ways. If we are 
simply referring to nudging as the attempt to inspire individual behavior by 
showing citizens which courses of action would be good “for themselves” at the 
moment of choosing, then the application of nudging is likely to be very narrow 
in scope, and confined to all those case in which systematic behavioral biases 
lead consumers to make undesired mistakes, which they will regret afterwards. 
However, if nudging means a more aggressive form of libertarian paternalism, 
this may mean that, while preserving the possibility for individuals or 
businesses to choose whatever course of conduct, the government will take 
action to persuade them to adopt a socially sustainable behavior, i.e. what would 
be “good for society”, rather than “good for themselves”. This latter version is of 
course much more debatable in political terms: not only it implies a potentially 
more intrusive role of the state in individual decisions; it also implies that 
governments formulate independent value judgments, and use those judgments 
to steer individual behavior.  I do not disagree with this view, and am confident 
in stating that the need for such value judgments to orient also ex ante policy 
appraisal is supported by recent developments in social sciences. At the same 
time, I am also aware that different political views can lead to widely diverging 
opinions on the extent to which the visible hand of the government can and 
should interfere with the invisible hand of individual freedom.  
The potential consequences of this Thesis for the EU Impact Assessment system 
and overall smart regulation agenda are more far-reaching. Policy 
recommendations can be drawn as regards many aspects of the current EU 
system, including; (i) the overall approach to IA; (ii) the scope of the analysis; 
(iii) the principle of proportionate analysis; (iv) the methodology used; (v) the 
most appropriate forms of oversight; (vi) the IA activity in the European 
Parliament and in the Council; (vii) the role of indicators and ex post evaluation; 
and (viii) the need to create a multi-level chain of impact assessments, which 
involves also Member States of the European union in a quest for enhanced 
policy coherence in the EU. Below, I briefly comment on each of those eight 
fronts.  
First, as regards the overall approach to Impact Assessment, the European 
Commission rightly decided to depart from exclusive reliance on quantitative 
cost-benefit analysis when introducing the system back in 2002, also based on 
the wise indications of the Mandelkern report. At the same time, the 
Commission seems to be getting it right when it announces that, in the future, 
more attention will be dedicated to ex post evaluation in order to “close” the 
policy cycle. However, the good news end here. A look at the practice of impact 
assessment in Brussels reveals a persisting and still stunning lack of skills, a 
growing emphasis towards administrative burdens reductions, and no interest 
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whatsoever for the analysis of incentives as opposed to the quantification of 
impacts. Even the new Communication on Smart Regulation adopted in October 
2010, though emphasizing the need for more ex post evaluation, relates this 
change mostly to the need to “identify new opportunities to simplify legislation 
and reduce administrative burdens”431. Accordingly, the EU impact assessment 
system remains suspended in a sort of political limb, with weak emphasis on 
quantification of impacts, but also weak relation to high-level political goals, as 
also observed by authoritative commentators. This Thesis suggests that, of the 
two opposite directions, the European Commission should move towards a 
better link between overarching policy goals (politically set and monitored over 
time), and the methodology chosen to achieve them (adopted in the ex ante 
impact assessment). In this respect, recent calls for stronger involvement of the 
European Parliament and the Council in the decisions of which proposals 
should undertake IA would enhance the role of IA as a tool that supports high 
quality policy proposals within a principal-agent mechanisms, where the 
Commission is the agent and the politically elected bodies the principal432.  
Second, for what concerns the scope of the analysis, the EU system made a very 
ambitious, but also encouraging step in the direction of a more pervasive RIA 
system, by getting rid of the “R” in RIA and creating an impact assessment 
system that applies to binding and non-binding policy documents, and to 
primary as well as secondary legislation. At the same time, this decision was not 
accompanied by sufficient arrangements aimed at diversifying the type of 
analysis needed, the types of questions asked at each stage of the policy process, 
as well as making the Commission accountable for deciding to undertake IA or 
not on a policy proposal. This is why the decision on the scope of IA in the 
European Union has remained orphan of accompanying measures.  
Third, the previous paragraph leads to further reflection, in particular as 
regards the use of the principle of proportionate analysis and the need to “ask 
the right questions, at the right time and in the right sequence”. As already 
recalled, the EU better regulation agenda contemplates a chain of IAs over the 
policy cycle, from the initial stage of broad strategic document to subsequent 
stages, in which the policy initiative is translated into a legislative document. 
This feature of the IA in Brussels calls for a careful application of the principle of 
proportionality, as well as of the selection of methodologies that are more 
appropriate at each step of the policy process. In particular, a “policy cycle” 
approach to the selection of the “right questions” to be addressed at each policy 
stage is needed in order to ensure that resources are correctly allocated. Against 
this background, using IA efficiently means investing effort and resources in ex 
ante appraisal up to the point where the input provided by the IA allows the 
decision-maker to make “the right choice”, or at least a reasonably educated 
guess.  A useful example is the impact assessment performed on White Papers, 
such as the one illustrated in our example on private antitrust enforcement in 
                                                   
431  See the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Smart 
Regulation in the European Union, COM(2010)543, 8 October 2010, at 2.1. 
432  Renda, A. et al. (2009), Policymaking in the EU; achievements, challenges and proposals 
for reform, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels.   
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Section 5.3 above. As these documents normally contain an indication of the 
direction the Commission has decided to undertake in order to address a 
specific policy problem, the key issues that should be tackled at this stage 
certainly include a thorough assessment of the need to intervene, and to do it at 
EU level. Thus, the subsidiarity test and the analysis of the zero option should 
play a paramount role in these IAs; in addition, a scenario analysis 
corresponding to alternative policy choices is certainly helpful to justify a 
specific approach the Commission considers to be preferable over alternative 
policy choices. Failing to assess the impact of the zero option and to perform the 
subsidiarity test at an early stage of the policy process can lead to undesirable 
results in terms of the efficiency of the overall process: what happens if, after an 
IA on a broad strategy document, in the IA on the final legislative document the 
analysis of the zero option (or, also, the subsidiarity test) shows that the 
proposal is a dead end, at least in cost-benefit terms? Many resources would 
have been invested in vain433. A possible way to approach the problem of timing 
and efficient use of resources is to revisit the IA guidelines by creating an 
“incremental” or “staged” approach to IA, such as the simple one reported 
below, in Figure 23434. As shown in the Figure, after the Green Paper stage, the 
first IA is normally performed on the way towards the White Paper or a 
Communication. In this phase, the key questions to be addressed are: is there a 
problem? Is action at EU level needed? What alternative policy options may be 
envisaged? These questions should ideally be addressed from a law and 
economics perspective, aimed at identifying the causes and drivers of emerging 
policy problems. Needless to say, if these questions are answered negatively, the 
IA would indicate a “dead end”. Once the White Paper sets the general approach 
that can be undertaken by the Commission, a consultation process leads to the 
                                                   
433  Conversely, investing too much effort in quantifying the impact of specific policy measures 
already at the White Paper stage makes little sense from an economic perspective, as the 
final policy choice will be taken only after a new legislative document, at least two rounds of 
consultation, the opinions of a number of EU institutions (EESC, CoR, etc.) and the input of 
Parliament and Council. Currently, many IAs performed by the Commission carry an in-
depth analysis of options that are not translated into final policy choices at the end of the 
legislative iter. For example, the IA on the proposed “Directive on the cross-border transfer 
of registered office” in 2007 concluded that it was “not clear that adopting a directive would 
represent the least onerous way of achieving the objectives set”, and that it would be “more 
appropriate to wait until the impacts of those developments can be fully assessed and the 
need and scope for any EU action better defined”. However desirable this result may appear, 
it must also be noticed that it was reached after two rounds of consultation (1997 and 2002), 
the work performed by a high-level group and a constant involvement of stakeholders before 
the IA was finally performed on the proposed directive. Part of this effort could have been 
avoided, had the IA been carried out at an earlier stage with a specific focus on the “zero 
option”, subsidiarity and proportionality. The same can be said of other IAs, such as the IA 
on the “Proportionality between Capital and Control in Listed Companies”.  
434  I proposed one such system in an earlier paper, back in 2008: the proposal was later taken 
on board by the European Court of Auditors in the draft version of its report on the EU 
Impact Assessment System, but not included in the final version of the report. See European 
Court of Auditors, Impact Assessments in the EU institutions: do they support decision-
making?, Special Report no. 3, 2010, available online at 
http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/5412743.PDF. The draft version of the 
Report was much longer and way more critical, but was ultimately shortened and cut after 
bilateral exchanges with the European Commission.  
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refinement of such approach, and its translation into concrete policy proposals. 
This is the stage at which more in-depth analyses such as cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA), cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) or in-depth law and economics analysis 
must be undertaken. Finally, as will be clarified in the next pages of this Thesis, 
the IA should be updated to reflect the amendments introduced by the 
Parliament and the Council during co-decision.  
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Fourth, the methodology to be used in Impact Assessment must be chosen with 
due care, especially in a system with a very broad scope such as the EU impact 
assessment system. This Thesis suggests that mainstream cost-benefit analysis 
can be useful only in a very narrow subset of the policy problems addressed by 
the European Commission in its impact assessments. To the contrary, especially 
whenever individual incentives, compliance and enforcement are at stake, a 
refined version of law and economics can help policymakers take informed 
decisions. In all other cases, a qualitative indication of the pros and cons of 
different policy options, such as a scorecard exercise, can prove useful. The 
decision about the right methodology must be taken by the central oversight 
body in charge of the impact assessment system, together with the proposing 
administration, at the beginning of the impact assessment process. Currently, 
no such decision is taken, which weakens the role of the oversight body and its 
capacity to monitor and support in due time the impact assessment work being 
carried out by the administration.  
Fifth, the problem of strengthening oversight to improve the quality of IAs has 
long been discussed in Brussels. As I reported in other publications, since the 
end of the 1990s the issue whether a dedicated, external oversight body should 
be created to oversee the better regulation agenda was always hot at the EU 
level. Since 2003, several authors – including myself – have advocated stronger 
oversight of Commission IAs, which led the European Commission to appoint 
the Impact Assessment Board. Today, several options are still on the table, 
including: (i) strengthening the IAB with more resources and support staff; (ii) 
enhancing/institutionalizing the role of existing networks such as the HLG of 
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national regulatory experts and the HLG of independent stakeholders435; (iii) 
mandating consultation on draft IAs; (iv) creating a new agency in charge of 
oversight; (v) providing for ex post scrutiny of a sample of IAs by the European 
Court of Auditors436; or (vi)  creating a representation of businesses within the 
Commission Secretariat General, along the lines of the UK Risk and Regulation 
Advisory Council (formerly “Better Regulation Task Force” and “Better 
Regulation Commission”). In previous research, I have advocated for public 
consultation on draft Impact Assessments as the most viable way of ensuring 
that administrations think outside the box, consider all possible options and 
provide all needed data for a comprehensive analysis of the policy problem. At 
the same time, only relying on stronger public consultation would create risks of 
capture of the European Commission, and does not guarantee a sound law and 
economics approach such as the one advocated in this Thesis. To achieve the 
latter result, a stronger Impact Assessment Board, with the participation of 
experts in inter-disciplinary analysis and behavioral sciences should be created 
– possibly with the participation of experts from the rather idle Bureau of 
Economic Policy Advisors of the European Commission, adequately re-staffed.   
Sixth, no reform of the EU impact assessment model would lead anywhere if IAs 
keep being so short-lived. At the same time, there seem to be little prospects for 
fulfilling the original promised cast in stone  y the Inter-Institutional Agreement 
on Better Lawmaking and by the Common Approach to Impact Assessment. If 
the EU impact assessment system will remain as it is, with no real tie with long-
term EU policy goals, the involvement of the European Parliament and the 
Council in the drafting of Impact Assessments is unlikely to materialize. To the 
contrary, the European Commission could assist the Parliament and the Council 
in drafting IAs on their own amendments, just as in the US the OIRA has been 
offering advice to the Congressional Budget Office for the drafting of certain ad 
hoc policy evaluations. For strategic Commission initiatives included in the 
policy agenda, the need to update the IA document during the co-decision 
                                                   
435  For example, ex post oversight could be strengthened by mandating that existing High Level 
Groups (HLGs) dealing with IA-related issues review a sample of Commission IAs every 
year and issue suggestions for improvement. The HLGs at hand would be the HLG of 
national regulatory experts and the HLG of independent stakeholders (for issues concerning 
the measurement of administrative burdens). This option would provide a rather “soft” 
solution to the need for increased accountability of the Commission’s work on IA, providing 
for an “institutionalization” of existing expert groups. This would be particularly welcome in 
case the EU agenda heads towards some form of convergence between the IA system and 
methodology at EU and national level, in line with one of the issues identified by the 
Commission in the Communication on the second strategic review of better regulation in the 
EU.  
436 In the UK, the National Audit Office reviews a sample of RIAs carried out by UK departments 
every year, highlights best and worst practices and issues recommendations. The 
replicability of the “NAO review” in Brussels is however difficult, as the ECA would have to 
be empowered with a function that is quite far from its current mission and competences. If 
the IA system at EU level were more explicitly targeted towards an efficient use of 
Commission resources, then the ECA could be given a broader role of ensuring that the 
Commission has spent its budget for IAs properly: but the ECA will hardly be able to 
comment on the quality of economic analysis contained in a sample of Commission IAs. In 
short, this option would require the creation of an additional unit within the ECA, which 
would remain rather separate from the mission of the institution. 
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procedure is almost a “must”: without a fully updated impact assessment 
document, closing the policy cycle and involving other EU institutions and 
member states would simply be impossible – this, in turn, would mean that also 
the current objectives of the EU smart regulation agenda would not be achieved. 
In summary, a strong central body in the Commission, supported by economic 
advisors skilled in law and economics, should select together with the European 
Parliament and the Council the strategic initiatives that should undergo in-
depth Impact Assessment in the Commission’s yearly agenda; depending on the 
stage of the policy cycle at which the proposal can be located, the key questions 
to be answered should be selected by the central oversight body; there should be 
consultation on draft IAs, and update of those IAs during co-decision. All the 
analytical work should be performed by the European Commission.   
Seventh, the need to update the IA document overtime becomes stronger as the 
European Commission has expressed its desire to “close the policy cycle” by 
expanding the use of ex post evaluation, and making such evaluation a 
mandatory step before any new ex ante Impact Assessment is performed. In this 
respect, it must be observed that Commission IAs almost increasingly feature a 
choice of indicators that will enable monitoring and evaluation over time, even 
though these indicators are not always properly chosen, and no one can assure 
they will be applied. In the future, based on the findings of this Thesis, a number 
of refinements should be introduced: (i) indicators should be chosen based on 
the specific objectives of the policy proposal, as specified in the introductory 
sections of the Impact Assessment; (ii) indicators should also reflect the policy 
coherence between the objectives of the specific policy proposal and the longer-
term objectives of the European Union in the specific policy domain in which 
the proposal can be located; (iii) indicators should be revised during co-
decision; and (iv) the same indicators should become the basis for tracking 
progress in the implementation of the policy action in Member States, as well as 
collecting data on the performance of the policy over time. This, and only this, 
means having a chance to close the policy cycle.   
Eight, there is a need for a coordinated action of the EU and member states in 
order to achieve multi-level convergence in the use of Impact Assessment tools. 
This has proven to be prohibitively difficult in the past years, also due to the fact 
that the Commission was expecting from Member States a mirror image of its 
own impact assessment system. To the contrary, the European Commission 
should involve Member States in the performance of key IA steps in the 
monitoring of the implementation and enforcement phases of the adopted 
policy action. This would help Commission policies keep their relation with the 
ultimate policy goals the Commission intended to pursue at the very beginning: 
the same goals that are currently lost very quickly, if not instantaneously, in the 
policy process of the European Union.  
Summing up, insights from law and economics suggest that the EU Impact 
Assessment system should be substantially reformed. This would lead to a 
system in which the democratically elected EU bodies – the European 
Parliament and the Council – act as principals in the policy process, choosing 
which proposals would deserve Impact Assessment (on the basis of clear-cut 
criteria) and delegating all IA activity to the European Commission, including 
the update of the IA document during co-decision. A system in which the 
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Commission performs Impact Assessment based on more flexible 
methodologies, fine-tuned both on the basis of the specific stage of the policy 
process at which the proposal is located, and on the IA techniques that fits best 
the specifics of the policy problem. An IA system in which incentives play a 
more important role, and are always considered, especially when public goods 
and long-term objectives of EU policies are at stake. And a system in which 
Member States contribute to tracking the progress and performance of EU 
policies through the provision of data and a virtuous market for ideas and policy 
suggestions. Finally, a system in which ex ante policy appraisal is only a piece of 
a more complex puzzle, in which some issues are addressed at the ex post 
evaluation phase, rather than uselessly subject to in-depth analysis ex ante.  
But most importantly, the EU Impact Assessment should become an instrument 
of policy coherence. In particular, coherence with the long term goals of the 
European Union, as enshrined in the EU Treaty, but also in the articulated long-
term strategies of the European Union, including, most notably, the EU2020 
strategy, its ambition to pursue smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, and the 
many indicators that are being developed under the umbrellas of its seven 
flagship initiatives. Since the European Commission is known as being the 
“guardian of the Treaty” in the European Union, it should also act as the 
ultimate guardian of the long-term policy objectives that have been agreed upon 
by political consensus of the 27 Member States of the European Union. Once 
these objectives have been identified, the Commission will have a set of goals to 
pursue with its proposed policies, and will have to address the issue whether 
command and control policies, self-regulatory policies, nudging or other forms 
of regulatory intervention are the most suited to effectively achieve these goals 
in the years to come. This is what I mean by policy coherence: linking the ex 
ante and ex post evaluation of EU policies to the promises made at EU level, and 
using the IA system to avoid that politically set goals are then easily lost in the 
day-to-day policy jungle of co-decision procedures.  
6.5 Agenda for future research 
This Thesis is an attempt to lay the first stone of what should, in my opinion, 
become a much more sophisticated dialogue in the years to come. Below, I 
outline some of the most promising avenues for future research I have identified 
during the drafting of this work. I start from individual research paths in law 
and economics and in policy appraisal, and then explore new research 
directions on the integration between the two disciplines.  
As far as law and economics is concerned, this Thesis has argued that more 
research would be needed on the incorporation of independent value judgments 
and on the treatment of distributional issues in cost-benefit analysis. At the 
same time, scholars in this field should seek to find ways to re-build the 
prescriptive power of law and economics after the advent of behavioral law and 
economics, which destroyed most of the self-confidence exhibited by 
neoclassical lawyer-economists in the past years. In this respect, asymmetric or 
libertarian paternalism do not seem to have substantially addressed the current 
lack of normative guidance from law and economics. Moreover, research on how 
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to overcome methodological individualism in law and economics would help 
building a bridge between this and other, equally enlightening social sciences, 
such as positive political theory, moral philosophy, psychology and sociology, 
which can help policymakers understand the causes of social actions and the 
mechanisms underlying public policymaking: the inspiring contributions of 
scholars such as Herbert Hovenkamp back in the mid-1990s has been almost 
neglected in recent years, and this Thesis attempted a rediscovery that I hope 
will trigger more research in the future. Finally, research on possible 
taxonomies of legal intervention and alternative forms of regulation would 
preserve the usefulness of law and economics scholarship for policymaking 
purposes. 
For what concerns the RIA world, this Thesis has argued that the international 
regulatory reform community should take a deep breath and reflect further, 
before proposing models of RIA in developed and developing countries. This 
comment is mostly addressed to the OECD and the World Bank, which sponsor 
RIA worldwide, often without placing it in the national context and ignoring the 
treatment of distributional issues in RIA. The main reasons for the huge 
adoption-implementation gap already denounced by authoritative scholars in 
the field can partly be related to the fact that the usefulness of the RIA model 
sponsored so far at the international level hardly justifies the skills and 
resources needed to put it in place. A more open approach to possible 
methodologies for ex ante impact assessment, including the use of behavioral 
sciences and the departure from methodological individualism, would certainly 
contribute to a more coherent use of RIA within the policy process adopted by 
national governments. Likewise, this Thesis has highlighted the need for more 
research on the “staged approach” to impact assessment, as well as on the 
allocation of resources between (different phases of) ex ante and (various stages 
of) ex post policy appraisal as ways to really close the policy cycle. This would 
also lead to a different view of cornerstones of regulatory reform, such as the 
principle of proportionate analysis and the interaction between the analysis of 
the stock (including the administrative burdens it generates) and the appraisal 
of the flow of legislation. Finally, this Thesis has also argued in favor of more 
research on indicators: this can be applied both at the systemic level (i.e. better 
ways of tracking the implementation of RIA in the policy process); at the 
individual IA level (i.e. comparing the relative quality of different IA 
documents); and at the individual policy level (i.e. developing indicators to 
enable monitoring and evaluation of individual policies).  
To the extent that readers will find the scientific angle adopted in this Thesis a 
promising one, more research will be needed to assess the extent to which law 
and economics, in the refined version advocated here, can find citizenship in the 
RIA world. This implies that the modeling of incentives, the assessment of 
patterns of compliance, the development of more advanced criteria to determine 
efficiency, fairness and justice impacts of alternative policy options would be 
needed in the years to come in order to inspire better impact assessment and 
policy evaluation work. Likewise, the study of social norms and how to change 
them to trigger more socially and environmentally sustainable behavior; the 
analysis of optimal incentives to use public goods; the assessment of the 
effectiveness of private and public regulation; and the possible uses of nudging 
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and asymmetric paternalism in the context of ex ante policy appraisal will 
constitute each an equally promising research avenue. If researchers will decide 
to advance in these directions, we may soon be able to announce that law and 
economics and RIA are not anymore twins separated at birth, but mutually 
supportive disciplines in the restless search for better lawmaking.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, future research is likely to shed more 
light on the possibility for all social sciences to more usefully contribute to the 
relatively isolated science of policy formulation. The brief account of recent 
theories of justice given in Section 4.3.3.2 above is perhaps the most revealing. 
There is little doubt that economics has in the past decades departed from the 
enlightening foundations laid by Adam Smith, David Hume and some of their 
inspired successors; similarly, there is no doubt that moral philosophy has had 
limited impact on policy studies because its prescriptions have remained so far 
tied to the definition of ideal states of the world, rather than to the reality that 
policymakers have to face every day. Bringing economics back to its 
methodological holism, and moral philosophy down to reality are two very 
promising ways to lay the foundations for a better society, and to bring all social 
sciences “in the RIA world”. For this reason, the interaction between theories of 
justice, efficiency and fairness should be subject matter of extensive future 
research, to which I myself plan to contribute.  
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SUMMARY 
 
The Thesis focuses on the use of law and economics in the ex ante impact 
assessment of proposed legislation. The two disciplines (law and economics and 
ex ante impact assessment) have been following parallel tracks since the late 
1970s. At that time, law and economics was a rising star in the domain of social 
sciences, and in particular Chicago scholars were conquering new spaces in the 
field of public policy, by increasingly dictating new paradigms in the fields of 
antitrust law, tort law, property and contracts. The theories of industry 
regulation were increasingly dominated by Chicago law and economics, which 
offered a simple and predictable set of principles that could guide policymakers 
in the search for more efficient rules. Scholars such as Ronald Coase, Guido 
Calabresi, Gary Becker provided ground-breaking insights into the 
understanding of the role of policymakers in market economies. However, their 
successors – in primis Richard Posner – sought to transform the egregious 
potential of law and economics into a deeply normative tool, which would 
replace other, equally important criteria used in legal adjudication and in public 
policymaking, such as justice and fairness. Posner’s idea was that efficiency 
(intended in the sense of neoclassical economics) is a proxy for justice, and 
proposed the “potential Pareto efficiency” criterion as the standard test to be 
utilized by judges in common law adjudication. This would have meant, 
however, very serious consequences from the standpoint of fairness, justice and 
even economic efficiency.  
First, The potential Pareto efficiency criterion, or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, 
neglects distributional impacts and treats all individuals alike: accordingly, 
whether a given legal rule provides advantages to a rich person or a poor person, 
it makes no difference for the policymaker using that criterion.  
Secondly, and relatedly, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is based on two basic 
assumptions: that absent the possibility of measuring and comparing individual 
utility, wealth can be a proxy for welfare – a corollary being that one Euro is 
worth to a rich person as much as it is to a poor person; and that measures of 
individual willingness to pay (WTP) can be taken as proxies for the intensity of 
individual preferences and can be aggregated into an overall figure that shows 
the total value attached to a given good or event by society. These two 
assumptions, “wealth a welfare” and “methodological individualism”, have been 
widely criticized by scholars and commentators in social sciences, and especially 
in philosophy and in economics.  
For those reasons, the ambitious attempt by lawyer-economists to “colonize” 
legal scholarship through the use of cost-benefit analysis based on Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency eventually failed. The Thesis locates this failure in the Symposium on 
“efficiency as a legal concern” held in Chicago in 1978, which later spurred a 
stream of scholarly papers appeared on the Hofstra Law Review and the Journal 
of Legal Studies in the following years.  
Notwithstanding this failed attempt, traces of the expansionism of Chicago 
economics into public policy are still found in the US and – to a lesser extent – 
in EU policymaking. Since 1981, the US launched the first system of ex ante 
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regulatory impact analysis (RIA), which was based on Kaldor-Hicks cost-benefit 
analysis. Based on this system, government agencies should perform a RIA of all 
new regulatory proposals, in order to show that they were justified in terms of 
net benefits. Since then, all US administrations have endorsed – with minor 
changes – the use of RIA as a mandatory procedure in US Federal regulation: 
failure to perform RIA (properly) would lead to blocking a proposal before its 
adoption, or to judicial review ex post. Thousands of RIAs have been completed 
in the US since 1981, and all based on a “resourcist” efficiency criterion, i.e. the 
Kaldor-hicks potential Pareto efficiency.   
Since 2003, also the European Commission has launched a similar system, 
termed Impact Assessment (IA), which aims at assessing all the economic, 
social and environmental impacts of major new policy initiatives adopted by EU 
institutions. More than 500 IAs have been completed since then, highlighting an 
increased use of quantitative cost-benefit analysis in support of policy decisions. 
Also in the EU, though to a lesser extent, the Kaldor-Hicks principle plays an 
important role in showing the policy option that should be retained as the “most 
efficient”.  
Today, RIA has been adopted in approximately 50 jurisdictions around the 
world, and is heavily sponsored by international organizations such as the 
World Bank and the OECD in their attempts to foster regulatory reform. Many 
of these countries have tried to adopt a RIA model that mirrored the US, but 
reality is that to date most of them have failed in their attempt.  
This Thesis claims that RIA could be better understood and implemented in 
practice if mre sophisticated and sound law and economics were used in support 
of public policy decisions. This would mean (i) departing, to the extent possible, 
from pure cost-benefit analysis based on the monetization of impacts, which – 
as explained above – features enormous methodological problems; (ii) using law 
and economics to model individual incentives and understand individual 
behavior, also based on the findings of recent literature on behavioral 
economics and neuroeconomics; (iii) relying on all social sciences to understand 
the role of social norms in determining the viability and effectiveness of a new 
regulation; and (iv) departing from individual WTP in the assessment of the 
value of non-market goods, such as saved lives or life-years, or public goods 
such as the environment. As a matter of fact, the Thesis states that, while 
current RIA practice is based on the pre-1978 “imperialistic” era of law and 
economics, future RIA systems should be reconciled with the enormous 
progress that social sciences have made since then.  
The Thesis contains six chapters. The first chapter (“Prologue: the birth of 
administrative law and economics”) introduces the main definitions and 
illustrates the crisis that is affecting both law and economics scholarship and 
RIA. It also traces back in time the birth of administrative law and economics, 
i.e. when neoclassical, Chicago law and economics determined the emergence of 
RIA in US government agencies at the beginning of the 1980s, under the Reagan 
administration. Finally, this section illustrates the purpose and structure of the 
Book.   
Chapter 2 (“RIA in the United States”) contains a chronological description of 
the evolution of the RIA model in the United States, illustrating in detail the 
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changes that occurred during the Clinton administration, and later with George 
W. Bush. The chapter also dedicates extensive attention to the current approach 
adopted by the Obama administration, with Cass Sunstein (a law and economics 
scholar from Chicago) being the new "regulatory Czar", i.e. the new head of the 
Office of Information and regulatory Affairs, which oversees the RIA process in 
the US. Finally, this chapter discusses the hectic debate that has surrounded the 
implementation of RIA in US government agencies, mostly from a 
methodological perspective.  
Chapter 3 (“EU impact assessment: history, practice and outcomes”) describes 
the origins and evolution of the EU impact assessment system. The chapter 
contains a historical account and also an unprecedented scorecard analysis of 
the content of the 475 IA documents produced by the Commission between 
2003 and the end of 2009. In addition, the chapter discusses current pressure 
for reforming the system and problems that have emerged both from the 
standpoint of governance, and from that of RIA methodology. Finally, the 
chapter surveys the state of RIA implementation in EU member states, 
providing a rather discouraging picture of current developments.  
In Chapter 4 (“Ex ante policy appraisal: insights from positive, normative and 
functional schools of law and economics”) the evolution of law and economics is 
described in a way that is functional to the understanding of current problems 
in ex ante RIA of public policies. First the origins of law and economics are 
described, its pioneers, its explosion in the 1950s and 1960s and the main 
schools that have emerged since then, which are classified in normative, positive 
and functional schools. This account provides an opportunity to show the main 
achievements and failures of mainstream law and economics: a brilliant toolkit 
to understand legal rules as incentives, but also a poor theoretical framework to 
analyze the ultimate impacts of legislation. The main findings of behavioral 
economics and the need to depart from methodological individualism are 
discussed in-depth, with a view to finding more solid grounds for applying 
economic analysis to the drafting, adoption, appraisal, implementation and 
enforcement of legal rules. The idea of "nudging", as the new dominant 
paradigm in US RIA under Cass Sunstein, is extensively quoted and used. 
Chapter 5 (“Informing the RIA process through law and economics: some 
examples”) explains whether, how and to what extent can law and economics 
help policymakers in practice, by means of examples. in separate case studies, 
the chapter explains: (i) how "optional law" and "Texas Shoot-out rules" could 
help solve the problem of efficient spectrum allocation, a problem that was 
subject to extensive research, but very few convincing results; (ii) how law and 
economics was able to inspire the choice of the best policy scenario in the White 
Paper on private antitrust damages actions in the EU, leading to the 
identification of upcoming rules on class actions, access to evidence, and many 
other procedural aspects of litigation; (iii) how the European Commission failed 
to apply cost-benefit analysis in the impact assessment of the first roaming 
regulation in 2007; (iv) how different ways to signal energy efficiency can 
"nudge" consumers towards more desirable behavior, with applications to an 
impact assessment being currently carried out by the European Commission DG 
Enterprise and Industry; (v) how understanding transaction costs, risk 
attitudes, one-stop shop effects and informational asymmetries can help 
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crafting better consumer protection policies in the retail financial services 
sector, and how there were initially neglected in the study on tying and other 
potentially unfair commercial practices carried out for the European 
Commission in 2009; (vi) how understanding the wealth of networks, social 
norms and "netiquette" can inspire more effective and efficient copyright 
policies in cyberspace; (vii) how failure to understand market reactions and 
incentives led to sub-optimal emissions trading regimes; and finally (viii) how 
EU rules on large exposure reporting have led to insufficient compliance and 
under-enforcement, and why did these rules fail to protect Europe from the 
financial crisis originated in the subprime mortgage crisis in the US.  
Finally, Chapter 6 (“The future of RIA – and how can law and economics help”) 
summarizes the findings of the previous chapters and sets a new agenda for the 
future of RIA implementation, especially in the EU. For the latter, policy 
recommendations are formulated both in terms of system governance and 
methodology. Issues such as the application of the principle of proportionate 
analysis, the use of a "staged approach" to Impact Assessment, the development 
of law and economics tools as a complement to quantification of impacts, the 
involvement of the European Parliament, the Council and Member States are all 
discussed in this chapter. In addition, a future research agenda is outlined.  
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SAMENVATTING 
 
Dit proefschrift handelt over de toepassing van rechtseconomie bij de ex ante 
beoordeling van de effecten van voorgestelde regelgeving. De twee disciplines 
(rechtseconomie en de ex ante effectbeoordeling) hebben zich sinds het eind van 
de jaren ’70 langs dezelfde lijn ontwikkeld. In die tijd was het vakgebied 
rechtseconomie een rijzende ster binnen de sociale wetenschappen. Met name 
wetenschappers uit Chicago legden zich steeds meer toe op het terrein van het 
openbaar beleid en ontwikkelden in toenemende mate nieuwe paradigma’s op 
het gebied van antitrustwetgeving, de onrechtmatige daad, het eigendomsrecht 
en het overeenkomstenrecht. De rechtseconomen uit Chicago oefenden steeds 
meer invloed uit op de theorieën met betrekking tot sectorregelgeving en 
ontwierpen een reeks eenvoudige en voorspelbare principes aan de hand 
waarvan beleidsmakers efficiëntere regels konden ontwikkelen. 
Wetenschappers zoals Ronald Coase, Guido Calabresi en Gary Becker leverden 
baanbrekende inzichten betreffende de rol van beleidsmakers in 
markteconomieën. Hun opvolgers – in het bijzonder Richard Posner – streefden 
er echter naar het enorme potentieel van de rechtseconomie om te zetten in een 
normatief instrument, dat de plaats zou innemen van andere, even belangrijke 
criteria die werden toegepast bij de beoordeling van geschillen en het maken 
van openbaar beleid, zoals rechtvaardigheid en billijkheid. Posner vond dat 
efficiëntie (in de betekenis die de neoklassieke economen daaraan hadden 
gegeven) een voorwaarde was voor rechtvaardigheid en hij bedacht het 
“potentiële Pareto-criterium” als de standaardtest voor rechters bij de 
beoordeling van common law-geschillen. Dit zou echter ernstige gevolgen 
hebben gehad vanuit het perspectief van rechtvaardigheid, billijkheid en zelfs 
economische efficiëntie.  
Ten eerste houdt het potentiële Pareto-criterium, of het Kaldor/Hicks-
criterium, geen rekening met distributionele effecten en behandelt het alle 
individuen gelijk: dat betekent dat de vraag of een bepaalde regel voordelig is 
voor een rijke of een arme niet van belang is voor de beleidsmaker die dit 
criterium toepast.  
Ten tweede, en daaraan gerelateerd, is het Kaldor/Hicks-criterium gebaseerd op 
twee veronderstellingen, namelijk dat, nu de mogelijkheid van het meten en 
vergelijken van het nut per individu ontbreekt, rijkdom een voorwaarde kan zijn 
voor welzijn – een uitvloeisel daarvan is dat één euro net zoveel waard is voor 
een rijke als voor een arme; en dat de individuele betalingsbereidheid 
(willingness to pay/WTP) als maatstaf kan worden genomen voor de intensiteit 
van persoonlijke voorkeuren en daaruit een totaalcijfer kan worden berekend 
dat de totale waarde vertegenwoordigt die door de maatschappij aan een goed of 
gebeurtenis wordt toegekend. Deze twee veronderstellingen, “rijkdom en 
welzijn” en “methodologisch individualisme”, zijn sterk bekritiseerd door 
wetenschappers en commentatoren in de sociale wetenschappen en met name 
in de filosofie en economie.  
Vanwege deze redenen is de ambitieuze poging van rechtseconomen om de 
rechtswetenschap te “koloniseren” door middel van het toepassen van een 
kosten-batenanalyse op basis van het Kaldor/Hicks-criterium uiteindelijk op 
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niets uitgelopen. In dit proefschrift wordt dit fiasco blootgelegd in het 
symposium over “efficiency as a legal concern” dat in 1978 in Chicago werd 
gehouden en dat leidde tot een stroom van wetenschappelijke artikelen, die in 
de daaropvolgende jaren zijn gepubliceerd in de Hofstra Law Review en het 
Journal of Legal Studies.  
Ondanks deze mislukte poging worden er nog steeds sporen van het 
expansionisme van de Chicago-economen in het openbaar beleid aangetroffen 
in de beleidsvorming in de Verenigde Staten en – in mindere mate – in de 
Europese Unie. In 1981 lanceerden de Verenigde Staten het eerste systeem voor 
ex ante Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA), dat was gebaseerd op de kosten-
batenanalyse volgens Kaldor en Hicks. Op basis van dit systeem moeten 
overheidsorganen een RIA uitvoeren voor alle nieuwe voorgestelde regels om 
aan te tonen dat deze gerechtvaardigd zijn in termen van nettovoordelen. Vanaf 
die tijd hebben alle Amerikaanse regeringen de toepassing van RIA – met kleine 
wijzigingen – als verplichte procedure binnen de federale regelgeving 
onderschreven: het niet (op juiste wijze) uitvoeren van RIA had tot gevolg dat 
een voorstel vóór de goedkeuring daarvan werd geblokkeerd of dat er achteraf 
een juridische beoordeling plaatsvond. Sinds 1981 zijn er duizenden RIA’s 
uitgevoerd in de Verenigde Staten, die allemaal uitgingen van een “resourcist” 
efficiëntiecriterium, d.w.z. de potentiële Pareto-verbetering volgens Kaldor en 
Hicks.   
In 2003 heeft de Europese Commissie een soortgelijk systeem geïntroduceerd, 
genaamd Impact Assessment (IA), dat gericht is op het beoordelen van alle 
economische, sociale en milieueffecten van belangrijke nieuwe 
beleidsinitiatieven die door de EU-instellingen zijn goedgekeurd. Sinds die tijd 
zijn ruim 500 IA’s uitgevoerd, hetgeen laat zien dat steeds vaker een 
kwantitatieve kosten-batenanalyse wordt toegepast ter ondersteuning van 
beleidsbesluiten. Ook in de Europese Unie speelt het Kaldor/Hicks-principe een 
belangrijke rol, hoewel in mindere mate, bij het aantonen dat het 
beleidsvoorstel moet worden gehandhaafd als het “meest efficiënte”.  
Tegenwoordig is RIA geïntroduceerd in ongeveer 50 jurisdicties over de hele 
wereld en wordt het sterk gesubsidieerd door internationale organisaties zoals 
de Wereldbank en de OESO, die streven naar het stimuleren van 
beleidshervormingen. Veel van deze landen hebben geprobeerd een RIA-model 
te introduceren dat lijkt op dat van de Verenigde Staten, maar in de praktijk zijn 
de meeste van deze landen daar tot op heden niet in geslaagd.  
In dit proefschrift wordt gesteld dat het begrip van RIA groter zou zijn en de 
invoering ervan beter zou verlopen als rechtseconomie op deugdelijke wijze zou 
worden aangewend ter ondersteuning van openbare beleidsbesluiten. Dit zou 
betekenen dat (i) er afstand moet worden genomen, voor zover mogelijk, van 
een pure kosten-batenanalyse op basis van de monetisatie van effecten, die        
– zoals hierboven uitgelegd – gepaard gaat met enorme methodologische 
problemen; (ii) de rechtseconomie moet worden gebruikt om een model voor 
individuele prikkels te maken en individueel gedrag te begrijpen, mede op basis 
van de bevindingen van recente artikelen over gedragseconomie en neuro-
economie; (iii) alle sociale wetenschappen moeten worden aangewend om 
inzicht te krijgen in de rol van maatschappelijke normen bij het bepalen van de 
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levensvatbaarheid en effectiviteit van nieuwe regelgeving; en (iv) afstand moet 
worden genomen van de individuele WTP bij het beoordelen van de waarde van 
niet-verhandelbare goederen, zoals geredde levens of levensjaren, of publieke 
goederen zoals het milieu. In het proefschrift wordt zelfs gesteld dat, hoewel de 
huidige RIA-praktijk is gebaseerd op het “imperialistische” karakter van 
rechtseconomie van voor 1978, toekomstige RIA-systemen moeten worden 
afgestemd op de enorme vooruitgang die de sociale wetenschappen sinds die 
tijd hebben geboekt.  
Het proefschrift bestaat uit zes hoofdstukken. Het eerste hoofdstuk (“Prologue: 
the birth of administrative law and economics”) introduceert de belangrijkste 
definities en beschrijft de crisis die zowel de rechtseconomie als RIA treft. 
Daarnaast schetst dit hoofdstuk de geboorte van “administrative law and 
economics”, d.w.z. het moment dat de neoklassieke, Chicago rechtseconomie 
aan het begin van de jaren '80, tijdens het bewind van Reagan, de aanzet gaf tot 
de toepassing van RIA door Amerikaanse overheidsinstellingen. Ten slotte 
beschrijft dit hoofdstuk het doel en de structuur van het boek.   
Hoofdstuk 2 (“RIA in the United States”) bevat een chronologische beschrijving 
van de ontwikkeling van het RIA-model in de Verenigde Staten en legt 
uitgebreid uit welke wijzigingen werden aangebracht onder Clinton en later 
onder George W. Bush. In dit hoofdstuk wordt tevens veel aandacht besteed aan 
de huidige benadering die wordt gehanteerd door de regering-Obama. Cass 
Sunstein (een rechtseconoom uit Chicago) is de nieuwe "regelkoning", d.w.z. het 
nieuwe hoofd van het Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, dat toezicht 
uitoefent op het RIA-proces in de Verenigde Staten. Ten slotte wordt in dit 
hoofdstuk het hectische debat omtrent de implementatie van RIA binnen 
Amerikaanse overheidsinstellingen besproken, veelal vanuit een 
methodologisch perspectief.  
In hoofdstuk 3 (“EU impact assessment: history, practice and outcomes”) wordt 
het ontstaan en de ontwikkeling van het Europese effectbeoordelingssysteem 
beschreven. Het hoofdstuk bevat een historisch relaas en tevens een nog niet 
eerder uitgevoerde scorekaartanalyse van de inhoud van 475 
effectbeoordelingsdocumenten die door de Commissie zijn opgesteld tussen 
2003 en eind 2009. Daarnaast worden in dit hoofdstuk de huidige roep om 
hervorming van het systeem en de ontstane problemen beschreven zowel vanuit 
het standpunt van bestuur als vanuit het standpunt van de RIA-methodologie. 
Ten slotte wordt in dit hoofdstuk onderzocht hoe het is gesteld met de invoering 
van RIA in de EU-lidstaten, hetgeen een tamelijk ontmoedigend beeld van de 
huidige ontwikkelingen oplevert.  
In hoofdstuk 4 (“Ex ante policy appraisal: insights from positive, normative and 
functional schools of law and economics”) wordt de ontwikkeling van de 
rechtseconomie beschreven op een wijze die bijdraagt aan het vergroten van het 
inzicht in de huidige problemen omtrent ex ante RIA van openbaar beleid. Ten 
eerste wordt de oorsprong van de rechtseconomie beschreven, de pioniers 
ervan, de grote bloei die het heeft doorgemaakt in de jaren ’50 en ’60 en de 
belangrijkste stromingen die sinds die tijd zijn ontstaan, onderverdeeld in 
normatieve, positieve en functionele stromingen. Deze beschrijving geeft de 
gelegenheid om de belangrijkste verworvenheden en mislukkingen van de 
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heersende stroming binnen de rechtseconomie te laten zien: een uitstekend 
instrumentarium voor het interpreteren van rechtsregels als stimulansen, maar 
tevens een slecht theoretisch kader voor het analyseren van de uiteindelijke 
effecten van regelgeving. De voornaamste bevindingen van gedragseconomen en 
de noodzaak om af te stappen van het methodologische individualisme worden 
grondig besproken, met de bedoeling om sterkere redenen te ontdekken voor 
het toepassen van een economische analyse op het ontwerpen, goedkeuren, 
beoordelen, implementeren en handhaven van rechtsregels. Het begrip 
"nudging", als het nieuwe heersende model binnen de Amerikaanse RIA onder 
Cass Sunstein, wordt uitvoerig geciteerd en toegepast. 
In hoofdstuk 5 (“Informing the RIA process through law and economics: some 
examples”) wordt aan de hand van voorbeelden uitgelegd of, hoe en in welke 
mate het vakgebied rechtseconomie beleidsmakers in de praktijk behulpzaam 
kan zijn. Met behulp van afzonderlijke casestudy’s wordt in dit hoofdstuk 
uitgelegd: (i) hoe "aanvullend recht" en de "Texas Shoot-out rules" kunnen 
helpen bij het oplossen van het probleem van een efficiënte spectrumtoewijzing, 
een probleem waarnaar uitgebreid onderzoek is gedaan, maar dat echter zeer 
weinig overtuigende resultaten heeft opgeleverd; (ii) hoe de rechtseconomie een 
inspiratiebron was bij de keuze van de beste beleidsaanbeveling in het Witboek 
over private schadevergoedingsacties in de EU wegens schending van de 
concurrentieregels, hetgeen leidde tot de vaststelling van aanstaande regels 
inzake collectieve acties, toegang tot bewijsmateriaal en vele andere procedurele 
aspecten van procesvoering; (iii) hoe de Europese Commissie er niet in slaagde 
om een kosten-batenanalyse uit te voeren bij de effectbeoordeling van de eerste 
roamingverordening in 2007; (iv) hoe verschillende manieren waarop het 
bewustzijn omtrent energie-efficiëntie kan worden vergroot, consumenten in de 
richting van wenselijker gedrag kunnen "duwen", met 
toepassingsmogelijkheden voor een effectbeoordeling die op dit moment door 
het DG Ondernemingen en Industrie van de Europese Commissie wordt 
uitgevoerd; (v) hoe inzicht in transactiekosten, risicoattitudes, one-stop-shop-
effecten en informatieasymmetrie kunnen helpen bij het ontwerpen van beter 
beleid op het gebied van consumentenbescherming in de financiële 
dienstverlening, en hoe deze aanvankelijk genegeerd werden bij het onderzoek 
naar “product tying” en andere mogelijk oneerlijke handelspraktijken dat in 
2009 voor de Europese Commissie werd uitgevoerd; (vi) hoe inzicht in de schat 
aan netwerken, sociale normen en “netiquette” aanleiding kan geven tot een 
effectiever en efficiënter auteursrechtbeleid in cyberspace; (vii) hoe het 
ontbreken van inzicht in marktreacties en prikkels leidde tot suboptimale 
regelingen voor de handel in emissierechten; en ten slotte (viii) hoe EU-regels 
voor verslaggeving over grote risico’s hebben geleid tot onvoldoende naleving en 
handhaving en waarom deze regels er niet in slaagden Europa te beschermen 
tegen de financiële crisis die haar oorsprong vond in de sub-prime 
hypotheekcrisis in de Verenigde Staten.  
In hoofdstuk 6 (“The future of RIA – and how can law and economics help”), ten 
slotte, wordt een overzicht gegeven van de bevindingen uit de vorige 
hoofdstukken en wordt een nieuwe agenda opgesteld voor de implementatie van 
RIA in de toekomst, met name in de EU. Voor dit laatste worden 
beleidsaanbevelingen gedaan, in termen van zowel systeembestuur als 
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methodologie. Kwesties als de toepassing van het principe van evenredige 
analyse, het gebruik van een "gefaseerde benadering" van Impact Assessment, 
de ontwikkeling van instrumenten op het gebied van rechtseconomie als 
aanvulling op de kwantificering van effecten en de rol van het Europees 
Parlement, de Raad en de lidstaten worden in dit hoofdstuk besproken. 
Daarnaast wordt een schets gegeven van een toekomstige onderzoeksagenda.  
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